BI: Are you more or less optimistic about the outcome of the revolution since our last interview a few months ago?

Kassem: My optimism remains the same but my realization as to how things will manifest themselves and the amount of frustration building in the country is more acute. Peoples' frustration with their lives is growing. [Developments] are more difficult than I thought. [Endless and distracting] demonstrations are taking place over personal issues, business and government issues, how cab drivers are dealing with the police force, etc.

BI: Some observers have concluded in recent months that this situation is benefitting the Islamists and particularly the Salafists, who are gaining strength. Is this your impression as well?

Kassem: At most, the Salafists represent around three million Egyptians, half of whom believe democracy is a western instrument and therefore reject it and won't participate in elections. So at best the Salafists will get 10-20 seats in the next elected parliament.

BI: So as matters stand now, how do you see Egyptian parliamentary elections turning out?

Kassem: My forecast is for the Muslim Brotherhood to get at most 10-15 percent of the vote, and the Salafists 10-20 seats. The powerful families and the pro-Mubarak forces from his old party will win again. The new parties are not getting their act together in time. No party will get a majority. The big question is who will recruit the many independents who get into parliament. In any case, this will be the last family-dominated elections in Egypt because politics is changing. In five years, political orientation according to political persuasion [based on parties and platforms] will replace loyalty [as the guiding concept for voting].

BI: What in your view is the likely timetable for the transfer of power? How much longer will it take for the military to bow out? Some estimate that it will take half a year for a new parliament to appoint a constitutional commission and another half year for it to deliver a new constitution, with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces ruling Egypt throughout this period.

Kassem: [Power will be transferred] somewhere between March and June 2012, when we have an elected president. We need six to nine months to elect a parliament and promulgate a constitution. It's a colossal task; they're working as fast as they can.

BI: Is the Mubarak trial a sign of strength or weakness of the revolution? Is there any sense that the military leadership is trying one of its own and thereby creating a precedent for more recriminations to arise in future stages, even against the military leaders themselves?

Kassem: [The trial is] a sign of strength. Hosni Mubarak represented colossal corruption and abuse of power. The antagonism against him doesn't exist against the armed forces right now. Some argue that the military will at some point seek immunity against prosecution. I don't think that will happen. [The revolution] is not directed against anyone in the armed forces. Moreover, a collision course with the military would be a stupid move right now. Bringing the military under accountability is a process that will take five to ten years. Eventually there will be a restructuring, but not a collision.

BI: Can you address the recently burning question of friction with Israel in the context of the revolution. Does it serve forces in the revolution?

Kassem: There are now three mindsets behind demonstrations and protests, including those at the Israeli embassy. First is the young Facebook and social media generation. They insist they are the leaders of the revolution but this is nonsense because they refuse to enter politics. There are pro-Mubarak demonstrators in this group, too. Second are protesters against SCAF who will get involved in most demonstrations. Then there are opportunists who try to create a crisis for their own benefit. Outside the Israeli embassy there were no more than 20,000 demonstrators, out of 80 million Egyptians. Any cab driver will tell you we don't want to go to war with Israel.

Meanwhile, there is very good SCAF coordination with Israel, meaning there is no problem where it matters. Some media reports have exacerbated the problem. There is no reason for deterioration. People here who normally welcome any harm done to Israel have taken a public stance against the attack on the embassy.

BI: Has the visit by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan exacerbated the tensions?

Kassem: Erdogan is being received like a hero after all this. But his credentials regarding the Arab-Israel conflict are seen as really weak. Strategically and geographically, the situation is very different for Turkey compared to Egypt. So [what if] he walked out on [Israeli President Shimon] Peres at Davos and protested over the flotilla. We fought wars with Israel and paid a price; Turkey never has. We have a delicate situation with Israel while Erdogan is across the sea and enjoys the bravery of being out of range. Would it be in our interest to enter a pact with Turkey when we would pay the price? Some Egyptians on the social media [front] are asking why we give him a hero's welcome--look what he's doing to the Kurds. The Islamists are using his visit to get traction and present the [ruling Turkish] AK party as a model. But it's hard to see strategic potential here, only temporary fireworks.-Published 15/9/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Hisham Kassem was founder and publisher of the Cairo Times and al-Masry al-Youm, and is former vice-president of the Ghad party. He is currently setting up a new media house.

The morning following Hosni Mubarak's resignation as president of Egypt, volunteers physically and symbolically cleaned the Tahrir protest space that had served as a rallying point for the last 18 days of anti-regime demonstrations. The cleaning spree soon expanded: by early afternoon middle-aged women in full-makeup were dusting the railings of Qasr al-Nil Bridge, while veiled teenagers swept up debris outside downtown cafes and bars. Egyptians were taking ownership of the public space previously seen as the property of the government.

Within days, the tough teenagers of my dirt alleyway removed the ubiquitous street litter, hung trash bins on every corner, and painted the buildings a head-high, street-length flag of black, white, and pink (pure red being too expensive). This psychedelic tunnel of patriotism was then ornamented with posters declaring "We'll change ourselves first!" and condemning non-civilized behavior ("Don't cut in line", "Don't harass girls". . .). The teenagers scribbled over the poster sponsorship script ("with the greetings of the Muslim Brotherhood"), rejecting outside patronage of their reinvented lifestyle.

The process of national self-discovery that will form the shape and character of eventual political and civil restructuring in Egypt began during the final week of January 2011 as citizens shed their fear of the ruling police apparatus. Over the next fortnight, a utopian community was formed in Tahrir Square, where Egyptians of all stripes and colors united under a common cause that fostered mutual respect despite otherwise divisive differences. Spontaneous discussions and debates among strangers bubbled up as class-conscious, politically-reticent Egyptians began getting to know one another.

Seven months later, the January 25 uprising remains far from being resolved, and is not always as pretty as one might hope. As surely as my alleyway has refilled with garbage and its painted walls been splotched and pock-marked, the revolutionary optimism of the spring has yielded to political frustration, conspiracy theorizing, and envy of other Arab uprisings' achievements. And, as beautification of reclaimed public space has often come to highlight deeply-rooted structural flaws, "changing ourselves first" has required a close look at "who we are," touching off personal identity crises and igniting a nation-wide culture war.

When Public Enemy No. 1 was removed from the arena, angst over what shape the freed nation would take spurred what was initially dialogue into frenzied claims and defenses of cultural legitimacy. The first skirmishes in the ensuing post-Mubarak culture war targeted the March referendum on constitutional amendments: isolated civic-secularists urged a vote of "no" to safeguard possible creation of an ideal constitution, while organized Islamists convinced the masses that voting "yes" would prevent future rule by infidels.

Occasional Tahrir demonstrations began to be tempered by ideological posturing. In May, I was stunned to encounter a demonstrator whose Islamist garb of beard and short gallabiya was adorned with a green sash reading "Muhammad's army" tied about his skullcap, and which held in place a color photograph of Osama bin Laden. At the July "Friday of Identity" demonstration, nicknamed "Kandahar Friday" by some detractors, hoisted flags bore the slogan "The Qur'an is our constitution", while revolutionary chants were rephrased to "The people want the application of Islamic law". In one heated exchange, a fervent youth shouted "It'll be Islamic, not Egyptian!", throwing the national flag to the ground and stomping on it for unneeded emphasis.

Public statements by Islamist figures have further stoked fears that Egypt will be narrowly defined in a tight Arab-Islamic frame. One leader has urged that pharaonic statues be covered because idols and human images are forbidden in Islam, while another has called for removing ancient Egyptian ("infidel") history from national school curricula. Islamist presidential candidate Hazem Salah Abu Ismail has turned secularists' fears into a feasible reality by declaring that all Egyptian women, Muslim and otherwise, should be veiled in public.

The breathing space to freely express oneself and the self-claimed right to politically organize in post-Mubarak Egypt have unleashed a spirit of experimentation. Citizens are testing these boundaries, sometimes pushing to extremes. Islamists are bolder than ever before, but their sensational fervor is more often than not producing backlashes among the so-called "silent majority".

The culture war taking place in Egypt today will eventually shape the political and legal parameters of the nation. Yet until (and surely even after) such concrete measures begin to crystalize, Egyptians will continue to invest much of their energy into exploring, discovering, defining who they are. Local, personalized initiatives--from painting murals to stretching dress codes to ranting on Facebook--will maintain their political urgency as long as Egyptians continue to fine-tune their reinvention of themselves.-Published 15/9/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Jennifer Peterson is an independent researcher and filmmaker residing in Cairo.

The victory of the Libyan revolution, the more-than-cosmetic reforms in Jordan and Morocco, and the escalation of revolutionary attempts to oust Bashar Assad in Syria and Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen signal that the wind is still blowing in the sails of the Arab spring.

However, the transformation is not easy and the spring is full of sandstorms. In Egypt, where the revolution has passed the point of overthrowing the regime, the post-revolution transition period reflects the enormity of the difficulties. The departure of President Hosni Mubarak from power launched a new era for the Egyptian revolution and certainly for Egypt. But by surrendering his powers to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Mubarak assured the continuity of the state as represented by three major institutions.

First, SCAF represents the sovereign rights of the president and his executive and legislative powers. Second, the judiciary has been in many ways part of the revolution as the revolutionaries have declared their intent to have a democratic system based on the rule of law. Third, the bureaucracy is historically the backbone of the Egyptian state and is ready to continue its mission under new leadership.

On the other side are the revolutionaries. First, the youth who launched the revolution but were soon to lose its leadership have evolved into a large number of coalitions and new political parties. Whatever the magnitude of the numbers, they reflect a highly-fragmented arena. Second, traditional political parties that worked as the formal and informal opposition to the Mubarak regime have reasserted themselves.

Third, a member of the traditional political opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood, has been reinforced by new "Islamic" parties. On the more liberal side of the Brothers is the "Wasat" or "Middle" party and on the more conservative side are the long imprisoned "Gamaat Islamia" and "Jihad" groups. Then there is the new power of the "Salafis" who advocate a strict implementation of Sharia. And fourth are all the non-party movements and civil society organizations that opposed Mubarak and his regime.

The organs of state and the revolutionary forces developed a formula that was summarized by the slogan: the people and the army are "one hand". Diverse revolutionary groups defined the situation as follows: the people made the revolution but the army was the one that protected it. In many ways this definition of what took place in Egypt recognized the continuity of the Egyptian state and, simultaneously, the necessity for Egypt to go through a process of massive change. Yet the basis for political change in the country has become an issue of state under the watchful eyes of the revolution.

Given this marriage between the continuity of the state and the continuity of the revolution, it was inevitable that tensions would grow over a variety of issues. Local forces have started to take public affairs into their own hands, while minorities have worked to assert their rights and the protests of the pre-revolutionary period continue to drag the economy to a halt.

Three clusters of tension have grown over time. The first is related to what the country should do with the former regime and the crimes it committed during the revolution, particularly Mubarak and his family. After considerable tensions, the ex-president and his two sons were put on trial, along with 48 senior members of his regime and their families. In a sign of instability, no fewer than four government cabinets were formed between January and July--ironically, all containing ex-members of the now-dissolved National Democratic Party.

The second cluster of tensions has focused on the road to be taken during the transition period to civilian rule. These tensions were among different factions of the revolution, and between some of them and SCAF. While part of the revolutionaries, particularly liberals and those on the left of the Egyptian political spectrum, pushed for a program to create a kind of steering committee or presidential council made up of civilians and military personnel to run the affairs of the country, others--all the Islamic organizations plus the nationalists--opted for the continuation of SCAF to run the affairs of the country.

Linked to this division, the first group opted for electing a constitutional assembly to draft a new constitution for the country as a basis for legislative and presidential elections. The second group opted for a counter-process that begins by electing the chambers of the legislative branch that will be empowered to select a constitutional council to draft the new constitution. SCAF took the initiative and formed a committee to amend eight articles of the 1971 constitution and put them to a referendum, where they were approved on March 19, 2011 by a majority of 77.8 percent. These amendments basically reduced presidential powers and limited the president to two terms of four years each. Then the 1971 constitution was replaced by a constitutional declaration to cover the transition period. The referendum also confirmed the proposition of launching the transition by first electing the two legislative councils. In many ways, the results of the referendum codified the split in the revolutionary camp.

This led to the third cluster of tensions about how to deal with SCAF. Is it the political leadership of the country and as such open to criticism and accountable to the public? Or is it part of the army that should be honored for protecting the country and the revolution and as such constitutes a "red line" that revolutionaries may not cross. Again, while liberals and leftists took the first view and accused SCAF of favoring the Islamists, the latter adopted the second view. A new configuration in Egyptian politics began to emerge and create its own dynamic, altering between confrontation and accommodation. The roadmap for transition was finally accepted, as was an Azhar document based on a consensus regarding guidelines for a constitutional council that will maintain the characteristics of a civil state.

Daily events were also the focus of tensions, the latest of which involved events in north Sinai. While augmentation of the Egyptian military presence in area "C" was agreed, the response to the Israeli attack on an Egyptian security post was considered weak and inconsiderate of Egyptian lives. While the situation in Sinai is much more complicated than the Israeli dimension alone, it has reintroduced the Arab-Israel conflict into Egyptian domestic politics after it had long been--like all national security matters--the domain of the presidency. This is likely to complicate Egyptian domestic politics, Egyptian-Israeli and Egyptian-American relations, and the management of Egyptian national security and foreign policy.-Published 15/9/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Abdel Monem Said Aly is a writer and political analyst at Al Ahram newspaper in Cairo.