• Is Arab secularism still alive?  - Khalil al-Anani
It will always be hard for secular ideas to spread in the region as long as fundamentalist ideas hold sway.

• Secularism cannot offer identity  - Rosemary Hollis
A rejuvenation of local community identity could rescue many from the resort to extremism.

• The struggle for Islam's soul  - Irfan Husain
The fact that more educated Muslims have entered this debate is a cause for hope that secularism will triumph.

• Part of a worldwide trend  - an interview withIkrama Sabri
If secularism means a society devoid of religious values, of course it will decline.

• Predisposed to think the worst  - Edward S. Walker, Jr.
Why should it bother us that in these difficult times more people are finding religion to be a source of support?

Is Arab secularism still alive?
 Khalil al-Anani

It is difficult to discern a specifically Arab approach to secularism or even any mainstream defense of it. Most secularists in the Arab world are individuals, and are not formed into a particular school of thought.

The decline of secularism can be seen as a global phenomenon, more than an Arab one, because the Arab world has refused all secular aspects, whether in religion or customs. When Samuel Huntington talked about the "clash of civilizations", he gave priority to factors of culture and religion over secularist ones in reshaping relations among different nations. Today, secularism doesn't sell in the marketplace. As American religious affairs columnist Terry Mattingly noted, "people hunger for spirituality, miracles and a sense of mystery..., but the core question remains: should believers defend eternal truths or follow their hearts?"

We can posit three main obstacles facing secularism in the Muslim world in general and the Arab world in particular. First is the historical background of secularism in the region. Many Muslims simply refuse secularism because it is seen as a western product, pure and simple.

Some Islamic thinkers maintain that Arab secularism represents a declaration of war on Islam, a religion that, perhaps unlike any other, shapes and influences the lives of its adherents. Islam is a religion whose values and principles are aimed at liberating mankind, establishing justice and equality, encouraging research and innovation and guaranteeing freedom of thought, expression and worship. Therefore, such intellectuals argue, secularism is entirely unnecessary in the Muslim world: Muslims can achieve progress and development without having to erect a wall between their religious values and their livelihoods.

Second is the dilemma of separation between religious traditions and aspects of modernity. The rise of "religionism", or fundamentalism, expresses that in some manner. Those who imagine themselves the "guardians of religion" purposely confuse modernization with westernization and Christianity. The revolution of the "new Islamists" or "Qa'edists", who spiritually belong to the ideological strain fronted by Osama Bin Laden, is evidence of the reality of conflict between traditionalism and modernization. Many of these don't believe in the values of democracy, pluralism, civil liberties and human rights, the values contemporary Arab secularists claim to uphold but fail to respect. In contrast, Muhammed Abdu (1849-1905), the most famous Muslim reformist, believed that Islam's relationship with the modern age was the most crucial issue confronting Islamic communities. In an attempt to reconcile Islamic ideas with western ones, he suggested that maslaha (interest) in Islamic thought corresponded to manfa'ah (utility) in western thought.

Salama Musa (1887-1958) called for the separation of the spheres of science and religion. He insisted that religion, due to the influence of religious institutions and clergy, had lost its progressive nature and become a burden. He tried to emphasize that Islam and Christianity have identical stands with regard to the freedom of thought and emancipation of the mind. He strongly believed that society cannot advance or progress unless the role of religion in the human conscience is restricted; progress, he said, is the new religion of humanity.

This secular aspect in Islam is not new. The Prophet Mohammad did not recommend a certain system of government or name a successor. The change in the Muslim system of government, from the caliphate to hereditary monarchy, is a sign that no particular political system is obligatory in Islam.

Third, the Arab-Israel conflict decreases enthusiasm for secularism in the Arab world. Some see secularism as a means to dilute Palestinian rights, because a secularist approach ignores the religious nature of the conflict. Despite the historical and political roots of the conflict, many people in the region still focus on the spiritual ones.

In addition, some Arab secularists argue that authoritarian regimes play a vital role in holding back secularism. Their argument relies on the mutually dependent relationships of such regimes with religious men, "Masha'kh", who defend despotism and prevent and block any secular idea, as is happening in Egypt and Saudi Arabia today. In the end, however, it will always be hard for secular ideas to spread in the region as long as fundamentalist ideas hold sway.- Published 14/7/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Khalil al-Anani is a political analyst and director of the Center of International Studies, Cairo. His latest book is Arabs and the American Empire.

Writing from London in the aftermath of the July 7 bombings, one has a very strong sense that old definitions of the Arab and Muslim worlds won't work any more. These are no longer places over there, geographically separate and far away.

Many scholars felt bound to point this out when Samuel Huntington published his work on the "clash of civilizations" several years ago. Islam and "the West" are intermingled. Where one begins and the other ends is impossible to judge. There are millions of Muslims in Europe, many of Turkish heritage, others who derive from the subcontinent, as well as all those whose forbears originated from the Mashreq, the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia.

By the same token, western imperialism and influence in Africa, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and further east have a long history. The Ottoman Empire encompassed both east and west as they are now understood in Europe, as too did the Arab and Roman empires before that.

To try to understand now what might motivate a group of young British men, of whatever descent, to adopt a radical Islamist agenda, commonly propagated on the internet and probably unrelated to any particular cultural context, requires an awareness of the larger picture. Herein may lie one clue at least as to why such men could find some purpose in the wanton killing of civilians.

They tell us that there are as many as three hundred different languages spoken in London, and the photographs of those missing in the bombings depict a multiplicity of ethnicities and presumably religions. Since the world has transited from empires to states to globalization, it is no wonder that identities are muddled and that there is some confusion about what it means to be British or European, local or foreign.

Trouble is, as people struggle to find their place in societies in flux, individuals and minorities may find themselves labelled--as Muslims or Asians or "other"--just because of how they look. This phenomenon has gathered pace in the context of the "war on terrorism". Secularism is offered as an answer, but that is a matter for the state; it is inadequate as a source of identity in and of itself.

Secularism is also not an ideology in itself. It gained salience as a facet of western democracy and of Soviet-style socialism. Its role within nationalist agendas of different Arab states differed from place to place. In Saudi Arabia religion is a pillar of the state. In Baathist Syria, by contrast, secularism and religious tolerance are now touted as benefits of the system.

But faith-based political platforms are gaining adherents, and not only in the Arab and Muslim states. Whether people support these platforms out of religious conviction is another matter. In so far as Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood give voice to popular frustration with foreign influence, occupation, or failures of the existing political elites, they may enjoy increased popular support.

But such support does not necessarily mean a new-found faith in the Almighty to deliver justice or meaning in life. Equally secular Iraqi nationalists may welcome the role of Islamist extremist groups in opposing the foreign forces in Iraq, while not buying into their worldviews or agendas. Presumably they expect to tackle their differences later, once occupation has ended.

In the Iranian revolution of 1979, secularists made common cause with the clerics but lost the battle for power in the aftermath. A parallel outcome no doubt haunts secularist members of the democratization movements in Egypt, Iraq and Palestine.

Meanwhile, in Europe people are turning to religion as a source of identity. According to the French scholar Olivier Roy, some European Christians and Muslims are adopting exclusivist versions of these creeds as affirmation of minority status and pride within what they see as a degenerate, amorphous host culture.

As with nationalist movements, the tendency is to develop a sense of self and belonging in antagonism to a dangerous or erosive "other". Conceivably, European religious fanatics could complicate Middle Eastern politics by depicting that region as the battleground for their ideals, demanding that local groups adhere to purist agendas and eschew pragmatism and compromise.

In the disorientating context of globalization or armed conflict, people need community, a sense of belonging. As Londoners are finding out, pride in being just that, a cosmopolitan community that can pull together at the level of the city and defy those who would divide it, is solace in a time of crisis.

Globalization and war challenge religion and the state. Both are fighting back. But over-emphasis on the apparent dichotomy between the secular and the religious is not working. While the battle goes on, a rejuvenation of local community identity, inclusive of diversity, could rescue many from the resort to extremism.- Published 14/7/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Rosemary Hollis is professor of Middle East Policy Studies at City University London.

As a concept, secularism in Pakistan has to fight against serious semantic confusion: in Urdu, the national language, it has been translated as ladinyat, or non-religiousness. This is close enough to atheism to make politicians understandably reluctant to be branded secularists.

Mullahs put writers, reformers and feminists on the defensive by attacking them for being godless and westernized, when all they are trying to do is to drag the country into the twenty first century. Even centrist, secular politicians like Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, both of whom were elected prime minister twice, were forced to pay lip service to Islam as the driving force behind their political agendas.

And yet, despite the extremist image Pakistan has acquired over the years, its people have never been convinced that religion should be mixed with politics. Until the national elections of 2002, religious parties fared very poorly at the polls, never winning more than seven seats (out of 232) in the National Assembly. In the last elections, their performance improved dramatically to 60-plus seats. The reason for this remarkable turnaround is to be found in President Musharaf's hounding of the secular mainstream parties of Bhutto and Sharif, and not in any sudden transformation in popular attitudes.

Another problem secular democrats in Pakistan have had to contend with is the army's search for legitimacy to underpin its frequent incursions into politics. For this, they have wooed the religious right which, in its turn, has used the army to further its Islamizing agenda. This symbiotic relationship has resulted in the constant undermining of secular democracy.

The result of the tension between these two worldviews is visible everywhere in Pakistan. Cable and satellite TV beam images from around the world into conservative homes. But at the same time, local private TV channels churn out endless religious programs. Unrestricted access to the internet has enabled young Pakistanis to log on to websites containing everything from porn to philosophy, while the call to prayer is pumped out through loudspeakers in mosques next to the cyber cafes that have mushroomed across the country. Pakistan also has the freest press in the Muslim world, where secularists engage Islamists in fierce debate, albeit usually in the English-language newspapers.

In fact, this debate has now gone global. Where Muslim intellectuals once considered their faith to be their personal affair and therefore not a subject for public debate, they now take on Islamic orthodoxy with sophisticated analyses of the holy texts. This is a relatively new phenomenon, caused largely by the major re-evaluation 9/11 has forced upon us.

Indeed, this re-thinking offers hope for secularism everywhere in the Muslim world. After the Saudis acquired sudden wealth in the early 1970s, they used their petro-dollars to buy Islamic scholarship. On the one hand they financed Wahabi madressas in many Muslim countries, and on the other they funded research and writing that spread their Wahabi/Salafi views.

Saudi wealth also assured clout with most poor Muslim countries like Pakistan. School curricula were given a heavy Islamic slant while other religions were denigrated. Thus, an entire generation was brainwashed either through madressas or state schools. And since secular Muslim intellectuals had virtually opted out of religious discourse, the extreme Wahabi philosophy became dominant in the Sunni-majority regions; Shi'ites were radicalized through the Khomeini revolution in Iran.

All this was changed by the events of 9/11. Suddenly, the Saudis were on the defensive, desperate for the spotlight to be removed from their activities. Wahabism came under close scrutiny, and many saw it for what it really was: an open license to hate all other faiths. Muslim scholars began studying the original texts to demonstrate that their faith was a tolerant one, in complete contrast to the message the Saudis had been promoting.

"Moderate enlightenment" is a concept much touted by Musharaf and his government in Pakistan. But although he has so far failed to deliver on his policy of tolerance, the fact that he continues to at least talk about it is an encouraging sign. By making a U-turn (under US pressure) on his earlier support of the Taliban as well as reining in the terrorists crossing over into Indian Kashmir, he has made himself a prime target for fundamentalist groups. That he has escaped at least five assassination attempts, two of them very narrowly, indicates how dangerous it is to preach tolerance and secularism in Pakistan.

Despite the threat posed to the whole world by Islamic extremism, few Muslims support the trend toward violence. The forces of globalization that are sweeping the world dictate conformity to the universal values of religious tolerance and peaceful commerce. There are thus two opposing tendencies in the Muslim world, one pushing toward an anti-West, anti-modernist worldview, while the other wants to be integrated into the modern world.

Only time will tell which tendency will prevail. But the fact that more and more intelligent, educated Muslims have entered into this debate is a cause for hope that secularism will triumph.- Published 14/7/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org


Irfan Husain writes two columns a week for Dawn, Pakistan's widest circulating and most influential daily. After a career in the civil service spanning 30 years, he was president of a university in Pakistan for five years.