• Hamas and the West  - Ghazi Hamad
Ever since Hamas’ inception it has been seeking to expand its platform in its Arab and international surroundings.

• The West and moderate Islamism  - Amr Hamzawy
Arab liberals have been gradually reaching out to moderate Islamists.

• Listening and talking  - Mark Perry
“We don’t want you to talk. We want you to listen”

• Islamists are intrinsically anti-democratic  - Michael Rubin
The White House has also flip-flopped on Hamas.

Hamas and the West
 Ghazi Hamad

“We are willing to open up to everyone except Israel.” So said Hamas politburo chief Khaled Mashaal in an interview with the Qatari-based Al Jazeera Satellite Channel on May 25, summing up the overall approach of the movement. Mashaal also confirmed that Hamas had been holding contacts with international and European parties for some time and said these contacts were never severed, but varied only in frequency in accordance with changing conditions at different periods.

One of Hamas’ most basic and significant goals over the years has been to open lines of communication with the Arab world and convince its neighbors it is a liberation rather than a terrorist movement. This has become especially pressing since Hamas became a major force in the Palestinian street, not just competing neck-and-neck with Fateh, but sometimes surpassing in popularity the traditional Palestinian party of power, as was seen in the most recent municipal elections.

Ever since Hamas’ inception in 1987 with the outbreak of the first intifada, it has been seeking to expand its platform in its Arab and international surroundings. As the movement grew increasingly prominent with the escalation of its military operations against Israeli occupation forces, Arab and international interest in the movement also increased. Soon it became the focus of attention for many observers and analysts, who viewed its emergence as a turning point in the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and an indication of a widespread Islamic renaissance, which was becoming increasingly involved in political life. In addition, its victory in the municipal elections, its willingness to participate in Palestinian Legislative Council elections and its ever growing political participation in general, granted Hamas a wider platform to open the door to the West, which had put it on its list of terrorist organizations.

Two years after the movement was established, in 1989, a limited effort by some Hamas leaders abroad to forge relationships with the outside world began. They succeeded in opening some lines of communication with a few European countries eager to understand the nature of Hamas and its approaches.

According to leading Hamas figure in Gaza, Mahmoud Zahhar, Hamas’ policy is based on openness with everyone. Still, Hamas is treading lightly when it comes to opening up to the western world for fear of what it describes as “attempts to contain the Islamic movements in the Arab world”.

As far as the Hamas leadership is concerned, the US follows just such a policy of containment, and Hamas is not interested in speaking to Washington just because it is Washington. The movement is afraid that, as with so many other Arab power centers, it will be forced to “grovel at America’s feet” at the expense of the Palestinian cause.

On the mainstream Palestinian political scene there is now a growing consensus that the West must understand that Hamas cannot be ignored in any attempt to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Hamas leaders will point out that, particularly among European countries, contacts have been ongoing for years, and while ebbing, particularly when the EU put the movement on its list of terrorist organizations, never stopped completely.

Indeed, a former British intelligence officer seconded to the EU, Alistair Crooke, spoke quite plainly about EU-Hamas contacts recently in several articles, and also pointed out that Britain’s Middle East policies are inextricably linked with Washington’s.

It is clear that European countries have greater room for maneuver in this respect, but it is equally clear that the US is keen to understand what Hamas is all about. Indeed, Mashaal has said that at the beginning of 2004, Americans and Hamas sat down to discuss various possibilities, and, according to Mashaal, the US tried to “entice” Hamas to end its resistance with various offers. Only after Hamas refused came the assassinations of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the group’s spiritual leader and founder, and his replacement in Gaza, Abdel Aziz Rantisi.

If that is the perception of the course of events, it will have strengthened the belief within Hamas that the US, unlike the Europeans, does not want to negotiate; it only wants to dictate. And as Hamas gains greater public acceptance in the mainstream among Palestinians, the lack of contact between Hamas and the US will only hinder progress toward a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Since Hamas has already declared itself ready for a dialogue with the US, the ball is now in Washington’s court.- Published 2/6/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org


Ghazi Hamad is a Hamas official from the Gaza Strip.

The West and moderate Islamism

by Amr Hamzawy
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It has become common to suggest that the West should reach out to nonviolent Islamist political movements in the Arab world and integrate them in its democracy promotion efforts. Two major factors have contributed to the apparent shift in American and European perceptions, from an overall stigmatization of Islamists as irrational fanatics after 9/11 to an operative distinction between violent and nonviolent, radical and moderate actors: the problematic path of Arab democratization, and the newly discovered pragmatism within the Islamist spectrum. However, both the United States and Europe have yet to articulate clear policy guidelines that structure their encounter with Islamist movements. Existing doubts about the degree of the movements' commitment to democratic reforms and the real intentions behind their pragmatism hamper attempts to move ahead in the direction of engaging them.

The absence of viable opposition movements with sustainable popular constituencies represents a persistent dilemma of democratic transformation in the Arab world. Reforms in authoritarian regimes never derive from the impulsive noble motivations of autocratic rulers. International efforts to promote the cause of democracy in countries where the tradeoffs of undemocratic governance continue to be bearable for the ruling elites are bound to fail. Without the formation of far-reaching opposition alliances, the autocrats between Morocco and Bahrain might eventually manage to do away with current western pressures, either by inventing a “theater of democratization” based on cosmetic reforms or by publicly discrediting American and European calls for democracy as acts of foreign aggression against the national sovereignty of Arab countries.

Western democracy-promotion policies and programs of the past several years have looked to Arab liberals as strategic partners, anticipating that they will be able gradually to contest the dominance of authoritarian regimes and force democratic concessions. To be sure, there is more than one good reason for the United States and Europe to support liberal parties and secular NGOs across the region. Normatively and politically, Arab liberals have embraced the western political value system with its three pillars; universal citizenship, democracy, and rule of law. Their objectives are identical with western aspirations for tolerant, pluralist Arab societies. They speak a language that is understandable and trustworthy in American and European policy and intellectual communities.

The dilemma of Arab liberals, though, is their marginalization back home. Contrary to their celebrity status in the West, in the “real world” of the Arabs liberal actors remain incapable of reaching out to considerable constituencies in their societies or of substantially influencing political developments. Left with ruling elites primarily interested in preserving power and with weak liberal opposition actors, the United States and Europe have no choice but to try collaborating with other forces on the Arab political scene if they are serious about promoting democracy in the region.

Non-violent Islamist movements such as the Egyptian and Jordanian branches of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Moroccan Justice and Development Party are well rooted in the social and cultural fabric of Arab countries and possess therefore a great potential for forging broad alliances for political transformation. On the other side, recent changes in Arab Islamist political movements have made it easier for western countries to engage some of them. Throughout the last decade the mainstream of Islamist movements has been moving toward more pragmatism, based on prioritizing gradual democratic reforms as the way ahead for their political integration and as the only viable strategy to challenge the persistent authoritarianism in the Arab world. Furthermore, the new pragmatism among non-violent Islamist movements materializes in an atmosphere of relative openness toward American and European policies in the Arab world, and an initial willingness to engage them less ideologically. Especially for the United States, this change represents a preferable setting for reaching out to the most popular opposition actors in the Arab world and developing a minimum of strategic ties.

But the challenge facing moderate Islamists is the continued determination of Arab regimes to contain or exclude them from the political sphere, even in the context of a gradual reform process. The fear of Islamist popularity structures official policies toward them. In spite of their continued containment and exclusion in the last few years, moderate Islamists have not questioned their strategic choice for gradual political reforms. Arab regimes have long secured the support or at least the silent approval of the United States and Europe for their repressive measures toward Islamist movements by evoking the so-called Algerian syndrome or the nightmare of anti-western fanatics coming to power through the ballot box. However, Arab politics has changed a great deal since the beginning of the 1990s. At present, excluding non-violent Islamists from the political sphere weakens the chances of democratic transformation in the region more than anything else.

In the last few years, Arab liberals have been gradually reaching out to moderate Islamists and engaging them in campaigns calling for reforms. Secular-religious national alliances for democracy are instrumental in contesting authoritarian state power and articulating popular consensus over the need for political transformation. Islamists, on their side, have seized the integration opportunity and positioned themselves at the heart of growing opposition movements across the region. In Morocco, Lebanon, and Egypt differences between liberals and Islamists remain relevant, but the degree of their convergence over national priorities is systematically growing.

These are steps in the right direction. Democratic opposition platforms are by far more effective with Islamist participation than without it. The United States and Europe should move forward in the same direction of engaging moderate Islamists. The cause of political transformation in the region is best served by bringing in Islamist movements and their popular constituencies.- Published 2/6/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Amr Hamzawy is research director and senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut.

It is said that, soon after the signing of the Oslo Accord, Hamas leader Abdul Aziz Rantisi traveled to Tunis to meet with then PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. When they met, Rantisi shouted at Arafat that he had betrayed the Palestinian cause, that he was a traitor to his country, that he had turned his back on the Palestinian dream, and that he was no longer fit to lead the Palestinian people. Arafat patiently waited for the tirade to end. Finally, after many minutes--and after a suitable period of silence--Arafat responded:

“And what is it that you want?” he asked.

Rantisi smiled: “Forty seats in the Palestinian legislature,” he responded.

Apocryphal or not, the story is emblematic of a larger debate now raging inside the Bush administration. One group of policymakers adamantly argues that the United States should never open a dialogue with the leaders of political Islam, as they are a force for instability and anti-Americanism. What political Islam wants, these policymakers say, is an end to American influence in the region. Other policymakers argue that the leaders of political Islam are far more interested in exercising power than in exercising their religion. What these leaders want, such policymakers say, is a chance at running their own affairs.

That this disagreement has yet to be resolved is reflected in George Bush’s own statements.

Two weeks ago in an address at the International Republican Institute, Bush seemed to imply that while free, fair and open elections might bring leaders to office that are strong opponents of the US, democracy itself would be a force for their moderation. But just two weeks later, at the US Naval Academy, he seemed to articulate a different message--implying that groups designated by the US as “terrorist entities” (which include the most prominent Islamist groups in the region) are incapable of change and would remain America’s implacable enemies.

So which is it? Will the US talk with the leaders of political Islam, or continue to hope that a dialogue with more secular democratic groups (supporting the old regimes now being out of the question) will provide a credible means for satisfying the desire for democracy among the region’s peoples? The way that such debates are usually resolved in Washington is to adopt Solomon’s methods--to “cut the baby in half.” In exchange for US recognition, Washington is likely to demand that Islamist groups meet a set of requirements: to disarm, renounce violence, participate in the political process, and agree to abide by the results of elections.

It is now clear, however, that if the Bush administration adopts this position it will be rejected by nearly all of the leaders of political Islam--including the leaders of Hamas and Hizbollah. “We will not acquiesce in our own destruction,” a senior Hamas leader said last month. A Hizbollah spokesman was more adamant: “It is not for the Americans to say what we are required to do, but for the Lebanese people to determine.” All of this may well be beside the point, of course, because members of the Bush administration are barred, by law, from talking to most Islamist organizations, especially those that, as George Bush says “use violence for political ends”--a phrase that brings wry smiles to even the most jaded Middle East policymaker.

Is there a way out of this impasse? Is there a way to come to an understanding with the region’s most powerful leaders of political Islam while assuaging fears that any move to democracy will mean rewarding political violence? Should we, in the final analysis, talk to political Islam? To get a proper sense of the right answer to this question, in March I participated with a group of retired American and European policymakers in an open exchange of views in Beirut with the leaders of several Islamist groups. The exchange was not condoned, let alone endorsed, by the Bush administration, a fact that was repeatedly made clear to our interlocutors. That was fine with them: “We don’t want you to talk,” one of them said shortly before the meeting, “we want you to listen”.- Published 2/6/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Mark Perry is an author and foreign policy, military and intelligence analyst based in Washington, DC.

President George W. Bush has placed democratization at the center of his Middle East policy. At his inauguration he declared, “Democratic reformers facing repression, prison, or exile can know: America sees you for who you are: the future leaders of your free country.” Bush is sincere, confronting not only adversaries like Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, but also pro-American dictators like Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

Bush can claim success: 2005 is the year of the election. Iraqis defied predictions to cast their ballots. Palestinians also embraced the vote, electing Mahmoud Abbas to replace the late Yasser Arafat.

Elections alone do not make democracy, though. Washington should be cynical about Mubarak’s commitment to democracy. Even though 83 percent of his electorate voted for multiparty elections in a May 25, 2005 referendum, his government still determines who can run. In October 2004, Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali won 94.5 percent of the vote after curtailing his opponents’ campaign. The Saudi kingdom has trumpeted its municipal elections, but the resulting councils have had neither budgetary nor legislative authority.

While the White House has treated these autocrats’ commitments with skepticism, the Bush administration refuses to extend the same cynicism to Islamist groups, many of which embrace elections but cast aside democratic values. In 1992, for example, Ali Balhadj, a leader of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria declared, “When we are in power, there will be no more elections because God will be ruling.” In March 2004, influential Karbala cleric Sayyid Hadi al-Modarresi told al-Hayat, “The first article in a democracy is the rule of the majority over the minority.”

In recent months, the Bush administration has sent mixed signals to Islamist groups in Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, and Egypt. Bush has held out an olive branch to Hizballah, a group funded and armed by Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Syrian intelligence. While the party does hold seats in the Lebanese parliament, it maintains its own private army and embraces violence. Hizballah’s March 8, 2005 rally in Beirut in favor of occupation made a mockery of its claim to be an anti-occupation resistance movement.

The White House has also flip-flopped on Hamas. While Hamas candidates came in second to those of Fatah in Palestinian elections, it nonetheless won the largest municipalities in Gaza. White House spokesman Scott McClellan called Hamas’ successful candidates “business professionals.” But election participation does not make candidates democratic. Hamas ran on a platform rejecting the compromises necessary for Palestinian statehood. Its charter embraced imposition of Islamic rule, with the Koran as its constitution, and it has eschewed rule-of-law. Well-known for its attacks on Israelis, it has also targeted liberal Palestinians.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, another recipient of recent State Department outreach, also has a long legacy of violence. Its armed wing has murdered thousands. Engaging any group that has been involved in terror only legitimizes the violence that propelled that group to prominence. Better that Washington support bold but peaceful politicians like Ayman Nour.

Washington’s infatuation with Islamists has emboldened such groups and deflated the morale of democrats. Condoleezza Rice bolstered the legitimacy of the Iranian-backed Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq when she invited its leader to the White House. This invitation signaled that the Bush administration endorsed the Islamist group over more democratic movements, and suggested to the Supreme Council that an ephemeral embrace of democracy was sufficient. Today, gangs belonging to the Supreme Council enforce Islamic law on cities like Basra and Kut, breaking up student picnics and tearing down posters championing other groups. More recently, many Iraqis interpreted the April 2005 appointment of National Endowment for Democracy official Laith Kubba as Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari’s spokesman to be an American endorsement for his Islamist platform.

The Arab world is capable of democracy. When mechanisms for electoral accountability exist, Islamists lose their charm. In Jordan, for example, the Islamic Action Front lost half its seats between 1989 and 1993, after it failed to fulfill its promises. Unable to withstand the popular rebuff, the Islamists boycotted the next election.

There is no reason why the Arab world cannot be democratic. But for democracy to succeed, all parties have to embrace not only elections as the path to power, but also regular subservience to the electorate as their master. Because Islamists base their legitimacy upon a higher power, they are intrinsically anti-democratic and unwilling to accept popular rebuke. One man, one vote, one time makes dictatorship, not democracy.

By embracing Islamists in Iran, President Jimmy Carter replaced one dictatorship with another. The Bush administration’s flirtation with Arab Islamists risks doing the same. Washington should push for democracy, but only work with groups willing to abide by democratic precepts.- Published 2/6/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School.