• An opportunity we cannot miss  - Gunther Altenburg
The evolution of the Middle East will affect Euro-Atlantic security more than the development of any other region

• Israel, NATO and the Euro-Atlantic Community  - Uzi Arad
The option of Israel's admission to NATO as a full member is viable in the future, as long as Israel preserves independent strategic capabilities.

• A role for NATO in the Gulf?  - Christian Koch
If a lasting Gulf security system is ever to come about, it needs to be based on the notions of consensus, inclusiveness and functionalism.

• The NATO-Med dialogue: An initiative that must succeed  - Mohammad K. Shiyyab
Conflict prevention is a far wiser strategy as well as less costly in human and material terms than conflict management.

An opportunity we cannot miss
 Gunther Altenburg

NATO and the Middle East--the very combination of these two terms may still strike some observers as far-fetched, perhaps even frivolous. But the time to explore how NATO can make a real contribution to Middle Eastern security has clearly come. Within the transatlantic community, there is a growing consensus that new ties must be built with a region of unique strategic importance. At the same time, many countries in this region also indicate a wish to put their relations with the West on a new footing. This creates an opportunity that we cannot afford to miss.

Clearly, change in the Middle East cannot be imposed from outside. However, we know from experience that outside encouragement and support are required to sustain a positive momentum. For decades, Europe and North America have tried to play such a role--albeit with a mixed record. The jury is still out on whether the transatlantic partners can do better this time around in developing a more coherent approach to the Middle East. But the consensus between Europe and North America on making NATO part of such a fresh approach--a consensus that would have appeared unthinkable only a few years ago--gives cause for optimism.

In essence, NATO's policy vis-a-vis the Middle East currently features three major elements.

The first element is the Mediterranean Dialogue that includes seven countries from North Africa and the Middle East. Since its inception 10 years ago, the dialogue has developed steadily, and its work program now includes subjects as diverse as airspace management, border security, counter-terrorism, defense reform, civil emergency planning, military exercises, and training and education. The dialogue is now being significantly enhanced through the inclusion of more concrete military cooperation activities. And NATO allies and dialogue partners are discussing ways to work together on specific operations, including participation in NATO's major maritime counter-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean, Operation Active Endeavor.

The second element is the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), launched at NATO's Istanbul Summit last year. The ICI focuses on establishing relations with countries in the broader Middle Eastern region, notably the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The ICI will follow the logic of our enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue, i.e., it will focus on practical areas such as defense reform, joint training and the fight against terrorism. Several Gulf states have already welcomed these new opportunities and together we are working out the modalities of our cooperation.

The third element in NATO's current approach to the Middle East is the training of Iraqi security forces--both inside and outside that country. The logic is clear: all allies have an interest in enabling Iraq to assume more responsibility for its own security. The NATO training mission is modest in size. However, the very fact that it came about is a strong indication that the transatlantic community wants to leave past controversies behind and focus on the challenges at hand. And that in itself is a most welcome development--both for NATO and for the Middle East.

The enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and our training mission in Iraq are three major elements of NATO's current engagement in the Middle East. They demonstrate that the Alliance is involved in the region--and that all the allies realize they have a stake in its future.

Admittedly, all these steps are still rather cautious. They take into account regional specifics and sensitivities and, above all, perceptions in the Arab world that are not always favorable. Yet NATO's engagement will grow stronger. Calls for NATO to play a role in the implementation of an eventual Israel-Palestine peace agreement indicate as much. That such ideas resonate among American conservatives as well as European liberals may be surprising to some, yet there are good reasons why such unlikely bedfellows agree. After all, NATO comprises North America and most of the European states. And as the Balkans have demonstrated, a NATO framework ensures a degree of political and military commitment and experience that no coalition of the willing could ever hope to match.

We are not yet at the point where an active NATO role is required. There would first have to be a lasting peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians; both would need to be in favor of a NATO role in its implementation; and there would have to be a UN mandate. These conditions do not yet exist. But there are signs that that time may be approaching. And I believe that, if the call comes to NATO, this alliance must be prepared to respond positively, and to play its full part.

In the years to come, the evolution of the Middle East will affect Euro-Atlantic security more than the development of any other region. That is why NATO needs to explore how it can support positive change. The first steps have already been taken, and more are likely to follow. They will put NATO in an even better position to help the states of the Middle East to enjoy peace and stability.- Published 17/2/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Gunther Altenburg is NATO assistant secretary general for political affairs and security policy.

The broader Middle East is home to the main strategic threats facing the Euro-Atlantic community, namely international terrorism and WMD proliferation. These threats, aimed at Israel as well, position Israel more than ever before on the Euro-Atlantic side. History, and particularly the history of the Euro-Atlantic community, proves that common threats can create ever-closer allies. As the Euro-Atlantic community, NATO particularly, is debating and changing its strategic orientation toward the broader Middle East to confront these threats, and since its actions and policies might well have substantial strategic effects upon Israel, both parties should assess their relationship--as a community consisting of Israel, too. In this respect, the proposal to develop these relations recently submitted by Israel to the secretary general of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, is an important step, as is Scheffer's upcoming visit to Israel on February 24, 2005.

NATO is the primary institution of the Euro-Atlantic community. Just as the European Union recently deepened its relations with Israel along the lines of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), NATO member states should also move to deepen relations with Israel following the Istanbul Summit Communique and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Indeed, there is a growing recognition of Israel's rightful place in the Euro-Atlantic Community in both Europe and the United States. Even in Europe, there is an emerging understanding that more than before interests and values tie the Euro-Atlantic community and Israel together.

This is also the basic assertion of the Israeli proposal to develop NATO-Israel relations. The proposal elaborates potential courses of action for elevating the Mediterranean Dialogue to a "genuine partnership" and for further developing the bilateral Israeli track. While it is evident that Israel should be at the table, the long-term framework of the relationship is yet to be determined. Since the future features of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the new Istanbul Cooperation Initiative framework are un-chartered, it might be useful to look at an acceptable institutional precedent as a model for formulating the relationship between Israel and NATO.

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is such an example. Within the PfP framework, NATO maintains solid and robust partnership relations with several western European countries that choose not to become full and formal members of the Alliance, yet are active members of the Euro-Atlantic community: Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Austria, and Switzerland. As NATO begins to operate in the broader Middle East, it is destined to rely much more on its western partners. Israel could prove as important to NATO as any other partner. NATO and Israel could develop substantial and practical bilateral programs based on Israeli capabilities and experience relevant to NATO's agenda, e.g., counter-terrorism, WMD proliferation and homeland defense.

The option of Israel's admission to NATO as a full member is also viable in the future, as long as Israel preserves independent strategic capabilities. Israel, as a country capable of defending itself and maintaining an independent deterrent posture, would be a more valuable strategic asset to NATO than a country far too dependent on Alliance guarantees. It is clear, however, that at this stage the majority of Alliance members will be loath, if not actively objecting, to offer Israel Article 5 guarantees, i.e., full defense treaty commitments. Yet as part of a final status peace agreement, Israel's place in NATO and the Euro-Atlantic community should be at the very least seriously considered, if not assured.

Moreover, when Israel needs to make territorial and other concessions, and should the Euro-Atlantic community want to be an effective player in bringing about peace, it will have to encourage Israel to take such risks. If Europe chooses not to offer these guarantees to Israel as part of the final phase of the roadmap it will forfeit the political and moral right to demand painful concessions from Israel. Bringing Israel into the Euro-Atlantic community would be the community's contribution to the Middle East peace process.

A common Euro-Atlantic effort to promote the peace process by also ensuring Israel's long-term security would improve Europe's political and strategic relations with Israel and could, in turn, contribute directly to improving the state of transatlantic relations. Curiously, the upcoming visit of NATO's secretary general to Israel is due immediately after President Bush's visit to Brussels this month.

Strengthening the ties between Israel and NATO and anchoring Israel in the Euro-Atlantic community are not only a strategic and political issue, important as it may be. Geographically, Israel is located in the broader Middle East, but culturally, politically, and economically it is an advanced western democratic nation. While this does not preclude peaceful cooperation and dialogue with its neighbors, Israel belongs to the Euro-Atlantic community of like-minded nations. Israel would not be coming empty-handed to the table--as its broad economic and technological cooperation with Europe has proven, or as the vast potential for cooperation with NATO holds. The Euro-Atlantic community is Israel's natural habitat.- Published 17/2/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org


Dr. Uzi Arad is head of the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Herzlia's Interdisciplinary Center. He served as foreign policy advisor to PM Netanyahu, and with the Israeli foreign intelligence service, the Mossad.

The debate over a possible role for NATO vis-a-vis Gulf security arrangements has received increasing attention over the past two years, in particular in conjunction with the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime and the subsequent widespread lack of security in the country that has continued unabated until today underlined the fact that past attempts at bringing about a more stable Gulf security architecture have not succeeded. From "Pax Britannica" to "Twin-Pillar" to "Balance of Power" to dual containment and ultimately to US hegemony, none led to a more systematic interaction among the regional states or between them and relevant external actors. The result is a cycle of permanent crisis that feeds on mutual antagonisms to sustain itself.

With the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, one of the main obstacles toward a more cooperative security arrangement has been eliminated, although as events over the past 18 months indicate, this has not resolved the security dilemma itself. In fact, it is not too farfetched to argue that promoting security in the Gulf has become even more problematic in light of the US failure to correctly anticipate the difficulties associated with the post-war reconstruction process in Iraq, which in turn has served to galvanize varieties of opposition to the US occupation and its broader role in the region. The current discussion about a possible confrontation between the US and Iran over the latter's suspected nuclear program further underscores the volatility of the present situation.

In light of these developments a debate has ensued about a possible NATO role in the Gulf, although the precise parameters of that debate remain largely undefined. The momentum driving such a consideration has come mainly from two sides: NATO itself and some of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As an organization, NATO continues to strive to define a role for itself. With its mandate now stretching into Central Asia and Afghanistan, there is a need to look more closely at the impact of Gulf regional events on the overall Middle East security environment. In addition, NATO wants to avoid another fiasco like the one in Iraq where internal wrangling among its members over the war's justification led the organization to appear incompetent and superfluous.

The result of the internal reevaluation process was the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative issued in June 2004 where NATO announced its readiness "to undertake a new initiative in the broader Middle East region to further contribute to long-term global and regional security and stability...". Deputy Secretary-General Alessandro Minuto Rizzo in a visit to the Gulf Research Center in September 2004 characterized the initiative as a step forward for the "transformed alliance" to move away from being Euro-centric and respond to new challenges.

The second impetus has come from the region itself based on the realization, as mentioned above, that past efforts have done little to alleviate the structural deficits of Gulf security. It was Qatar's Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim al-Thani who first proposed the idea of a NATO-GCC dialogue in late 2002, in turn leading to a conference on "NATO's Transformation & Gulf Security" in April 2004 in Doha. From other quarters as well, consideration of new types of arrangements is evident. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal made that clear in December 2004 when he spoke of the "urgent need" for "developing a new and more solid framework for Gulf security".

Given such consideration, is a role for NATO in future Gulf security arrangements realistic and does it represent an alternative worth pursuing? To be sure, both sides continue to speak in generalities, with NATO officials stretching themselves to emphasize the organization's modest objectives and underlining that nothing will be imposed on the region. Similarly, Gulf officials voice support for a dialogue but refrain from proposing specific mechanisms.

In that context, there would appear to be three prerequisites that have to be met if the current discussion is to lead to anything substantive. First, the situation in Iraq has to calm down to move toward greater stability. NATO will have to meet part of that burden. Second, a NATO foray into the Gulf would primarily mean a broader European role in security arrangements. NATO cannot be seen as a simple substitute for the US role in different clothing. And third, and in relation to the previous point, the GCC States cannot look at NATO as a substitute for the present US role.

If a lasting Gulf security system is ever to come about, it needs to be based on the notions of consensus, inclusiveness and functionalism. And that in turn requires a greater determination to promote regional interaction and cooperation among all the regional states, including Iraq, Iran and Yemen. - Published 17/2/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org



Christian Koch is the program director for GCC-EU Relations, Gulf Research Center.

In the coming years, extra-regional powers, above all the United States, will retain a large stake in the Middle East and Mediterranean security. American and European institutions have profoundly impacted the development of the modern Middle East, and, for better or worse, they will continue to play an integral role in the region. Hard and soft security issues in our region will be difficult, if not impossible, to address without engaging these extra-regional actors.

The NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue was launched in 1994 and thus far includes seven countries in the North Africa and Middle East region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. One of the main objectives of the dialogue is to foster practical cooperation on issues relating to security, areas where NATO has a recognized comparative advantage. During the last decade, discussions have focused mainly on peacekeeping issues, arms control, small arms and light weapons, environmental protection, civil-military cooperation for civil-emergency planning, crisis management and military cooperation. For all that, however, the dialogue is still far from realizing its full potential.

Unfortunately, NATO has a poor image in many of the dialogue countries, stemming from a lack of trust and communication that ultimately hinders cooperative efforts in the region. This is extremely important because many observers in the dialogue countries fear NATO plans to create an intervention force basically aimed at their dialogue partners. It is incumbent upon NATO therefore to provide the political elites and opinion-makers in the dialogue countries with a better sense of the organization's true goals and purposes.

Because the MENA region faces many uncertainties, it is vital that the dialogue succeeds. Serious attempts should be made to reconcile a history of mistrust between the region and the West. The goals of the dialogue must be clearly defined to serve the needs of both sides. In this context, inviting Libya, Syria and Lebanon to join the dialogue should be considered. Libya seems to have moderated its international behavior and made positive progress toward normalizing its relations with both Europe and the United States. Syria also is a member of the Euro-Med partnership and could be a potential candidate down the road. The same is true for Lebanon.

In addition, the NATO-Med dialogue should focus on establishing effective confidence and security building measures to enhance peace and stability in the Mediterranean region. Further, it should implement measures to deal with and eliminate the root causes of instability and terrorism. NATO needs to promote democracy and respect for human rights. It should also enhance dialogue toward a better mutual understanding of cultures, religious interfaith and civilizations of the people of the Euro-Mediterranean region.

Finally, in the face of current security threats, it is clear that conflict prevention is a far wiser strategy as well as less costly in human and material terms than conflict management and the inevitable consequences. No one in the two regions is immune to the strife and turmoil that much of the Med-basin lives under. The question then becomes, is NATO willing to marshal the adequate resources to make this policy option more appealing to the governments of the partner states? - Published 17/2/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

General (rtd) Mohammad K. Shiyyab is managing director of Middle East Security Consultants in Amman.