• Perhaps a charm offensive  - Mensur Akgun
If the Turks are against US policies, there should be a reason to question and amend these policies.

• A momentary hiccup  - Henri J. Barkey
At the heart of the new wave of anti-Americanism in Turkey lies a deep sense of anxiety and uncertainty about the radical changes in Turkey's political environment and domestic politics.

• Winning Turkey's heart  - Soner Cagaptay
The impact of the war in Iraq on the Turkish public has affected opinion across the board but is not a matter of simple "anti-Americanism".

• Only Iraq and the PKK  - Ersin Kalaycioglu
The same factors that paved the way for AKP to ascend to power are also responsible for the erosion of the US government image in Turkey

Perhaps a charm offensive
 Mensur Akgun

A cursory internet surfer may stumble upon hundreds of articles and comments on the poor state of current relations between Turkey and the United States. Most of these address the unfulfilled expectations of the American side, especially following the US intervention in Iraq. More recent ones deal with the public mood in Turkey, which is not at all receptive to the policies of the Bush administration. Those who can read Turkish can also come across similar criticism in Turkish press columns.

But does this really reflect the current state of relations between the two countries? Has it really hit rock bottom? My short answer is, no. Except for some minor points of friction and unfortunate instances, state-to-state relations are not that bad, interests are complementary, policies coincide, and Turkey and the US need each other more than ever.

If nothing else, the convening of the NATO conference in Istanbul in June 2004, Bush's visit to Ankara, and the inclusion of Turkey in Secretary of State Rice's first tour of Europe and the Middle East prove that mutual relations have not been sacrificed to the media.

It seems that both the media and the public, and in some instances politicians on either side, expect more than the other can deliver. Overburdened with culturalist assumptions and neo-conservative designs, the Americans tend to become disillusioned much more easily with the current government, due to its Islamic roots, than with previous ones. On the other hand, Turks, having once again sunk into their own nationalist quagmire, are unable to grasp the realities of the world surrounding them.

If Turkey had a different type of government with fewer Islamic credentials, the US reaction to the perceived unfavorable decision of the Turkish Parliament in March 2003 to the stationing of troops probably would have been more conciliatory. Turkey's relations with Syria and Iran would also be seen from a different angle. And if nationalist propaganda did not dominate public opinion, the Turks would have seen the American presence in Iraq as a factor contributing to the stability and integrity of the country even after the ill-designed intervention.

US-Turkish relations have constantly been blurred with misperceptions. Seen from the Turkish perspective, there is no single issue that may have led to friction between the two countries. Turks are of course worried about the reluctance of the Americans to collaborate against the PKK threat in northern Iraq. They still blame the Bush administration for its short-sightedness regarding the consequences of the intervention in Iraq. Indeed, Turks are concerned with the fate of that country. They are worried about the consequences of a failed non-unitary Iraq. The pictures of systematic torture in Abu Ghraib have troubled the Turkish population.

However, when it comes to the overall policy framework, Turkey is behind the US grand strategy and even instrumental in initiating it. Turkey, for instance, was one of the first countries endorsing the Greater Middle East initiative. Speaking at Bourgas Free University, Bulgaria, on May 12, 2003, Foreign Minister Gul "strongly urge(d) all the related parties to carefully examine this initiative and to candidly work on it". During the foreign ministers meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Tehran on May 28, 2003, Minister Gul once more called on Muslim leaders to "first put our house in order".

Both Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan have furthered this idea at various national and international forums, and Turkey's eagerness was reciprocated in the Sea Island G8 Summit with a non-governmental co-chair seat at the newly created Democracy Assistance Dialogue mechanism.

Turkey was again among the first countries to announce its wish to participate in the multinational peacekeeping force in Afghanistan, and has subsequently assumed command of that force (ISAF) twice. Both instances were hailed by the US administration as demonstrations of the solidity of the US-Turkey strategic partnership and of Turkey's resolve to combat terrorism.

Moreover, Turkey and the US have a common interest in boosting stability in the Caucasus and the Middle East. Although it is usually taken for granted, one should not forget that without Turkey's good will the conflicts in the Caucasus are unlikely to be solved. Needless to say, Turkey with its multicultural and multi-ethnic credentials has a lot to offer to the harmonization of civilizations.

But Turkey cannot fulfill all of the American public's expectations and cannot be held accountable for the failure of American neo-conservative assumptions. Despite the long history of mutual relations and American assistance, at the end of the day Turkey is a sovereign country with a proud history, ever diminishing imperial reflexes, and national interests. Not all the interests of the country correspond to neo-conservative designs. Turkey cannot consent to everything American.

Aligning Turkey and the Turks with anti-Americanism cannot and will not lead to the normalization of relations. Turkey is a test case for the success of American policies in gaining the hearts and minds of the friendly countries in this region. If the Turks, with a long history of almost unilaterally beneficial relations, are against US policies, there should be a reason to question and amend these policies.

As Graham Fuller aptly put in the LA Times, "right now, opposition to US policies is the nearest thing to a national consensus in Turkey. Major elements across the political spectrum--Turkey's strong secularists, nationalists, Kemalists and leftists-- are even more harshly critical of Washington than the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Efforts by Washington to intimidate a popular, representative Turkish government or to bring it in line with US government policies will almost surely backfire".

Instead, the US might consider launching a charm offensive. There are plenty of opportunities available to change the perception of Turks about the current American administration. Primary among them is the Cyprus problem, which has defied every attempt at settlement for 50 odd years. A diplomatic intervention in the direction of the empowerment of Turkish Cypriots as part of a lasting settlement of the conflict would definitely have an enormous positive impact on Turkish public opinion.- Published 14/4/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Mensur Akgun is the foreign policy director of TESEV, the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation. He is associate professor of political science at Kultur University, Istanbul, and columnist for the daily Referant.

One should not be overly surprised if an outside observer thinks that US-Turkish relations are on a downward slide. A series of press articles in the US media of late have highlighted the strident anti-American rhetoric in the Turkish media. Much has also been made of a newly published Turkish novel depicting an American invasion of Turkey and the successful Turkish resistance. Against the backdrop of differences on Iraq policy, the American press has implicitly questioned the very nature of the Turkish-American alliance, one that dates to the beginning of the Cold War.

It is true that the Turkish press is replete with vitriolic attacks on the US. As an added flavor, many of these articles also carry anti-Semitic (as distinct from anti-Israeli) messages. Accusations against the US range from deliberately causing the Asian Tsunami to instigating riots in Turkey and trying to carve up the country. Opinion polls also show that President Bush is disliked by some 82 percent of the Turkish public, the highest among America's allies.

Anti-Americanism in Turkey is not new and, therefore, the latest diatribes in the Turkish media have to be taken in stride. What is different from the US perspective, however, is the contamination of the political and bureaucratic elite's discourse by such sentiments. This was most apparent when a leading member of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) accused the US of committing genocide in Falluja, or when a senior military commander directly accused the US of complicity in the murder of Turkish special agents traveling through northern Iraq. Equally unfathomable was the accusation by the main opposition leader that the emergence of a challenger against his leadership in his own party was a plot concocted in Washington. It appears that he convinced himself that the US administration, bent on revenge for the failure of the March 1, 2003 parliamentary vote seeking authorization for the opening of a second front against Iraq, decided to target him. As incorrect or stupendous as were these charges, almost no one in a Turkish leadership position had the courage to challenge them.

At the heart of this new wave of anti-Americanism in Turkey lies a deep sense of anxiety and uncertainty about the radical changes in Turkey's political environment and domestic politics. Different groups have embraced this discourse for their own particular reasons. Although the unpopularity of the war in Iraq and unbecoming US conduct play a major role, they is not the sole reason. After all, the war is unpopular in many other countries.

The change began immediately after 9/11. Just as in the Arab world, many in Turkey were deeply disturbed by the image of a confrontation between the West and Islam that these attacks seemed to conjure. Unable to accept al-Qaeda's role, those sympathetic to Islamist causes sought to blame their usual suspects, CIA, Mossad etc. The glow that President Clinton had created in Turkey with his 1999 visit and his decision to deliver to the Turks the fugitive leader of the Kurdish insurgency on a silver platter was extinguished almost overnight.

The war in Iraq and the ensuing insurgency refocused Turkey's attention on the Kurds. Ankara has always feared the contagion effect of Kurdish independence and autonomy in northern Iraq, and had made it its solemn cause to prevent either of these from materializing. The emergence of the Iraqi Kurds as an important, if not indispensable, player has reawakened Turkish fears of a rekindling of Turkish Kurdish activism. In addition, Turks became convinced that the US was bent on punishing them for rejecting the second front option despite the Bush administration's signals to the contrary.

Turkey's own fears and insecurities have allowed it to suspect US motives and intentions in Iraq. Almost everyone in Turkey is convinced that the US is intent on establishing an independent Kurdish state in Iraq--despite years of contrary rhetoric and assurances--either to reward the Kurds for their help in the war or as part of a grand design to remake the Middle East. It is not that Turks and Americans disagree on what they would like to see happen in Iraq. It is that they cannot agree on what ought to happen in the event conditions go awry and Iraq falls apart.

It is ironic that Turks, who have finally managed to get the European Union to open the door to accession talks after many years of trying, would feel far from confident about their future prospects. Yet for some, the EU is a poisoned chalice precisely because it proscribes changes that will force the democratization of the Turkish political space. Inevitably, this would entail the articulation of dissident voices and demands--primarily, although not exclusively, Kurdish ones--which they fear will gnaw away at the unity of the republic. Even the government, which pushed so hard with its audacious reform agenda to obtain a date from the EU, seems to have lost its elan and has stumbled on Iraq.

These fears are culminating in what can best be described as a "nationalist moment". From the extreme right as one would expect to the extreme left, there has been a rallying around symbolic issues. These have ranged from the Turkish-speaking Turkmen in Iraq who performed miserably in the January 30 elections to the mundane, such as the characterization of Turks in American television shows.

This moment will not last forever. Much of the disagreements on Iraq can be resolved amicably and with patient dialogue. The rest will be taken care of in time. If Turks are worried about how America portrays them on television, it is because they care about American attitudes. Washington, on the other hand, also knows that Turkish diplomacy may be slow and hard to influence, but in the end it has rarely failed the US.- Published 14/4/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Henri J. Barkey is a non-resident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and professor of international relations at Lehigh University.

Turkish-US relations are at a low point. In Turkey, literally every Turk feels resentful of America's Middle East policies, and Ankara is reaching out to US foes Syria and Iran. An outgoing US ambassador to Ankara may not be replaced immediately when the time comes in the summer, a sure sign of strained relations. Some US officials have, in a rather ungrounded manner, blamed Turkey's lack of cooperation in the initial phases of the Iraq war for the lasting Iraq insurgency. Turkey is no longer considered a real partner when the US makes its plans for the Middle East.

How did it get to this and what needs to be done to repair relations whose positive tone has been unique in the region? There are three main reasons, but one underlying cause that feeds them all, and that is the ramifications for Turkey of America's war in Iraq. The impact of the war in Iraq on the Turkish public has affected opinion across the board, but is not a matter of simple "anti-Americanism". To understand this, one needs to understand some of the history.

When the Iraq war started, Turkey had just come out of a traumatic decade-and-a-half struggle against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) terrorist group. That conflict resulted in 30,000 casualties, which in Turkey means almost every individual was personally affected.

The PKK entered into a unilateral ceasefire in 1999 and remained largely dormant for several years. It pulled most of its operatives out of Turkey and into northern Iraq. The issue was not over, but it was about to become perhaps a closed chapter when the Iraq war started.

Some US officials, notably Donald Rumsfeld in March of this year, have argued that the lack of a northern front--as a result of the vote in Turkey's parliament prior to the onset of war in March 2003 against cooperating with US forces--is one of the main causes of the lasting Iraqi insurgency. But most military analysts disagree. The lack of a northern front did not affect an insurgency that would have happened with or without it.

But what the Iraq war has done is concentrate an unprecedented amount of political power in the hands of Iraq's Kurds. It is partly because Turkey did not offer the US an alternative that the US has come to rely so heavily on its Kurdish allies. Regardless, with the PKK enjoying a safe haven in northern Iraq under the control of Iraq's two Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the PKK renounced its ceasefire in June 2004 and restarted its attacks into Turkey.

This is where Turkey has become so wary of US policies. The struggle against the PKK is a fresh wound in Turkish society and has been reopened again too soon. Had Kurds in Iraq gained an equivalent amount of political power ten years down the line, Turkey would have reacted differently. But it happened now, and since Iraq is controlled by the US, that's where Turks lay the blame.

It is in this context that we should read the current rapprochement between Turkey and Syria and Iran, countries that have provided safe haven for the PKK in the past. Both countries have Kurdish populations and have concerns similar to Turkey's over the rising political profile of the Iraqi Kurds. This is why Syria and Iran are now starting to cooperate with Turkey against the PKK. It is also a short-term strategic move. Syria and Iran see that by showing commitment against the PKK, they can win Turkey's heart.

The Kurdish issue, however, while shaping the majority nationalist constituency in Turkey, is only one factor. Also fiercely opposed to the Iraq war are the conservative and Islamist trend in Turkey as well as the liberal intellectual elite. The Islamists abhor the war because it is a war on a Muslim country. That rhetoric, while normally marginal in Turkey, has gained new credence in the country since the rise to power of the AKP (the Justice and Development Party). Although the AKP has an Islamist pedigree, since its rise to power in November 2002 the party has presented itself as a conservative democratic movement. Nevertheless, the AKP's ascent to power has broadened what is politically acceptable discourse in the country, and enabled Islamist and conservative views of the war to be well reflected in the mainstream press.

This is aided by the liberal media and academic elite, which, in European fashion, opposes the war because it judges it as illegal, as about US hegemony, and a neo-colonialist attempt at dominating the Middle East.

Nevertheless, it is the nationalist constituency and the Kurdish issue that have the greatest resonance, and it is here that the US needs to make inroads if it wants to repair relations with Turkey.

The US has two options, both predicated on the assumption that Turkey is too important an ally to let go by the wayside. One is direct, quick and sure-fire, but carries political costs. The other is slower but also less costly.

The US needs to reach out to the nationalist majority in Turkey. The quickest way of doing so is by addressing the issue that most excites this majority, namely the PKK. If the US did what Syria and Iran are doing so smartly, i.e., show commitment against the PKK, a Turkish majority would quickly be swayed back in favor of America. That would entail taking action against the PKK in northern Iraq. The PKK is a small organization of some 5,000 members. It is very hierarchical, and if the US acts against its leaders, the PKK will be paralyzed as it was after Turkey captured erstwhile leader Abdullah Ocalan. (It was immediately after Turkey captured Ocalan, with US help in 1998,that the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire.)

But such action carries a political risk for the US, dependant as it is on the Kurds of Iraq. While it is the most effective way of swaying Turkish public opinion, it demands a relatively stable Iraq, which appears to be still some way down the line. In the meantime, the US, however, has another, politically risk-free option.

The fate of Turkish Cyprus is very important to Turkey, as it appears to hold the key to membership of the EU. Turkish Cypriots showed a spirit of compromise during the April 2004 UN vote on the future of the island that Turks feel has gone unrewarded. In this referendum, which offered both sides the minimum of their political demands, Turkish Cypriots voted to accept the plan, while Greek Cypriots rejected it. If the US stepped in, by offering trade links, cultural contacts, and tourism, and acted to ease the economic and humanitarian sanctions Northern Cyprus has endured, it would play well in mainland Turkey and go some way to improve the image of American policy in the eyes of Turks.

What Washington does depends on how strongly the US values its relations with Turkey. Dangerously shorn as it is of allies in the Middle East, it would seem foolish not to make an attempt at restoring relations with a country that has historically been one of the western world's greatest allies in this region.- Published 14/4/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org


Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Hale Arifagaoglu is a research assistant at the Institute and Cansin Ersoz was a research intern at the Institute in 2009-2010.

Politicians and journalists in the United States have been pointing to the eroding image of the US and emerging anti-Americanism in Turkey, which threaten to undermine relations between the two NATO allies. US authorities have started to pressure the Turkish government to cope with rising xenophobia in Turkey, or otherwise risk losing the financial and political support of the US.

In fact, since 1995 Turkish voters have sharply shifted their allegiances from the center of the left-right ideological spectrum to the right. Chauvinism, Islamism, and xenophobia have increased in Turkey ever since. Consequently the champion of Islamism, the Welfare Party, and its offshoot Justice and Development Party (AKP), ascended to power through popular elections. Meanwhile, US governments did their best to promote the idea of a "Turkish model of moderate Islam". So it is bewildering to observe the US government develop a concern over xenophobia and Islamism in Turkey now.

One obvious reason seems to be the recalcitrance of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) to go along with US policy toward Iraq. It is a well-known fact in Turkey that the Turkish government was the first to alert the US against Saddam Hussein's ill intentions in 1989. Turkey immediately imposed an embargo on Iraq upon its invasion of Kuwait in 1990, causing the economy of eastern Turkey, which had experienced a boom in the Iran-Iraq War of the1980s, to experience a sudden downturn.

Small wonder that this economic downturn generated a wave of anti-establishment and anti-Turkish feelings among the Kurdish citizens of the region. It also contributed to the rising popularity of the Maoist PKK, which championed Kurdish nationalist separatism and anti-Turkish propaganda. The PKK instigated a wave of terror that caused 30,000 deaths in the 1990s; Turkey paid a heavy economic and political toll, and received no benefits. Under the circumstances, Turks blamed US governments as having acted with callousness and disdain toward Turkey. When the second Gulf War became imminent, the Turkish public had a feeling of deja vu, and reacted sharply to avoid repetition of the same costly involvement in Iraq.

In the meantime, the freshly elected and inexperienced AKP leaders wanted to show the US that their previous record of Islamism and anti-Americanism would not stand in the way of cooperation with America. The Turkish government and military seemed to have signaled the US government that Turkey would cooperate in the northern offensive into Iraq. However, a large faction in the AKP parliamentary group consisted of a pro-Arab and anti-Jewish lobby. Their Arab connection and Islamism influenced their reactions, and they acted with a vengeance toward the US offer for joint military action in northern Iraq. Hence, on March 1, 2003 about 90 deputies of the AKP jumped the whip and voted with the opposition against sending Turkish and US troops into Iraq. Consequently, the US government had the impression that it had been deceived by the Turkish establishment.

Turkey permitted the US to use its airspace, and US troops were eventually parachuted into northern Iraq to coalesce with Kurdish tribal forces in their northern offensive in Iraq. The subsequent Kurdish-US alliance spared the anti-Turkish PKK stationed in the north of Iraq the wrath of the US army, while US troops moved against other terror organizations in Iraq. This provided a biased image of the US in the Turkish media: a double standard that tolerated the PKK while attacking "Muslim" radicals with a vengeance. Such incidents as arresting the members of the Turkish military in northern Iraq in 2003, and the brutal murders of the five Turkish police on their way to the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad in the American zone in 2004, further reinforced the dismal image of US forces in Iraq in Turkish eyes.

The destruction of the population and land registration files by the Kurds in Kirkuk gave the impression in Turkey that the Kurds of Iraq were doing their best to cleanse that city of its Turkmen and Arab culture. US indifference to such moves further increased fears in Turkey that the US was providing the Kurds of northern Iraq with support in their potentially irredentist initiatives. Consequently there developed in Turkey an image of the US government that is poised against "Muslims" and "Turks" and follows a pro-Kurdish foreign policy.

Yet here a caution is in order: it is impossible to extend this picture over the entire gamut of Turkish-American relations. For example, regarding Afghanistan, Georgia, and Caspian oil, Turkish-US relations could not be more cooperative. Consequently, I am inclined to conclude that Turkish-American relations are strained only over the specific issues of Iraq and the PKK. While these are not entirely the fault of the Bush administration, the style of its policy toward Iraq seems to have a lot to do with the problems of Turkish-American relations today.

The Turkish government also could have managed the situation better, though paradoxically it is the same factors that paved the way for AKP to ascend to power that are also responsible for the erosion of the image of the US government in Turkey.- Published 14/4/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Ersin Kalaycioglu is full professor of political science at Sabanci University, Istanbul, specializing in comparative politics with special emphasis on Middle Eastern and Turkish politics.