Edition 2 Volume 3 - January 13, 2005
The Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement
• Bread and butter -
Paul Schemm
Dealing with Israel is still a very sensitive topic, but Egypt has decided that, at least for now, it is in its best interests to get closer to Israel.
• Pulling strings discreetly -
Smadar Perry
It is startling to witness the trust-but-verify code that has so quickly emerged between the two generals/rulers in Cairo and Jerusalem.
• Egyptian role is welcome but not at the expense of our rights -
an interview withIsmail Haniyeh
Hamas expects Egypt, which has always stood behind the Palestinian people, to be cautious of Israeli schemes.
• Understanding the Egyptian paradox -
Abdel Monem Said Aly
Creating stability has been the traditional business of Egypt during the past three decades.
Bread and butter
Paul Schemm The cold peace between Egypt and Israel had long been one of the givens of Middle East politics. In contrast to former President Anwar Al Sadat's warm handshake with Israel, his successor, Husni Mubarak, kept relations cool and later, in 2000, positively glacial with the start of the latest intifada. Egypt pulled out its ambassador, trade dwindled and even agricultural cooperation was petering out between the two countries. The government made no effort to rein in the anti-Israeli rantings of the press corps and many analysts.
So it was with some surprise for Egyptians when this December, Israel and Egypt were suddenly not only engaged in intense negotiations over the future of the Gaza Strip, but exchanging prisoners and signing trade deals. The Egyptian government has made a major policy shift in the last month and decided to publicly improve its relations with Israel, despite continuing antipathy for the Jewish state in the general population. Part of the reason for this sea change is probably political and relates to worsening relations between Egypt and its chief patron the United States, but at its heart, it may have more to do with the bread and butter issues of business and economy.
For those looking for the signs, the events of December were not a total surprise. The Israeli press occasionally carried stories about plans to sign a Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) trade deal with Egypt as well as ongoing negotiations for a major natural gas deal between the two countries. There had also been persistent rumors about the imminent release of Israeli Druze Azzam Azzam, who worked for an Israeli garment manufacturer in Egypt and was sentenced to 15 years in jail for espionage in 1997. The Egyptian press, however, was silent about these matters, concentrating instead on the ongoing violence against the Palestinians.
So it was an unprepared population that suddenly heard that Azzam was being returned to Israel only halfway through his sentence. Even though it was an exchange for several Egyptian teenagers who'd stumbled across the border as well as over 150 Palestinians released later that month, many newspapers and commentators denounced it as a betrayal. There was more to come, however, when on December 14, Egypt signed the QIZ agreement with Israel and the US. The country that had once been routinely pilloried, even in the state owned press, was now signing an important trade deal with Egypt.
Under the QIZ agreement, Egypt can export duty-free to the US, as long as products contain 11.7 percent Israeli content. A similar agreement in Jordan increased that countries exports (mainly apparel) almost a hundred fold in a few years.
Egypt needed the agreement badly because with the abolishing of global export quotas for textiles and apparel in 2005, China and India are set to push smaller textile producers like Egypt out of the market. Egypt can only remain competitive in the US market with duty free access. After the US refused to give Egypt a free trade agreement, the QIZ was the only route left. Without the QIZ, Egypt stood to lose $500 million in annual textile and apparel exports to the US, devastating one of its most important industries.
The release of Azzam can certainly be viewed in this context. As an employee of an Israeli apparel company working in Egypt, his continuing imprisonment might have sent the wrong message to potential investors. If the Jordanian case is anything to go by, Egypt stands to receive hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign investment as Asian apparel companies seek to take advantage of its duty free access.
The decision is characteristic of the new cabinet governing Egypt. Composed largely of technocrats and given the task to get the economy moving again, it shows little interest in the ideological preoccupations of previous governments. Foreign investment has plummeted by two-thirds over the last five years and Egypt needs to get it back.
At the same time, the decision to move closer to Israel clearly has its political dimension. The US Congress (often encouraged by the pro-Israel lobby in Washington) has been particularly critical of Egypt in the last few years, while the US administration's supposed increased focus on democracy in the region is not popular with the Egyptian government. For the past several years many commentators have described the decline in the two countries' relations. By improving relations with Israel, Egypt suddenly gains the amity of many of those lobbyists once working against it. The Bush administration will also be more reluctant to criticize the human rights policy of a country being so constructive on the peace process and improving ties with its closest ally in the region.
Dealing with Israel is still a very sensitive topic in Egypt, not least because the government has done little to prepare people for its abrupt shift. Further violence and atrocities in the Palestinian territories could also easily derail this tentative thaw. However, the fact remains that Egypt has decided that, at least for now, it is in its best interests to get closer to the neighbor it has long held at arms length.- Published 13/1/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org
Paul Schemm is a Cairo-based freelance journalist
Pulling strings discreetly
Smadar PerryQuestion: What is more complicated for President Husni Mubarak inside Egypt? To declare that "Prime Minister Sharon can make peace" and recommend that the Palestinians not miss the window of opportunity? Or to release Israeli citizen Azzam Azzam halfway through his sentence, after a Cairo court found Azzam guilty of seriously damaging Egyptian intelligence security?
The answer is in the timing. Had US President George W. Bush not been elected to a second term, and had Mubarak not been persuaded two months ago beyond any doubt that Sharon is determined to implement his disengagement plan in Gaza with or without Egyptian cooperation, Mubarak would not have taken the trouble to scrape the frost off of nearly 20 years of cold peace.
Four terrorist attacks in Sinai last October and dozens of dead and injured were a serious shock to the heads of Egyptian security and intelligence. Beyond the damage to tourism, what happened in Taba could repeat itself elsewhere in Egypt. Then too, the departure of Yasser Arafat elicited sighs of relief not only on the Israeli side. In Cairo, too, Arafat was seen as a dangerous obstruction from the economic-political and security standpoint. Who would dream of investing in building factories in an area labeled a security liability? Who would contribute to rehabilitating infrastructure in the Palestinian Authority, whose head diverted tens of millions of dollars for financing terrorism and investing in secret foreign accounts?
Egypt accompanied Arafat on his final journey in a short, utilitarian ceremony. Sharon and his new "telephone friend" in the Itihadiya Palace in Cairo pitched in discreetly to help solidify the status of the new Palestinian partner, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen). It is startling to witness the trust-but-verify code that has so quickly emerged between the two generals/rulers in Cairo and Jerusalem after long months of bitterness and lack of contact. Sharon understands Mubarak without difficulty. Mubarak, with his sharpened sensors, knows how to read Sharon.
Behind closed doors, Israel was ready to absorb Abu Mazen's angry last minute election propaganda. Egypt is concerned about his weakness in confronting Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The stronger the leadership institutions in the territories, the smoother will be the disengagement. Mubarak promises that the Palestinian state will be established within four years.
President Bush, in close coordination with Sharon and Mubarak, is looking forward to hosting Abu Mazen in the White House. All of a sudden four partners, in Washington, Cairo, Jerusalem and Ramallah, are pulling strings discreetly. The disengagement plan has long ceased to be unilateral. Whoever wants a part of this game has to warm up relations.
In this era of positive attitudes, the new Cairo government is signaling its intention to enhance cooperation, particularly in the economic field. Egypt badly needs investments in order to create jobs for tens of thousands of unemployed. Go do business with Israel, Mubarak urges Egypt's entrepreneurs, no need to request special permission.
>From the Israeli standpoint, the qualified industrial zone (QIZ) agreement signed last month in a festive ceremony in Cairo is first and foremost a window to normalization. There is room for optimism: all of a sudden the Cairo media has ceased being hostile to Israel, the anti-Semitic cartoons have disappeared, and you need a magnifying glass to find hateful expressions against the "Zionist enemy". Of course, suspicions of Sharon's intentions remain, along with the (legitimate) criticism. The unions will still insist on boycotting Israel. "The Syrian bride", for example, a spellbinding Israeli film that has won international prizes, will not be invited to the Cairo film festival. A Tel Aviv publisher seeking to translate a work by an Egyptian author will be turned down. The physicians' syndicate will not invite experts from Israel to an international conference in Cairo.
A minority of optimists among us argue that, with time, the rejectionism on the Egyptian street will soften. Those with a pessimistic vision ("realist", they'll argue) counter that they don't see any peace beyond the "peace of interests". The new free trade zones will generate positive interaction within the business community. A large gas deal will warm up inter-governmental relations. But it is still hard to imagine a time when Cairo intellectuals will permit themselves to host Tel Aviv intellectuals, writers will meet to discuss their trade, historians will publish joint research, and journalists in Egypt won't hesitate to report on signs of a warming peace.- Published 13/1/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org
Smadar Perry is Middle East editor of the daily Yediot Aharonot.
Egyptian role is welcome but not at the expense of our rights
an interview with Ismail Haniyehbitterlemons: Are you concerned about the apparent warming of relations between Egypt and Israel?
Haniyeh: Hamas is very confident in its approach and actions and believes it is a strong movement with deep roots in the land. We are not afraid that the movement is in any danger of annihilation. However, at the same time, we understand that the Zionist entity is trying to take advantage of the political situation, especially the withdrawal plan from the Gaza Strip, to market itself in Arab and foreign countries, especially Egypt, with which it has a border.
bitterlemons: Don't you think that any warming of relations between Egypt and Israel could influence the strength and activities of Hamas, especially if Egypt is given a security role in the Strip after the withdrawal?
Haniyeh: We expect Egypt, which has always stood behind the Palestinian people, to be cautious of Israeli schemes aimed at pushing the Palestinians into a major crisis. We know that Egypt carries a lot of weight in western circles and it is imperative that it use this weight to support Palestinian rights. We hope that our brothers in Egypt will stay clear of Israeli influence and not busy themselves with strengthening relations with Israel, the enemy of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. The Israelis are trying to take advantage of their relationship with the Egyptians to serve their security interests and are proposing a limited role for them [in this respect]. They are not interested in giving the Egyptians a broad platform from which to work in the Gaza Strip.
bitterlemons: Have there been any discussions or meetings between Hamas and the Egyptians regarding the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip?
Haniyeh: Both Hamas in Gaza and our leadership abroad are in contact with the Egyptians. The subject of security has already been discussed more than once with Egyptian delegations. I can safely say that we have had our say and that the Egyptians informed us they would have no security or military role in case of an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. They said their role would be limited to helping and training the Palestinians and offering their security expertise to help impose security and order. We also feel the Egyptians are interested in encouraging inter-factional dialogue as well as dialogue between the factions and the Palestinian Authority.
bitterlemons: What do you expect the situation on the border to be if there is a withdrawal from the Gaza Strip?
Haniyeh: I would like to reiterate that Hamas is always at the service of the people and works only to eliminate the occupation. Our resistance always flows in that direction. Our position is that if there is a permanent withdrawal from Gaza, the movement will be willing to halt its military operations because it is important to us to end the suffering of our people. However, our fear is that the occupation troops will retain a presence on the border strip, which means that Gaza would still be under occupation and it will not be easy for people to travel freely.
bitterlemons: What do you think Egypt's role will be after any withdrawal?
Haniyeh: An Egyptian role is always welcomed. Egypt is very close to the Palestinian arena, both geographically and historically. Egypt has sacrificed perhaps thousands of martyrs in consecutive wars against the occupation of Palestinian territory and on the border with Palestine. We, as Palestinians, are also concerned with protecting the deep Arab and Islamic concern with the Palestinian cause and we do not want to be detached from our Arab and Islamic surroundings. However, in the end, we will not appease anyone at the expense of the rights of our people and at the expense of our people's options regarding their right to defend themselves and to resist the occupation. Our relationship with our Egyptian brothers is one of respect based on the premise that Egypt is an Arab country and a strategic regional power. However, all of this cannot be at the expense of the rights, determination and steadfastness of our people. No dialogue, no matter when or where, will convince us to surrender to the Zionist enemy.
bitterlemons: Do you expect Egypt to pressure you into accepting a truce or a ceasefire?
Haniyeh: In the past, we offered a truce that lasted more than 50 days. To establish a new truce today cannot be for nothing. There must be conditions, which the Zionist enemy must abide by in exchange for such a truce, including a halt to incursions and attacks, a halt to assassinations and the release of prisoners and detainees. The goal of the resistance is to protect the people and fulfill their aspirations. If this protection is provided without having to resort to the means of resistance, then you have achieved your goal. These are issues that we have already discussed with our Egyptian brothers and I think they understand our demands and our positions. I think they may be using their international relations to urge the Zionist entity to halt its crimes against our people. Let me also say, it is not proper to use the term "pressure": what is between us is the language of dialogue and understanding.- Published 13/1/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org
Ismail Haniyeh is a member of the Hamas politburo in Gaza.
Understanding the Egyptian paradox
Abdel Monem Said AlySigns of improvement in Egyptian-Israeli relations are abundant. Understanding the complexities of the Egyptian side of the relationship requires multiple perspectives.
For a start, it was Magid Abdel Fatah, the ex-spokesman of President Mubarak, who said that good Egyptian-Israeli relations should be the norm. Indeed it is only under exceptional circumstances that these relations deteriorate. The reality reflected in this statement is that the Egyptian posture toward peace with Israel has been a strategic posture no matter what circumstances negatively affect their interactions. In a way, the recent positive developments in the relationship are a testimony to the tenacity of the peace agreement and its capacity to endure difficult regional developments, such as the Israeli war in Lebanon and two Palestinian intifadas.
However, Egyptian-Israeli peace does not stand on its own right. It is largely influenced by developments on the other Arab-Israel tracks, particularly the Palestinian track. From the time of Camp David I, Egypt has had to negotiate with Israel within two frameworks for peace: one for Egypt and one for Palestine. In the Egyptian mind, the two tracks were never separated.
The developments in the occupied Palestinian territories since the outbreak of the intifada in September 2000 made the deterioration of Egyptian-Israeli relations just a matter of time. Now, in contrast, the possible improvement in the Palestinian question through Sharon's disengagement plan has paved the road for the current improvement. The death of Yasser Arafat, the election of Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas), and the possible renewal of Palestinian negotiations all open the gates for more improvements.
Yet Egyptian-Israeli relations are a function not only of Palestinian-Israeli or even Arab-Israel relations. The domestic economic and political situation in Egypt plays its part. It is not a coincidence that Egyptian-Israeli relations have deteriorated at times of declining Egyptian economic fortunes. Following a growth rate of between five and six percent in the second half of the 1990s, the Egyptian economy went through a recession that dropped the rate of growth to about 2.5 percent in the first three years of the new century. With a population growth rate of about two percent, Egypt was not growing at all.
Part of this downturn in the Egyptian economy can be attributed to the regional instability generated by the Palestinian-Israeli confrontations. But by mid-2004, Egypt was about to review its reform policies, and with a new cabinet in July geo-economic concerns overpowered geo-political ones. The official Egyptian justification to the Egyptian public for signing the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) deal with Israel was tightly linked to the way the deal contributes to Egypt's economic indicators, particularly unemployment. The deal to release Israeli prisoner Azzam Azzam was necessary to open the way for further relaxation of the regional situation, and to make further deals in trade and gas possible.
It is also essential, however, to see Egyptian moves toward Israel as a part of the Egyptian regional posture in 2004. For Egypt, the American war in Iraq and its consequences in terms of the insurgency, the Israeli-Palestinian confrontations, and the continuation of the civil war in Sudan--all have destabilized the entire Middle East. The "swamps" of terrorism in the region have been expanding, and radical forces in Iran and elsewhere have been boosted.
An unstable Middle East is not an environment in which Egyptian national interests are served. Creating stability has been the traditional business of Egypt during the past three decades. Therefore, Egypt moved to help the Americans in Iraq through the Sharm El-Sheikh summit that legitimized the American presence in Baghdad. Cairo also moved to support the peace process in Sudan through to its conclusion on January 9, 2005. Nonetheless, the Israel-Arab peace will continue to be the cornerstone of regional stability in the Middle East.
Improving Egyptian-Israeli relations is an important starting point. President George W. Bush and his team will continue in the White House for the next four years. Turning this into an opportunity rather than a liability required the improvement of Egyptian-Israeli relations. This in turn will help improve Egyptian-American relations, which reached a low point following Washington's talk of wholesale reforms in the Middle East, talk that was bound to touch on Egyptian sensibilities.
In a way, Egyptian-American relations have now reached a higher energy level, insofar as the Egyptian-Israeli peace has been the cornerstone of the relationship between Cairo and Washington. Thus, following the improvement in Israeli-Egyptian relations the US was not only ready to sign the QIZ protocol, but also to negotiate a free trade agreement, release $300 million in funds assigned to Egypt to compensate it for the Iraq war's negative impact, and upgrade Egypt again to its rightful place in Washington.
All in all, the Egyptian-Israeli relationship is a function of the peace treaty, Arab-Israel peace or war, the Egyptian domestic situation, the Egyptian regional role, and the relationship between Cairo and Washington. Understanding these variables and there interactions is necessary for an understanding of Egyptian positions.- Published 13/1/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org
Abdel Monem Said Aly is a writer and political analyst at Al Ahram newspaper in Cairo.
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