• "Impossible" options  - Nizar Abdel-Kader
Lebanon no longer has an excuse not to fulfill its obligations toward the international community.

• Syrian-Lebanese relations are not a zero-sum game  - Rime Allaf
As long as they believe their own country's interests are best served at the other's expense, Lebanon and Syria seem stuck in a self-destructive cycle.

• Uncomfortable moments  - Nicholas Blanford
Re-establishing ties with Syria is far from the only challenge facing Siniora's new government.

• Continuity and change  - Farid el Khazen
The elections have restructured political alliances but did not usher in a new era of change.

"Impossible" options
 Nizar Abdel-Kader

Between May 29 and June 19, Lebanon held its first parliamentary elections in 30 years free of Syrian military and intelligence domination. The political alliances leading to the elections were drawn along sectarian and traditional lines. The compromises reached by the different political factions were in contradiction with the spirit of the March 14 Independence Uprising, thereby causing a certain disenchantment among the public. Local observers expressed disappointment and fear lest Lebanese political factions continue to engage in a zero-sum political game.

Recently, the new government, representing most of the victors, presented its program to the parliament. It set as priorities reform of the security apparatus, the initiation of political and economic reform, and respect for all aspects of international legitimacy, but failed to pledge to fulfill the demands of UNSCR 1559 concerning the disarming of militias. There are hopes that the government can draw on political understandings among the parliamentary majority in order to carry out its long-awaited and needed reforms.

In view of broad public dissatisfaction, the government must realize that the current political ills and security breaches are untenable. Nor can it blame the Syrians any longer for its shortcomings or failures. Lebanon no longer has an excuse not to fulfill its obligations and responsibilities toward the international community and, consequently, to implement the various commitments implied by 1559 and by its promises to the Paris Two Economic Forum.

Yet the recent surprise visit to Beirut by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to encourage the Siniora government to pledge to execute 1559, failed to achieve its purpose. Siniora bent under pressure from the Syrian prime minister and the Iranian president, as well as by Shi'ite representatives within his government, and deliberately neglected to mention 1559 in his speech to parliament. In response to this omission, the United States and France expressed their disappointment and again emphasized their expectation that Lebanon would meet its international obligations.

The challenge to the new parliament and government remains how to fulfill Lebanon's commitments concerning the execution of 1559--a task representing the tip of the iceberg. In his approach to parliament, Prime Minister Siniora has tried to delay confronting the Syrian call to preserve Hizballah's weapons as "a strategic asset to Syrian security". But this is extremely difficult to reconcile with Lebanon's need for US and French support to resolve its economic and financial dilemmas.

Lebanon stands at a crossroads. The challenges that confront it are considerable, and success in overcoming them will not be easy to achieve. Besides its internal political and economic hurdles, there are also major problems to be solved with the Palestinians, the Syrians, and the Israelis. Building a Lebanese national consensus over the optimal solution for disarming Hizballah remains a critical task.

Facing a precarious security situation after all the bombings and assassinations that have taken place during the past few months, the Lebanese government cannot ignore the arms in the Palestinian camps, which are hideouts for criminals and terrorists. In the past, it was the Syrians who influenced the government to delay taking control over these camps.

Syria, disturbed by its withdrawal from Lebanon, by the outcome of the elections, and by the hostile political environment that now dominates the Lebanese scene, may continue trying to punish the Lebanese people and destabilize the country. Siniora's recent visit to Damascus was devoted to solving the border clampdown, but Syria may not agree to help without trying to weaken the Lebanese drive toward sovereignty.

In addition, tensions along the southern border are expected to rise during the Israeli evacuation of Gaza. During his recent visit to France, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon expressed Israel's urgent need to see Lebanon fully implementing 1559 and deploying the Lebanese Army along the border. The situation may become volatile, presenting the risk of Israeli retaliation against vital Lebanese infrastructure to "force" action to disarm Hizballah.

It will only be possible for the new parliament and government to tackle the above-outlined "impossible" options if the Lebanese are able to articulate a set of national priorities that seek to enhance security and advance political and economic reform. They must also take steps to provide a cohesive approach to the international community that stands ready to help them. It is time for the Lebanese to transcend their divisions and define the goals that will guide the way toward the birth of a stable, secular, and sovereign country.- Published 4/8/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org


Nizar Abdel-Kader is a political analyst/columnist at Ad-Diyar newspaper in Beirut. He has authored four books on Lebanon and regional political and strategic issues.

It would have been naive to expect Syrian-Lebanese relations to improve rapidly after Syrian troops finally withdrew from Lebanon in April. Regardless of whether the withdrawal was justified or not, each side felt slighted by the other, betrayed by perceived extreme positions and actions, and took for granted the other's responsibility for numerous offences or crimes. Most Lebanese didn't feel the need to wait for any inquiries to be convinced of Syria's involvement in a number of assassinations, beginning with that of Rafik Hariri. The tempers that had flared after February 14 failed to cool and instead opposing sides waged a war of words and insults, while bombs continued to spread fear and claim victims. Resentment increasingly manifested itself as outright bigotry and emotions overtook reason.

In the last few weeks, this antagonism culminated with Syria closing its borders with Lebanon, demanding compensation and apologies, and unceremoniously expelling Lebanese nationals from Syria. While most Syrians will feel this is going too far, their patriotic fervor has nevertheless been stoked by the unremitting vitriol of some Lebanese media that didn't seem to distinguish between the Syrian people and the regime.

The Lebanese establishment is not blameless either. Warlords-cum-democrats and businessmen-cum-politicians have demonstrated as little political acumen as their amorphous nemesis. Greedy ruling elites (on both sides) who had enriched themselves for years at the expense of their compatriots underwent a slick metamorphosis into seemingly respectable legislators, but the rhetoric still lacked sensitivity. That the Syrians needed to prove they were still powerful and that the Lebanese needed to let off steam is only understandable, but what they needed even more were nerves of steel and lucidity, both conspicuous by their absence.

If only for the sake of their own national interests, Lebanon's new leaders could have played the game better. Three decades of a kind of co-existence that was certainly much too close for Lebanon's comfort should nevertheless have prepared the main actors for potential Syrian withdrawal symptoms, both in a physical and in a psychological sense. The Syrian regime is touchy about criticism, and paranoid (often rightly) about its security. In an increasingly crowded neighborhood where old local foes have resurfaced and loudly joined the anti-Syrian choir, Syria's claustrophobia has been intensified by the new sources of "inspiration" of Lebanon's ruling elite. Indeed, Damascus considers American and French interference in Lebanon as targeting its interests, rather than at securing Lebanon's. In that, it has a point.

The US has continued to pressure Syria on all fronts, irrespective of the latter's attempts at reconciliation, and France's most recent swipe at Syria probably even took Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon by surprise: as he hassled Jacques Chirac to control Iran and isolate Hizballah, the French president singled out Syria instead as a "threat to the stability of the region" and complained that the Syrians' psychology could not be comprehended. Clearly, Syria's compliance with UNSC Resolution 1559 wasn't sufficient to douse French ire.

Whether the Lebanese like it or not, Syria (under any regime) will do what it can to retain some form of hold over Lebanon and will consider the latter's security to be tied closely to its own, especially while the greater conflict with Israel continues to dominate the regional agenda and while there are territorial issues to be settled. This, consequently, means that the wisdom required of Lebanon is doubly needed from Syria.

But how have recent actions been in Syria's interests? More than anything, the Syrian regime has been accruing mistakes with its knee-jerk reactions and by misjudging their impact. While Damascus pretended it was business as usual in the aftermath of Hariri's assassination, satellite channels were beaming events in Martyrs' Square into millions of Syrian homes, while not even the killing of innocent Syrian workers at the hands of Lebanese thugs was mentioned in the official Syrian media. For the Syrian government suddenly to lament those workers' tragic fate and demand compensation, while overdue, scores no points and opens a huge can of worms: how many Lebanese, not to mention Syrians, are entitled to similar compensation and apologies, or just explanation?

Syria is not only skating on thin ice, but seems to be losing sight of its long-term interests. It seems the more it feels pressured, the more it chokes Lebanon; the more it fuels resentment in a new Lebanese generation, the more it hurts itself in the process. By blocking its border and abusing its geographical privileges, Syria has momentarily managed to strangle its small neighbor, with which it supposedly entertains brotherly relations, driving truckers to despair as their produce rots in the sun and their livelihood evaporates. It remains to be seen how these unilateral steps can induce the Lebanese to be less critical of their big brother, and to be less eager to find relief in Franco-American arms, among others. Indeed, by seeking to punish Lebanon for behavior it finds offensive, Syria is merely cutting its nose to spite its face, and its only achievement so far has been a great leap: not the great leap forward promised with the 10th Baath Party Congress, but a great leap backward in Syrian-Lebanese relations.

Even after Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's visit to Damascus last Sunday and the ensuing relaxation of the border crisis, it is clearly still too soon for the anger to abate and for relations to improve. As long as the protagonists lack long-term vision and continue to believe their own country's interests are best served at the other's expense, Lebanon and Syria seem stuck in a self-destructive cycle. It is incumbent on their respective leaders to find the way out.- Published 4/8/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org


Rime Allaf is an associate fellow at Chatham House in London.

It must have been one of the more uncomfortable moments of Fouad Siniora's political career when, at the end of July, he visited Damascus for the first time as prime minister of a Lebanon newly released from Syria's tight embrace.

Relations between the two countries have soured since the end of April, when Syria withdrew its troops from Lebanon in response to massive protests in Beirut and unrelenting international pressure. An economic blockade on the Lebanon-Syria border, combined with a series of deadly car bombings, have created a fraught atmosphere as Lebanon sheds the last vestiges of 15 years Pax Syriana and emerges into an uncertain era of independence.

Re-establishing ties with Syria, however, is far from the only challenge facing Siniora's new government. Other tasks include restoring security in the country; tackling the disarming of the militant Hizballah organization; creating a new electoral law; and implementing long-awaited economic and political reforms.

In early July, Syria began to squeeze Lebanon by closing the border to commercial traffic. The move left hundreds of trucks stranded at the frontier and cost Lebanon some $300,000 a day. Several Lebanese fishermen were detained for entering Syrian territorial waters north of the coastal city of Tripoli, an unprecedented action.

The Syrian media attacked leading Lebanese political figures, particularly those that were part of the anti-Syrian opposition, and a Syrian government minister demanded compensation for the deaths of at least 30 Syrian workers. They were allegedly murdered in Lebanon in revenge for the assassination in February of Rafik Hariri, a former prime minister, whose death many Lebanese blame on Syria.

The Syrian authorities insisted that the border blockade was intended to prevent weapons and militants from entering Syria. Many Lebanese, however, believed that Syria was acting out of spite.

Talal Salman, the editor of Lebanon's As Safir newspaper, wrote in mid-July that the border restrictions "expressed Syria's feeling of depression and humiliation" after the forced "expulsion" of Syrian troops from Lebanon.

Indeed, 24 hours after Siniora visited Damascus on July 31, Syria relaxed its border blockade, suggesting that its purpose had more to do with muscle-flexing toward Lebanon than internal security concerns.

In its policy statement to parliament, the new Lebanese government stressed its "eagerness to build healthy, serious, unique and solid relations" with Damascus. But the border crisis merely underlines the difficulty both countries face in allaying the ghosts of the past and forging a new and equitable bilateral relationship. Furthermore, the UN investigation into Hariri's assassination hovers over Lebanon and Syria like a sword of Damocles. The UN commission headed by Detlev Mehlis, a German prosecutor, is reportedly making progress in tracing who was responsible for Hariri's death. If it transpires that senior Syrian officials were involved, it would pose a potentially insurmountable obstacle for the resumption of normal relations between Beirut and Damascus. Siniora was a lifelong friend and ally of Hariri, and the largest Lebanese parliamentary bloc is headed by Saad Hariri, the former premier's son and political heir.

Siniora was appointed prime minister following the final round of parliamentary elections in mid-June. Thus began a tortuous negotiating process on the composition of the new government, in which Siniora sought to strike a viable balance among the main parliamentary power blocs.

Michel Aoun, a former army commander who has emerged as a populist Christian leader, eventually opted to remain out of government to spearhead the opposition in parliament. While his decision will enliven parliamentary debate and is probably healthy for Lebanese democracy, it does mean that the Christian community lacks a truly representative figure in the government, which risks aggravating their sense of marginalization in the new Lebanon.

Fifteen cabinet seats were secured by the former anti-Syrian opposition alliance, which includes the Future Movement headed by Saad Hariri, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt's Democratic Gathering, the Christian Qornet Shehwan group and the Lebanese Forces. Of the other nine seats, five went to Hizballah and Amal, the two main Shi'ite parties in Lebanon, and the remaining four to allies of Emile Lahoud, the Lebanese president who was Syria's most faithful ally. The nine portfolios held by Lahoud and the Hizballah/Amal alliance exceed the one-third required to block government decisions. That veto power could complicate the government's ability to usher in vital economic reforms to generate revenues and curb Lebanon's public debt of around $38 billion. It could also hamper the smooth appointments of new chiefs to the main intelligence and security services, vital to improve the precarious security climate. Hizballah is not expected to approve anyone who is less than committed to safeguarding the Islamic Resistance, Hizballah's military wing.

Syria's disengagement from Lebanon increased Hizballah's vulnerability to international and domestic demands that it dismantle its military wing in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559. Hizballah's decision to participate in the government for the first time is an attempt to safeguard its resistance priority from continued international pressure.

Although the Bush administration is determined to see the implementation of 1559, it is apparently willing to grant the government some leeway in recognition of the sensitivities surrounding the subject of Hizballah's arms. Clearly, disarming Hizballah is an issue that the government is unwilling to address at this stage. It has officially declared the resistance as "a genuine and natural expression of the Lebanese people's national rights to free their land and defend their dignity from Israeli aggressions, threats and designs, and to continue the effort to free the Lebanese territory".- Published 4/8/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Nicholas Blanford is a Beirut-based correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor.

The recent parliamentary elections held in Lebanon in May-June 2005 came at a time of drastic change in postwar Lebanese politics. It was the first parliamentary election held after the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, and it followed upon the international community's renewed interest in Lebanese politics embodied in the passing of UNSCR 1559 on September 2, 2004.

The elections were also the culmination of events that marked Lebanese politics following the prolongation of President Emile Lahoud's term for three years in violation of 1559. The status quo that had prevailed in Lebanese politics since the end of the war in 1990 was shattered by the assassination of former prime minister Rafic Hariri on February 14, 2005, followed by UNSCR 1595, which established an International Independent Investigation Commission concerning Hariri's assassination, and by the Independence Uprising that brought together over a million Lebanese from all communities to demand the withdrawal of Syria's military and intelligence forces from Lebanon.

Notwithstanding these momentous developments, the electoral law that governed the 2005 elections remained unchanged. It was the same electoral law adopted in the 2000 elections, and differed little from the electoral laws of the two previous elections in 1992 and 1996, both dictated by Syria. These laws, which created large constituencies and involved extensive gerrymandering, were designed to influence the outcome of elections; they targeted political groups and communities, notably the Christian communities.

Despite repeated calls by several politicians to adopt an electoral law that would allow better representation and greater competition, no change in the 2000 electoral law was possible. The international community's insistence on holding elections according to schedule allowed no time for any serious revision of the law, and provided an excuse for supporters of the 2000 law to block a proposal presented by several deputies for an electoral law based on medium size districts.

The 2005 elections witnessed relatively little intervention by government authorities; Damascus, too, had no hand in the making and unmaking of electoral lists and alliances, as was the practice before. The elections were marked by two contradictory patterns. One, competition, took place in Mount Lebanon and North Lebanon. There, electoral lists engaged in fierce competition between two broad alliances: lists backed by General Michel Aoun, who returned to Lebanon in early May 2005 after 15 years of exile imposed by the Syrian-controlled Lebanese government, faced lists backed by Saad Hariri, the son of the late premier, who succeeded his father as leader of the Sunni community, in alliance with Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Christian politicians and parties formerly associated with the Qornet Chehwan Gathering.

Another pattern of elections took place in South Lebanon and Beirut, where the outcome was largely predetermined. In Beirut, which scored the lowest participation rate at about 25 percent, eight candidates out of 19 won uncontested, and deputies on Hariri's list won by wide margins. Similarly, in South Lebanon, six candidates out of 23 won uncontested, while the alliance in such a large constituency between the two major Shi'ite parties, Amal and Hizballah, monopolized Shi'ite representation and made it almost impossible for a third Shi'ite force to emerge as a serious competitor. In North Lebanon, the resort to sectarian slogans by Sunni religious figures in support of the Hariri list was an unprecedented development in Lebanese electoral politics. The elections were also marred by the widespread and uncontrolled use of money.

More than any other parliament in pre- and postwar Lebanon, the 2005 parliament is made up of large parliamentary coalitions headed by leaders who have near total monopolies over the representation of their respective communities: Hariri's coalition includes 21 out of 27 Sunni deputies, Amal and Hizballah's coalition includes 24 out of 27 Shi'ite deputies, and seven out of eight Druze deputies are in Jumblatt's coalition. The most diversified group of deputies in terms of political allegiances and alliances is Christian, though General Aoun's coalition includes the largest number of Christian deputies (18 out 64).

While the 2005 elections brought a large number of newcomers to parliament, particularly among groups that were targeted or banned by the Syrian-controlled Lebanese government, the political process is still heavily constrained by politicians and parties that have close ties with Syria and harbor agendas that go beyond Lebanon, notably Hizballah. In addition to Syria, Hizbollah is backed by Iran and has the support of Amal and a number of other Lebanese politicians.

Lebanon is currently in a transition period after nearly 30 years of Syrian hegemony, and it will take time for the Lebanese government to exercise sovereignty fully now that it has regained it. The duration of the transition period will depend on several developments, some of which are beyond Lebanon's control. In the short run, the outcome of the international investigation of Hariri's assassination will have a bearing on Lebanese politics, perhaps on Syria and, by extension, on Syrian-Lebanese relations. Moreover, the full implementation of UNSCR 1559 concerning the disarming of Hizballah and of armed Palestinian groups is the greatest challenge facing Lebanon in its dealings with the international community. In the long run, Syrian-Lebanese relations will constitute the major source of tension facing Lebanon both internally and in its external relations.

The recent elections would have had a greater impact on the political process had the electoral law been different, for the Syrian-backed "old guard" with its multiple regional agendas, ranging from Iran to the Arab-Israel conflict, retains significant influence. The elections have restructured political alliances but did not usher in a new era of change. It will take time for Lebanon to find a new equilibrium, one that disengages Lebanon from regional turmoil.- Published 4/8/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Farid el Khazen is professor of political science at the American University of Beirut.