Edition 7 Volume 1 - August 21, 2003
Syria, Lebanon and the peace process
• Lebanon and Syria: searching for a map? -
byAs`ad AbuKhalil
Lebanese popular attitudes against the Jewish state will not evaporate through a change in Syrian policy.
• Until someone sees the light -
an interview withRime Allaf
Syria has always tried to have a united Arab front.
• Prospects for renewed Syrian-Israeli negotiations -
byItamar Rabinovich
For years the rhetoric of peace and an exacerbation of violence have intermingled.
• Syria and Lebanon: the missing links to peace -
byEdward S. Walker, Jr.
Assad is ready to negotiate with Israel once the Palestinian track is open.
Lebanon and Syria: searching for a map?
by As`ad AbuKhalil It is often assumed that Syria and Lebanon have a joint stance toward the so-called peace process. Syria is believed to exercise full control over Lebanon's foreign policy. In reality, while Syria enjoys supreme influence over Lebanese affairs partly because the dynamics of internal Lebanese politics has introduced Syria as an internal factor and partly due to the Syrian military presence in Lebanon, Beirut has its own agenda which has been popularly shaped by decades of Israeli (mis)treatment of Lebanon and its people.
The 1996 Qana massacre, in which civilians hiding in a shelter were killed by Israeli bombardment, and which seemed part of the Labor Party's electoral campaign, marked a crucial watershed in shaping Lebanese popular attitudes towards Arab-Israel peace. If Israel's first president David Ben Gurion is said to have observed that Lebanon would be the second Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel, it is now safe to predict that Lebanon will be the last country to ever sign a peace treaty with Israel. Lebanese popular attitudes against the Jewish state will not evaporate through a change in Syrian policy toward Israel. Thanks to cruel Israeli occupation of South Lebanon and exploitation of Lebanese sectarian politics, the opposition to Israel is now firmly established in Lebanese political culture. The rise of the Party of God (Hezbollah) is also responsible for hardening of the Lebanese position toward the "peace process". The right-wing Lebanese camp that attempted to normalize relationship with Israel is long gone, and its symbols and slogans have long been discredited in Lebanese domestic politics.
The Syrian matter is different altogether; unlike Lebanon where public opinion is a crucial determinant of Lebanese foreign policy, Syrian foreign policy toward the "roadmap" (which leaves both Lebanon and Syria outside of the American "solution") is dictated by the Syrian vision of its relationship with the United States. Syrian public opinion, historically known as vibrantly Arab nationalist and anti-Israeli, also has to be factored in by the new Syrian president. Syria wants to resolve the issue of the Golan Heights, but, unlike other Arab negotiators, refuses to barter with "a few square miles here and a few square miles there." That President Hafez al Assad was firm on this position will prevent his son from deviating from the established argument.
Syria has adamantly insisted on the full recovery of its occupied lands, although the Syrian position has changed in that Syria no longer insists on linking together all tracks of Arab-Israel negotiations. The Oslo agreement rendered the argument of the "comprehensive peace" obsolete, and it facilitated Israeli attempts to divide the ranks of Arab negotiators. But the Syrian president, who does not have the shrewdness and diplomatic skills of his father (nor his ruthlessness), does not want to keep Syria in isolation in the era of an American empire. He wants to maintain good ties with the US--but the US no longer seems interested.
Syria's willingness to reach an agreement with Israel faces tremendous obstacles, not only due to the hardening of Arab public opinion from scenes of Israeli brutality transmitted through the Arab satellite channels in the course of the second intifada, but Syria has also lost faith in the ability or willingness of the US to play an honest mediating role between the two sworn enemies. Furthermore, the US has increased and not decreased its hostile pronouncements against Syria, and the US Congress refuses to send messages of goodwill toward the new Syrian president. Instead, the US government and Congress are both using the war in Iraq to exhibit more belligerency towards Syria and Iran--and anybody who dares to disagree with US policies and actions in the Middle East.
Even without these mitigating factors, neither Syria nor Lebanon can commit to join the roadmap, not only because the roadmap leaves both countries outside of the charted "solution," but because neither government expects the US to exercise any pressure on Israel no matter what it does on the ground. The American president, who was elected with the help of the Likudnik Christian Right, will not waver in his support for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, especially as he gets ready for his reelection campaign.
Still, Syria may not be as nervous as might be expected under these circumstances. The US government's pronouncements on reform and democracy are easily ignored by any observer who has watched the US exploit those ideals for foreign policy posturing. Similarly, the US will not pressure Syria on Lebanon as long as the Party of God remains the most popular organization in the country. Lebanon under Syrian control is far more manageable for US policy makers than a chaotic Lebanon, and Syria must know that. Furthermore, both Syria and Lebanon think that Israel will not be willing to implement the roadmap, despite its advantages for the Israeli side.-Published 21/8/03(c)bitterlemons-international.org
As`ad AbuKhalil, a Lebanese, is professor of political science at California State University, Stanislaus and visiting professor at UC, Berkeley. His latest book is titled Bin Laden, Islam, and America's New "War on Terrorism."
Until someone sees the light
an interview with Rime AllafBI: It has been said that since the invasion of Iraq and a more aggressive United States policy towards Damascus, Syria is in a period of contemplation about how to best meet the new realities. Do you agree that this is true and are their any signs as to what Syria is deciding?
Allaf: Like any other country that is being relentlessly attacked, if only verbally, by very right-wing segments of the American administration, Syria is thinking very seriously about how to offer a different picture to the US administration. I don’t think that Syria has really considered changing the fundamentals of its position with regards to the Middle East conflict, because it keeps on repeating what it has been repeating since 1967, and keeps trying to bring the track back to where it was in 2000.
Syria does understand that there is a new situation, but as in one example just days ago, like other Arab League members, Syria said that it does not recognize the legality of the new council in Iraq, but is willing to play along and see what happens.
BI: Your father took part in previous Syrian-Israeli negotiations. What did Syria learn from the experience of those talks?
Allaf: Quite frankly, what I think Syria learned from these talks is that you cannot always trust what is being said. After the invasion of Kuwait, [US] President George Bush Sr. was trying to gather the Arab states’ approval for the liberation of Kuwait. He said, “We will deal with Kuwait, but we will also deal with your conflict,” and then he launched the peace conference and the famous “land for peace” equation.
But, in spite of [Syria’s] trying to stick to the original fundamentals of the peace conference and negotiations--United Nations resolutions 242, 338 and “land for peace”--nothing happened. Syria agreed to numerous meetings at the highest level, the last one being in March 2000 between the Syrian and American presidents, thinking that something new was coming. But the Americans had misled the Syrians. They implied that there was a new Israeli offer on the Sea of Galilee, but the Syrians arrived to find that the Americans were hoping only to sweet-talk them into agreeing to something. What is interesting is that several people, [former US secretary of state] Warren Christopher among them, have admitted that [former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak] Rabin already promised in 1993 to withdraw from the Golan Heights, which is the only reason Syria was interested in continuing the talks with Israel.
It is very interesting that we should be speaking this week about the Syrian and Lebanese tracks, which have always been so closely related. Only a few days ago, [Palestinian foreign minister] Nabil Shaath suggested that there be a troika--Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority--dealing with the Israelis on the peace process. Syria has in fact always tried to have a united Arab front.
So Syria is basically sitting and waiting for the American administration to come back to its track and pick up the pieces where they left off. We have already agreed that the bases for negotiations are the Golan Heights and the Lebanese and Palestinian occupied lands.
BI: How has the intifada affected the Syrian-Israeli peace process?
Allaf: The intifada, with the help of satellite television, has brought the Palestinian tragedy back into the lives of everyday Arabs. If anything, the intifada has helped the Arab street to become more adamant in asking more of its governments: do not give too much to Israel.
From the Atlantic to the Gulf, the countries where the largest demonstrations happened were the countries where a certain level of diplomatic relations had been achieved with Israel. In Egypt, the population was outraged by the intifada and particularly by the Israeli response to the protests, and this is where one million people came out to a demonstration.
In Syria, I don’t think much has changed. What has been said is that we are still glad that there is no Israeli flag in Damascus and that we will be the last country to have that flag.
BI: How does Lebanon fit into this picture?
Allaf: The Lebanese and Syrian tracks have been very, very closely coordinated for the last 20 or 30 years and at least since the launch of the peace process. But even the United Nations secretariat is caving in to requests to break this last united front by saying that Israel has left Lebanese land and that the [Israeli-occupied] Shabaa farms have nothing to do with Lebanon, even though both Syria and Lebanon have said that this land is Lebanese. The UN secretary general had a very unfortunate role in this in that he first agreed with the Syrian and Lebanese position, and then a few days later came back and said that, actually, [the farms] are Syrian.
This is a consistent and tireless attempt to break the cake into many pieces and make it more manageable. Now the Palestinians are realizing what a big mistake this was. Unfortunately, it may be a bit too late because the Syrian track is all but dead at the moment.
BI: You are there in Damascus now. Are people angry after the invasion of Iraq?
Allaf: What I am hearing and have been hearing for the last few months is that the US and Great Britain have dared to use United Nations resolutions to invade an Arab country when the Arabs have been demanding for years that [the US and Britain] go back to the resolutions they voted for and make Israel abide by them. There is a sense of outrage, of anger, of bitterness, of disappointment that the double standard has been so blatant, especially after the immense suffering of the Palestinians.
Syrians are outraged about the recent aggressions against Lebanon; they are very angry that the western world would see only the Arab response and be surprised by it. People are very supportive of a hard line and are happy to remain that way until someone sees the light.-Published 21/8/03©bitterlemons-international.org
Rime Allaf is an associate fellow at Chatham House in London.
Prospects for renewed Syrian-Israeli negotiations
by Itamar RabinovichRecently several reports heralded Syrian plans to renew negotiations with Israel; most prominent and most specific among them was the account by the United Nations Middle East envoy, Terje Larsen, of his conversation with Syrian President Bashar al Assad. Simultaneously, in early August tensions arose along the Lebanese-Israeli border, as Hezbollah attacked an outpost on the Israeli side of the border and intensified its anti-aircraft fire in a fashion designed to cause harm to towns and settlements in northern Israel.
This pattern is hardly surprising. For many years now rhetoric of peace and an exacerbation of violence have come together, intermingled, in the tortuous history of Israeli-Syrian diplomacy and fighting by proxy along the Israeli-Lebanese border.
Let us begin with an examination of the prospects for an effort to renew Israeli-Syrian negotiations. There are three parties to any such new endeavor--Israel, Syria and the United States. Of the three, two are not interested at present. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, unlike his four predecessors, does not hold a preference for a "Syria first" policy. Prime ministers Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu and Barak all held the view that it was preferable for Israel to first conclude an agreement with Syria so that they could then negotiate with the Palestinians with a stronger hand. They all saw the Israeli-Syrian conflict as easier to resolve, and regarded President Hafez al Assad as a better partner than Yasir Arafat.
But in the meantime Hafez al Assad died, and his son and successor is perceived as weak and immature, certainly not the challenging but promising partner that his father was. Furthermore, Ariel Sharon is not interested in a deal with Syria and in the price tag that it is bound to exact--a complete withdrawal from the Golan Heights. He is fully focused on his conflict with the Palestinians and, in his view, the crowning achievement of his tenure would be an interim agreement with the Palestinians that would put an end to the current crisis. Additional negotiations with Syria would impose another heavy load on his agenda and would entail concessions that he is not willing to make.
A similar change has taken place in Washington. For eight years, the Clinton administration's policy towards the Arab-Israel conflict rested on the assumption that an Israeli-Syrian agreement was the best premise for a larger Israel-Arab agreement. The Bush administration began its term of office with a reluctance to engage in Arab-Israel diplomacy. It was dragged into a high profile involvement in Arab-Israel affairs, but would like to limit it to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Its view of Bashar al Assad and his regime is critical and hostile. From the Bush administration's perspective, Damascus lies perilously close to the "axis of evil": it is a potential target for Washington's wrath and certainly not a candidate for diplomatic munificence.
This state of affairs is precisely one of Syria's motivations for seeking to renew negotiations with Israel, or at least to create the background noises of such diplomacy. It wants to improve its relationship with Washington and wants to be perceived as a serious candidate for peace coalitions and not for the axis of evil.
On a deeper level, Syria cannot afford to remain outside the Middle East diplomatic game. By now all other participants in the 1967 Arab defeat have either regained territory or are engaged in a process that should accomplish that aim--Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians. Even Lebanon, Syria's protégé, can now boast of Israel's withdrawal to the international boundary. For the past 35 years, the Baath regime could always explain to its constituency that it was either fighting to regain land or negotiating for it. But since the war in Iraq, Syria has been threatened by Washington and told to cease its support for Hezbollah, its proxy in South Lebanon in the armed conflict against Israel. It is thus neither fighting nor talking.
The recent surge of increased violence in South Lebanon may very well be a Syrian attempt to open a safety valve in order to release some of the pressure, as well as an attempt to signal to Washington that in the absence of any diplomatic progress, Damascus will have no choice but to use Hezbollah in order to generate new tensions along the Israeli-Lebanese border. At the same time, Syria has not taken any real measures to put an end to the activities of the rejectionist Palestinian organizations in Damascus and, together with its ally, Iran, is responsible for the activities of such organizations as Hamas and Islamic Jihad that threaten the fragile truce between Israel and the Palestinians.
This state of affairs presents both Jerusalem and Washington with new challenges. Israel needs to find a way of attaining peace and quiet in northern Israel without being dragged into a new cycle of violence along its border with Lebanon. Washington, assuming it does not want to provide Damascus with a diplomatic outlet, needs to reestablish its deterrence and to keep Bashar al Assad and his regime at bay.-Published 21/8/2003©bitterlemons-international.org
Itamar Rabinovich, Israel's former ambassador in Washington and chief negotiator with Syria, is the author of the forthcoming "The Lingering Conflict: Israel, the Arabs and the Middle East 1948-2011".
Syria and Lebanon: the missing links to peace
by Edward S. Walker, Jr.Although United States President George W. Bush and the administration are now, finally, firmly committed to pursuing Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the prognosis does not look very good. The three month unilateral ceasefire seems to be disintegrating before our eyes while neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians appear anxious to fulfill the steps required in the Quartet’s roadmap. US Secretary Colin Powell is bravely telling the world that we are not going to let terrorism stand in our way, but he is relatively powerless to stop the escalation between Hamas, Jihad, the Al Aqsa Brigades and the Israelis.
Even as the West Bank is heating up again, the Israeli border with Lebanon has suddenly come back into focus. Cross border attacks both ways suggest the possibility of escalation on that front as well. While it may be difficult to document the link between Damascus, Hizballah, cross border attacks and the violence in the West Bank and Israel, it stands to reason that violence feeds on violence. And the absence of movement toward peace feeds the frustration that helps foment terrorism.
Clearly, the authorities in Syria have to be concerned when there are signs of movement and a US-energized process on the Palestinian track, and a vacuum of movement on the Syrian and Lebanese fronts. If Syria becomes the last man standing, then the authorities there will have to ask themselves what leverage they have left to negotiate on an equal basis with Israel. Iraq is out of the equation. That leaves a nervous Iran and the terrorists on Syria’s side--a much better foundation for upsetting the apple cart for the Palestinians and the US than for making peace.
For years Syria has stressed the need for a comprehensive peace and comprehensive negotiations. For years we have had an attention deficit disorder of being able to focus on only one front at a time. It is time to question that approach. Simultaneous movement on the Syria/Lebanon front and the Palestinian front would be mutually reinforcing. There would be greater incentive to stop terrorist attacks and greater support throughout the region for those willing to stand up to the terrorists. If it is true, as many suspect or claim, that Syria has been playing a hand in supporting terrorism, then the best way to stop that game is to engage Syria in negotiations.
President Bashar al Assad made it clear to Secretary Powell during their first meeting, which I attended, that he stood ready to engage in negotiations with Israel once the Palestinian track was reopened. He has repeated that pledge to me and he has since sent signals to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that he is interested. It is a fact that we got close to an agreement between Israel and Syria with three separate prime ministers of Israel--in the time of Prime Minister Rabin, and then with Prime Minister Netanyahu and finally with Prime Minister Barak at Shepherdstown and Geneva. The issues are difficult but not impossible. And they may be more manageable with Prime Minister Sharon who knows the two most difficult elements, water and security, so well. Sharon has proven many times to be flexible on the issue of water. And while he is known for being tough on security issues, most of the major problems have already been solved between the two parties through combinations of technical means, limited forces zones and other mechanisms.
There is no inherent reason why Syria should support terrorism other than its fear that it might be left to its own devices, all alone with no resolution of the Golan issue. If Syria can reach agreement with Israel, there is no reason for it to continue its relationship with radical forces in Iran. On the other hand, there would be every reason for it to normalize its close relations with Lebanon, repair its relations with the United States and open itself up to foreign investment, improve its standard of living, and join the family of peaceful nations in the Middle East region. And if Israel can reach agreement with Syria, a terrorist trail would be closed, the last threat on the ground removed and Israel’s remaining enemies isolated with limited options for causing damage. This is a win-win-win situation for Syria, Lebanon and Israel. We should make it our urgent business to move these parties back to the table with as much vigor as we are investing in pursuing the roadmap with the Palestinians.-Published 21/8/2003©bitterlemons-international.org
Edward S. Walker, Jr. is president of the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC. He is a former United States ambassador to Egypt and Israel.
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