• Is the Arab democratization wave real?  - Amr Hamzawy
A combination of opposition movements pushing for democracy and international pressures on ruling autocrats is crucial in paving the way for reform.

• Coups at the ballot  - Caise D. Hassan
The Palestinian and Iraqi elections were coups: They empowered candidates pliable to Washington’s Middle East strategies in states with strong opposition to US policies.

• Bush ill-served in Iraq by his bureaucracy  - Laurie Mylroie
There is a yawning gap between Bush's strategic objective--the spread of freedom and democracy--and its implementation at the tactical level.

• Burning down the house  - Mark Perry
Having urged democracy on the Middle East, the White House is finding it increasingly difficult to smother the smoldering embers they have sparked.

Is the Arab democratization wave real?
 Amr Hamzawy

The Arab world is changing. Popular protest movements, parliamentary and municipal elections, and successive concessions by the ruling elites are creating a momentum for political transformation in countries as different as Lebanon and Palestine, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Yet it is difficult to foresee what the outcome of the long anticipated “Arab democratization wave” is likely to be. The dream of pluralist polities and open public spheres goes hand in hand with the risk of authoritarian backlashes and radical Islamist insurgencies.

Apparently we can account for the uncertain political path of the region by referring to the inherent ambivalent nature of profound transformations in non-democratic countries. Neither their driving logic nor their consequences stand clear from the outset. This was the case in Eastern Europe in 1989-1991, and it is definitely going to be the case in the Arab world in the years to come. However, there are other sources of political uncertainty that are specific to the historical legacy and social reality of Arab countries.

Throughout the last decades we witnessed various seemingly promising beginnings that did not bring about any substantial changes. Different measures of political liberalization did not pave the way for real democratic change, and privatization strategies led to stagnant crony capitalist structures rather than socially responsible market economies. Several Arab countries suffered from a systematic rise of radical ideologies and violent movements that had its root causes in state repression and economic deprivation. Traditional elements, mainly tribalism and primordial loyalties, remained as persistent in the social fabric as authoritarian and chauvinistic (nationalist) notions in the prevailing political culture.

Above all, in the last two decades the region lacked agents of democratic transformation. Arab ruling elites, including the young, western educated generation of monarchs and presidents’ sons, were not interested in power sharing in any substantial way. Liberal parties and civil society organizations were never able to alter their legacy of structural weakness and social isolation. The formation of broad alliances for democracy that contest the dominance of autocratic rulers and force democratic concessions clearly exceeded their capacity in the 1980s and 1990s. Back then, non-violent popular Islamist movements such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Moroccan Justice and Development Party were yet to come up with a strategic commitment to democratic forms of governance. Caught in a triple iron cage of state oppression, continuous radicalization on the fringes of the Islamist spectrum, and international fears of their potential role, these movements were forced out of the official political sphere and excluded from western efforts to promote democracy in the Arab world.

In the last few years, however, this overall picture has gradually fallen apart. Confronted with increasingly disenchanted domestic populations as well as western, primarily American efforts to promote democracy in the region and press for it, a representative number of Arab governments has embarked on the road of political reforms or accelerated the pace of their realization. Changing regional conditions, especially since the collapse of the Ba'ath regime in Iraq, have helped create an unprecedented momentum for debating the perspectives of democratic transformation from Morocco to Bahrain. Never before 2003 was the public interest in power sharing and good governance as genuine and far-reaching as it has been since then.

Yet the path to Arab democracy continues to be problematic. Reading the contemporary regional political scene, legitimate doubts emerge at three central levels: the degree of commitment to reform by governments, the limits of internal democratization pressures, and the plausibility of effective democracy promotion strategies implemented by the United States. In a nutshell, democratic reforms in authoritarian polities never happen out of impulsive noble motivations of autocratic rulers. The experiences of Eastern Europe and other parts of the non-western world in the 1990s suggest that a combination of opposition movements pushing for democracy and international pressures on ruling autocrats is crucial in paving the way for significant reforms to take place. However, pressuring the autocrats does not mean alienating them. Managing the first reform steps remains the prerogative of existing governments, and without their backing the whole process can not take off.

In the Arab reality of 2005, the predominantly missing element when compared to more successful experiences of political transformation is the emergence of democratic opposition movements with considerable constituencies that contest authoritarian power and force concessions. American efforts to promote democracy in societies where the tradeoffs of undemocratic governance continue to be bearable for the ruling elites do not suffice to make political reforms plausible or viable. Without the formation of far-reaching popular alliances for democracy, the Arab autocrats and their rather sophisticated state apparatuses will eventually manage to deal with external pressures, either by inventing a “theatre of democratization” based on various creative scenes (cosmetic reforms) and dialogues (official discourses on human rights and good governance), or by discrediting them publicly as acts of foreign aggression against the national sovereignty. History informs us that authoritarian rulers are best equipped to successfully play the game of “us against them”, and in doing so to portray themselves as national heroes to whom unquestioned obedience becomes a sacred duty.- Published 31/3/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Amr Hamzawy is research director and senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut.

What could be more just with respect to a people’s sovereignty than its free choice of a representative government? US President George Bush wants the world to believe that this maxim inspires Washington’s activity vis-a-vis Middle East elections. He declared the alleged electoral successes in Palestine and Iraq as the opening stages of a Middle East political reformation.

Notwithstanding Bush’s determination to free Arabs, the Palestinian and Iraqi elections were coups: They empowered candidates pliable to Washington’s Middle East strategies, in states with strong opposition to US policies. The elections proceeded though the electorate had insufficient information to make rational choices. It was the occupiers’ policies, not popular will, that determined who could campaign freely, how campaigns were run, who could vote, and the numbers that voted.

In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israeli constraints on most candidates enabled the victory of Mahmoud Abbas, the American and Israeli favorite. A popular Fatah challenger, Marwan Barghouti, could not campaign because he was in an Israeli jail. Other candidates campaigned under extreme hardships imposed by the Israeli army. The Israeli army on a few occasions beat or arrested Mustafa Barghouti, who finished second to Mahmoud Abbas. Gazan contenders were denied entry to the West Bank. Candidates from other parties suffered similar handicaps.

Israel granted Abbas total freedom of movement. He was able to rally Fatah support through his access to Palestinian media and visits to the towns and refugee camps. He also received help at the ballots by Palestinian Authority workers who manned the polls. As Palestinian turnout appeared low at poll closing time, PA poll workers kept them open later to enhance turnout figures. Abbas won handily.

Israeli restrictions on Palestinian movement prevented many Palestinians, especially in Jerusalem, from voting. A former CIA official reported that, “Israel will allow 5,376 Palestinians to vote in five post offices in their occupied capital. The rest will have to travel outside the municipal borders to polling stations in the West Bank,” an act that could lead Israel to refuse their return into Jerusalem. This restriction on Jerusalemites probably hurt Mustafa Barghouti, whose community service and endorsement by secular Palestinian parties made him popular in Jerusalem.

The Iraq elections offer similar lessons, hinting that freedom’s bell is not ringing as loudly as Bush thinks.

In Iraq, the US pushed for the elections in January, despite the deteriorating security situation. The fighting between the American army and the insurgency, and the growing number of kidnappings under the occupation made it dangerous for Iraqis to leave home. Many Iraqis were trapped in their houses. Consequently, they could not assemble at political rallies or speeches to hear the candidates’ ideas.

The same danger applied to Iraqi candidates. Most candidates could not campaign publicly as they feared reprisals from the insurgency. They were in any case little known to the Iraqi electorate, whose knowledge of non-Ba’ath parties during Saddam Hussein’s regime was scant. The candidates’ names were publicized only online, then only days before the election. How could Iraqis cast informed votes without knowing the candidates’ positions?

The US pressed forward with elections anyhow, thinking that a large turnout would vindicate the American occupation.

The American occupation used its power over the Iraqis to force voter turnout. Dahr Jamal reports Iraqi complaints that officials threatened to cut their monthly food ration if they did not vote. The extortion of Iraqi support for an American-initiated process undermines Bush’s claim that the elections are for Iraqis’ benefit only.

Bush does not care that it is illegal under the Geneva Conventions for an occupying power to tamper with a conquered nation’s government. He has instigated coups, under the cover of elections, that have empowered partners who will accept Israeli settlement of the West Bank and American bases in Iraq.

Mahmoud Abbas’ political biography suggests that he will endorse Sharon’s plans to annex Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Abbas is an architect of the Oslo Accords that enabled Israel to build many of the settlements that have strangled Palestinian towns. The Bush administration is counting on him to disarm the Palestinian resistance and accept Israeli conquests.

The US is building a dozen permanent bases in Iraq; time will tell how the new Iraqi government will deal with the American presence, though the government itself is dependent on American troops for protection from the insurgency. The elected Kurdish leadership, with a long history of CIA support, has captured many seats in the Iraqi parliament. The Kurds are the most likely to accommodate the US bases in Iraq. Though some of the other elected political parties want the Americans to leave Iraq, they need American protection. Iraq’s insurgency pronounced its clear opposition to those participating in the election. The “success” of the Iraq coup partially depends on how much more responsive the Iraqi government will be toward American demands for bases and oil than toward the demands of the insurgency and the Iraqi people.

Previous American-supported coups in the Middle East--Iran (1953) and Israel’s Lebanon invasion (1982)--ended in disaster for the US and its clients. Manipulating the strings of a new set of puppets with a ballot will endear the Arab peoples neither to the US nor the new governments.- Published 31/3/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Caise D. Hassan is a Muslim American human rights activist of Palestinian descent. He is currently working on a book on the 1987 intifada.

When over eight million Iraqis turned out to vote, they surprised the world with their bravery and commitment to securing a better, more promising democratic future for their country. The power of the American call for freedom was evident on that day, as Iraqis risked their lives to cast their ballots and, indeed, over 40 Iraqis died in insurgent attacks. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt later affirmed, “When I saw the Iraqi people voting three weeks ago, eight million of them, it was the start of a new Arab world". Jumblatt himself helped launch the Lebanese drive to oust Syria from his country.

Yet nearly two months after the Iraqi elections, it is evident that there is a yawning gap between President George Bush’s strategic objective--the spread of freedom and democracy--and its implementation at the tactical level. An Iraqi government has yet to be formed and the plague of violence continues unabated. A significant section of the Iraqi population feels embittered and betrayed. What did they risk their lives for?

Part of the problem was Iran’s unchecked exercise of its influence in the internal politicking of the United Iraqi Alliance and the resulting selection of Daawa leader Ibrahim al-Jaafari as candidate for prime minister. Jaafari is the most dogmatic of the Islamic candidates and is regarded by many as the least competent. His selection was essentially dictated by Tehran, which told the Shi’ite leadership it wanted him as prime minister. SCIRI, which along with Daawa maintains close ties with Iran, accepted Tehran’s fiat and the joint SCIRI-Daawa front sealed the decision. (Those who claim Iran is fueling the Iraqi insurgency fail to understand that Iran’s greatest potential avenue of influence is through the Iraqi government.)

The Kurdish parties, which are essential to the formation of a new government, view Jaafari with particular mistrust. They are taking a harder line in negotiations to form the government than they would have had they been dealing with Adel Abdel Mehdi, the SCIRI candidate, or Ahmed Chalabi, the liberal Shi’ite politician who was central to the formation of the Alliance. The Kurds are essentially bargaining over issues, like the fate of Kirkuk, that an elected government should resolve after it is constituted, and in which the National Assembly should have a say.

The United States was not prepared for the election results, and it may well have been satisfied with Eyad Allawi continuing in office as caretaker prime minister for as long as it took the Iraqis to establish a new government. Ayatollah Sistani was issuing urgent public calls to form that government, but the United States was not, until just a few days ago.

Indeed, on the eve of the elections the US embassy reported that Allawi, the CIA’s long-time protege whom it had appointed interim prime minister, would likely continue in his post. It anticipated a three-way tie among Allawi’s list, the Kurdish list, and the Shi’ite list, and it calculated that it could then use its influence with the Kurds to secure Allawi’s continued tenure as prime minister. This prediction, however, constituted a very major misreading of the Iraqi scene. Allawi received only 14 percent of the vote--compared to 25 percent for the Kurds and 48 percent for the Alliance.

Allawi’s government is widely regarded by Iraqis as thoroughly corrupt. In early January, for example, Defense Minister Hazim Shalaan shipped $300 million in cash to Lebanon outside established channels for making government purchases. Shalaan claimed the money was to buy arms, but even the US embassy recognized that it was a dirty maneuver. However, this was not reported to Washington--part of an established pattern in which policymakers back home are not told the bad news from Iraq.

Allawi also failed to address the security situation, which deteriorated on his watch. Key government departments, particularly the Interior Ministry, are penetrated by Baathists whose loyalties lie with the insurgents rather than the government. Indeed, this is what happened in the 1990s, when the CIA engaged with Allawi in plotting at least two coups against Saddam Hussein. They were penetrated by Saddam’s regime and failed.

These very considerable problems are compounded by the hostility of the CIA and State Department toward Ahmed Chalabi. Chalabi committed the cardinal sin of warning the CIA in the spring of 1996 that a coup plot it was running was penetrated, and after it failed, Chalabi told others that he had warned them. In addition, shortly after Saddam arrested and executed the conspirators in that plot, he marched 40,000 troops northward to attack Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress in its Irbil headquarters. The Clinton administration did nothing more than watch as the Iraqi regime prepared and launched its assault, and afterwards it adopted a posture of blaming the victim.

Many years, and many substantial events later--including nothing less than a US-led war that ousted Saddam--little has changed. Indeed, the CIA and State Department generally opposed that war, and Bush does not seem to understand how ill-served the United States and Iraq are by unaccountable bureaucrats, and bureaucracies, who cling to positions they adopted a decade ago.- Published 31/3/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Laurie Mylroie is an adjunct fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and author of Study of Revenge: The First World Trade Center Attack and Saddam Hussein's War Against America.

My friend Clem is, and was, a talented farmer. We grew up together as boys and then became closer in college. He was a superb student and a gifted classicist. I believed he would surely attend graduate school and become a professor of Latin or Greek. I was stunned when he told me otherwise: he wanted to return to manage the family farm.

"It's something I'm good at and like," he said, "and that's what I'm going to do."

So I moved to Washington, D.C. to pursue my career, while Clem remained in Wisconsin and managed his very profitable farm. Eventually we lost touch with each other. But one day, many years after I had last seen him, he called to ask a special favor. "I need your help," he said. "I'm in a little bit of trouble. I want you to co-sign a loan. I need a little money."

I returned to Wisconsin and drove through the cool rolling countryside to Clem's home, set out just below a hill named for his family. I couldn't believe what I saw: acres of burned out farmland greeted me--and near a structure that had once been a barn he stood, hands in pockets, smiling in embarrassment.

"It's a pretty simple story," he said. "I decided that this year instead of leaving some of my land fallow I would burn out the corn husks and let the ash seep into the ground. The next Spring I would sell wild berries."

Things didn't turn out as he had planned. Clem started the fire--and burned out his fallow field, then acres of planted corn, a nearby stand of trees, the forest near the creek, then his barn, his two tool sheds and then his garage. He saved his house. As he stood, smiling sheepishly, he provided a solemn judgment: "Once you a start a fire," he said, "it's almost impossible to stop it."

The Bush administration is now faced with much the same problem. Having urged democracy on the Middle East's numerous single party regimes, the White House is finding it increasingly difficult to smother the smoldering embers they have sparked. While there's no way to tell whether what they have enflamed will one day turn into a conflagration, it's certain that what the White House believed would happen and what actually has happened are two different things.

The recent Iraq elections are a case in point. That the Bush administration would endorse the likely ascendance of Ibrahim Jaafari to the post of Iraqi prime minister seemed unthinkable just two short years ago, when a White House official opined that Jaafari and his Daawa Party were aligned to "the hardline mullahs of Iran". Now Washington has had to change its tune: the people have spoken and Jaafari is being described as a vibrant and honest leader.

The recent dust-up over Lebanon provides another example of how pushing for democracy can actually become a model for the law of unintended consequences. Having led an international outcry calling for Syria's withdrawal and "free, open and fair elections", the Bush administration has belatedly acknowledged that the key to Lebanon’s future may well rest with Hezbollah--a movement the US has labeled a terrorist group. Much the same applies in Palestine, where Hamas is poised to win as much as one-third of the seats in the upcoming legislative elections. The jewel in the American crown, Egypt, might well be next: last week a Cairo demonstration marking the second anniversary of the American invasion of Iraq turned into an anti-government rally calling for more democracy.

Put simply, while the White House might understand the value of promoting democracy, they seem to have little understanding of history.

"There are people in this administration who seem to think that all you do is take two pills, go to bed, and when you wake up you're Thomas Jefferson," Boston University political scientist Richard Norton Smith says. "But that's not the way it works."

Democracy need not be a violent, or even messy business--but it often is. The history of this globe's "great democracies" is soaked in blood, a fact often lost on my own citizens, who troop to the polls without remembering that the vote of a large segment of our population was secured only after half of their country was left in ruins, and 638,000 of its young men lay in shallow graves.

For all of that, Americans are believers in democracy, and for good reason. Fully apart from the jingoistic patriotism engendered by Washington's latest love-fest with voting (and its thoroughly distasteful habit of deploying American kids to conduct "workshops" that purport to teach you "how democracy works"), building civic institutions answerable to the people remains the most credible reflection of political self-expression and national identity. The paradox for Washington, of course, is that the growing democracy movement in the Arab world holds out the best hope for true political independence--from the United States.

Just think of what might happen: the phrase "American-supported Arab regimes" would disappear from our language. And yours. It would finally cleanse my own country of the unutterable but unalterable truth that, for 50 years and more, we have unblinkingly supported corrupt single-family, single-party, single-leader governments that do not represent the will of their own people. George Bush arrogates this faith to himself, saying he is "confident" that the Arab peoples "are capable" of governing themselves. I agree. All we have to do is stand out of the way.

It would be about time.- Published 31/3/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Mark Perry is an author and foreign policy, military and intelligence analyst based in Washington, DC.