Edition 5 Volume 3 - February 10, 2005
The future of Sudan
• A microcosm of Africa -
an interview withHasan Abdin
We can set an example that African problems can be resolved, the unity and integrity of each state can be maintained, provided that people agree on certain principles.
• The Naivasha enigma -
Robert O. Collins
Are the Sudanese Islamists ready to abandon their ideology in return for a united, democratic Sudan?
• People don't change their mindsets overnight -
an interview withRoss Herbert
People fight for their own small patch of the world and their own interests. The bigger issue is, will people come to see peace as being more beneficial.
• Necessary but not sufficient -
an interview withSadiq al-Mahdi
We in the North need the southern element as a check against Islamic fanaticism.
• The unfinished big leap -
Gamal A.G. Soltan
Not used to happy endings, peoples of the Middle East have strong doubts regarding these developments.
A microcosm of Africa
an interview with Hasan Abdin BI: The peace treaty signed in Kenya has been welcomed as an historic agreement ending Africa's longest running civil war. Is it sustainable?
Abdin: I think it is sustainable, and we are hopeful that it will be implemented with the same spirit and mutual confidence that helped conclude it. Of course it's not simply a peace agreement bringing to an end a long war--though it did that with the ceasefire--it is also a new formula for a political and constitutional set-up for the Sudan of the future.
BI: It's a very interesting treaty in this respect. How did it come about?
Abdin: The issue of decentralization and establishing a political constitutional system that will suit the Sudan. Sudan is a huge country, the biggest in Africa in terms of area, a very diverse country, actually a microcosm of Africa in terms of diversity, with hundreds of languages and ethnic groups. So there has always been a search for a constitutional and political set-up that would accommodate this size and this diversity. But, of course the war did not allow the time and peace to devise such a system. Now that negotiations have come to a successful conclusion about the relationship between North and South, it was always felt very important to redefine relationships between all the parts of Sudan with the center. I think the best formula, which we have arrived at now, is a federal system that will accommodate the aspirations of the southern Sudanese, who will have almost self-rule for six years after which they will decide whether they want to remain in this federal political system or to form their own state.
BI: The treaty provides for secession...
Abdin: It really doesn't provide for secession. It offers southerners a choice, and it was agreed that priority would be given to unity.
BI: But do you think secession is likely to happen?
Abdin: At this time this would be speculation. The idea of the six-year period is to carry out certain steps to restore stability in the southern Sudan, to repatriate the refugees and the displaced, to rebuild the infrastructure, to do many things. All these are intended to build confidence among the southerners that they can live and co-exist in one state with their brothers in the North. Depending on our success in implementing these articles of the agreement, after that, I think it is left to the southerners to decide.
BI: The prospect of a united, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and peaceful Sudan is something that not long ago seemed very unlikely. If such a situation should come about, do you foresee Sudan becoming an example for the rest of Africa and a bridge between the Arab and Muslim world and Africa?
Abdin: To answer the second question first, Sudan has always tried to play the role of bridging African and Arab and Muslim cultures, itself being a hybrid. There are a lot of African, Arab, Muslim and Christian influences in the country.
As for the first part, if Sudan can be a role model, I think this is very true. What we suffer from now and have managed fortunately to resolve is a potential conflict in other African countries, because of this diversity that is religious, cultural, ethic. There are many current conflicts in other parts of Africa, in West Africa, in Somalia, in Congo, and we should set an example that these African problems can be resolved, the unity and integrity of each state can be maintained provided that people agree on certain principles, as we have agreed on the question of a united state where all people are equal in a constitutional, democratic system, accountability, transparency, good governance. Within this framework, people can co-exist in one state in spite of these apparent differences in ethnicity, religion and so on.
BI: How does the treaty affect the conflict in Darfur?
Abdin: It should reflect positively in Darfur or on the peace process for Darfur. The government has declared, in recent weeks, that what has happened in southern Sudan and brought about agreement, there is no reason why we should not apply the same principles for resolving the conflict in Darfur. Mainly these are the principles of power sharing, wealth sharing and also the modality of dialogue. The Darfur crisis cannot be solved militarily, it will have to be resolved through negotiations as in the southern Sudan.
Now that the vice president who led the government delegation [in the negotiations with the south] and managed to bring about this agreement last month, has assumed direct responsibility for negotiations in Darfur, we hope, given the experience of Naivasha, to settle the crisis in Darfur, and then, and only then, do we have a comprehensive peace agreement.
BI: Are you optimistic?
Abdin: Very optimistic.- Published 10/2/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org
Hasan Abdin is Sudan's ambassador to the United Kingdom
The Naivasha enigma
Robert O. CollinsOn January 9, 2005 the government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed a peace agreement in Naivasha, Kenya, after 22 years of violent conflict that killed over two million southern Sudanese and displaced another six million. Make no mistake, this is an historic achievement concerning inscrutable and imponderable differences, the result of long and tortuous negotiations that could have failed at any moment without intense international pressure from the troika of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the stalwart Norwegians.
It was the vindication of Dr. John Garang, leader of the SPLM, who envisaged a new Sudan of unity in diversity in 1983, a conviction from which he has never deviated during two decades of military victories and defeats, revolts against his authority, and interminable negotiations with disingenuous Islamist members of the National Islamic Front (NIF). His consistency, determination, and patience have been rewarded. He is now on paper the most powerful man in the Sudan as first vice-president, president of the Southern Autonomous Government, and commander-in-chief of his own army.
The new Sudan will no longer be an Islamist state but a democratic "one Sudan regardless of race, religion, or tribe" in which the new South will have autonomy, retain its own army, receive 50 percent of Sudan's oil revenues, and have the right to vote for secession after six years. Those who have worked so hard for so long to achieve this triumph deserve our heart-felt praise, but they have had neither the time nor the energy to realize what they have accomplished or how they achieved it. After the celebrations in the sober light of day the participants awoke to the fact that, in their focused determination to complete the Naivasha Agreement they had little or no understanding of reality in the southern Sudan.
What are the realities? No amount of rhetoric can overcome the fact that today the overwhelming numbers of southern Sudanese are open or "closet" separatists, including some within Garang's SPLM National Leadership Council. This should come as no surprise after 150 years of slavery, discrimination, and racism by northern Sudanese and, since independence, too many promises broken and millions dead or driven from their homes. Moreover, there is a large body of silent northerners who are quite prepared to let the South go its own way. For, indeed, southerners are different, often despised, and not about to become Arabs and Muslims, so it's time the two million unwanted southern refugees milling around Khartoum went home.
Among the European and the United States governments there is an accepted folklore that the southern Sudan does not have the necessary educated and experienced individuals to administer the new South. This is undoubtedly true, but it is a situation the international community has pledged to rectify by massive infusions of cash and personnel to help. And if the past is any prophet of the future, after winning a measure of autonomy at Addis Ababa in 1972 the southern Sudanese enjoyed themselves immensely managing or mismanaging their affairs, and see no reason not to try again on their own. During the six years before the promised referendum this enthusiasm for independence will be hard to contain despite the anticipated attempts by any northern government to subvert it.
The key to the success of the unified new Sudan, however, is not the evolution of a separatist movement in the new South, but the reception and acceptance of a large number of hitherto despised southerners by the northern Sudanese. Naivasha guaranteed that southerners would receive 30 percent of the executive and legislative seats in the government of north Sudan, 12 percent more than in the elected central government of 1958.
In 1958 the southern representatives were ill-educated, inexperienced, and naive. Some were fooled, most were bought. It is doubtful that the southern Sudanese veterans of war, political infighting within the SPLM, and years of negotiations with Islamists, supported by the educated and successful southern elite in the diaspora, will be bought or betray their constituents a second time around. The new southern politician, however, will soon perceive that his future lies in being a member of the independent government of the South and not as "minister of cows" in Khartoum.
Perhaps the greatest enigma of Naivasha is the seeming willingness by the leadership of the National Congress Party (formerly NIF) to abandon the Islamist state and the ideology upon which it was founded of converting all Sudanese into Arabs and Muslim fundamentalists. Many have long wondered at the incongruity of the professed policies of the Islamist government to transform multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-religious Sudan into an Arab nation run by Salafist militant Muslims, a policy whose current manifestation is disaster in Darfur.
Are the Sudanese Islamists ready to abandon their ideology, their mission, and above all their power in return for a united, democratic Sudan, or is it to be just more of the same tactics of give-and-take, stonewalling and prevarication that have characterized their governance during the past 16 years? That is the Naivasha enigma.- Published 10/2/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org
Robert O. Collins is professor of history emeritus at the University of California Santa Barbara. He first went to the Sudan in 1956 and has since written extensively on the Sudan, the Southern Sudan, and the Nile.
People don't change their mindsets overnight
an interview with Ross HerbertBI:Is the agreement sustainable?
Herbert: It is if both parties act out of good will and they want it to be sustainable. But I'm not convinced that the government in Khartoum is acting with any long-term sincerity. I think they have been under a lot of pressure and this is a way out for a time. The regime there is still basically hardcore. Many of the players are dedicated Arabists and Islamists. I don't see, particularly in their conduct toward the Darfur rebellion, any great enlightenment. So when it comes down to the referendum in six years on allowing separation, will they do so? But I also think at this point you have to give it the benefit of the doubt, and as along as it remains peaceful then you have success.
BI:But the treaty is more than a ceasefire agreement.
Herbert: It is in enshrining the ability to secede. And the federalism is quite contentious. The instincts that say "no" to that, that say "if we can win this militarily, we can continue to rule from Khartoum and have everything our own way," are still strong. The tests will really only come with time. Clearly they were influenced to get back to the negotiating table by intense pressure from the region, from the Americans--the American war in Afghanistan woke them up a bit as did the subsequent Iraq venture. I'll believe this thing is stable when they cross the six years and have the referendum. It's an enormous country and the pressures to fracture are great.
One could look at this in a peaceful way and say there's more than enough. If they share half the oil resources with the south, the south would have infinitely more than it has now and so it ought to be happy. And similarly the north surely would be better off if they didn't have to spend enormous sums on fighting a war.
BI:If there is secession, which you seem to be suggesting, what signal would that send to the rest of the continent?
Herbert: I don't think it will directly embolden someone to start a rebellion, but I certainly think a lot of people talk and think about these things. For the likes of the people running around and destabilizing the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), quite a lot of them would like to break off and have their own fiefdom.
I think the question of Africa's geographic boundaries is one that is not going to go away. It will take many decades, even centuries, before people stop questioning the set-up. Every country has a capital controlled by some ethnic group and there are a whole lot of other ethnic groups who are aggrieved and want to be in charge.
BI:Is there not an interest on behalf of the African Union in seeing Sudan succeed?
Herbert: I think definitely the AU has put a significant amount of energy into it. They would like to see the country stay together and the war to stop. That's all common sense. But are other aggrieved regions going to be emboldened by this? Perhaps, but one doesn't win the acknowledged right to succeed unless mayhem has carried on for a great many years. Nobody internationally is going to want to bless the break-up of the DRC, but if it carries on for 20 years perhaps people will see it as a more appropriate solution.
BI:But isn't there a lot of interest in seeing this treaty succeed exactly to avoid bloody secession elsewhere?
Herbert: There is interest in seeing it succeed, but whether it does or doesn't, strictly speaking doesn't have a whole lot to do with what the AU does. They can influence the course of events and apply pressure, but ultimately it's the parties themselves who will choose to go back to war or not, and they will do so apart from the influence of the AU. They are not fighting for the greater good of Africa or for some pan-African vision. People fight for their own small patch of the world and their own interests. The bigger issue is, will people come to see peace as being more beneficial, will resources flow and will they follow through on these promises sincerely, or will they think after a while they can fool people and give less and less to the aggrieved regions.
BI:So you are not very optimistic.
Herbert: Self interest always drives governments in various ways, and autocratic governments are not controlled by the disciplines of public protests and the exercise of the democratic franchise. Having struck this deal does not make Sudan a democracy and it does not take away those autocratic instincts, so I would question whether they have really had an epiphany that they need to be democratic and inclusive, share the wealth with the South and not impose their narrow religious perspective on the rest of the country.
BI:Perhaps a signal of that would be if a similar agreement is struck in Darfur?
Herbert: Yes, it would be a signal. But I would say their hamfisted, "pass out the guns and blow up the villages regardless whether or not we establish culpability" doesn't speak to me of an enlightened mind. It speaks to me of someone who is in a corner and doing what they feel they have to do and they don't really care about the human rights and democracy of it.
If you have an overall national election, and an open vote, would the regime be prepared to honor the will of the public that would create a black southern president? I'm pretty skeptical. I would like to see it work, but there are enormous pressures at work and I don't think people change their mindsets overnight.
BI:Of course you could argue that it hasn't been overnight--it's been over 22 years of fighting.
Herbert: True. It would be nice if they have accumulated that wisdom and seen that this conflict just isn't winnable militarily. That was what infused the South African settlement. Both sides recognized they couldn't win without tearing the place apart and a peaceful solution was the better way to succeed.
The temptation will be if they can use political tricks to manipulate the rules, the voting practices, the representation, definition of districts, apportionment of funds and who gets to be governor, all the tricks by which people concentrate power in the hands of an elite and insulate themselves. Will they succumb to that temptation, or not, as some have historically? I'm not convinced that there is such a democratic tradition, at least among those in power now in Khartoum.- Published 10/2/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org
Ross Herbert is an Africa research fellow at the South African Institute for International Affairs.
Necessary but not sufficient
an interview with Sadiq al-MahdiBI: Recently the Sudanese government and the southern opposition movement led by John Garang signed an historic North-South peace agreement. Will it last? As leader of the opposition Umma Party, can you support it?
al-Mahdi: The agreement is a very great step forward toward peace and democratization in Sudan. However there are certain drawbacks: the agreement has been reached by two Sudanese parties to the exclusion of others, particularly northern parties with very wide popular support and southern parties with arms.
Therefore this agreement is necessary but not sufficient. The external contributors to the agreement have done a wonderful job through the IGAD states [Intergovernmental Authority on Development, incorporating Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Uganda and Kenya] and the troika--the US, UK and Norway. The exchange has not involved all of Sudan's neighbors and they have to be involved also.
This is a formal critique. In substance there is a need for certain aspects that would make the agreement sustainable. We need to define them better.
BI: For example?
al-Mahdi: There are ambiguities that need to be defined. For instance, the North will be allowed Islamic legislation and the South will be secular. What about the capital, Khartoum? Further, the North is Islamic, but according to which interpretation of Islam? The interpretation of the ruling party does not represent many of Sudan's Muslims.
Secondly, there are items in the agreement that need to be amended in order to correct mistakes. When you state that 50 percent of Sudan's oil wealth will go to the South, southerners will support secession in order to get 100 percent of the oil. We need to state that the natural resources of the entire country should be divided among the population on a per capita basis, with positive discrimination for areas like the South that have suffered.
Thirdly, some items are missing. Part of the problem [between the North and the South] was religion; we need a chapter on religious pluralism. We need a truth and reconciliation commission to absorb the bitterness. We need a national conference to transform the agreement from bilateral to national. We need a protocol on foreign policy: for example, the North favors the Palestinians while the South leans toward Israel; this has to be resolved, too.
BI: The agreement provides for a referendum in six years, in which the South can decide to secede. What will keep North and South together six years from now?
al-Mahdi: At present bitterness is high. But we in the North need the southern element as a check against Islamic fanaticism. The South needs the North as a check against tribal fanaticism.
Secondly, there is a demographic reality that makes secession impossible. There are four million southerners in the North--a number larger than all the southerners in the South. The majority [of southerners] in the North will not accept repatriation, as they are integrated into the northern money economy. Secession for them means forced repatriation or ethnic cleansing. Also, the Bagara Arab borderline tribes that live between the South and the North could only be prevented by force from grazing in the South eight months out of the year. So there is an organic link for unity.
Regarding oil, too, the infrastructure, representing an investment of $8 billion, is oriented toward the North. Secession would create more problems for both sides than unity.
BI: What impact would secession have on the region?
al-Mahdi: An independent South would have an impact on our southern borders, which have their own internal tensions, for example between eastern Congo and the rest of Congo, and northern and southern Uganda. Southern independence could destabilize East Africa and the Horn. Similarly, a North that is not tied to the South will have a potential effect on North Africa.
BI: Can a united Sudan serve as a bridge between the Arab Middle East and black Africa? Between Islam and Christianity and African religions?
al-Mahdi: If Sudan manages to stay together, it will reflect a need for Islamic extremism to accommodate with modernization and pluralism. It will create new conditions for religious communities to coexist. It will show the way for meaningful Afro-Arab accord. And it will allow Sudan to play its rightful role in the Nile basin. There are growing tensions between the countries of the Nile sources and the countries of the Nile flow. Only Sudan borders them all.
BI: How does the agreement affect the Darfur situation?
al-Mahdi: Some of the problems in Darfur are developmental and tribal. These can be resolved through traditional Sudanese means. However, the current crisis in Darfur has four new elements caused by present regime policies: politicized ethnicity; a huge humanitarian problem; the existence of armed groups confronting the government; and internationalization of the problem. If the crisis in Darfur is not resolved, it will derail the North-South agreement, since the North and the South of Sudan have diametrically opposite views on Darfur.- Published 10/2/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org
Sadiq al-Mahdi is a former prime minister of Sudan, and currently leader of the Umma Party.
The unfinished big leap
Gamal A.G. SoltanThe peace agreement signed between the Sudanese government and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement is an historic development that should put an end to the longest ethnic conflict in Africa. The significance of the peace agreement in the Sudan is much more than just ending a long civil war. In particular, the agreement could be a model for resolving many of the ethnic conflicts around the region. The principle of "power and wealth sharing" that has guided the peace agreement in the Sudan could be applied to other ethnic conflicts. According to Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir, the same principle will be applied to the conflict in Darfur.
The mere fact that power and wealth sharing was the principle underpinning the peace agreement in the Sudan indicates a major shift in the attitudes of Sudan's ruling elite. It is equally important to note that this shift has taken place among an elite that has a strong fundamentalist background. Also, the wide support the Sudan peace agreement is receiving among the Arab Muslims of the Sudan indicates a radical change of the prevalent mood among an ethnic group that has enjoyed hegemonic status for decades.
The ethnic pluralism of the Sudan and its dual African and Middle Eastern identities make it likely that peace there will influence developments in a larger area across the two regions. In particular, the peace agreement in the Sudan could have a significant impact on regional politics in the wider Middle East. Egypt is likely to be the channel through which this impact could make its way to the region.
The new arrangements in the Sudan challenge long-held principles of Egypt's foreign policy toward that country. The initial Egyptian reaction to the Mashakos peace protocol of the year 2002 was rather unfavorable. However, Egypt was able to make a quick adjustment to the developments in the Sudan. A policy of "constructive engagement" with the new realities in the making there has been swiftly developed. Egypt's new Sudan policy has been accompanied by a larger change in its African policy. After years of negligence, the continent currently enjoys a prominent position on the ladder of Egyptian foreign policy priorities. This southern reorientation could have a significant effect on Egyptian foreign policy at large.
The central component of the peace agreement in the Sudan is the six-year transition period after which the Sudanese of the South will be given the opportunity to exercise the right to self-determination. The uncertain future of the Sudan requires all concerned parties to remain alert and ready to adjust to the changing reality there. Even if the people in the southern Sudan choose to go for independence after the six-year transition period, so be it. This does not mean a failure of the whole process. It rather means a success in producing a civilized divorce after long decades of failure to coexist peacefully.
The situation in the Sudan is extremely fragile. The successes achieved by the southern armed rebellion have encouraged other ethnic groups to follow suit. The rising ethnic tension in Darfur to the west and Kasala to the east is a result of the dynamics that were unleashed by the peace agreement in the south. Failing to handle these tensions in the east and the west properly could jeopardize the progress made in the South. Therefore, upgrading the peace deal in the South to a more comprehensive approach that covers other major conflicts in Sudan seems a must.
Reaching the peace deal in the Sudan required a great deal of determination and clear vision from the immediate parties to the conflict. Similar levels of determination and clear vision are needed to implement the agreed-upon deal through the coming six years of transition. However, the peace agreement in the Sudan could not have been reached if not for the active constructive role played by a number of third parties, particularly the United States. As in many of the interstate and intrastate conflicts in the region, parties to the conflict in southern Sudan did not have the capacity to resolve it on their own. The US provided the needed clout to make the demands and pressures of the international community and Sudan's neighbors credible. This third party role is badly needed both to handle Sudan's other ethnic conflicts and to implement the agreed upon peace deal in the South.
Peace in the southern Sudan is one of the positive developments the Middle East has witnessed during the past few months. Together, the rise of a new Palestinian leadership, the successful elections in Iraq and the peace agreement in the Sudan constitute a new trend in Middle Eastern politics. The consolidation of these developments could be a turning point in the three major conflicts that have poisoned the political environment in the region.
Not used to happy endings, peoples of the Middle East have strong doubts regarding the long-term effects of these developments. Nurturing them to the phase of maturity and delivery is extremely important to ensure a lasting shift in the course of events that has dominated the region for so long.- Published 10/2/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org
Gamal A.G. Soltan is senior research fellow at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS) and the editor of the center's monthly Strategic Papers.
|
All Rights Reserved