• Apply sparingly  - Alastair Crooke
Third party interventions are not the remedy to all the flaws of the process. The answer is to address some of those failings directly.

• Tinkering will no longer help  - Omar Karmi
The Oslo Accords changed the role of third party intelligence involvement and the intifada has changed it again.

• US intelligence: pivotal player?  - Ellen Laipson
The public use of intelligence as part of the peace process effort emerged at the 1998 Wye River talks.

• Where diplomacy has failed  - Yossi Melman
The PA welcomes the intelligence involvement, in line with its general strategy of "internationalizing" the conflict.

Apply sparingly
 Alastair Crooke

The international third party role (3PR) has been evolving into a remedy believed to hold quite wide-ranging restorative powers. It has become a remedy for ailments to a political process for which its efficacy is not evident. A key ailment, in the Israeli-Palestinian context, is the international community's persistence with a political framework (Oslo) whose flaws have become only too evident since 1993. The loss of credibility and legitimacy of the incremental process for both parties is a fundamental failing; but one that the international community refuses to address or even to recognize.

The asymmetrical nature of the power of the two parties to the negotiations underlies the problematic approach of both toward each other. Inevitably, the involvement of a 3PR has been seen by some as a useful counter-weight in the search to correct the perceived asymmetry of power. It also has been resisted by others for that same reason. Equally the 3PR has been viewed as the tool to drive forward the incremental process against a backdrop of popular disenchantment with an incremental process that is seen failed by both communities. Both of these requirements overburden the 3PR. The latter does have an important function; but third party interventions however are not the remedy to all the flaws of the process. The answer is to address some of those failings directly.

The role of intelligence services in this process derived from the CIA's security committees that were designed to oversee security co-operation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. As originally conceived, the objective was not to mediate, but simply to "hold the ring". The subsequent evolution of a mediation role to try to keep down the level of violence however does not sit easily with the prime interest of intelligence services. Their interest lies in maintaining and preserving key relationships with individuals and services that they view as strategic. This objective can easily conflict with a wider mediation role that is centered on listening broadly and being seen to attend to all the various constituencies. There is an inherent tension between the narrow security optic from which the intelligence services approach a 3PR, and that of building a critical mass of support for a process and a security framework that may require the 3PR to extend across various constituencies and factions.

There is unquestionably a role for facilitation/mediation in any conflict. Ticking off breaches of a ceasefire, however, is a separate role and one that should not be conflated with the facilitation task. In practical terms, the role of monitoring a ceasefire has not been of key importance in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It is fairly obvious to all whether the situation is deteriorating or improving.

More important is the role of facilitation and verification: to be seen on the ground, to witness events, to listen to problems and grievances, to trouble-shoot specific misunderstandings and problems, to explain what is happening widely to opinion-formers and, crucially, to work to lift the "feel-good factor". The dynamic of moving from conflict to political progress depends fundamentally on that sense of improving conditions and improving horizons. People will only wait so long in the absence of tangible signs of improvements in daily life.

Practical experience has underlined the time-consuming work of going between the various constituencies to sort out the mechanics of de-escalation of violence, building public support and acting to "translate" the perceptions of one side to the other. It is not clear that intelligence services are best equipped to do this type of work or, at least, to do it unaided by other mediators.- Published 12/5/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Alastair Crooke is a director of Conflicts Forum.

The role of third party intelligence agencies in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been primarily one of contact and facilitation. Long before the PLO became an acceptable political player in the West, back in the Lebanon days, intelligence agencies opened several avenues of communication with the Palestinian community. Once trust was established between the intelligence services and the PLO leadership, it became possible to build a political process. That process culminated in the Oslo Accords.

The Oslo Accords changed the role of third party intelligence involvement. While maintaining clandestine lines of communication between western intelligence services and the PLO remained an important function (and one utilized to ease diplomatic friction between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government), the training and empowerment of Palestinian security forces became the primary focus of intelligence cooperation. While the training was aimed at providing security enhancement, it was also engendered to deepen political contacts between prominent Palestinian and Israeli intelligence and political figures. But the contacts were deepened primarily to maintain the course of the peace process and, say Palestinian security officials now, to suppress any Palestinian dissent to that process.

The peace process was soon paralyzed. The clearer this became the greater became the security aspect of third party intelligence involvement. But the enhanced profile of these third party officials inevitably backfired. The more powerless the PA seemed in its efforts to end the reinvigorated settlement building in the occupied territories (the most obvious and grievous Israeli transgression of the Oslo agreements), the more unpopular the peace process became. The Palestinian security services sought to quell this growing dissension particularly among the Islamist opposition, and increasingly repressive measures were employed. The greater the public perception that the PA, through its security services, was acting as the guarantor primarily of Israel's security and by extension of the growing number of settlements, the more unpopular it became.

The rank and file of the security services could not remain immune to such criticism, tantamount to treason. Once the intifada broke out, and confronted with the massive and brutal Israeli military response to the stone throwing demonstrations that prevailed in the first weeks after September 29, 2000, members of the security services duly broke ranks, and the Palestinian resistance, outside the Islamist groups, became more than factionalized, it became fractionalized.

With no clear role left--political activity was frozen and Israel had completed the destruction of Palestinian security infrastructure--the intifada saw third party intelligence involvement revert to intelligence gathering for its own sake. Some activity continued, notably the brokering of the deal over the Nativity Church siege in Bethlehem, but intelligence agencies were casting about for a new role.

The fragmented Palestinian political scene provided an answer. Taking its lead from European thinking, Egypt, in the person of intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, expended much effort in facilitating contacts and negotiations between the PA and the Islamist opposition. The result has been the unofficial ceasefire that continues to prevail (though just barely) and the entrance into the mainstream Palestinian political process of Hamas, the largest Islamist opposition faction.

Certainly, Hamas chose its moment well. Having been united against the PA onslaught during the 1990s, it had little trouble in adapting to the intifada, and has emerged, unlike the traditional Palestinian party of power, Fateh, institutionally unscathed and with as much popular support and in many places with more. Belatedly, western intelligence agencies have cottoned on to this fact and opened up their own lines of communication with the movement.

But to what avail? Every inch of the Palestinian political landscape appears to be monitored carefully, not only by Israeli and western agencies, but, probably more competently, by the Jordanian and Egyptian sides. In terms of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, however, there seems little point in pushing political movement absent an Israeli government interested in political negotiations.

Western intelligence on Israel, particularly US intelligence, appears to be sorely lacking. How is it, for example, that a US president can allow himself to be embarrassed by a country dependent on his goodwill and financial and military aid the way George Bush did recently when he publicly excoriated Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on settlement expansions only for the latter to turn around just two weeks later and announce tenders for yet more settlements in the West Bank? Where was the CIA? Where were the intelligence analysts to warn Bush that he was about to make himself look not just like a fool, but even worse, a weak fool?

Third party intelligence services need to restore their role as facilitators of contact between the two sides. But this time, rather than the onus being on the Palestinian side to prove that it can provide security for Israel, the onus needs to be on the Israeli side to prove that it is serious about a negotiated settlement. Without any credible signals to this effect, no amount of tinkering with the Palestinian factions will lead anywhere.- Published 12/5/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Omar Karmi is a Jordan Times correspondent based in Jerusalem.

With all the laments about intelligence failures in Iraq and elsewhere, a belief persists that intelligence professionals from key outside countries can play an important, and positive, role in promoting the security environment that is so vital to the peace process. It is worth exploring under what conditions intelligence leaders and their experts can or should be part of peace-building efforts in the Israel-Palestine arena, and whether there are important downsides to such a role.

The public use of intelligence as part of the peace process effort emerged at the 1998 Wye River talks, which created the US-Palestinian-Israeli Trilateral Committee to work on security. Intelligence operatives were part of the process, since any initiative to curb political violence would require enhanced intelligence collection by the Palestinians, and they seemed receptive to professional help from the US side. President Clinton increasingly turned to Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet to work with the parties, in part because Tenet had established strong personal rapport with the Palestinian security chiefs and was also trusted by the Israelis, and because the Central Intelligence Agency had the capacity to contribute to the training and professionalization of the Palestinian security services. Tenet's role continued through the period of the Mitchell report, released in April 2001, with Tenet's work-plan of "specific, concrete and realistic security steps" offered as the necessary bridge to reach implementation of the Mitchell recommendations. The appointment of General Anthony Zinni as the president's special envoy in late 2001 superceded Tenet's role, although the elements of Tenet's work-plan became Zinni's guide.

The use of DCI Tenet as a mediator and as judge of non-compliance was more controversial, as it placed him directly in a policy role, not the more discreet or detached role common to the American intelligence tradition. Intelligence professionals were not all comfortable with such a prominent role for the DCI, and some feared it would compromise other aspects of intelligence work, including the need for field operatives and even analysts to not be identified easily by the local population.

Turning from this brief history to an analysis of the key issues at hand, four topics suggest themselves.

To begin with: security first, or an integrated approach? At a conceptual level, if the parties opt for addressing security as a precondition to political talks, then a prominent role for intelligence is quite logical. But an integrated or parallel process where security and political issues are addressed simultaneously, as the Palestinians seem to prefer, would make intelligence only one of the pieces of a more complicated process, and would relegate US intelligence officials to supporting cast, not lead player. In fact, most diplomats prefer the integrated approach, and they view the problems as fundamentally political in nature. Once political will and determination are there, building capacity of local security services becomes a more manageable issue, subordinate to the high politics of peace.

Secondly, security means more than intelligence. Improving the performance of Palestinian security services requires input from a number of security disciplines. For sure, intelligence is key to any security force's understanding of the adversaries' plans to do harm. But training of cadres and leadership must also draw on the worlds of law enforcement and paramilitary operations, and must be closely coordinated with domestic functions including transportation, housing, health, and even education. This wide range of activities does not correspond neatly with the expertise of American intelligence professionals, who are trained to respect a clear boundary between domestic and foreign intelligence, and who often, as field operatives, prefer to work with strong fences between their tasks and those of other institutions, such as the military, diplomacy and law enforcement.

Third, leadership and trust. What we have learned from the 1998-2001 period is that the role of outsiders depends at least in part on the chemistry between them and the parties on the ground, and the perception that they are close to the American president. George Tenet, George Mitchell, and Anthony Zinni all had qualities that made them effective interlocutors, and imbued their missions with an authority and legitimacy. Yet even with their charm and persuasiveness, external factors impeded them from accomplishing what they set out to do. Intelligence chief, politician, and military officer--each brought a mix of personal and institutional attributes, key among them the respect and trust of the parties. That the adversaries of the peace process were still able to undermine peace does not diminish their efforts, nor does it prove that one national security discipline is more vital to the process than another.

Finally, intelligence and democratization. The active promotion of political reform by the Bush administration adds a new dimension to the use of intelligence professionals in promoting peace. Intelligence processes in countries governed by the rule of law are subject to democratic oversight, albeit not always in full public light. But in pre-democratic states facing acute security challenges, intelligence services are often given a wide berth to work for the interests of incumbent power. The danger in putting great weight on the intelligence component of security is that it sends a mixed message to those security services as well as to the citizens whose security is at risk. Does the urgent need to quell violence trump the development of more open political processes? Will citizens, seeing empowered security services before they see genuine democracy, grow even more cynical about politics? To be sure, American intelligence professionals can help get the balance right between improved performance on the security side and enhanced awareness of issues of accountability and rule of law. But it's a delicate act, and as US behavior post-9/11 shows, not always one easy to get right.- Published 12/5/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Ellen Laipson is president and CEO of The Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington. She was vice chair of the National Intelligence Council from 1997 to 2002.

For many years, one of the special skills of the Mossad, Israel's foreign espionage agency, has been running a unit called Cosmos. Its main task is liaising with friendly foreign security services and conducting and maintaining special encounters with organizations and states with which Israel does not have diplomatic relations. In a way, Cosmos has been a state tool, a shadow foreign ministry for carrying out secret missions, conducting confidential dialogues and producing clandestine negotiations. In this manner the Israeli-Egyptian peace process was facilitated and the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty achieved.

The four-year Palestinian intifada has witnessed the emergence of a Cosmos-like process, but this time in the opposite direction and against the wishes of Israel. Several countries that seek to influence the outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have dispatched intelligence operatives and chiefs to the region. This began in 1999-2000 with George Tenet, director of the CIA, who was assigned by President Bill Clinton to serve as an arbitrator and sort out disagreements and quarrels in the realm of security between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Tenet visited the area, met with Israeli and Palestinian leaders and security chiefs, proposed his ideas, and eventually got frustrated with the responses he received, especially from President Yasser Arafat.

The lack of progress convinced Tenet to personally disengage. He found himself involved in the Iraq war preparations and entrusted the Israel-Palestine mission to the CIA bureau chief at the US embassy in Tel Aviv.

CIA involvement triggered the EU to try to play a similar role, using similar tools, and to introduce its own intelligence operative. The selection of Alistair Crooke was no coincidence; he was an experienced MI6 operative, and the EU assessed that Israel would somehow accept a British intelligence agent. Crooke very soon reached the conclusion that the main obstacle to a cessation of hostilities between the two sides was the attitude and policy of the Islamic militants, their rejection of any proposal for a ceasefire, and the inability of the Palestinian Authority to disarm them and impose its will on them. Thus he employed an indirect approach. Instead of involving himself in futile efforts to mediate between Israelis and Palestinians, he decided to try to reach an understanding between the PA and Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Another intelligence player, Omar Suleiman, the cabinet minister in charge of the Egyptian intelligence community, has pursued the same policy. While the EU ceased its official intelligence role after Crooke's departure, MI6 remains involved.

Officially, the role and mandate of the CIA, MI6 and Egyptian intelligence are limited to "professional" aspects and they deal only with "security parameters". They (the French and Italian intelligence services are also involved) have provided training and equipment, including communications interception gear, to the Palestinian security organizations and police. But practically speaking, their role has expanded beyond these boundaries. Tenet's name has been given to a plan that supports a central portion of the US-brokered roadmap. Crooke and Suleiman have been not only mediators between the Islamic militants and the PA, but also important channels of communication and negotiations with Israel.

While the PA welcomes the intelligence involvement--in line with its general strategy of "internationalizing" the peace process--Israel turns a cold shoulder. Israeli leaders and security chiefs would have preferred not to see Tenet, Crooke or Suleiman mingle with the PA. To a certain degree their presence in the region was imposed on Israel by the US, the EU and Egypt.

Yet it would be more precise to note that there is no single coherent Israeli policy in this regard. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is determined to sideline this foreign intelligence involvement, especially that of the EU and to a lesser degree of Egypt. "We shall never let them set foot in the peace process," said a senior official in the Prime Minister's Office "What they are doing is an internal Palestinian matter which is not coordinated with us. Of course we support any attempt to unify and reform Palestinian security organizations." The Israel Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, has a less rigid approach. Some of its top echelons, though not Foreign Minister Sylvan Shalom, privately admit that the intelligence chiefs and operatives might succeed where diplomacy has thus far failed.- Published 12/5/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Yossi Melman is a commentator with the Israeli daily Haaretz, specializing in security and intelligence.