• Overall, a success story  - an interview withRobert Einhorn
Those who made a genuine commitment find that renouncing it is not so easy.

• The dissonance of the NPT is getting louder  - Imad Khadduri
Dip the NPT in a glass of water, soak it, and then drink the water for all the good it will do you.

• On the edge of extinction  - Gerald M. Steinberg
Israeli governments have concluded that the NPT requirements are incompatible with Israel's core deterrence requirements.

• Iran and the NPT  - Sadegh Zibakalam
Even those Iranians who are critical or oppose the Islamic regime support its nuclear program.

Overall, a success story
an interview with Robert Einhorn

BI: Has the NPT been a success in the Middle East?

Einhorn: Yes. Not withstanding violations of the treaty by three Middle East countries, Iraq, Iran, and Libya, it has been a success. Iraq, Iran, and Libya adhered to the treaty cynically. But those who made a genuine commitment find that renouncing it is not so easy. Why? Because it has put in place political commitments that create a kind of non-nuclear inertia for countries that genuinely renounced a nuclear capability. It puts in place a norm that is the basis for pressuring them to comply with their obligations.

If not for the NPT, UNSCR 687 ending the first Gulf war would not have been possible. It put in place verification measures that we now see impeded Iraq's capability. Nor could the IAEA have conducted its rigorous investigation of Iran's clandestine program and pressured Iran to suspend its program. Without the NPT the US and UK could not have demanded that [Libyan leader Muammar] Qadhafi come clean and give up his program. And impediments to Israel-Arab peace negotiations would have been worse without the NPT.

BI: Is renouncing it so difficult for a member like, say, Iran?

Einhorn: Iran joined the NPT cynically and has been cynical about its obligations for 25 years. But take Egypt. Many Egyptians I have spoken to regret adhering to the NPT. They would like Egypt to have a better option today to go down the nuclear path if the situation in the region warranted it. They haven't entirely burned their bridges in Egypt, but there's a lot of nuclear inertia there now. Saudi Arabia would also find it hard to develop an indigenous capability. Even where there has been non-compliance, in two of the three cases I mentioned the NPT has been instrumental in getting them back into compliance.

BI: What can the NPT Review Conference currently taking place in New York do to improve the NPT regime in the Middle East?

Einhorn: At this stage, prospects for a successful conference are very small. The NPT of course will survive a conference without a final communique and will only be damaged a little bit. Only three or four of the previous six conferences have had a final communique, meaning a successful outcome. The real world will govern the health of the NPT, not what happens at this conference. But there will be missed opportunities, for example for putting greater pressure on Iran and developing ground rules for fuel cycle capabilities.

BI: Do you see a parallel or equivalency between NPT signatories that violate the treaty, as Iran is currently alleged to be doing, and non-signatories like Israel, India and Pakistan that develop a military nuclear capability.

Einhorn: I always draw a distinction between those that never joined and those that joined and cheated. Israel, Pakistan, and India never misled the international community; they made it clear they insist on keeping their options open. That's qualitatively different from a country joining and cheating, like Iran, Iraq and Libya. On the other hand, when India and Pakistan tested weapons, that had a negative impact by demonstrating they could defy non-proliferation norms, be mildly punished internationally and quickly be rehabilitated. Countries like Iran and North Korea gained the impression from this that they too could demonstrate a capability, weather a few years of sanctions, and eventually be rehabilitated too. I hope they are wrong and the world reacts very differently.

BI: Has Israel's avoidance of testing had fewer negative ramifications for the non-proliferation regime?

Einhorn: Israel's strategic ambiguity or opacity has been positive in terms of promoting peace in the region. The NPT has made Israel's posture possible. If the NPT had not served as a constraint on some of Israel's neighbors and they had felt compelled to go down the nuclear track, such an opaque posture would have been untenable.

BI: The NPT survived North Korea's developing of nuclear weapons. If Iran now also develops them, will the NPT still be viable?

Einhorn: Returns are not yet in on North Korea. We have to see whether they insist on retaining this capability, and how countries in the region like Japan and South Korea react. If North Korea retains its capability and Iran continues down this path, it could do irreparable damage to the NPT.- Published 19/5/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Robert Einhorn is senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. Prior to 2001 he was US assistant secretary of state for non-proliferation. From 1992 to 1995 he co-chaired the Middle East multilateral Arms Control and Regional Security Group.

The constant drumbeat of US propaganda about how Iran has to "come clean" with the world and "stop conducting a secret nuclear weapons program" is relentless, though dissonant in tone.

The latest US demands would impose conditions--specifically, a permanent ban on reprocessing uranium--that goes far beyond anything that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) actually stipulates. The US is demanding that Iran voluntarily agree to unilaterally American-imposed restrictions and submit to intrusive, unrestricted American inspections of its nuclear facilities, anywhere, anytime, anyplace, without any guarantees that these inspections won't be used to determine targets for a later (and, of course, illegal) US attack.

In attempting to stitch together the unraveling strictures of the NPT mandate, Mohamed El Baradei, the head of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has recently proposed a five-year moratorium on both the enrichment of uranium and the production of plutonium, anticipating that if more and more countries get hold of the technology to make bomb-grade uranium and plutonium, there will be many "virtual" nuclear weapon states that could quickly put together a bomb at any time.

Many countries that felt the moratorium would limit their future nuclear fuel options immediately balked at the idea, and notably both the United States and Iran strongly opposed El Baradei's proposed moratorium on enrichment.

Another idea El Baradei proposed was making all uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities multinational consortia that are not controlled by a single country. Many countries have expressed support for this idea. He said the urgency of the matter was made clear after the discovery of a global black market linked to Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, who supplied Iran, Libya and possibly North Korea with technology used to make fuel for nuclear power plants or atomic weapons.

But the Khan revelations also showed something else. A moral and judicial double standard is exemplified in the utter absence of any effective recrimination in treating this particular fissure in the NPT on such a different scale than the dogged pursuit and illegal occupation of Iraq for its nuclear non-capability after the 1991 war. This does indeed drain the once stolid NPT of any remaining stature of respectability.

El Baradei commented: "we cannot just sit still, stand still, because we are facing a threat." Like the story of the Dutch boy trying to plug a leaking hole in a bursting dam with his finger, El Baradei expressed disappointment at the failure of a recent meeting of the 180 signatories of the nuclear NPT to agree on an agenda for discussing ways of repairing loopholes in the 35-year-old pact.

In all fairness, El Baradei did plug another argument. US President George W. Bush is proposing to simply ban the sale of enrichment and reprocessing technology to nations (other than the dozen or so who already have it) and ensuring that any who want fuel can buy it "at reasonable cost". Asked about this idea, El Baradei diplomatically responded that it "has merit" but also has two problems; one is that many countries can already develop the sensitive technology on their own; the other, as he finally got around to suggesting, is that it raises questions of "different standards", that is, double standards, for those allowed to have fuel technology and those denied it.

But the double standards already exist, and, notably, Israel's actions and constant dismissal of the NPT remain as one of the prime factors for the NPT's ineffectiveness and gradual demise.

When more than 180 nations met two weeks ago hoping to strengthen global protections against the spread of nuclear arms, they barely managed to surmount the paralysis centered on Israel's arsenal of atomic weapons and Egypt's demand that the issue of nuclear weapons in the Middle East be on the agenda.

A tenuous compromise was worked out by conference president, Sergio Duarte of Brazil, who added an asterisk to the proposed agenda. It referred to a separate piece of paper ensuring that the practice of previous NPT conferences, in which the Middle East had been discussed, would be "taken into account". Duarte hailed the reference as a "miracle of diplomacy".

The UN Security Council has long called for the Middle East to be transformed into a nuclear-free zone, and Egyptian UN Ambassador Maged Abdelaziz said the United States and European powers had assured the Arab world that they would work to bring Israel into the NPT. "But this is not happening," Abdelaziz meekly complained.

When Israel belligerently attacked and destroyed Iraq's research reactors in 1981, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution equating such actions with a "nuclear attack" on a member state. That attack not only led to Iraq's political determination to pursue a covert nuclear weapons program, but the same UN resolution failed to deter America's attack on Iraq's (hot) nuclear sites in the 1991 war, as it followed Israel's example of ignoring any UN resolutions that do not suit its interests.

And Iran's nuclear program and facilities are next on the agenda of both.

Israel and the US, and in that order, are in effect telling the world a reformulation of an Iraqi proverb: "Dip the NPT in a glass of water, soak it, and then drink the water", for all the good it will do you.- Published 19/5/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Dr. Imad Khadduri worked with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission for nearly 30 years, from 1968 until 1998. He was able to escape from Iraq in late 1998 with his family. He recently published his autobiography: Iraq's Nuclear Mirage: Memoirs and Delusions

In the Middle East, the status of the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has always been shaky. Now this unique international regime is in danger of losing its remaining relevance. A number of the most problematic signatories are located in this region, beginning with Iraq, which acquired the French-built Osiraq reactor and other technology in order to produce material for use in making weapons. Later, Libya attempted to follow a similar path, and Algeria remained outside the treaty structure until 1995, when US satellite images discovered a reactor that had been secretly acquired from China.

There are also unconfirmed reports of clandestine programs in Syria, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere, based on the assistance provided by Pakistan's nuclear entrepreneur, Abdul Qadeer Khan. As a result, confidence in the ability of the NPT regime, including the IAEA safeguards system, to prevent proliferation in the Middle East has never been particularly high, even before the illicit Iranian program was revealed.

The question of the NPT's relevance has been further highlighted by the conflict surrounding Israeli exceptionality. For over three decades, successive Israeli governments have concluded that the NPT requirements are incompatible with Israel's core deterrence requirements. But unlike the regimes in Iraq and Iran, Israel did not try to have its nuclear cake (by signing the NPT), and eat it too (by cheating).

Nor, in contrast to the other two non-signatories (India and Pakistan), has Israel declared itself to be a nuclear power, or exploded weapons to demonstrate such capabilities. The policy of ambiguity remains in place as the least bad option, which both meets Israel's security needs and also limits the impact on the NPT regime.

In this context, the continuous efforts to press Israel to accept the terms of the Treaty and relinquish its nuclear deterrent option have not made significant headway. The current NPT Review Conference taking place in New York is unlikely to change this situation.

These efforts are generally based on claims of "universality", which is the diplomatic equivalent of "one size fits all", in which all states, large or small, powerful or weak, democratic or dictatorial, are forced into a single set of requirements. Universality also fails to consider the problem of countries that sign treaties and then find ways to violate them.

This distorted framework ignores Israel's unique strategic situation and political environment, which includes missiles paraded through the streets of Tehran decorated with signs that read "Wipe Israel off the Map". Thus, until the concept of universality is also applied to requirements for democracy, mutual acceptance and strategic depth, there is no justification for demanding it with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty alone.

The main cost of this public relations campaign regarding Israel's status is to deflect the focus and resources from the much more important challenges facing the NPT system, particularly in the Middle East. Despite the weaknesses, for most of the past three decades the terms of this treaty and the verification mechanisms under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have prevented many countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding its flaws, the NPT has been an unusual success, and rather than promoting policies that will lead to its collapse, positive action needs to be taken in order to strengthen its effectiveness.

As noted, the holes in the fabric of this treaty come from a few countries and regimes. Saddam Hussein was the first major violator to be exposed--he signed the NPT to acquire peaceful technology while secretly using the materials and knowledge in making weapons. In many cases, his illegal facilities were literally across the street, but IAEA inspectors could not go beyond the buildings designated by the Iraqi government. The international response was too weak and slow to provide an effective response.

After this ruse was exposed following the 1991 war, the IAEA tightened its inspection system, but it failed to deter other NPT signatories, including Iran, from violating its terms. Iran continues using the nuclear energy facade in an effort to acquire weapons, and while the IAEA has reported on these activities in great detail, the diplomatic process led by the European Union appears to be going nowhere.

If Iran continues on this path and begins to produce significant amounts of fissile material for weapons production, this is likely to end any role for the NPT in the Middle East. The resulting arms race between Israel and Iran--with no diplomatic relations, no means of direct communication, and a high potential for conflict--could quickly lead to widespread regional instability, and generate efforts by Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other countries to gain similar capabilities. And without this unique arms control framework, warts and all, the region and the world would be far more dangerous.- Published 19/5/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Gerald M. Steinberg is the founder and president of NGO Monitor and professor of political science at Bar Ilan University.

There is virtually no domestic or foreign policy issue about which there exists a consensus among Iranians. The nuclear issue is, however, an exception. The two main political camps, the conservatives and reformists, both support Iran's overall policy on the nuclear issue. Even those Iranians who are critical or oppose the Islamic regime support its nuclear program. The nuclear issue has been turned into a national cause, like the war against Iraq, and Iranians tend to perceive the country's nuclear ambitions with a sense of pride and patriotism. Even many Iranians who are not articulate about the details of the country's nuclear program regard it as an achievement.

Part of the reason for this nationalist feeling is the regime's sustained and effective campaign to justify the country's nuclear program. The nuclear issue has been portrayed by the Islamic leaders (both conservatives as well as reformists) as a struggle between Iran and its powerful enemy, the United States.

One element of the regime's argument is the legitimate right that Iran enjoys under international conventions, including the NPT, to pursue its peaceful nuclear program. Iran's enemies, state the regime's media, are denying its legitimate right to progress and development. "The arrogant powers deny the others the possibility of developing their nuclear industry in order to keep them dependent on the western powers, dependent on their technology and know-how, and subsequently to weaken their independence," said the Iranian supreme leader during a speech to the country's atomic energy officials in January 2005.

The next line of defense adopted by the Iranian leadership concerns the vast benefits that the acquisition of nuclear technology would bring for Iran. Iranians are constantly educated on the uses and benefits of the nuclear industry in the medical field, in industry and agriculture. The state run media also provide extensive coverage on the future of nuclear energy as "the cheapest energy". Nuclear power is portrayed as the future source of generating electricity in the world. There are frequent reports on the decisions by various countries to build new nuclear-powered electricity generating plants.

Next is the commercial consideration. Iran has vast deposits of uranium. If it can master uranium enrichment technology, and given its rich uranium deposits, the country can become an exporter of enriched uranium for use in nuclear power plants. Iran's enemies, suggest the Iranian leaders, are struggling to block Iran's opportunity to become an international supplier of enriched uranium on the world market. "Even if Iran's hydrocarbon sources were to last forever", stated Doctor Hasan Ruhani, the chief Iranian nuclear negotiator, in February of this year, "there are no logical reasons why Iran should not become a leading supplier of uranium as fuel for nuclear power plants in the world."

The arguments in support of Iran continuing its nuclear program have become such a nationalistically sensitive issue that to give in to western demands would be tantamount to treason--to giving away part of Iran's soil to a foreign country. Many Iranians feel that the West's demand that Iran halt its nuclear program, and particularly to abandon or freeze its pursuit of uranium enrichment, is an unjust request. In fact, many Islamic hardliners are pressing Iran to leave the NPT altogether and pursue its nuclear program irrespective of what the world might think.

It was against this backdrop that the conservative-dominated Iranian parliament (Majlis) passed a bill on May 15, 2005, compelling the government to make every effort to pursue the country's nuclear program. Out of a total of 256 deputies present during the voting, 188 voted in favor of the bill. Another hundred or so, who abstained from voting, were actually supporting a more radical bill advocating that Iran leave the NPT altogether. One of their leading figures stated that, "[since] the US and its Zionist ally would eventually take Iran to the Security Council and sanction us for our nuclear program, why waste our time and wait for such an eventuality?"

It would be very difficult to imagine how, under present conditions, any government could give in to the West's demand to permanently freeze Iran's pursuit of uranium enrichment. Yet many moderate Iranians are aware that any international sanctions against Iran would hit the country's economy. There is still room for a compromise whereby Iran will maintain the "voluntary" freeze on its enrichment program and in return the West will assist Iran in its nuclear program as well as providing additional inducements.

Such a compromise is the only way to make a deal. Otherwise, the future will be bleak not only for Iran but for the whole region.- Published 19/5/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Sadegh Zibakalam is professor of political science at Tehran University.