BI: How do you expect the results of the recent presidential elections in Iran to affect affairs in the Middle East?

Azzam: I don't think that these elections will have a serious impact on Iran's major positions. There is a general Iranian policy, and the name of the newly elected president will not affect it. With regard to Iranian foreign policy, I don't expect any significant changes.

BI: What do you think the Iranian elections show about Islamic democracy as a political system?

Azzam: Elections are part of Shura and an Islamic way of managing affairs. We are convinced that there must be elections to give people the opportunity to express themselves. In the West they call this democracy. We don't care about the name as the practices are more important.

BI: The Bush administration has talked a lot about democratization in the Middle East. What do you think the Iranian elections show about democracy in the Middle East?

Azzam: Iran is very far from the recent American calls for democracy, because it is used to holding parliamentary and presidential elections every four years. It has its law and institutions, and it also has Shura. Furthermore, we doubt American calls for democracy in the first place. We believe that the aim of these calls is to impose America's orders on others. The US is trying to choose the regimes that suit it. Its talk about democracy is not related to freedom or respect for the rights of other peoples or nations, as America claims.

BI: How do you view the negative reaction of the US to the results of these elections?

Azzam: The US lives its own system of injustice. It evaluates individuals, peoples, and nations according to its own particular perspective. This perspective is utterly far from the proper morality, because morality is on one side and the American system is on the other. The US attacks anyone who doesn't want to subdue to its will. They start a media, military, and economic war against those that are not obedient. Accordingly, any free man or nation could be targeted by the Americans.

BI: Given the recent elections in Lebanon and Iran, what is your forecast for trends in the Middle East? Do you think these elections represent a shift in the popular mood in the region?

Azzam: I don't think that the results of these countries' elections represent any serious changes in the public mood. They are simply an opportunity for these people to practice their right to express themselves. People in the Middle East are frustrated with American policy in the region. They are disappointed with policies of the Arab and Islamic governments, as well. In consequence, when they get the chance to practice their right to choose, the results are clear for all to see. Generally speaking, however, there have been no serious changes in popular sentiment in these two countries.

BI: Some analysts are saying that many Iranians chose Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad on the basis of his domestic agenda of fighting poverty and corruption. Do you expect voters to act on a similar basis in the upcoming Palestinian parliamentary elections?

Azzam: These bases might be in the mind of some people. But the fact is that there is another important factor here in Palestine, which is the Israeli occupation and resistance against this occupation. This is the real factor that will be taken into consideration by Palestinian voters.

BI: How do you expect the results of the Iranian elections to affect Palestine, if at all?

Azzam: I don't think that there will be any direct influence because Iran is already facing external pressures, especially on the part of the Americans. Moreover it has its own internal problems. In addition, the Palestinians have their own lives and face challenges that make their miserable lives even more difficult. They also have their own vision about how to face these challenges. Therefore, we cannot compare the two cases.

BI: How do you expect the results of these elections to affect Palestinian armed resistance in general and Islamic Jihad in particular?

Azzam: I am really astonished by this kind of question. I hesitated to answer the previous questions, but decided to answer because as a Muslim, I do care about what is happening in Arab and Muslim countries. If you want to talk about the effect of the Iranian elections on the Islamic Jihad movement, however, there is no effect. The Islamic Jihad movement determines its relations with others according to two basic principles. First, it considers how close or far this other party is from Islam. Second, it considers how far or close this other party is from the Palestinian cause. Our relationship with Iran, therefore, is based on these two principles. The Islamic Jihad movement is completely independent in making its own decisions and determining its own policy. Moreover, the policy of the Islamic Jihad movement will not be affected by elections in any other country, regardless of its relationship to the movement.

BI: What kind of role does Iran currently play in the Occupied Palestinian Territories?

Azzam: I don't see any role for Iran in Palestine. Furthermore, even asking about the Iranian role in Palestine represents a serious insult and offense to Palestinians' feelings and dignity. The Palestinians are a great people who have lost their land and are fighting and struggling for their freedom and dignity. The Palestinians are not working as a farmhand for others or paying others' bills. They are doing their sacred duty toward their cause and their country. Saying that this or that country has an effect on the Palestinians is an illusion that is provoked by the Palestinians' enemies, which represent them as employees working with commands from Iran.- Published 7/7/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Nifaz Azzam is leader of the Islamic Jihad movement in the Gaza Strip.

After his unexpected victory in the 1997 Iranian presidential election, Mohammed Khatemi surprised analysts by concentrating as much on foreign policy initiatives, especially the "dialogue of civilizations", as on the domestic policy front. The initiatives did much to shape perceptions of the new president, both at home and abroad. They had little practical effect, however, given that the key decision-making authority on foreign and defense policy lies with the supreme leader, not the president.

The initiatives raised Khatemi's profile and, had Khatemi been a man with a stronger backbone, could have enabled him to insist on greater power relative to the shadowy revolutionary bodies that effectively control Iran. It will be interesting to see if Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad takes this same route after his unexpected victory in the 2005 presidential election, i.e., using foreign policy pronouncements as a way to define his image and to stake out a claim for a more powerful presidency.

Like Khatemi, Ahmadinezhad enters the presidency better known for his domestic policy activities than for his involvement in foreign policy. But in fact, while he may be new to international diplomacy, Ahmadinezhad has been active in foreign policy of a sort. He acknowledges having been a leader of the Revolutionary Guard Corps special forces involved in operations across the border in Iraq's Kurdish region. He also seems to have been active in terror against Kurdish dissidents. The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) alleges he was "directly involved in the murder of Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou," the KDPI secretary-general killed in Vienna in 1989 in an operation the Austrian authorities say was conducted by the Iranian government. The KDPI says that "aside from being responsible for the coordination between the assassins group and the so-called negotiators [who lured Ghassemlou to the meeting by offering talks with Tehran], he was ... also in charge of arms supply required for the groups." So, whatever the accuracy of charges that he was involved in the interrogation of the US embassy hostages, Ahmadinezhad has a shady background.

His terror activities took place years ago; what has he said more recently about foreign policy? So far, Ahmadinezhad seems to prefer the traditional Middle Eastern style of different messages to different audiences. When he met with the foreign and local press after his election, his words were sweetness and light, meriting headlines about his moderation. But one of the few other times he has spoken since the election was at a memorial service for hardliners killed in the early days of the revolution, at which he said, "The Islamic Revolution of 1384 [2005 CE] will, if God wills, cut off the roots of injustice in the world. . . . The era of oppression, hegemonic regimes, tyranny, and injustice has reached its end. The wave of the Islamic revolution will soon reach the entire world" (as reported by the official Islamic Republic News Agency). That is a pretty expansive agenda.

As such rhetoric indicates, Ahmadinezhad is convinced that Iran's revolution is on the march, fueled by oil riches, unimpeded by an America mired in Iraq, and victorious over the reformers at home. This viewpoint is not just a personal idiosyncrasy, but instead the product of a powerful current of which Ahmadinezhad is only the public face. That is the current of increasing power by the Revolutionary Guards, in whose special forces Ahmadinezhad served for years. It was the Guards and their close allies in the basij paramilitaries who were accused of election fraud by the (Khatemi-controlled) Interior Ministry and the losing candidates.

Indeed, the Ahmadinezhad phenomenon looks and smells quite like the Putin story: a previously obscure figure from the security services rises to power, determined to reassert the old authoritarian ways. Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, writing in Survival in summer 2005, are right on the money when they warn, "The scope of the Guard's influence in the political, economic, and foreign policy arenas is such that it is fair to speculate as to whether the clerical leadership is not fast becoming a captive of its Praetorian Guard."

Ahmadinezhad may well test the West's resolve regarding Iran's nuclear program and support for terrorism, including the Qaeda figures Iran acknowledges are on its soil (claiming they are in detention) and the support Iran proudly announces it offers those killing Israeli civilians. The signs so far are that the West may stand firm. As was agreed months ago, the next step in the nuclear negotiations will be a European proposal to Iran. For once, European diplomats are not floating trial balloons about rationales for giving in to Iran's demands; instead, they are discussing how to solidify international support for pressing Iran in the event the talks collapse. Admittedly, they focus on how to get resolutions of diplomatic disapproval rather than more vigorous punitive measures, but at least that is a start.

Meanwhile, Washington has already begun to take stronger action. The June 29 declaration by the secretary of the US Treasury, declaring the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) a company engaged in weapons proliferation, authorizes the US government to take action against any bank that deals with AEOI . While Washington may apply this power selectively so as to avoid disputes about extra-territorial sanctions, the Treasury designation is a good way to remind Iran that the US government has sticks it has not yet applied.- Published 7/7/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Patrick Clawson, deputy director for research at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, has written several books on Iran, including (with Michael Rubin) Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos (Palgrave/Macmillan, forthcoming).

The landslide victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad in the second round of Iran's presidential elections came as a blow to the reform movement and to the Iranian civil society that elected Mohammad Khatemi to the presidency eight years ago.

Ahmadinezhad is a new face on the political scene to most Iranians and foreign analysts. He is the first non-cleric to hold the position of president since 1989, yet he is seen by many as more fundamentalist than his main opponent, Hashemi Rafsanjani. In a campaign where Rafsanjani advocated better ties with the United States and the European Union and more civil liberties, Ahmadinezhad ran for president on a populist platform with no clear foreign policy, but with plain isolationist tendencies. He criticized Iran's acceptance of World Bank loans and the emergence of private banks which through high interest rates have created a gap between the urban elite and the rural poor.

Ahmadinezhad has also spoken of holding officials to account in order to eradicate corruption and has insisted on more equitable redistribution of national wealth. However, his economic prescriptions are vague: he has been pointing out problems without offering any real solutions.

The big question is whether Ahmadinezhad's domestic and foreign policies will be very different from those of his predecessor. There is no doubt that, with Ahmadinezhad as president, ultra-conservatives now have a monopoly on power, controlling all of the elected and appointed institutions that govern Iran.

Moreover, the new president and his government will face many challenges in order to bring prosperity and peace to Iranians. The most important is to overcome the high rate of unemployment, especially among youth. Unemployment numbers are not very reliable: the official figures stand around 15 percent, but can be assumed to be well over 30 percent. As a result, fully half the population lives in difficult economic conditions. Ahmadinezhad needs to take positive economic steps that don't rattle the nerves of Iranian investors.

Then, too, regarding Iran's foreign policy Ahmadinezhad will surely be less extreme than what many observers predict. A sudden reversion to the revolutionary standards of the 1980s seems unlikely. He will certainly think twice regarding the Islamic Republic's attitude toward the problems of the Middle East.

It is no secret that the new president has very little experience in foreign policy matters. No doubt his foreign policy task will be a difficult one, given the severe polarization within the Middle East and between Iran and the West, and in view of the possibility of foreign interference or regional conflict spilling over into Iran. He has ruled out improving ties with Washington in the near future, stating that Iran does not really need the US.

The Bush administration, knowing that the victory of Ahmadinezhad effectively blocks any move toward a new working relationship between Tehran and Washington, questioned the legitimacy of the entire election. Contrary to the Americans, who seem to be the least shocked by the results, most of the EU countries, especially France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, seem to have been taken by surprise, mainly because they had previously argued that, with Rafsanjani as the new president, the Iranian government would be ready for a comprehensive dialogue with the West.

Things are now different, but the EU members hope that Iran will continue negotiations with them aimed at convincing it to permanently give up sensitive uranium enrichment activities. Germany, the UK, and France are even offering Iran trade incentives and help with its peaceful nuclear energy program. The question now is whether the future Iranian government of Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad will be willing to cut deals with the Europeans and eventually with the Americans.

We need to wait and see how the new president will deal with the parliament, with the military elite and with the country's religious leaders. One way or another, if there is a real return to the rhetoric of the first years of the revolution, it could set alarm bells ringing in many capitals in Europe as well as in neighboring countries. Ahmadinezhad's Iran holds many doubts and uncertainties concerning the degree of centralization of power and the role of religious ideology in foreign policy.

As long as oil prices hold up, Ahmadinezhad can work on his "technopopulism" without rocking the boat too much. But if oil earnings collapse and the new president's assault on civil society and private businesses augments the rising temperature of confrontation with the West over the nuclear program, then his four year term will take a turn for the worse.- Published 7/7/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Ramin Jahanbegloo is professor of political science at the University of Toronto. He is the author of "Talking Politics" (with Bhikhu Parekh , Oxford University Press, India, 2010).

The outcome of Iran's June 2005 presidential elections proves once again that miracles still happen in this land of legends and wonders. In fact, miracles occur every day in this realm and the Islamic regime owes its endurance to this amazing phenomenon.

The most recent miracle surprised not only the insiders but the entire world. The surprise came when, contrary to all opinion polls and field surveys, a relatively unknown "conservative hardliner", Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad, left behind the powerful pragmatic statesman Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in a run-off race for Iran's presidency. How did this miracle happen, and what are the plausible ramifications for the region and the wider world?

The end of the reformists' reign in the Iranian parliament in 2004 was the beginning of a series of democratic reverses in Iran's political and social landscape. During the period of progressive control in the executive and legislative branches of the government, Iran was able to prevail over many threats and calamities that could endanger the very existence of the Islamic regime. The West and the world in general hoped that the trend would ultimately lead to a flourishing civil society and democratic institutions that would abandon obsessive and fundamentalist ideas.

But the severe defeat of the reformist elements in parliamentary elections was a serious blow to progressive ideals; it turned naive dreams into nightmares. Soon after conquering the seventh Majlis in Iran, the conservatives aimed at the last bridgehead, the executive branch, in order to complete their decisive battle for absolute power control. This objective was successfully achieved on June 24, 2005.

Considering that analyzing the political process in Iran is a rather thorny issue, one may approach the subject from an optimistic or a pessimistic perspective.

Optimists tend to believe that Iranians are very unpredictable people and their voting attitudes and social psychology with respect to political processes do not necessarily match the standard patterns in western societies. They claim that Iranians are fed up with the reformists' empty slogans and pompous contentions regarding political development, freedom, and human rights. Their demands are mainly for improvements in material well-being, and their major preoccupations are the eradication of such plagues as corruption, poverty, injustice, favoritism, inflation, unemployment, narcotics, and other social anomalies. To that end, Iranians have endorsed a rather unknown but zealous and energetic figure who aligns himself with the supreme leader and is devoted to the Islamic regime.

The critical pessimists contend that this presidential election was faulty right from the beginning, and that the whole process failed to meet democratic standards. They argue that the Guardian Council's intervention in the initial arbitrary selection of a limited number of candidates from among more than 1000 applicants was an undemocratic action, which put into doubt the entire election.

Furthermore, they believe that there was a strong political hand behind the election of Ahmadinezhad as president, despite widespread boycotts throughout the country. Thus, balloting statistics were manipulated in his favor with a view to showing a high turnout as proof of the regime's public support and legitimacy. This was a calculated symbolic action to promote a non-clergy figure to high public office in order to restore the clergy's severely damaged reputation.

It is premature to offer a realistic assessment of the future trend of Iran's political behavior regarding domestic, regional and international issues. Nevertheless, a number of points are of note. First and foremost is the nuclear venture, which has created concern throughout the world. The president-elect has reaffirmed Iran's right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. He also has assured the world that Iran will do everything to gain the confidence of the international community in Iranian nuclear transparency.

With respect to the Middle East and the Palestinian question, he reiterated Iran's previous position. As to relations with the United States, he did not commit himself, and repeated the official position of the Islamic regime. On other issues that might interest the Middle East region and the world as a whole, we shall wait and see how events develop.

Finally, a word about the emerging new conservatives. Despite the apparent antipathy and hard-line attitude of the president-elect, the new generation of conservatives in Iran is much more educated and pragmatic than are the many old-fashioned actors who lack an academic background and adequate understanding of the modern world. The new conservatives are clever enough not to swim against the current, which could endanger their very survival. Besides, the new international environment will not allow the emergence of an irresponsible leader like those during the cold war.

The new conservatives in Iran speak elegantly of democracy and the rule of law, accountability of office holders, national interests, efficiency, competence, good organization, and goal-oriented management. They allow themselves to use the same rhetoric and vocabulary as their reformist rivals. Yet in one aspect they are different: they merely seek their identity among the hardliners; they go along with their style but not with their substance. The new president appears to be the prototype of this emerging generation.

In conclusion, it seems fair to suggest that with the attainment of all national powers by the new generation of conservatives, henceforth the Islamic regime has no choice but to seek to gain popular support by devoting itself to good governance and offering an effective response to widespread demands for change, justice, and steps against corruption and other social evils. On the international scene it will do its utmost to gain recognition and respect, and will make every conceivable concession in order to remain in power.

This is just an optimistic and wishful assessment of the present trends, unless another miracle changes the entire course of events.- Published 7/7/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Ali-Asghar Kazemi is professor of international relations at Islamic Azad University in Tehran.