• American troops will not solve Iraq's problems  - Safa A. Hussein
American troops on Iraqi territory render Iraq a "battlefield" with Iran--something Iraqis do not want.

• Iraq at a crossroads  - Danial Anas Kaysi
While Iraq has come a long way from the totalitarianism of the Baath era, it is in fact still far from being the democracy it is assumed to be.

• US may be withdrawing its military, but it is staying on  - Hamid Alkifaey
Iraq remains under Chapter 7 of the United Nations, which keeps it under constant threat of interference in its affairs unless the US stands with it.

• The impact on Jordan  - Mohammad K. Shiyyab
Jordan's most significant influence over Iraq is its hosting of a large Iraqi expatriate community.

American troops will not solve Iraq's problems
 Safa A. Hussein

For nearly a year now, most of the articles written about Iraq by western observers and journalists have focused on the ongoing departure of American troops, drawing a gloomy picture of post-withdrawal Iraq at the end of this month. Their arguments are usually based on the insufficient readiness of Iraqi security forces, concerns about the return of sectarian violence, ethnic conflict between Arabs and Kurds, the instability that can be caused by unresolved political disagreements, and Iran's increasing influence in Iraq filling the gap left by the withdrawal of American troops.

These observers often conclude that the national security interests of both the United States and Iraq require extend¬ing the Status of Forces Agreement and retaining a smaller but still substantial US military footprint in Iraq. What is puzzling is the pessimism of these analyses, the mixing and overlapping of Iraqi and US interests, and the level of ignorance of realities in Iraq.

It is a fact that the Iraqi armed forces do not have the readiness to defend Iraq against an external threat. It will take years to have an effective air force, air defense, navy, and ground combat forces with sufficient fire support. But what analysts miss is that no classic external military threat against Iraq is anticipated within the next few years. Yes, some neighbors may try to intervene in Iraq by supporting militant groups, proxies, terrorists, etc. But such a threat in any case cannot be dealt with by American troops. Iraqi security forces perform better in this area, as they do in maintaining internal security.

A return to sectarian violence is possible but not highly probable. Iraqis learned their lesson during the 2003-2008 period of sectarian violence and don't want to repeat that experience. The campaigns and outcomes in the 2009 provincial elections and the 2010 national elections showed clearly that the majority of Iraqis, Sunni and Shiite, may vote for candidates from their own sect but would not vote for someone they perceive to be promoting a sectarian agenda or sectarian violence. Anyway, even if the least probable scenario emerges and sectarian violence starts again, American troops can do very little about it. At the height of sectarian violence, when the American troop contingent exceeded 140,000 combatants, they could not do much.

Kurdish parties played an important role alongside Iraqi opposition parties-in-exile during the Saddam Hussein era. After the toppling of Saddam's regime in 2003, Kurds played a key role in drafting the 2005 Iraqi constitution. The federalism embodied in that constitution was perceived as the solution for the Kurdish problem in Iraq. But there remain unresolved issues that present national security challenges such as the future of Kirkuk, the future of the areas of common interest, the distribution of wealth, and the deployment of Kurdish Peshmerga troops outside the Kurdistan region.

American troops did play the role of arbitrator in 2009 in preventing security friction between Peshmerga and Iraqi security forces from developing into a political crisis. Their presence also had a psychological effect in easing the fears of some Iraqi factions. But in the bigger picture, they were not able to bring Kurds and Arabs to resolve their key differences. Nor could they facilitate Iraqi national reconciliation. There is no reason to believe that a smaller presence of American forces with fewer assets could do what a bigger and more resourceful troop presence could not do.

Much has been said about Iranian influence in Iraq and the danger that Iran will take over Iraq once the American troop presence is ended. This is an oversimplification of a complicated issue. Iraq suffers from intervention and intelligence penetration by neighbors and more distant countries. Americans troops are not counter-espionage forces. They could not solve this problem in the past, and they cannot solve it in the future. In fact, they are part of the problem. American troops on Iraqi territory render Iraq a "battlefield" with Iran--something Iraqis do not want. The only way Americans can help in this regard is by developing the capabilities of specialized Iraqi agencies. And this can be done far more effectively through training, equipping and intelligence-sharing under the Strategic Framework Agreement of 2008.

The departure of the last American combat units is a significant milestone that will end Iraqis' concerns about sovereignty, enhance the legitimacy of the Iraqi government and create the right climate for Iraq to engage its neighbors. The withdrawal allows normalization of a solid strategic relationship between Iraq and the US based on the Strategic Framework Agreement. Lastly, while withdrawal could encourage insurgents to increase their attacks in the short term, it prevents them from using the occupation to justify their crimes, thereby positively impacting stability in the longer term.-Published 15/12/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Safa A. Hussein is a former deputy member of the dissolved Iraqi Governing Council. He served as a brigadier general in the Iraqi Air Force. Currently he serves in the Iraqi National Security Council.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stood by American President Barack Obama on December 12 to mark the closing of a chapter in Iraq's history and the country's transformation into what Obama called a "sovereign, self-reliant and democratic" state. While Iraq has come a long way from the totalitarianism of the Baath era and embraced a more pluralistic system, it is in fact still far from being the democracy it is assumed to be. As American troops withdraw from the country they invaded almost nine years ago, Iraq faces several challenges that must be constructively addressed in the months ahead.

The protests that took place across Iraq in the beginning of 2011--small compared to those in neighboring countries--signaled to the country's political class the growing impatience and discontent among Iraqis. High levels of corruption, along with months of political maneuvering and a dearth of efforts to address the lack of jobs and low levels of services, drove the public to the streets in a clear show of people power inspired by regional uprisings. While several demonstrators were killed by security services, the protests indeed shook up the political system.

Unfortunately, the central government responded by deflecting protestors' criticisms of poor services by shifting blame to the provincial and local governments. Provincial leaders strongly rejected these claims and insisted that the central government had been uncooperative, slow to distribute funds, and keen on consolidating power without regard for the legally-mandated rights of the provincial authorities. Thus, al-Maliki and his ministers inadvertently brought about the second shakeup of the system in 2011: several provincial leaders began threatening to transform their provinces into autonomous regions similar to Kurdistan if the government did not address their grievances.

Sectarianism returned to center stage at the end of October when the government commenced a new campaign of what appeared to be extra-judicial de-Baathification, arresting hundreds purportedly involved in a coup planned for after US troop withdrawal. This, so close to the date of the US troop pullout, has alarmed many Iraqi Sunnis, including tribal and political leaders who had in early 2010 witnessed a wholesale de-Baathification campaign that barred over 500 politicians from running for elections - undertaken by a highly politicized Justice and Accountability Commission and also without specific justifications or evidence for the bans. Consequently, the council of the Sunni-majority province, Salahuddin (and more recently that of Diyala) voted for a referendum on the question of transforming into single-province regions. Iraq's prime minister illegally rejected the requests, claiming that they were based on sectarian considerations and aimed at providing safe havens for the Baath party.

Most actors agree that these initiatives--coinciding with the troop withdrawal--will likely push to the surface new boundary and ethno-sectarian disputes that will be difficult to address at such a sensitive point in time. Nonetheless, what in fact needs to be addressed by the central government are root causes.

The al-Maliki government has indeed worked to consolidate an alarming level of power in its hands--the prime minister remains acting minister of interior to this day and the ministers of defense and national security have both yet to be named. The 2008 de-Baathification law, while far from perfect, has often been ignored or abused for political ends. Further, the language of sectarianism and the specter of the Baath must, by example, be purged from the Iraqi government's rhetoric. Unsubstantiated allegations of Baathist loyalties create a sense of uncertainty in the future for considerable portions of Iraqis. They also work towards entrenching a mutual lack of trust between Sunni and Shiite communities--the former perceives systemic discrimination and the intent to sideline them, and the latter believes that it continues to live in the shadow of a regime that was toppled almost nine years ago but that their co-nationals are conspiring to reinstate.

In order to overcome the increasingly contentious disputes among Iraq's communities, Iraqi politicians must work together in the coming months to allay the fears of Sunni, Shia, Kurdish, and minority communities by beginning a long overdue process of reconciliation. Politicians across the spectrum are now speaking of serious constitutional amendments and would serve the country well to begin a constructive dialogue in that direction. The drafting of the 2005 Iraqi constitution was rushed due to an unrealistic deadline set by the Coalition Provisional Authority's Transitional Administrative Law. Ethno-sectarian consensus was not achieved in the process, and many parts of the document remain vague and allow for politically-motivated interpretations and contentious disagreements. Indeed, even Iraq's Supreme Court is viewed to act as a partisan and tends to issue controversial interpretations in favor of the prime minister's positions.

The government would do well to decentralize the system in a fashion whereby powers are balanced between a strong executive, a fair judiciary, and a vibrant legislature, with responsibilities shared between central, provincial, and local governments. True power-sharing between Iraq's various political players is necessary in order to end disputes between Al-Maliki's State of Law bloc and other coalitions that allowed the so-called unity government to be formed. This will surely be difficult to achieve, however, there will be neither stability nor cooperation towards prosperity without addressing the major flaws in the Iraqi system and the concerns of various ethno-sectarian communities. The government must ensure that all citizens feel equal before the law, that politics are vibrant and capable of creating effective policies rather than disruptive debate, and that foreign policy is conducted in such a way that draws from Iraq's own experiences with tyranny, war, and lack of sovereignty. Only if Iraq's internal affairs are sorted will the government be able to take advantage of its diverse communities and its disparately connected politicians in order to play a central, effective, and balancing role in the region. -Published 15/12/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Danial Anas Kaysi is a graduate student at Yale University's Jackson Institute for Global Affairs.

After almost nine years in Iraq, the United States military is leaving. Not because it wants to, but because it has to. All Iraqi political groups--friends and foes--were united in demanding troop departure by the end of 2011. The Obama administration is not totally happy at this turn of events, since it wanted to keep 20,000 soldiers in the country to make sure its interests are not undermined. But it had to accept the Iraqi decision, since it promised American citizens it would withdraw from Iraq. Obama has a tough re-election battle next year and he doesn't want Iraq to deprive him of a second term that he seeks in order to leave some imprint on American politics, apart from being the first black US president.

Do Iraqis still need Americans? Certainly. Not least because of distrust of one another. Fear is the order of the day in Iraq. Fear of uncertainty, violence, foreign interference, new dictatorship, instability, and a lot more. The Iraqi army is still weak. The army chief of staff said that his forces would not be able to protect Iraq's sovereignty until 2020. The Iraqi air force is still in its infancy and in need of American training and technical support. Currently, it only operates helicopters; its fixed-wing capacity is non-existent.

On the other hand, the performance of Iraqi security forces is much better now. Their intelligence capabilities have also improved. They are able to conduct large-scale counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. They have managed to gain public trust--and this is important for the country's morale. Thus, the US withdrawal of its forces won't make a lot of difference in this regard. They have hardly been in action in the last three years, simply because they have not been needed.

Iraq remains under Chapter 7 of the United Nations, which keeps it under constant threat of interference in its affairs unless the US stands with it. It has problems with some of its neighbors that have not been very supportive. Many Iraqis, the government included, fear foreign influence, especially that of Iran, which is believed to be increasing. Iraq scores 175 out of 182 countries in Transparency International's corruption index. Although it is oil-rich, Iraq's oil revenue is swallowed up by the salaries of state employees and corruption, with little left for investment.

The question remains: are the Americans really leaving Iraq? Or they are leaving from the door to come back in through the window? The US embassy in Baghdad is twice the size of the White House, covering an area of 104 acres. In addition to the mammoth embassy, there are ten more facilities across the country, including three US diplomatic missions in Erbil, Kirkuk and Basra. Between 15,000-16,000 US personnel will be remaining in Iraq, at least 10,000 of whom have security duties. Americans are also involved in all sectors of the Iraqi economy, running programs worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

The latest state visit of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to Washington confirmed deep US involvement in Iraq. President Barack Obama assured his guest that Iraq will not be abandoned--the US will continue to support it on all fronts. Al-Maliki needs this assurance to cement his power base, just in case his opponents feel he is weakened by the US military withdrawal. He will need US political muscle to get Iraq out of UN Chapter 7 restrictions. He is also wary of what might happen to Iraq after the prospective fall of the regime of Bashar Assad in Syria. He distrusts Assad's likely successor, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni religious party that might (in league with hostile Arab states) undermine the power of Islamic Shiite parties in Iraq. But if al-Maliki maintains close relations with the US, this danger can be removed since the US will use its influence to reduce any possible threats. The Iraqi leader has proven to be a shrewd politician who is not going to compromise his relations with the US under any circumstances. The Americans have helped him stay in power over the past six years and they will continue to support him as long as he maintains stability in Iraq and keeps Iranian influence at a minimum. He is certainly not an Iranian stooge as his opponents try to portray him, but he knows he also needs to keep Iran on board if he is to succeed.

Obama, too, needs al-Maliki's support, both at home and abroad. At home, the US president is being criticized that American sacrifices in Iraq have been in vain. His ambivalence caused the US to lose to Iran, which made it clear it will fill the vacuum left by the US. In the Arab world, US policy and influence are challenged by its perceived failure in Iraq. Arabs believe Iran has actually defeated the US. So Obama needs al-Maliki to move Iraq away from Iranian influence and crack down on Tehran's allies in the country. Al-Qaeda has been defeated and Iraqi Sunnis helped greatly in achieving this breakthrough. Although many of them feel marginalized, they are no longer seeking to undermine the current regime, and stability can be achieved if they are treated as equal partners and trusted with sensitive posts in government. Al-Maliki is expected to listen to advice from his US friends in this regard.

Withdrawing its forces from Iraq won't reduce Washington's ability to influence events in the country. On the contrary, America will be freed of the burden of "occupier" it has carried for nine years. It can now turn to providing real support for Iraq in the areas where it is needed most, as well as help protect its fledgling democracy.-Published 15/12/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Hamid Alkifaey is a writer and journalist. He was the first government spokesman of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq and founder-leader of the Movement for Democratic Society. Currently, he is researching democratization at the University of Exeter in the UK.

In November 2008, the governments of the United States and Iraq agreed that US troops would leave Iraq by the end of 2011, almost nine years after the US invasion of 2003. The US troop withdrawal is now under way. What impact will it have on Iraq's neighbors, particularly Jordan?

Before attempting to answer the question, one has to look at the situation in Iraq as it stands now.

Many Sunnis, a minority that held the reins of power in the past, consider the current unity government a fig leaf for increasingly centralized control by the Shiite majority. Violence, resulting from sectarian and ethnic conflicts between Shiite and Sunni Muslims and Kurds, is still endemic in most Iraqi cities. In the northern cities of Kirkuk and Mosul, Kurds and Arabs are jockeying for control of oil-rich lands. These continued conflicts have had a negative impact on Iraq's political progress and economic growth. They take place against the backdrop of the rising influence of neighboring Iran.

For Iraq's Arab neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia, the upcoming US withdrawal appears to be leaving the field open to Iran, which already has the greatest influence in Iraq. This reflects a primary Iranian objective: to prevent the growth of a threat from the direction of Iraq and limit American and Saudi influence in the area.

Another concern of Iraq's neighbors, including Jordan, is whether Iraq will reemerge as a strong state or remain divided and unstable. It appears that Iraq has a long way to go and needs an extensive, long-term nation-building phase to evolve as a united and stable country that can effectively address its own security needs. As long as the Iraqi state remains weak, regional powers such as Iran and Turkey will retain inordinate influence.

Jordan's most significant means of influence over Iraq is its hosting of a large Iraqi expatriate community, mostly of Sunni Arab origin. More than half a million Iraqis fled to Jordan in the wake of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, exacerbating economic demands and inflationary pressures. Now the final US withdrawal may cause anarchy in Iraq, which in turn would increase the flow of Iraqi refugees to Jordan. Ongoing Sunni-Shiite tension may draw Jordan against its will into the conflict, as occurred in 2005 when a Jordanian suicide bomber killed 127 Iraqis, mostly Shiites, in Hillah, approximately 100 km. south of Baghdad.

In addition, Jordan is concerned that Iraq might become a haven for terrorist groups, a fear dramatically heightened by the November 2005 suicide bombings in Amman.

Jordan also has an interest in the economic development of Iraq and is trying hard to promote its trade and business relations with Baghdad. It hopes for more economic cooperation and joint ventures with Iraq in the upcoming reconstruction phase of the country. Hence it is anxious about growing Iranian involvement in Iraqi politics and concerned more broadly regarding increasing Iranian and Shiite influence in the region.

On the other hand, there are indicators of Jordanian-Iraqi cooperation in many fields. Recently, the commanders of the Jordanian and Iraqi armies expressed a desire to boost bilateral cooperation in all military spheres as US troops leave Iraq. In this context, Jordan could be tasked again with the training of Iraqi troops after the withdrawal of US forces. The Jordanian army trained tens of thousands of Iraqi troops and policemen after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Meanwhile, the Iraqi government has also reportedly turned down an Iranian offer to train the Iraqi army.

Whatever shape the relationship between the US and Iraq takes in the long term, for the short term the US definitely remains committed to the country. No one, most particularly Iran, should miscalculate that continuing commitment.

There are many uncertainties connected with the future situation in Iraq. However, the Iraqis are ready to cooperate with neighboring countries and have called upon them to establish good bilateral relations based on neighborly ties and mutual respect. To that end, Iraq abstained on the November 12 Arab League vote to suspend Syria and impose sanctions against it.

To sum up, Iraq will soon be faced with many challenges, but even after a final US pullout there will be more than 40,000 American troops in the Gulf region. This includes troops stationed at bases in Turkey, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Saudi Arabia, as well as Djibouti, just across the Red Sea from Yemen. There is also a newly-established CIA base for launching remotely-piloted vehicles from an undisclosed location in the Arabian Peninsula.

According to US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, "the US shall maintain a firm stance and continue to reassure its partners, deter aggressors and counter those seeking to create instability in a vital part of the world--the Middle East."-Published 15/12/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

General (rtd) Mohammad K. Shiyyab is managing director of Middle East Security Consultants in Amman.