• Iran, the Arab intifada and the end of the 'Middle East'  - Arshin Adib-Moghaddam
The old (post-) "colonial" "Middle East" is withering away.

• Turkey: rising tensions and loss of direction  - Ersin Kalaycioglu
Turkey is now perceived with suspicion by some countries of the MENA region.

• Ready for new Erdogans in the Middle East?  - Yuksel Taskin
It is natural for Muslim populist leaders to look to the experience of Turkey's Erdogan.

• Syria spoils the Iranian victory  - Sadegh Zibakalam
The Great Islamic Awakening is seen as a clear indication of Islam's moral superiority and a blow to its rival.

Iran, the Arab intifada and the end of the 'Middle East'
 Arshin Adib-Moghaddam

Once upon a time there was a United States naval officer who invented a region he called the "Middle East". His name was Alfred Thayer Mayhan (1840-1914) and he lived during a period when this "Middle East" was subjugated and colonized, when it was turned into a geopolitical "region" that could be defined by the office of a naval strategist whose penchant for US imperialism made him famous.

Since then, there exists a place the "West" imagines as the "Middle East" as if it has an existence of its own. Yet this "Middle East" is not merely a jolly good imperial fantasy. The Euro-Americo-centric designation buttresses the West's claim to hegemony, re-inscribing dependency into the very consciousness of the peoples and governments acting in that area. It is also distortive because it suggests that the "West" can control events there. It is indicative of this illusion that the "Middle East" is the only "region" that is still officially defined from the perspective of Europe and America.

But the old (post-) "colonial" "Middle East" is withering away, at least since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The ensuing mayhem, the immense loss of life and the horrific images of torture and death that accompanied that devastating war put psychological and material boundaries on US foreign policies. The "Vietnam syndrome" has turned into an "Iraq pathology", exactly because political elites in the US were forced to accept that there are no military solutions to the conflicts in the region and that a military victory does not necessarily yield a strategic advantage. There seems to be an emerging understanding that events cannot be controlled by the barrel of the gun, that the area we have called the "Middle East" can't be defined from here anymore, that there is both reciprocity (them affecting us) and autonomy (them doing what they want beyond our control).

As such, the Iraq war was a major step towards a post-American order in the area exactly because it revealed the impotence of military might in the contemporary international system. It also signaled the demise of the "Middle East" as a region defined in terms of dependency on us. Today, when we look at the map we don't see an abstraction anymore, but concrete events, memories--Abu Ghraib, Saddam Hussein, Gadaffi--and Tahrir square, civil society, democracy, calls for liberty, empowerment, revolution!

It is within this context of a non-colonial future that the Arab intifada can be interpreted. If the revolution in Iran of 1979 uprooted a pro-western dictatorship from the country, the Arab uprisings have created their own possibility for independence. After all, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak were quite comparable to the shah; kings of kings who were dependent on the United States and skeptical of democratic accountability. "King of kings" was also a preferred title of Muammar Gaddafi, who lost the last residues of ideological support from his people when he turned himself over to the Bush administration and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair during their inglorious "war on terror". Add Turkey's increasing distance from the US and its confrontation with Israel to the mix and what emerges is a region that has ceased to function in a colonial mode.

What we are witnessing, then, is the second coming of independence, which promises a non-colonial order. It signals the end of the "Middle East", which would translate into the end of dependency on the "West". This is salutary for Europe and the United States, as well, if we finally accept and appreciate that non-western societies are writing their own history. They don't need us to dictate words to them and to pester them with our patronizing wisdom. This is what the Iraq war and the uprisings should have taught us.

And then there is Iran, of course, which in 1979, much like Castro's Cuba two decades before, instituted a revolutionary narrative advocating radical independence for the country, the region and the "global south". The revolutionary emphasis on independence is one of the main reasons why Iran refers to the Arab uprisings as "awakenings". In the jargon of the revolutionaries of 1979, including Ayatollah Khomeini, being "awake" (or "bidar" in Persian) signified the prelude to revolutionary action: a society that was ready to struggle for its independence.

Of course, there are also many in Tehran who are delusional enough to assume that the Arab revolts are modeled after the Islamic revolution of 1979. Those Persian fantasies need to be ignored. But by and large the emerging post-American order is viewed with immense optimism in Iran and a good dash of anxiety, too. Optimism, because Iranian strategists assume (rightly so in my opinion) that governments that are more responsive to the preferences of their societies will yield foreign policies that are more friendly to the Palestinian cause and Iran itself, and by implication less acquiescent to the United States and Israel.

Below the surface, however, there is anxiety too, especially among the right wing, which is subduing the demands of Iran's powerful civil society. They are aware that Iranians have been plotting their own intifada to reform the state for quite some time now and that today democracy and human rights, not only independence, are the measure of successful governance in the Arab and Islamic worlds. In the middle-to-long term, the Iranian state, which perceives itself a major player in this area, can't be oblivious to that brave new world and its anti-authoritarian norms.-Published 27/10/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Arshin Adib-Moghaddam teaches at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London and is author of "A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilizations" (Hurst & Columbia U. Press).

When asked what the most demanding challenge is for a seasoned politician, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was reported to have said, "events, my dear boy, events". The events of the last nine months in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria have shattered the game of politics that the elites played in the Arab countries along with the political dreams of many, including those of Turkish foreign policy-makers.

Turkey has in recent years followed a policy of peaceful mediation between the parties of conflict in the Middle East/North Africa region, further accentuated since 2007 with a wish to achieve "zero problems" with neighbors. Such a foreign policy posture seemed to have depended on the assumption that Turkey had the capacity to sustain dialogue with all of the countries of the MENA region, while its geostrategic location and capabilities were at such a significant level that Turkey could project sufficient soft power to make a difference in the region as well.

It was also assumed that Turkey "mattered" to such an extent that unless Ankara participated, no peace settlement could take place. Turkey's membership in the G-20, the Organization of Islamic Conference and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its strategic relations with the United States and Russia, and its good relations with China, Brazil and Iran meant that states of the MENA region had to take Turkish soft power projection into perspective. Neglecting to do so would bring risks to them but not to Turkey.

Accordingly, the AKP government moved to reciprocally abolish visas with Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. On October 14, 2009, the Turkish and Syrian councils of ministers held a joint meeting with great fanfare, as if they were fused into one single government. As the human rights award accorded to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan by Muammar Gaddafi's government indicated, relations between Turkey and Libya were quiet amiable in 2010. A high-level Turkish entourage that visited Yemen in January 2011 received red carpet treatment from President Ali Abdullah Saleh's government. The AKP government seemed to have developed intimate relations with all the authoritarian Arab governments, from Syria in the north to Yemen and Libya in the south and west of the MENA region.

Then the "Arab spring" arrived in early 2011.

From February to October 2011, relations between Turkey and Syria went from intimacy and integration to hostility and confrontation. Relations between the Mubarak and Erdogan governments were less than cordial. The Arab spring created a rapprochement with Egypt, yet Erdogan's visit to Egypt in September 2011 was stymied when his request to visit Gaza received a cold shoulder. Relations with the Muslim Brotherhood also cooled when Erdogan suggested that Egypt should adopt "laiklik" (laicite; state secularism) in regulating relations between the state and religions of Egypt.

As Egypt began to move to the center stage, Turkey's only contribution to the hostage exchange between Gilad Shalit and 1,027 Palestinian prisoners in Israel was the hosting of 11 Palestinians in Turkey. It seems as if relations between Palestine and Israel can move forward mainly with Egyptian mediation, with Turkey playing a marginal role.

As the Egyptian government has favorably addressed prospects of joint oil exploration in the eastern Mediterranean with the Greek Cypriot government, Turkey seems to be left to its alliance with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Turkey now seems to be facing Israeli, Egyptian, Greek Cypriot and US collusion in eastern Mediterranean energy politics, where neither Lebanon nor Syria appears to have a pro-Turkish stance. It appears as if Turkey's current policies have not only failed to materialize zero problems with these countries, but have also managed to generate the immaculate isolation of Turkey herself in the energy politics of the eastern Mediterranean.

The Turkish performance with democracy and "laiklik" seems not to have impressed the elites of the Arab countries, who are looking elsewhere for inspiration for their multi-party systems. The only performance that led the Turkish government to gain plaudits from Arab voters and elites alike has been Erdogan's criticism of the Olmert and Netanyahu governments' policies toward the Gaza Strip. In the meantime, Turkey seems to have lost its ability to play the role of trusted and honest broker with the parties to conflict in the Middle East--a role it played for so many decades in the past.

Ankara's policies of promoting zero problems with neighbors and peace through mediation have become ever farther goals to reach. Turkey is now perceived with suspicion by some countries of the MENA region. Problems have begun to mount with all of its southern neighbors, from northern Iraq through Syria, Israel, Egypt, and the Greek Cypriots. Thus far the Arab spring appears to have led mainly to unfulfilled expectations, falling trade figures, rising tensions and loss of direction in Turkish foreign policy.-Published 27/10/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Ersin Kalaycioglu is full professor of political science at Sabanci University, Istanbul, specializing in comparative politics with special emphasis on Middle Eastern and Turkish politics.

Right after the landslide victory of the AKP in the 2007 elections, the government led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan felt secure enough to follow a very active and more independent foreign policy under the supervision of Ahmet Davutoglu, appointed minister of foreign affairs in 2009. Even before the outburst of the "Arab spring", Turkey was vigorously trying to return to the Middle East--a region that the Kemalists had deliberately stayed away from in their westernization zeal. This new foreign policy discourse does not content itself with being a regional power but seeks to make Turkey a global player, which is justified by the legacy of the Ottoman Empire.

As Davutoglu lucidly described his vision to the Daily Zaman in May 2010: "The new global order must be more inclusive and participatory. . . . Turkey will be among those active and influential actors who sit around the table to solve problems rather than watching them." This self-celebratory rhetoric cannot be understood apart from a wounded nationalism that has a love-hate relationship with "the West". When Davutoglu was praised by the journal Foreign Policy as "the Turkish Henry Kissinger", even ardent anti-Americans in Turkey felt reassured to see their grandeur in the mirror of the hated yet envied superpower.

Nevertheless, Turkey has been caught unprepared by the shock waves of the Arab spring (like many actors, including the US and Europe). Perhaps it arrived too early for Turkey, which was following a soft power strategy of "zero problems with neighbors", accompanied by a restless army of exporters. Visa restrictions were lifted, trade boomed, and millions of tourists including the citizens of Iran and Syria poured into Turkey to see the places where popular Turkish TV series were shot. Turkey's impressive economic boom seems to have attracted Middle Eastern entrepreneurs who might be expected to exert greater influence in the new Middle East, together with a new generation of populist leaders.

Despite fluctuations and setbacks in Turkey's response to the Arab spring, I contend it will play a crucial role in the Middle East in the coming decade. It is not difficult to anticipate the coming of "new Erdogans"--populist Muslim leaders--out of the ballot boxes of the new Middle East.

Will these new populist leaders have a clear map of action after they win the elections? I do not think so. Their political choices will be largely dependent on the strategies of secular-modernist rivals, on the one hand, and their more radical Islamist contenders, on the other. Last but not least, the attitudes of international power centers will be very decisive in opening or closing a space for these leaders to move. An Orientalist-Islamo-phobic discourse will immediately spark off a similar Occidentalist reaction by these populist leaders, who would successfully manipulate these issues in times of domestic political and economic crises.

It is natural for Muslim populist leaders to look to the experience of Erdogan, as they will likely face similar political tensions. Erdogan also represents a conservative Islamic populism that blends some authoritarian and democratic ideas and attitudes. The legacy of democratic struggles in Turkey underway since the 1950s, and its international alliances have a moderating effect on the AKP. But Turkey's influence in the Middle East could be positive (encouraging a democratic consolidation) or negative (exporting an illiberal democracy) depending on the outcomes of the country's own ongoing democratic struggles.

Marketing Turkey as a model that has successfully synthesized Islam, democracy and capitalism is misleading. It is true that Turkey has undertaken significant political and economic steps under AKP rule. However, it is also true that Turkey has not yet completed its democratic consolidation. Erdogan can be said to have amassed enormous power at his disposal after his party finally captured the control of the judiciary and military--once formidable fortresses of the Kemalist elite. If he manages to realize his dream of crafting a presidential system under the new constitution, Turkey could be an example of an illiberal democracy. Then, Turkey's impact on Middle Eastern countries might not be very positive.

There is also a related problem that could garner popular support for authoritarianism in Turkey: the Kurdish problem. The recent tendency of the AKP government to follow a hawkish policy, accompanied by a nationalist discourse of "one nation, one flag, one fatherland, one state" risks revitalizing the notorious legacy of the 1990s national security state. Hence, the Kurdish problem is the most significant litmus test for a possible democratic consolidation in Turkey. Besides, if Turkey can democratically and peacefully resolve this problem, it will also have crucial repercussions for overall democratization in the Middle East.

As the largest minority of the Middle East, the Kurds are dispersed throughout Syria, Iran, Iraq and Turkey. Until recently, the seemingly rival states of Turkey, Syria and Iran were collaborating in violent suppression of the Kurds. The Arab spring has abruptly ended or shaken this uneasy alliance against the Kurds. Syria and Iran are further distancing themselves from Turkey due to the latter's increasing assertiveness in favor of the democratic movement in Syria. If Turkey chooses the option of a peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish issue, it will have a boomerang effect in the region, making it increasingly difficult to use violent means against a people experiencing an awakening. It is clear that this move would erode the legitimacy of Syria and Iran by further isolating their anachronistic regimes.

However, some state-centric analyses tend to exaggerate Iran's prospects for becoming a regional power. The Iranian ruling elite is becoming more paranoid and, hence, fractured due to the perceived dangers of the Arab spring. Such an internally destabilized state cannot assume the role of regional leadership. Despite some contrary analyses, Turkey and Iran are not allies but inevitable rivals due to the different models that the two states represent. For the reformists of Iran, the AKP model is inspiring as a case that has synthesized Islam and democracy. For the secular-minded people of Iran, the model of Turkey has secured the basis for peaceful coexistence between the pious and others. Can a regime that its people find anachronistic and illegitimate survive in the new Middle East?

Last but not least, if regime change in Iran could be realized in a relatively peaceful way, and if the Arab-Israel conflict could be settled peacefully, so-called Middle East exceptionalism will finally come to an end.-Published 27/10/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Yuksel Taskin is associate professor of politics at Marmara University in Istanbul.

Throughout the Middle East and the world at large, there has been a great debate during the past nine months about the origin, implications and future of the so-called "Arab spring". Everywhere in the region, academics, journalists and analysts are trying to examine various aspects and dimensions of this unexpected and baffling avalanche of events. Everywhere, that is, with the exception of Islamic Iran.

There are no Arab spring surprises in Iran. Iranian leaders as well as the state-run media view the Arab uprising without ambiguity. Their approach to these momentous events is very simple and straightforward.

To begin with, Iranian leaders regard the Arab spring not as a socio-political movement that aims to democratize Arab societies but rather as what they call an Islamic awakening. One after another, Iranian leaders praise this glamorous Islamic awakening. One might think this is a mere formality--that, given the intense religious feelings that many Iranian leaders hold, they simply prefer to call the Arab spring an Islamic awakening. But this is much more than a mere label. Not only have they altered the name, but more importantly the leaders have altered the entire contents of the movement as well.

Thus, this "Great Islamic Awakening" has allegedly been influenced and inspired by the radical and revolutionary Islamic notions developed by the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979. That is to say, it is anti-western, anti-American and, above all, anti-Israel. The Arabs, according to the Iranian leadership and media, were against Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, Tunisia's Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and the rest of the Arab leaders not so much because they were ruthless dictators but rather because they were primarily pro-western and enjoyed good relations with the Jewish state.

The fact that Mubarak had good relations with Israel and recognized it counts for far more in the eyes of Iranian leaders than his autocratic style of government. Mubarak's good relations with Washington caused more resentment among the Egyptian people than the fact that he locked up his opponents in jail or failed to hold free elections. The general coverage of the Arab spring in Iran is so distorted that if you have no access to alternative media, you would be inclined to believe that the Arabs are not seeking democratic changes but rather only want to break relations with Israel and the US. There is no reporting of the political reforms the Arabs seek; of their opposition to political prosecutions, detention of political opponents and press censorship; and of a host of other demands such as the rule of law and free elections.

It was against this background that the attack on the Israeli embassy in Cairo received massive coverage in Iran, as if this was all the huge Arab uprising was about. Any comment by an Islamist that is hostile or threatening towards the West, the US or Israel receives widespread coverage, while comments by the more liberal and secular as well as moderate Islamists who do not seek confrontation with the West and do not seek to destroy the state of Israel fail to get any attention in Iran regardless of how significant the commentator might be.

There is a second significant underlying approach to the Arab spring that shapes the Iranian interpretation of the issue. Many Iranian leaders perceive the Islamic regime to be in an ongoing ideological struggle with "the decadent West". The Great Islamic Awakening is seen as a clear indication of Islam's moral superiority and a blow to its rival. Given that Arab leaders struggling desperately for their very survival are strategic allies of the West, their demise is in fact the defeat of the West.

If the Arab spring was interpreted as a mere social struggle for political reform and democracy, then it would offer no ideological gain for Iran's Islamic leaders against their enemy. The ideological dimension of the struggle against the West is so crucial for the Islamic leaders that they have even interpreted current protests against economic hardship in several western countries, including the Wall Street occupation movements, as a clear sign of the collapse of western civilization.

But here we encounter the dilemma created for Iran by Syria. The entire Arab spring would have constituted a moral victory for Islamic Iran over the West were it not, alas, for the Syrian factor, which does not at all fit into the grand theory of the Islamic awakening. With much difficulty, the Iranian leadership managed ultimately to portray the Libyan regime under Muammar Gaddafi as a western protege. To rank Gaddafi as a western puppet was the only way to portray the Arab uprising as an Islamic awakening against the West. But Bashar Assad could not possibly be portrayed as a western ally. Yet there is no escape from the reality of the huge protest against his regime.

For all intents and purposes, the uprising in Syria punches a huge hole in the Islamic awakening theory. Initially, Iranian leaders as well as the state-run media simply ignored events in Syria. But when some independent Iranian writers raised the issue of the brutal suppression of the Syrian people, the leadership was obliged to comment on the crisis in Syria. It has maintained simply that the "nature of the uprising and protests in Syria is different from the rest of the Arab world. Whereas the uprising in the other Arab countries is genuine, in Syria it is Israeli and American agents who are catalyzing unrest against the heroic and revolutionary regime."-Published 27/10/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Sadegh Zibakalam is professor of political science at Tehran University.