• Signs of Israel's changing neighborhood  - Saleh Abdel Jawad
The climate of the Arab spring is one of uncertainty, and Tel Aviv, in particular, should be concerned.

• Where Israel has every reason to help  - Yossi Alpher
All these factors have created the impression in Israel that the king is weak.

• Avoiding the regional ramifications of stalemate  - Hassan A. Barari
Jordan seeks a solution that can strengthen its stability and national identity.

• Reckless behavior  - Labib Kamhawi
The Israeli right-wing government seems ready to ignore its treaty obligations.

Signs of Israel's changing neighborhood
 Saleh Abdel Jawad

Some saw as surprising Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman's remarks before the Knesset Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security in which he said that Jordan is a sovereign and independent country, and that talk about it being a substitute for Palestine was negative and destabilizing. Lieberman belongs to an ideological camp within the Israeli right that is opposed to Palestinian statehood in the West Bank and Gaza. He is one of those who were convinced that this state "lies in eastern Jordan, which is the eastern part of Palestine" and also that "it is not logical that the Palestinians receive two states; one state is enough." Lieberman's ideas on this match those of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu expressed in his famous book, "A Place Among the Nations", as well as statements and attitudes of many Israeli officials, civilian and military. These all contradict the peace agreement between Jordan and Israel signed in 1994, in favor of the "Jordan option" that states that Jordan is Palestine. They are also in lieu of solving the "Palestinian problem" according to the terms of reference of the peace process and international resolutions.

In recent years, the chronic impasse in the "peace process", and the declining opportunities for an independent Palestinian state under the heavy weight of settlement and accelerated Judaization in the West Bank have reactivated the "Jordanian option", which has once again become an attractive route for Israelis and returned strongly to the agenda of the Israeli right, which is sliding increasingly towards militancy and extremism. The Jordan option has even being championed by some right-wing US groups.

To return to Lieberman's statement, however, I would argue that it should not be met with surprise. Instead, it should be understood in the context of the regional geopolitical situation, which is not in Israel's favor. In a previous article for bitterlemons, published on November 24, 2010 one month before the outbreak of the Jasmine revolution in Tunisia and the start of radical regional transformations that are working against Israel, I argued that the Israeli leadership lacked vision and had been blinded by a sense of infinite power. I warned that it must try to see into the future, into what lies ahead. Still, even today, there has been no change in Israel's myopia--even in this new atmosphere that is impossible to ignore.

The season of the Arab spring brings with it uncertainty. Israel is concerned about the changing situation in Egypt in light of Hosni Mubarak's removal, the deteriorating security situation in the Sinai, and the landslide victory of the Islamists (Salafists along with the Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt's elections. Although I am convinced that Egypt will not engage in war with Israel in the short and medium term, what happened in Egypt--regardless of the nature of the next regime--is an irreplaceable loss for Israel and its allies.

Equally important is the American withdrawal in Iraq. Already the withdrawal from Iraq has cost the United States itself--through military defeat and financial crisis--but then there is the trouble of protecting Jordan against the strategic vacuum created by the US departure. The likely candidate to fill this vacuum is apparent through the growing Iranian role in Iraq. This would lead to the vulnerability of Jordan, which is already undergoing unrest and deep disturbances, even among the tribes in middle Jordan. Although the economic situation and difficult living conditions in Jordan (unemployment, low income, a water crisis and lack of prospects for radical political reforms) are the main drivers of this unrest, Jordan's relations with Israel are also not satisfactory to most Jordanians, especially in the absence of a sufficient Israeli response to the peace process and Israel's violation of Jordanians' religious rights in Jerusalem. Add to this public feeling King Abdullah II's personal bitterness over Israel's positions, expressed through his recent public statements about his pessimism over the peace process.

Israel is not interested in undermining the Jordanian regime and knows that the fall of the monarchy in Jordan in a scorching scenario would lead to chaos, cross-border attacks, and (in the best case imaginable) the emergence of a system led or dominated by Islamists. And so Israel gives signals to encourage the Jordanian regime.

Among these was Israeli President Shimon Peres' unplanned visit to Amman on November 28. Peres met with Netanyahu before leaving, according to one news report, "reaffirming the importance of strengthening the strategic good ties between Israel and Jordan." It is also in this context that we must understand Netanyahu's last-minute decision to delay the demolition of the Mughrabi walkway in Jerusalem's Old City, after Egyptian and Jordanian warnings of possible unrest in the whole Arab world. And it is in this context that we must understand Lieberman's sudden "change of heart". Regardless, these signals are insufficient and will not alter the fact that no progress has been made in the peace process--it is clear that Israel has not yet paid its dues.-Published 8/12/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Saleh Abdel Jawad is a political scientist and dean of the Faculty of Law and Public Administration at Birzeit University.

Any attempt to understand the current interaction between Jordan, the Palestinians and Israel has to begin with the Hashemite Kingdom's broader regional strategic environment.

The current Arab revolutionary wave has affected Jordan, provoking demonstrations from several quarters, including tribes traditionally loyal to the monarchy but also a resurgent Islamist movement. But even without the "Arab spring", Jordan has always had to contend with pressures from the four Middle East geographical entities it separates: Iraq from the east and Israel/Palestine from the west; Saudi Arabia from the south and Syria from the north. Currently it faces an extreme reality on virtually all sides.

Syria is falling apart, projecting refugee pressures as well as fear of revolutionary overflow. Iraq is entering a new era with completion of the American withdrawal, and Jordan fears growing Iranian and Shiite pressures, including more refugees, from that direction. The absence of a peace process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization has generated an unprecedented low in bilateral relations with Israel. Egyptian pressures to effect Hamas-PLO reconciliation and Islamist pressures inside Jordan are causing considerable unease in Amman. Finally, Saudi Arabia, concerned for the kingdom's stability, is providing financial aid and a possible role in the Gulf Cooperation Council, but at a cost of policy demands by Riyadh that could constrain King Abdullah II's freedom of maneuver and even his freedom to carry out much-needed political reforms.

Taken together, all these factors have created the impression in several quarters, including in Israel, that the king is weak and the Hashemite Kingdom is in danger of real destabilization. This in turn has recently generated a series of rather unusual acts and gestures on all sides.

One was a statement by Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman reassuring Jordan that Israel supports its national integrity. The Jordanian leadership periodically expresses anger and dismay at declarations by Israelis on the far right to the effect that the "Jordan is Palestine" formula (known in Amman as the "alternative homeland" strategy) is the best way for Israel to "solve" the Palestinian question and hold on to the West Bank. That Lieberman, who is not known for his graciousness toward Israel's Arab neighbors, should make a declaration effectively condemning this approach, was presumably designed to reassure King Abdullah II on a sensitive issue. The vast majority of Israeli politicians and strategic thinkers view Jordan as Israel's effective "strategic depth" toward the east (Iraq, Iran) and with respect to the Palestinian issue, and therefore value the stability of the Hashemite Kingdom.

A second, minor gesture of conciliation was Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's recent last-minute decision to yield to a Jordanian/Egyptian request and temporarily suspend the dismantling of the Mughrabi bridge walkway leading from the Western Wall plaza to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. Under the Israel-Jordan peace treaty, Amman has a say in issues affecting holy places in Jerusalem. Israel's intention regarding the walkway is in no way sinister. But Jordan will oppose any Israeli initiative in this regard as long as its relations with Israel are so poor. Should Netanyahu yield to pressures from the Jerusalem municipality and allow the bridge to be replaced, a large part of the attention of the Muslim world could again focus on Jerusalem, with Israel accused of ignoring Muslim sensitivities and Jordan held partially responsible.

This brings us to the Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian triangular relationship. More than any other Arab state, Jordan desperately needs to be able to point to a fruitful Israeli-Palestinian peace process in order both to reassure its own Palestinian population and to envisage a robust Hashemite future once a Palestinian state exists to the west of the Jordan River. This, Netanyahu is plainly uninterested in providing. And this, more than any other factor, explains why the king refuses to meet with him.

In contrast, last month the king did meet with Israeli President Shimon Peres. And he paid a rare visit to Ramallah where the main topic of discussion with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas was apparently Abbas' ongoing dialogue, under Egyptian aegis, with Hamas concerning reconciliation and elections. Any concession by Abbas to Hamas could affect Jordan's relationship with the Islamists, which in any case is influenced by the dramatic achievements of political Islam in Egypt and Tunisia.

Many of Jordan's problems and fears do not lend themselves to easy solutions. But the Hashemite Kingdom's current quandary certainly offers the Netanyahu government yet another reason--as if it needed more--to move forward decisively on the Palestinian issue.-Published 8/12/2012 © bitterlemons-international.org

Yossi Alpher is coeditor of the bitterlemons.net family of internet publications. He is former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.

For Jordan, the impasse of the Israeli-Palestinian track could not be more threatening. Time and time again, King Abdullah II has stressed that the failure of a two-state solution would be detrimental to the national security of his country. For this reason, Amman has pushed both Palestinians and Israelis to get their act together and hammer out an historic deal to allay the fears of Jordanians.

Two weeks ago, the king made a rare visit to Ramallah to meet President Mahmoud Abbas and discuss ways of resuming peace negotiations with Israel. Implicit in this visit was Jordan's desire to play a role after Egypt had pulled back from its longstanding status as third party and bridge between Israel and the rest of the Arabs. Also, the king received Israeli President Shimon Peres in Amman to discuss ways of reviving the stalled peace process.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Jordan--after having been kept in the dark for years regarding Palestinian-Israeli interactions--is looking for ways to expand its regional role. Indeed, Jordanians have begun to feel that they cannot afford to sit idly by while regional developments sweep the region at an alarming rate. The timing of the Ramallah visit was very important as Khaled Meshaal, the head of Hamas' political bureau in Damascus, is expected to visit Jordan soon. Almost ten years after being expelled from Jordan, Hamas leaders seek to mend fences with Amman in case the regime in Syria falls. Explicit in the king's latest moves is a message to Hamas leaders that in reconciling with them Jordan is not about to shift gears and change its diplomacy concerning the desired outcome of the peace process.

Public debate in Jordan has focused for some time on threatening Israeli moves in Jerusalem. The Mughrabi bridge issue is a source of concern for Jordanians who have little faith in the Israeli government. Additionally, statements coming from Israeli right-wing politicians have reinforced deep-seated suspicions of Israel's intentions vis-a-vis Jordan. The notion that "Jordan is Palestine", reiterated recently by the Israeli right wing, is seen as a recipe for instability in Jordan. Islamists and anti-Wadi Araba peace treaty forces never miss an opportunity to play up these statements. They feel that they are vindicated by anti-Jordan statements by Israelis like Member of Knesset Aryeh Eldad, who has publicly demanded the transformation of Jordan into a Hashemite Kingdom of Palestine.

Thus Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman's statement to the effect that Jordan is not Palestine resonated well with the palace. He is quoted on November 14 as having said that "those who say that Jordan is Palestine are mostly harming Israel . . . . [T]hat would create a continuous Palestinian state which would endanger us. It is in our interest for this not to happen." This statement seemingly urged the king, after bilateral relations had reached a low point, to finally accept dialogue with an Israeli representative. Needless to say, the Jordanian public views Lieberman in particular as someone who will not hesitate to destabilize Jordan if this serves his concept of Israel's interests.

Domestically, the king feels weakened by the protest movement. His obvious ineffectiveness in swaying the Israeli government has only further rendered the kingdom vulnerable to unpredictable regional developments. Against this backdrop, the king has been proactive in creating the conditions for peace negotiations.

Yet, far from feeling assured, Amman does not fully trust the Palestinian Authority. Jordan-PLO relations have always been uneasy. Mutual mistrust between Amman and the Palestine Liberation Organization has led many Jordanians not to trust the Palestinians to negotiate final status issues. Some Israeli strategists such as Major General (res.) Giora Eyland suggest a Jordanian role, complicated as it may look, in the West Bank. This new thinking is a reflection of the eclipse of a two-state solution. In his many meetings with Israelis, the king has made it clear that he has no ambition whatsoever to control any part of the West Bank.

The idea of Jordan-Palestine unity or confederation is seen by a majority of Jordanians as a euphemism for implementation of the "alternative homeland". The Jordanian press contains a plethora of articles and op-ed pieces making the case against any type of confederation with the Palestinian territories lest this trigger evacuation of Palestinians from their land across the Jordan.

If anything, Jordan seeks a solution that can strengthen its stability and national identity. The official thinking in Amman is that rapprochement with Hamas, coordination with the PA, and intensifying relations with Israelis help serve Jordan in its bid to avoid the regional ramifications of stalemate in the peace process.-Published 8/12/2012 © bitterlemons-international.org

Hassan A. Barari is professor of Middle Eastern politics at the University of Jordan and the author of "Israelism: Arab Scholarship on Israel, a Critical Assessment" (London: Ithaca, 2009).

Recent statements by Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman lack credibility and do not seem to reflect a real change in Israel's stated or hidden policies, expressed through various other official avenues. His acknowledgement that Jordan is not Palestine came about, it seems, through pressure exerted by Jordan, which has a peace treaty with Israel, and Jordan's many friends in Israel and abroad. In fact, we are not talking here about policies or a change in policy, but "maneuvers" being used by Israel to the extent that its credibility has dropped to zero. This is reflected in the general atmosphere in the region, which has soured to the degree that King Abdullah II of Jordan, despite his personal commitment to the peace process, has expressed pessimism regarding the future of that process, particularly between the Palestinians and Israelis.

It is clear that the major players managing the peace process are not able to reach a peace agreement acceptable to Israel or to Palestinians, creating a huge political gap that is affecting most countries in the region. The last elections in Israel brought us the Israeli right and far right, placing the parties involved in the peace process in an era of political deadlock characterized by the construction of settlements, the siege of the occupied territories, and the criminal policies of killing Palestinian civilians, whether in military operations or assassinations. If Israel stopped all these practices, parties would continue to live with the paradox that, despite the desire to end the political stalemate, the status quo would remain--either because this rightist Israeli government does not want peace, or because the Palestinian Authority has been unable to obtain the minimum required and acceptable to Palestinians.

Israel's right-wing policies and its officials' repeated references to Jordan as an alternative homeland for Palestinians (the "Jordan option") and the only possible solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict have raised Jordan's concerns. Although Jordan is linked to Israel by their peace treaty, which has resulted in Israel's respect for the Jordanian border and sovereignty over its land and people, the Israeli right-wing government seems ready to ignore its treaty obligations. This has strengthened Jordan's uncertainty about the real intentions of Israel's right-wing government, and strengthened the camp opposed to the peace treaty in Jordan.

This has created problems for the Jordanian regime, especially in light of a clear evolution in popular hostility to Israel, resulting from its negative attitudes toward peace with the Palestinians. There have been increasing demands in Jordan, expressed in the parliament, to abolish the treaty with Israel. These have converged with those of the Jordanian street and the political parties, among them the Islamic Action Front, calling for the abolition of the peace treaty, until Israel stops its offensive support for "Jordan is Palestine". Given these developments, the king has been under increasing pressure to deal with this growing triangle around him, represented on one side by the possibility of the cancelation of an international and regional treaty, on another side by Israel's offensive position, and on a third side by public pressure to act by withdrawing the ambassador to Israel and canceling the treaty.

Jordan's monarch has not yet found his way out of this conundrum over the issue of the alternative homeland, even after strengthening his political alliance with the Palestinian Authority, in particular its president Mahmoud Abbas. The recent visit of the Jordanian monarch to Ramallah in the West Bank was carried out in this context: to confirm that Palestine is Palestine, and Jordan is Jordan. It appears that the last statement of Lieberman asserting that "Jordan is not Palestine" was also in the same vein and meant to calm the discussion. This statement, intended to correct extremely stupid policies and attitudes devoid of logic, doesn't seem, however, to reflect a change in the intentions of the extreme Israeli right on this subject. In fact, such a commitment should not come from the foreign minister, who is known for his senseless political positions, but from the Israeli Knesset itself.

This is what must be sought by Jordanian officials as minimum acceptable collateral if the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel is to have any credibility at all. The Palestinian Authority rejects any solution that does not lead to an independent Palestinian state on the lands of historic Palestine occupied in 1967. It, too, faces a dilemma in that this compromise does not enjoy unanimous Palestinian support.

It is the reckless political positions of the Israeli right-wing government that has brought Jordan and the Palestinian Authority together to confront this threat of the alternative homeland. Heedless policies have strengthened the anti-peace camp, which is now being used as a red herring by Israel to buy time and change the demographic reality in the Palestinian territories.

I wonder: if Palestinians used a slogan similar to that raised by the Israeli right, insisting that "Palestine is not Israel," what would be the position of Avigdor Lieberman and Binyamin Netanyahu on this and the Palestinians who wielded it?- Published 8/12/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Labib Kamhawi is a political analyst in Amman.