• Show them death and they will love the fever  - Peter Galbraith
Kurdish nationalism in Iraq is a fact, and Turkey’s ability to influence the drive for statehood is minimal

• A dilemma or a breakthrough?  - Hiwa Osman
Despite pressure from Kurdish public opinion, the leadership does not intend to break away and form an independent Kurdish state.

• Vision, trust and leadership required  - Murat Somer
From the liberal-nationalist perspective, cultural forms of Kurdish nationalism may not threaten Turkey's unity.

Show them death and they will love the fever
 Peter Galbraith

“There is no such place”, the Turkish intelligence officer told my son earlier this month. He was going through our luggage at the Turkish end of the Habur bridge that separates Turkey from northern Iraq, and had found a chess set, with the place of origin, “Kurdistan” carved into it. After initially insisting we return the set to Iraq, he loaned Andrew a screwdriver to gouge out the offending word.

Fifty meters away from the Turkish intelligence post, at the other end of the bridge, is a sign that reads “welcome to Kurdistan of Iraq”. The operative question is how long the “of Iraq’ will be there. The Iraqi flag does not fly at the border crossing or anywhere else in Iraqi Kurdistan (a pre-1991 version of the flag does fly on a few public buildings in the part of Kurdistan controlled by the PUK). The Kurdistan flag, a green-white-red tricolor and with a bright yellow sun, is ubiquitous. The Kurdistan government--not the authorities in Baghdad--controls the Habur crossing. There are no central government offices in Kurdistan and the Kurdistan government does not allow the Iraqi army to send its forces into the region.

And, should there be any doubt about where all this is heading, the people of Kurdistan voted in an advisory referendum on Iraq’s election day on whether Kurdistan should remain part of Iraq or be independent. Two million people voted (almost the same number as in the regular ballot) and 97 percent chose independence.

Andrew’s defaced backgammon board was a gift from the PUK leader, Jalal Talabani, who headed the united Kurdish list in Iraq’s January 30 elections. With 26 percent of the seats in the Iraq National Assembly, the Kurds are an indispensable partner to Sistani’s Shi'ite list, which won a narrow majority. Effectively, all important National Assembly decisions require a two-thirds majority, meaning if the Shi'ite list is going to form a government--or write a constitution--it must have Kurdish support.

The Kurds have already declared the price of their support: any constitution must codify the current level of Kurdistan independence. Kurdistan will run its own affairs (financed by a proportionate share of Iraq’s federal budget), keep its own armed forces, own and manage its own oil, control its international borders, and be totally free from Baghdad interference. This includes, as KDP leader Massoud Barzani stated in a recent New York Times interview, a constitutional ban on the presence of the Iraqi National Army in Kurdistan.

And the Kurds want the oil-rich province of Kirkuk attached to Kurdistan. Their claim was substantially bolstered by the provincial elections which gave a pro-Kurdistan list (that included Turkmens, Arabs, and Christians) more than 80 percent of the vote.

The Kurds also expect to share power in Baghdad, not only to affirm their status with the Arabs as one of Iraq’s two nations, but also because they believe a major role in Baghdad is key to securing and safeguarding a separate Kurdistan. As part of a deal to install a Shi'ite as prime minister, the Kurds insist that they get the presidency, and their candidate is Jalal Talabani. It will be a fitting irony that Iraq’s first ever freely chosen head of state--indeed arguably the first freely chosen leader in the territory that is now Iraq since Adam was there alone--is a Kurd.

Like the military man we encountered at the border, some Turks are in denial about the new reality in Iraq. But, overall, Turkey’s response to emerging Kurdistan has been sophisticated. Many Turks--both close to Erdogan’s government and, more surprisingly in the military/intelligence/diplomatic establishment known as the “deep state”--see opportunity as well as peril in developments in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Kurdish nationalism in Iraq is a fact, and Turkey’s ability to influence the drive for statehood (whether merely de facto or recognized) is minimal. Turkey has no meaningful military option. A large scale armed intervention would confront more than 100,000 well armed peshmerga operating on their own terrain (a far more formidable force than the Turkish military faced in a 15 year war against the PKK in southeast Turkey), would shatter relations with the United States and kill Turkey’s hopes of joining the European Union. An economic boycott is a double edged sword that would also destroy Turkey’s lucrative trade with Iraq. Closing the border would inflict particular pain on Kurdish southeast Turkey where popular sympathy is solidly behind the Iraqi Kurds.

Separatist sentiment among Turkey’s Kurds has sharply declined not only with the military defeat of the PKK but also with the prospect that all of Turkey--including the southeast--might join the European Union. Wrong steps on Iraq--particularly those that compromise EU accession or indeed the substantial advances made on Kurdish rights in Turkey as a result of that process--could reignite nationalist sentiment among Turkey’s Kurds.

While the rhetoric out of Ankara is sometimes threatening, Turkey has maintained cordial relations with Kurdistan’s leaders since 1991. Indeed, of all Iraq’s new leaders, the Kurds are the ones Ankara knows the best. The Kurds appreciate Ankara’s role in establishing and maintaining the safe haven that enabled a separate Kurdistan to survive--and later thrive--during Saddam Hussein’s time. Turgut Ozal, the Turkish president who opened the door in Ankara to the Iraqi Kurds and who pushed the reluctant George H.W. Bush to establish the safe haven, is revered among Iraq’s Kurdish leaders.

The Iraqi Kurds have shrewdly cultivated Turkish business and investment in their region. Turkish companies are ubiquitous--creating a bottle water plant, building an airport, and even establishing a brewery. A Turkish company, Genel Enerji, won the first production-sharing contract awarded by the Kurdistan Regional Government to develop the Taq-Taq oil field--a venture strongly supported by the Turkish government.

Enlightened commentators in Turkey note that Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan have a lot in common, and not just shared bonds of ethnicity. The Iraqi Kurds have the same western and secular orientation that defines the modern Turkish state. Instead of being seen as subversive, many Turks--including in the deep state itself--now view Iraqi Kurdistan as a potential ally, a bulwark against a militant Islamic Iraq.

One practical consequence of Kurdistan’s drive for independence is Ankara’s silence on the issue of federalism in Iraq, which just two years ago was proclaimed publicly to be unacceptable. As the Kurdish proverb goes: “Show them death and they will love the fever”.- Published 24/2/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Peter Galbraith is on the faculty of the National War College, Washington, DC. He has served as US ambassador to Croatia and as a senior adviser to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He documented Saddam Hussein's genocidal campaign against the Iraqi Kurds in the late 1980s, contributing to the decision to create a safe-haven for the Kurds.

Turkey will receive good news and bad news when the new government is formed in Iraq. The good news is that Jalal Talabani, a long-time friend of Turkey who understands its importance in the Middle East, will be the president. But the bad news is that as a Kurd he cannot do much about Turkish-Iraqi-Kurdish relations

The recent statements from Ankara regarding the city of Kirkuk and their fear of Kurds oppressing Turkomans there have sent a strong message to Iraqi Kurdistan that Turkey's "Kurdophobia" has not subsided, despite repeated Kurdish reassurances that Kurds have no intention to Kurdisize the city of Kirkuk.

For the Iraqi Kurdish leadership, Kirkuk has a Kurdistani character. This means that it is part of a geographical region called Kurdistan, but does not mean that it is exclusively Kurdish. The demographic makeup of the region of Kurdistan includes Kurds, Turkomans, Arabs and Assyrians--and so does Kirkuk.

The city of Kirkuk symbolizes for many Iraqis the old Iraq that was rife with destruction, expulsion, discrimination and racism. Looking to its future, Kirkuk has the potential of being the symbol of the new Iraq.

The people of Kirkuk took the first step in this direction. They went out of their homes, despite the security threats, and voted. But the process of turning Kirkuk into a success story does not stop here. It is only the start, and Turkey can play an important role.

Turkey should appease the Kurdish and Iraqi leadership by assuring them that it will not interfere in Iraq's internal affairs. It should further declare its support for any efforts to democratize and create an infrastructure that would be conducive to lasting peace and stability in Iraq, especially in the areas near its border.

Rather than making a fuss over the situation of only the Turkomans of Iraq, Ankara should encourage the newly elected Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Assembly to write a regional constitution that enshrines the principles of human rights, equality and civil liberties for all those who live in the Kurdistan region.

A constitution in the Kurdish region will be a lot easier to adopt and will guarantee everyone's rights there. By doing this, Turkey will send a message to the leaders and the people of the new Iraq that Turkey is a partner that wants to see a strong, stable, free and democratic Iraq--not one that is threatened by civil war.

The naming of a Kurdish president for Iraq or the presence of a large number of Kurdish deputies in the Iraqi parliament should not create a dilemma for Turkey. It should signal the start of a new policy on Iraq and the Kurds. This can only be done by setting "Kurdophobia" aside and seeing the Kurds as a key ally in the new Iraq.
The Kurds and other Iraqis realize that, unlike most of the neighboring countries, Turkey has played no role in encouraging the terrorist violence in Iraq. Turkey should capitalize on this and build upon it.

Turkey is the model for an Islamic state that is democratic. It has managed to prove that Islam and democracy are not mutually exclusive. The challenge for Turkey is to prove that Turkey and the word Kurdish are not mutually exclusive either.

By the same token, tolerating the word Kurdish or setting "Kurdophobia" aside in Turkey will pave the way for solving Turkey's problems with the PKK, an issue that can not be solved across the border. The PKK issue needs to be taken back into Turkey. In this regard, the Kurds of Iraq seem to have enough on their plate. The last thing they want is to create new enemies. They do not see the PKK as an issue they can solve, especially violently. All they can do is prevent the PKK from using Iraqi Kurdish territory for launching attacks against Turkey.

The United States cannot do much to change the sides' minds or hearts regarding one another. It will eventually leave Iraq. Change has to come from within. The Kurds and Turks are stuck with each other, and need to work out a relationship either with or without Iraq.

Despite pressure from Kurdish public opinion, the elected Kurdish leadership has said over and over again that it does not intend to break away and form an independent Kurdish state. It will send its heavyweights to Baghdad and be part of shaping the new Iraq. But this is conditional; if the violence does not stop in the center and south, no one in their right mind would want to be part of it. If the Kurds are not helped to be a real part of the new Iraq, they will be forced to look at other options.

Under these circumstances, Turkey could receive a visit from the Kurds asking the following: Iraq is not working; we don't want to be part of it, nor do we want to have a war with you. And we can't drop our Kurdish identity. What shall we do?

Turkey will have to have an answer.- Published 24/2/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org


Hiwa Osman is Iraq country director at the Institute for War & Peace Reporting, Baghdad.

Looking at the rhetoric of Turkish political and military leaders on Turkey’s red lines in Iraq, an outside observer may conclude that Turkey and Iraqi Kurds are on a course of inevitable collision caused by irreconcilable interests. Turkey strongly opposes many Kurdish aspirations such as the control of Kirkuk within an ethnic federation and eventual independence. Moreover, its policies seem to be primarily shaped by these concerns.

Is there any room for flexibility and compromise? Given time, perhaps, because within Turkey both the official and societal views on Kurds are changing and diversifying in response to internal and external developments. Beneath the defensive-nationalist perspective that continues to dominate the official discourse, one can also discern a growing liberal-nationalist perspective, which allows ample room for cooperative relations with Iraqi Kurds. Over time, this second perspective may become more influential in shaping Turkey’s policies and developing a more multidimensional approach toward Iraq.

In addition to formative historical experiences outside the scope of this article, recently Turkey underwent a traumatic period of violence and terrorism whereby tens of thousands of people lost their lives as a result of the conflict between the security forces and the Kurdish-separatist PKK (now also called Kongra-Gel), mainly in the country’s southeast. According to Turkish authorities, the creation of de facto Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq following the first Gulf War significantly contributed to the escalation of violence in the early 1990s by providing a safe haven for the PKK. Overall, these experiences produce a reflexive suspicion of Kurdish nationalism (both cultural and political) and superpower meddling in the region.

The ideology that actual and enforced cultural-linguistic homogeneity is the insurance of state survival and political unity has been under question in Turkish society since the 1980s. However, open search for less diversity-phobic models of national identity and citizenship, by civil actors and within the state, really began only after PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s capture and Turkey’s EU-member candidacy in 1999. It gained serious momentum recently in expectation of the start of the actual membership negotiations in October 2005.

These discussions give rise to the liberal-nationalist perspective on Iraq. From this perspective, cultural forms of Kurdish nationalism may not threaten Turkey’s unity and there is no reason why Turkey and Iraqi Kurds should not be mutually supportive neighbors over time, perhaps in a way similar to how Britain and the Irish of Ireland manage today. About half of Turkey’s sizeable Kurdish population, which one may perhaps call a silent majority comprising fully or partially ethnic Kurds scattered across the country, is well integrated with the rest of Turkish society. In addition, Turkey’s EU prospects and the fact that Turkish Kurds enjoy full citizenship and--more recently and yet incompletely--the actual ability to express their ethnic-cultural identity on an individual level, make it unlikely that they will support separatism.

Thus Turkey could value the well-being of Iraqi Kurds, who are not only its neighbors but also the ethnic-linguistic relatives of a significant portion of its citizens, as much as it values the well-being of Iraqi Turkmens (if one accepts the dubious premise that ethnic affinity should be a major guide in shaping state policy). Turkey would benefit economically from a stable and thriving neighbor bordering its poor southeast.

Turkey also fears that Iraq may turn into an undemocratic, theocratic state. Among the various groups in Iraq, Kurds probably share Turkey’s secular and western-looking agenda the most. Similarly, Iraqi Kurds have everything to gain from building cooperative relations with their major northern neighbor for their security and economic and political interests. At the same time, conflict is costly for both sides: it could put an end to Iraqi Kurds’ hopes for prosperity and self-governance, while undermining Turkey’s democratization and integration with the EU and derailing its hopes to find a peaceful solution for its domestic Kurdish conflict. Thus, Turkey and Iraqi Kurds can move toward a mutually beneficial, cooperative relationship if they manage to form their policies on a more rational and forward-looking basis.

It will take time and much work to build mutual trust in order to reach this stage. For the time being, Turkey’s expectations from Iraq’s reconfiguration include: the protection of Iraq’s territorial integrity; opposition to Kurds controlling Kirkuk (which would weaken Iraq’s unity and give the Kurds the economic power to pursue independence and/or pan-Kurdish foreign policies); provincial federation (which weakens the political role of ethnic identity); security and cultural-political rights for Iraqi Turkmen (reflecting suspicion over Kurdish intentions and in order to counterweigh Kurds); and a crack-down on the PKK in northern Iraq. In order to make any compromise between Turkey and Kurds possible, one needs to understand that the primary Turkish concerns underlying these expectations are, first, civil war and unrest in Iraq that could draw Turkey in, and second, the emergence of a "hostile" southeastern neighbor with pan-Kurdish aspirations. The Turkish, Iraqi, and American sides should work together to find creative ways in which they can credibly address these concerns.

Several examples come to mind. First, de facto elimination of the PKK military threat to Turkish state security from northern Iraq would probably go a long way in establishing trust and making Turkish positions more flexible. Second, to meet Turkey’s security concerns, Turks and Iraqis may find ways to make the mountainous Turkish-Iraqi border safer against terrorist infiltration. Third, granting a hefty share of oil revenues to Iraqi Kurds in return for their acquiescing to an autonomous status for Kirkuk would create a credible commitment to Iraq’s unity on the part of Kurds; this would probably make Turkey less wary of an ethnic federation or semi-ethnic federation (Kurdish regional autonomy in the north plus the rest), provided that Iraqi Turkmen minority rights are ensured. Fourth, major economic projects that would create further economic interdependence between Turkey and Iraq would contribute to the development of trust over time. Fifth, Iraqi Kurdish leaders should abstain from making conflicting statements regarding pan-Kurdish aspirations and explain to younger generations the reasons for abandoning or postponing some aspirations.

In return, Turkey can find ways to reassure Kurds that it does not intend to be a hegemonic neighbor. Internal democratization vis-a-vis the Kurds, along with the EU anchor and the exercise of leadership--rather than focusing on satisfying an often weakly informed public opinion--can be used for this purpose. As the actor that undertook the restructuring of Iraq by force, the US has significant responsibility to help in this process. By doing so it would also eliminate some of the suspicions over its own intentions in the region, which are widely shared by regional actors but may at least partly be undeserved. The EU can also contribute to peace-building and developmental efforts.

However, the major initiatives for lasting credibility and trust, and thus peace and cooperation, should come from the regional actors themselves. Ten or 15 years from now, the US may not be actively present in the region, but Turks, Kurds and Arabs will continue to be neighbors.- Published 24/2/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org


Dr. Murat Somer teaches at Koc University, Istanbul. His recent articles on Turkey and the Iraqi question appear in The Middle East Journal and Security Dialogue.