• Fragmentation presages popular awakening  - Rosemary Hollis
The reordering of sectarian fortunes in Iraq signals the transformation of the existing Arab system.

• "Clean breaks" and false dawns  - Khader Khader
It seems that Cheney's doctrine in fragmenting the Arab world is proving successful.

• White Arabism  - Chibli Mallat
At the core is democratic, non-violent change at the top, with Arabism read as a liberal call that unifies people irrespective of their religion or sect.

Fragmentation presages popular awakening
 Rosemary Hollis

The Arab system is in crisis, but it was never broadly secure or unified. It was externally imposed three generations ago and has been evolving ever since. Now it is on the verge of a more profound transformation.

For hundreds of years empire was the fashion, then came statehood, and now democracy is the mantra. All along, different tribes, classes, sects, parties, movements and states have sometimes found common cause or formed alliances. But diversity, rivalry, competition and conflict have also featured in the history of the Arab world. At no time could you say that unity subsumed all the differences and particularities in the region.

If there is a process of fragmentation under way today, it is a sequel to the carve-up that took place in the 1920s, when the Arab world was divided into states by the British and French colonialists following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Then, the lines drawn on the map by the Europeans and blessed by the League of Nations cut across pre-existing social, commercial, tribal and sectarian links. That was a major shake-up.

The map is still evolving and the Palestinians have yet to realise their ambitions for statehood. Yet the Palestinian competition with the Israelis over statehood in the former Mandate of Palestine is in a sense unfinished business left over from the twentieth century era of state building. Elsewhere, the Arab states have taken hold, but at a price.

It should be no surprise that Arab regimes turned to militarism in the post-colonial era. They each espoused their own version of nationalism to oust the imperialists and in the process established their separate Algerian, Libyan, Yemeni, Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi identities. The armed forces, like the bureaucracies, were unifiers as well as vehicles for social mobility within the state. Where minorities surfaced at the top of the hierarchy, they had to legitimize their ascendancy with ideologies that distinguished them from their neighbors; the competition to champion the Arab national cause became part of the political landscape.

Viewed in retrospect, the state-building era of the twentieth century has been no less bloody and painful than it was in Europe, the Americas or Asia. As in other parts of the developing world, the process was mediated by Cold War competition between the superpowers, obliging and enabling Arab governments to adopt one or another patron as arms supplier, donor and defender.

Oil also played a part in the evolution of the political landscape. The quest to wrest control of the national asset from international companies was part of the process of national liberation. Thereafter oil provided the rents that cemented state power in both the monarchies and the republics. Those without oil received subsidies from those that had it, among the former the so-called "frontline" states bordering Israel, until the United States adopted the peacemakers. Now the European Union is on hand to provide trade and development aid in return for economic liberalization.

Against this background, what passed for Arab unity at the state level has been more about strategic alliances than a transnational enterprise. Solidarity across borders has been among subnational groups, including Islamists, and has been largely frowned upon by the authorities. The Arab League, unlike the EU, was never about pooling sovereignty and the free movement of labor, goods and capital across state borders. It has been easier for Arabs to access the rest of the world than to move from one Arab state to another.

In any case, prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States seems to have assumed that the state system at least was durable, even if the regimes could do with reform. No preparation was made for the management of porous borders, cross-border tribal and sectarian links, and ethnic divisions.

The US appears to have misjudged the Iraqis as well, anticipating the cooperation of a predominantly secular population. Now the US wants to counterbalance the Shi'ite victory at the polls in January with a policy of outreach to the Sunni and secular Arab minority. Meanwhile, the Kurds have been told to abandon aspirations for separate statehood.

The reordering of sectarian fortunes in Iraq need not spell the break-up of that country, but it does signal the transformation of the existing Arab system. If replicated, popular Arab nationalism and Islamist radicalism will come into their own. So fragmentation there may be, but only as a prelude to a broader Arab awakening.- Published 3/3/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Rosemary Hollis is professor of Middle East Policy Studies at City University London.

With every March Arab League Summit one expects renewed verbal vigor and focus on the Palestinian cause and the Arab-Israel conflict as the root of all instability in the Middle East. But for all the summitry toothlessness, it is nevertheless instructive that what we see now is the emergence of new Arab priorities alongside the Palestinian cause. The Arab foreign ministers meeting in Cairo on March 3, for example, has 14 items on the agenda to discuss.

To understand what is happening in the Arab world these days and not to rush into romantic analyses about the strong desire of the Arab masses to enjoy democracy, as some Arab intellectuals tend to believe, one needs to look back at a 1996 policy paper prepared under the supervision of now-US vice president Dick Cheney and his neo-con task force of Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, David and Meyrav Wurmser, et al. Entitled "Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm", this paper outlined a scenario whereby the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the PA would be torn to shreds, and, first Iraq, then Syria, Lebanon, Hezbollah, and Iran, would be targeted for military assault and political destabilization. The outcome of the regional convulsions provoked by the "Clean Break" doctrine was to be a new Middle East, with Israel hegemonic in the region, presiding over a series of newly balkanized states run by puppet regimes.

The war on Iraq was the first stage in the implementation of that doctrine. Iraq is now off the Middle East political map as regards the Arab-Israel conflict. Even in the event of the emergence of a stable Iraq, any Iraqi government, inextricably indebted to the US, would be one fully supporting the peace process and direct negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis, in line with Egypt and Jordan.

The assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri in Beirut on February 14 can then be seen to usher in the second stage of the "Clean Break" doctrine. Even though the perpetrators remain unknown, the murder will of necessity render Lebanon and Syria preoccupied with their own problems for the foreseeable future and will serve the US in exerting pressure on Syria to restrain Palestinian opposition factions headquartered in Damascus. Already we hear voices in the Lebanese opposition calling for the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1559 and not only the Taef Accord. Even Arab League Secretary General Amr Musa a few days ago said there is no contradiction between the Taef Accord and 1559.

Combined with the recent suggestion from Israeli political sources that Israel might suddenly withdraw from the Shebaa Farms as a "gift" to the Lebanese people, the further isolation of that country from the Palestinian cause becomes possible. Such a step carries serious political ramifications for the Lebanese political map and relations with Syria. If Israel were to leave the Shebaa Farms, there would be a complete end to the Israeli occupation in Lebanon, and Hizballah would be left with no justification to remain as a resistance movement or maintain arms outside the context of the Lebanese army. In the Lebanese domestic arena, however, a withdrawal of Syrian troops and the absorption of Hizballah will complicate matters immensely.

In Egypt, meanwhile, the "western winds of democracy" are blowing strongly, and President Hosni Mubarak is trying to sway along. His most recent step to propose changes in the constitution to accommodate direct elections for president and other measures looks promising on the outside. But let us wait and see how the changes will be translated in the constitution. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, is having its own problems with regards to "fundamentalists" and other voices that call for reform and greater equality in national wealth distribution and is using these as pretexts to slow reform.

So while the Middle East is in the grip of change set in motion by the US, I use the word "change" deliberately instead of more optimistic visions of "reform" or "democracy". I simply cannot see any true US enthusiasm toward "democracy" and "reform" as long as Jordan, Bahrain, Libya, or the United Arab Emirates are excluded from such pressures. Those who are targeted with this American "recipe for democracy" happen to be countries with influence and contrary opinions on the Arab-Israel conflict.

It seems that Cheney's doctrine in fragmenting the Arab world is proving successful. From the outside, the world will see a US initiating reform and democracy in the Arab world. Inside, the future promises just more turmoil and chaos. Turmoil and chaos, of course, necessitate continued American-led security and military interference. US Secretary of State Rice hinted a few days ago that the US is ready to offer security and international assistance to Lebanon. NATO is currently discussing a possible role for its troops in Palestine, but only after the Palestinians and Israelis reach a peace agreement. Why then? If Palestinians and Israelis reach a peace agreement, there should be no need for NATO troops.

The fragmentation of the Arab world will serve at least two goals: it will serve Israel to a great extent when it engages in final-status negotiations with a weaker Palestinian side stripped of support from any Arab hinterland, and it will serve the US in replacing the current Arab leaders who have been exhausted with a new group of indebted "young democrats".

This is not a defense of any of the current Arab leaders or regimes. It is a warning to the romantics, those who advocate reform and democracy in the Arab world and see the US as the necessary conduit for such change. One day, when they have outlived their usefulness, they will face the same fate as their predecessors.- Published 3/3/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Khader Khader is a media analyst with the Jerusalem Media and Communications Center.

In the past two years, the "Iraqi earthquake" (a phrase coined by Jihad Zein, a leading Lebanese columnist) occasioned by the collapse of the most dictatorial system in the Arab world is slowly confirming a new era in the region, where the forces of democracy are emerging as the dominant ideological appeal in each and every Arab country. With fits and starts the system is shaking, within Iraq itself, then in Palestine, now in Lebanon and Egypt.

The stakes following Rafiq Hariri's assassination go far beyond Lebanon and Syria, where they are bound to change the political scene. As underlined in Lebanon by such diverse writers as Samir Kassir, a strong voice against the Syrian leadership, and Talal Salman, the respected editor of the pan-Arab daily al-Safir, and echoed in a column by Thomas Friedman in the New York Times, it is the whole Arab political system that is shaking to the core. The absence of a single Arab president or king at the funeral of a man whom every Arab leader knew personally is telling. While it may be superficially explained by the estrangement of Hariri from his nemesis, President Emile Lahoud, Arab leaders were mostly apprehensive about the question of their legitimacy: would they risk going down with the Lebanese government and president if they showed up, like French President Jacques Chirac, on the side of an angry family?

For the past 20 years, so-called Arab civil society has been slowly denting the status quo. Initially, questions were defensive and focused on human rights, while participants in human rights gatherings were incapable of mustering the courage needed to name those leaders responsible for all kinds of violations, even the more egregious ones like Saddam Hussein. In part this was understandable, and the level of repression meted out against dissidents was uniquely high: scores of dissenters were brutally assassinated, thrown in jail and tortured, while the usual "higher national interest" was put forward and was reinforced by the brutality of Israeli repression of Palestinian dissent and the inexorable shrinking of Palestinian land over half a century.

As time passed, however, the connection between brutality at home and the inability to stand up to anti-Israel rhetoric became increasingly apparent: from the condemnation of the Arab record in general, typified in the UNDP reports since 2002, particulars of repression were getting linked to people responsible at the helm in every single Arab country. Local Arab democrats are still hesitant to accuse the emirs and kings in the Gulf, but the taboos have fallen in the Levant and North Africa: Zein al-Abidin, Mubarak, Lahoud and Asad are being openly challenged to leave the presidency, and the perceived weakness of the hardliners in Israel, leading to the withdrawal from settlements in Gaza and the West Bank, will accelerate the trend of decoupling Arab domestic reform from the Israel "higher interest" fig leaf.

The Arab nationalism that has prevailed since the Nasser revolution is increasingly being dubbed "black Arabism" by those of us who do not want to abandon their yearning for closer integration between societies separated by arguably artificial colonial borders. Black Arabism, in this perception, is characteristically fascist, and is epitomized by the Baath systems in Iraq and Syria. Against it is put forward the need for "White Arabism", which harks back to such figures as Saad Zaghlul in Egypt, Kamel Chadirchi in Iraq, and Kamal Jumblatt in Lebanon. At the core of the message is democratic, non-violent change at the top in these countries, with Arabism read as a liberal call that unifies people irrespective of their religion or sect: in Egypt, Copts and Muslims; in Lebanon, the various communities that form the country; in Iraq, Shi'ites and Sunnis.

The example of Iraq, where Arabism is not capable of giving Kurds their due of equal citizenship, is particularly telling of the more advanced thought needed to accommodate every citizen, hence the surge of the concept of federalism as a further trait of White Arabism. Only federalism can allow forms of Arab identity to be preserved while Kurds are treated as equal both on the individual level and as a collective community.

Perhaps the greatest challenge of White Arabism will be a review of the Palestine-Israel crisis in the light of new parameters, guided mostly by visions of federalism and where human rights are no longer acting passively, but as an offshoot of democracy. While the establishment of a Palestinian state appears inevitable in the short to medium future, White Arabism may have far more to offer to both Jews and Arabs in Palestine-Israel.- Published 3/3/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org


Chibli Mallat is EU Jean Monnet Professor at Saint Joseph's University in Beirut and a Lebanese presidential candidate.