• Egypt: more than a "third party"  - Mohamed Ahmed Abd Elsalam
Egypt has played a central role here--a role not based on the traditional concepts of mediation.

• A unique opportunity  - Shlomo Brom
There is a need for deeper third party involvement to open these logjams.

• Third party scramble  - Jarat Chopra
A year ago there were pockets of potential third party activity to assist during the disengagement. Now these pockets have become cracks.

• Unilateralism is the problem  - Ghassan Khatib
The main feature of the disengagement project, namely its unilateralism, leaves little role for either second or third parties.

• Palestinian economic revival  - Nigel Roberts and Stefano Mocci
Unless a solid start is made soon, the goal of economic recovery and eventual prosperity may slip from our grasp.

Egypt: more than a "third party"
 Mohamed Ahmed Abd Elsalam

The Egyptian role in facilitating arrangements for the Israeli disengagement plan represents an enormous change in Egyptian policy. Egypt has become a major player; its role exceeds that of a mere mediator and approaches that of a partner. The Egyptian vision is pragmatic in dealing with the plan, which, as Egypt understands it, is not automatically connected to the roadmap. The efforts being made by Egyptian officials are reminiscent of the shuttle diplomacy adopted by Henry Kissinger in the Middle East during the mid-1970s. The talks between Egyptian officials and both the Palestinian and Israeli sides deal with delicate details that are regularly reviewed. Even more important are Egypt's commitments stemming from its immediate geographical proximity to the Gaza Strip.

After the Madrid conference of 1991, Egypt became one of the three main effective parties to the Palestinian-Israeli process. But it always kept its distance enabling it to review its role according to the actions of the parties directly involved and the tendencies of Egyptian public opinion. During the following years many contacts without Egyptian involvement were made directly between the parties, such as the Oslo Accords in 1993. Egypt's engagement fluctuated between supporting the Palestinians in seeking reasonable agreements and what seemed to be an Israeli desire for Egypt to play a different role by pressuring the Palestinians. It moved between action and inaction, case by case, regarding the Wye agreement, the Hebron Protocol, Camp David II, and Taba. But it was always present.

Recently, a number of factors have altered this approach. A reassessment of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's positions proved he was a man Egypt could deal with in order to achieve some kind of settlement. An equally important parallel transformation took place on the Palestinian scene after the demise of Yasser Arafat. In terms of Egypt's position this process led not only to a decision to reengage with energy in the peace process, but also to a move to substantially improve Egyptian-Israeli relations. This new cordial atmosphere was crowned by the signing of a QIZ agreement, the release of the Israeli prisoner Azam Azam, Sharon's visit to Egypt, and the return of the Egyptian ambassador to Tel Aviv, in addition to talks about exporting Egyptian natural gas to Israel. These developments also sustained Egypt's ability to influence the course of the political process.

The dominating sense in Egypt is that a special relationship binds it to Gaza, and that this is due to historical, political and demographic factors as well as "neighborhood" issues that involve border security problems between Egypt and Israel. Accordingly, Egypt's efforts this time not only reflect the traditional Egyptian commitment toward the Palestinian issue but also direct Egyptian national interests. Any complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza will include a redeployment of forces on the border in a way different from that agreed upon under the military appendix of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979. In this regard it should be noted that the Egyptian-Jordanian consensus reached at the Sharm El-Sheikh summit makes clear that Egypt is more concerned with Gaza's engagement with the West Bank than with the engagement of Gaza and the West Bank with the two neighboring Arab countries.

Egypt, however, is also directly involved in the arrangements for disengagement. Based on official statements, the Egyptian position holds that the disengagement plan must be considered a step toward implementation of the roadmap in order to prevent the peace process from breaking down, as happened with the Oslo Accords. Since the disengagement plan will not lead to a viable Palestinian state or a permanent settlement, the intricate final status issues must still be dealt with. But Egyptian efforts this time exceed this official position. Egypt has made clear through its practical actions that Palestinian success in dealing with the challenges that may appear after the withdrawal from Gaza will pave the way for progress toward a final settlement.

>From this perspective Egypt, with American support, is playing many roles. It has worked on reaching an understanding between the new Palestinian leadership and the Israeli government on a ceasefire agreement, thereby providing a better climate for Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the northern West Bank. It worked to secure a consensus among the Palestinian factions in Cairo on the ceasefire agreement. This was a difficult mission that required contacts and complex compromises with a number of parties. Egypt also concluded an understanding with Israel regarding arrangements along its border with Sinai. Even more important is the follow-up to all these understandings, designed to prevent their breakdown at any point, especially in view of complicated Palestinian issues.

Egypt's next mission is to help in managing the post-Israeli withdrawal stage in Gaza and provide a successful model. This mission may be the most difficult. It involves problems related to border security and the Palestinian armed factions, as well as administration of the lands from which Israel withdraws and the problems facing the Palestinian economy. In this latter regard, the Palestinians will need real support, especially concerning financial and administrative affairs. Another potential problem relates to what is called the "Islamization" of Gaza, in the event Hamas gains more control than expected as a result of Palestinian elections. All this represents a huge burden in terms of contacts, follow-up and understandings with the new Palestinian leaders and the Israeli leadership, in an attempt to build a new partnership.

No doubt Egypt has played a central role here--a role not based on the traditional concepts of mediation, and one that exceeds anything done before. Egyptian efforts are using up so much energy that some in Egypt complain that our interest in these issues comes at the expense of others of similar importance, such as relations with the Nile Basin countries. What facilitates this process is the conviction on the part of all the direct parties regarding the necessity of the Egyptian role. There are positive responses from the Palestinian side and a kind of flexibility on the Israeli side, as well as support and encouragement from the United States.

Thus far Egypt has not faced huge obstacles. But it has to be noted that after the Israeli withdrawal there will be a need for both further Israeli steps and a powerful American reengagement in the peace process, if we are to avoid a regression once again back to square one.- Published 21/4/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Dr. Mohamed Ahmed Abd Elsalam is a senior researcher in the Military Research Unit of the Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, where he edits the Al Ahram Strategic File.

The Gaza disengagement will have a positive impact on the Israeli-Palestinian relationship only if it is a stage in a process aimed at bringing about the end of occupation and the creation of a stable, non-violent Israeli-Palestinian relationship. As an independent step divorced from any meaningful process it may only escalate the conflict between the two peoples due to both sides' failed expectations.

To make disengagement a success story, several developments must take place:
* The present ceasefire should persist and become more stable and more comprehensive;
* there should be a rapid improvement and normalization of the living conditions of the Palestinians;
* the parties will have to reach understandings on the post-disengagement political process;
* the disengagement should be implemented in a coordinated and cooperative way.

Each of these goals faces serious obstacles. It is difficult to maintain the ceasefire as long as violent friction continues between Israelis and Palestinians. The Palestinian Authority security organs are not in real control and are not capable of operating effectively against the various armed factions; the Israeli security forces must continue their operations in the Palestinian areas.

The withdrawal from Gaza will not be complete. The IDF will continue to deploy along the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip (the philadelphi road), and this will cause continuous friction with smugglers and the Palestinian population living nearby. It will be difficult to normalize the movement of goods and people as long as Israel continues to retain control of the outer envelope of the Gaza Strip and there is no real change in the West Bank other than removal of four settlements. And the instability of the ceasefire will also not allow Israel to substantially ease restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement.

The two sides have divergent positions on the post-disengagement political process. Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) wishes to skip the second interim stage of the roadmap, namely the establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders, while Israeli PM Ariel Sharon insists on another interim stage and refuses to enter negotiations on a permanent status agreement. This divergence of positions also causes the two parties to refrain from real cooperation and coordination on implementation of the disengagement plan.

It seems there is a need for deeper third party involvement to open these logjams. Third party involvement is essential in several key areas:
* Establishing an effective monitoring system that strengthens the ceasefire.
* Suggesting a mechanism that allows Israel to withdraw from the philadelphi road and allows the Palestinians to operate their own airport and seaport in Gaza.
* Increasing financial assistance to the PA to jumpstart the Palestinian economy, then continuing assistance in building the institutions needed for economic revival.
* Assisting in rebuilding and reforming the Palestinian security services.
* Reaching an understanding with Israel and the Palestinian leadership regarding the day after.

The present ceasefire is very fragile and vulnerable. The two parties should operate according to rules of conduct that reduce unnecessary friction between them. The presence of international monitors would strengthen compliance on the part of both parties.

The PA and Israel do not seem capable of negotiating by themselves arrangements that prevent use of the philadelphi corridor for smuggling of weapons into the Gaza Strip--arrangements that could enable Israeli withdrawal from this area and prevent continuous Israeli-Palestinian friction. The international community can devise a system that allows Israel to withdraw from this area. It has to include the following elements:
* An Egyptian commitment to prevent the operation of smuggling rings on the Egyptian side and to deploy the necessary military and internal security forces for this purpose.
* MFO (Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai) monitoring of the above forces' deployment and performance.
* A PA commitment to prevent smuggling and to deploy security forces for this purpose.
* Establishment of an international mechanism that deploys in the corridor, and monitors and assists Palestinian counter-smuggling operations.
* Establishment of an international monitoring mechanism at the Rafah crossing to enable Israeli withdrawal from the crossing point. This mechanism will prevent smuggling and maintain the common customs envelope. It may be combined with a system of remote Israeli inspection through video. This could make it easier for Israel to accept the replacement of its own forces by an international mechanism.
* The same mechanism can be implemented later in the airport and seaport in Gaza, thereby enabling their opening to the external world.

International financial assistance is a necessary condition for a Palestinian economic revival, but also for rebuilding the capabilities and institutions of the PA after the destruction they endured during the intifada and as a result of Yasser Arafat's leadership. It is especially important to reform the security services, decrease the number of competing services, and create unity of command. Abu Mazen needs third party support, assistance and advice for this purpose.

The international community should not miss this unique opportunity to change the course of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship and put the political process back on track.- Published 21/4/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Brig. Gen. (ret.) Shlomo Brom is a senior research associate at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv.

A year ago there were discrete pockets of potential third party activity to assist the Palestinian and Israeli sides during the disengagement; now these pockets have become cracks. A year ago a number of difficult issues posed management challenges; today they pose a security threat requiring a crisis response. In the absence of a response, the resulting complexity of the "day after" may necessitate a high level of international involvement that is unlikely to be available.

Each day there are fewer prospects that the difficult issues affecting the disengagement will be sufficiently resolved in the coming months. It is inconceivable that new Palestinian institutions can be built in time to react adequately.

A strategy is needed that can buy time for the broad range of disengagement issues to be addressed after the final day of Israeli troop withdrawal, or "D-Day". To "hold the ring" on the ground in the meantime, a security plan has to reclaim the space squandered in the preceding year. If D-Day can be secured and vacated areas handled for a limited transitional period, then time pressure on most other problems can be relieved.

Given the integrated nature of the disengagement, the process would have been well served by a comprehensive campaign plan, civilian-led with a security pillar. With the prevalent threat to and urgency in the process, chiefly a security plan in the short term is a priority that may be able to advance toward a comprehensive approach subsequently.

A number of separate calendars can be plotted. The Israeli withdrawal itinerary includes critical milestones through summer 2005. There are corresponding dates regarding construction of the wall and settlement activity in the West Bank. The Palestinian calendar for the same period is dominated by municipal, legislative and Fateh General Conference elections against a background of internal struggle for political dominance. The international calendar is focused in part on fixing a donors' conference to pledge support to the Palestinian Authority pursuant to progress on World Bank and Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) recommendations.

Missing from the various calendars is a Palestinian sequence of operational activity leading to a chance for an orderly, coherent or effective handover of vacated areas from Israeli to Palestinian control. Also, Israel still needs to supply to Palestinians a description of the geographic scope of withdrawal (including the northern West Bank, philadelphi and international crossing points).

Analysts are divided about the prospects of chaos on D-Day, though it may be argued that the "Somalization" of the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank is starkly evident and constitutes a threatening factor for planning purposes. At present, worst-case conditions are still producing best-case expectations. Certainly, order may prevail on D-Day as the result of a self-evolving balance of power. In such a scenario, the outcome of muddling through would have been left largely to chance.

At this late stage, the nature of third party involvement in the short term is going to be limited to activities such as planning assistance for the withdrawal process and the possibility of monitoring a handover of some kind. International "boots on the ground" are unrealistic. And the cast of third party characters has necessitated creative formulations, given the limitations of the usual actors, including the UN. The central role of the World Bank has been unique but ultimately circumscribed by an institutional mandate. By default, private entities have been considered as a means of filling some gaps.

The international architecture on the ground remains divided between largely bilateral security efforts and all other development and humanitarian sectors--embodied by the separate William Ward and James Wolfensohn missions. Paradoxically, this fact could be exploited positively in a sequential order of business to create a secure environment in the interim for economic recovery, governance rehabilitation and infrastructure reconstruction to follow D-Day. On the day after, however, longer term security sector reform and these broader imperatives will require a degree of linkage that has so far been absent.

Given the anatomy of strategic and operational planning for a crisis response and the kinds of steps to be taken in security implementation, there are a few short weeks to get going. Thereafter, diminishing returns will undermine the last chance for a managed process as events unfold by themselves.- Published 21/4/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Jarat Chopra is the director-general of the International Assessment Group, established by Strategic Assessments Initiative for third party operational planning during the disengagement process. The views expressed are the author's own.

The Israeli plan to unilaterally disengage from the Gaza Strip has created a lot of controversy, but most of the parties involved in one way or another in the conflict have been excited about the project, with the notable exception of the Palestinians. The different countries that have played roles in the past either directly or indirectly in the conflict are now trying to find new roles in what has become the only game in town as far as the conflict is concerned, i.e., disengagement.

With all this, the main feature of the disengagement project, namely its unilateralism, has been neglected. Israel has already determined the details of disengagement and there is very little role for either second or third parties to play.

The basic plan, which Israeli legislators voted for in the Knesset, includes the evacuation of settlements and army bases and the withdrawal of settlers and soldiers. Overall, however, the Gaza Strip will remain under Israeli control, with access to and from the Strip subject to direct Israeli restrictions.

While the evacuation of settlements is always a positive step, maintaining restrictions on the movement in and out of Gaza will, according to the Palestinian side as well as international agencies, cause further economic deterioration. It is because this is well known by all the countries interested in playing a third party role, and because of the unilateral nature of the project, that most of these countries and parties are having difficulty in finding a role to play.

The Palestinians have been encouraging third party countries to try to convince the Israelis to modify the disengagement plan to make it part of the roadmap. They have met with no success. The US and other major donors, meanwhile, have pledged financial support to the project to improve it, but also with very little success. Finally, third parties have been trying to play a role in both encouraging "coordination" and mediating between the two sides for coordination purposes. These efforts too have met with very little success.

The Palestinian side has asked more than one of these parties to try to ask Israel to clarify some uncertain aspects of this withdrawal. For instance, it is not yet clear what are the positions to which Israel will withdraw. Without knowing where any border will lie, it is impossible to coordinate what kind of border regime will be in place and what restrictions on the movement of goods and people Israel has in mind. This is especially important because most of the industrial and agricultural assets that Israel might leave in the settlements are intended to produce goods for export. Not knowing what kind of border regime will regulate the movement of products from Gaza to the outside world through Israel very negatively affects Palestinian preparations for post-disengagement. In addition, of course, the Palestinian side still doesn't know exactly what assets, if any, will be left behind, and thus cannot prepare for their management with any success.

But criticism directed at Israel for not negotiating the withdrawal with the Palestinian side has fallen on deaf ears. One Israeli politician responded that the project is intended as a punishment rather than a reward and that's why it is being done unilaterally.

In general, by insisting on the unilateral nature of this project, Israel has been making it very difficult, not only for the Palestinian side but also for those trying to help both sides.

There are two ways in which the international community can contribute to make the disengagement a constructive step toward reviving the peace process and thus help both Palestinians and Israelis. The first is to arrange for an increase in financial and technical aid to Palestinians. Without it, the Gaza Strip's current levels of unemployment and poverty will leave the PA with great difficulty in maintaining political and security stability.

The second and most important way, however, is if, through individual third countries' bilateral relations with Israel, third parties were to pressure and convince Israel to cooperate with the Palestinian side, particularly by adding new elements to the project, including a linkage between the West Bank and Gaza. The economy of Gaza is not viable on its own, it is only viable as part of the overall Palestinian economy. In this context third parties can also help by convincing Israel to allow the establishment of a seaport in Gaza and the reopening of the airport to create an environment that might attract some investment and thus create jobs and ensure at least the minimum level of economic and consequently political stability.

The Quartet has appointed James Wolfensohn as its Gaza withdrawal envoy. The Quartet could have been more constructive if it had appointed Wolfensohn as the envoy to move the parties back to the roadmap, and part of that could be achieved by developing this Gaza withdrawal project as part of the roadmap. The roadmap is a process that aims at making peace. The unilateral steps Israel has declared in Gaza and is practicing unannounced in the West Bank do not contribute to moving the parties in this direction.- Published 21/4/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Ghassan Khatib is coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet publications and director of the Government Media Center. This article represents his personal views.

The World Bank has spent much of the last year analyzing and discussing with the Palestinian Authority (PA), the Government of Israel (GOI), and the international community what is needed to revive the devastated Palestinian economy, and what it will take to develop a new and healthier economic relationship between Israel and the PA. We have done so knowing that economic growth and prosperity by themselves might not guarantee peace, but that stagnation, unemployment and widespread poverty make any search for reconciliation infinitely more difficult.

When the GOI announced in June 2004 its plan to withdraw from Gaza and parts of the northern West Bank, the World Bank was asked by the PA, the GOI and the donors to review the initiative's potential impact on the Palestinian economy. In the report Stagnation or Revival? Israeli Disengagement and Palestinian Economic Prospects, issued in December 2004, the Bank concluded that disengagement in and of itself will not make an appreciable difference to the prostrate Palestinian economy. A lot more than the act of disengagement is needed if Palestinian economic fortunes are to be revived.

The report, endorsed and adopted by the international community at recent conferences in Oslo and London, emphasized the need for a sustained flow of foreign assistance. It also argued, however, that foreign aid is not the key factor in bringing about economic revival. A cursory appraisal of the history of donor assistance in recent years illustrates this. During the intifada, donors doubled their annual disbursements to almost one billion dollars per year--over 300 dollars per person per year, itself a record in the annals of foreign assistance. And yet, at the same time Palestinian personal incomes contracted by almost 40 percent in real terms. This is a graphic illustration of how a malign policy environment can overwhelm the benefits of additional donor assistance. Only if this environment changes can donor assistance achieve very much at all.

What exactly do we mean by the policy environment in this case? We are talking above all of the restrictions on the movement of Palestinian goods and people imposed during the intifada. These have so severely distorted and compressed the functioning of the economy that returns on investment are now for the most part negligible. If disengagement is to have much positive impact on the Palestinian economy, it will therefore need to be accompanied by a swift dismantling of closures. This in turn places a premium on the PA and on Palestinians to restore law and order and to abide by Palestinian security obligations as defined under the roadmap. In addition, in order to attract back the private investors whose efforts are essential to the achievement of sustained growth, the PA will need to accelerate its program of internal governance reforms in areas like legal and judicial reconstruction and combating corruption.

These complementary activities can be defined collectively as "preconditions" for Palestinian economic revival. Only once these policy changes begin to take root will donor assistance have any positive transformational impact (as opposed to merely slowing the speed of economic decline, as it does now). Put another way, donor developmental assistance can only bring sustainable growth if the policy environment changes first. In this sense the Bank has argued that meaningful progress on closure, security and reform is a necessity if one wishes to achieve a "quantum leap" in levels of donor developmental assistance. In adopting this logic, the donor community, at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) in Oslo in December 2004, requested the Bank to translate its recommendations into a set of concrete steps that should be taken by the PA and the GOI--and to assess progress toward implementation.

The Bank has since then been working with officials of the PA and the GOI to identify possible practical ways of dismantling today's closure regime without compromising Israel's security, as well as seeking new ways to support Palestinian reform. One aspect of this work has involved a dialogue on options to improve the border passages and terminals. Israel wishes to upgrade these terminals into modern, efficient and secure facilities. The Bank has proposed an approach to border management in which cargo flows would be regularized and determined principally by market demand, involving the adoption of internationally-accepted terminal service standards, modern risk management techniques and commercial dispute resolution mechanisms. Critically, these new facilities should dispense with today's highly disruptive back-to-back system of cargo inspection. To permit this new management philosophy to be implemented without appreciable risk, the terminals need to be equipped with the latest security scanning equipment.

Efficient border terminals alone will not be enough to revive the economy, however. Israel will need to adopt a more comprehensive approach to dismantling closure, including the removal of the checkpoints and roadblocks introduced into the West Bank during the intifada, and establishing a flow of people and goods between Gaza and the West Bank adequate to maintain the economic coherence of the two parts of the Palestinian territory. It will also be important to maintain a reasonable and predictable flow of Palestinian labor into Israel while Palestinians seek to reduce their excessive economic dependency on Israel and to develop export competitiveness--something likely to take many years, and to require transitional support of various kinds from Israel and the donors. Important too is to maintain the current quasi-customs union economic relationship between Israel and the PA, in both Gaza and the West Bank--at least until such time as new and appropriate arrangements can be mutually agreed.

There is some cause for optimism these days, but the road to Palestinian economic recovery will not be an easy one, even if the parties can agree on how it should be constructed. The Bank's December report speaks of a recession "of historic proportions", of a "loss of all economic dynamism", and of the PA's fading political control and popular support. Even under the most optimistic assumptions, the PA will face daunting challenges as it attempts to cater to its rapidly expanding population.

Unless a solid start is made very soon, the goal of recovery and eventual prosperity may slip from our collective grasp, condemning Palestinians to long-term penury and Israel to the possibility of an impoverished, bitter and angry neighbor. And in this context it has to be said that very little has changed on the ground since the Bank delivered its December warning.- Published 21/4/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Nigel Roberts is the director of the World Bank - West Bank and Gaza Country Department since April 2001. Stefano Mocci is the World Bank's senior external affairs officer in the West Bank and Gaza.