• The fate of the Assad dynasty  - Nizar Abdel-Kader
The latest developments in Libya will have a tremendous effect on the Syrian uprising.

• From conspiracy to vox populi  - Rime Allaf
The Syrian regime repeatedly managed to weather the storms and come out steady again.

• The storm revisited  - Elias Samo
The opposition has become an irresistible force colliding with an immovable object, the system.

The fate of the Assad dynasty
 Nizar Abdel-Kader

As the rule of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi appears to be reaching its end after rebel forces took over his Tripoli stronghold, it is legitimate to wonder about the effects of these developments on the course of events in Syria and the future of President Bashar Assad. It is hard to draw a parallel between the societies and regimes of Libya and Syria, but the common denominator between the two is that their rulers have used their security and military forces to crack down on protesters in an attempt to regain "stability" and remain in power.

The latest developments in Libya will have a tremendous effect on the Syrian uprising. They will certainly boost the morale of Syrian protestors and cast doubt on the destiny of the Syrian ruler. The Libyan fallout, along with the international isolation and sanctions imposed on the Syrian regime, will weaken it and shake the army's resolve to continue its campaign to put down the uprising.

The main difference between what is happening in Syria and what has happened in Tunisia, Egypt, and now Libya is that Syria is ruled by an Allawite minority while the other states were ruled by leaders from the Sunni majority. Also, the discipline at both security and political levels imposed by the Syrian regime is much stricter, and Syria remains less susceptible to collapse under the pressure of popular protest of the masses. Also, the military and security apparatus are fully controlled by Allawites who act on orders, believing their destiny is linked to the survival of Assad's regime.

The international community, led by the United States, has been reluctant for almost five months to take any clear position on discrediting Assad and his regime despite its brutal crackdown, killing over 2,000 civilians. After the recent failure of the latest Turkish diplomatic effort, the United States and major European governments, along with Canada, decided to block the regime's assets and impose restrictions on the Syrian petroleum sector. If the European Union decides to ban oil imports from Syria, it would deprive Assad of 60 percent of the revenues needed to continue the present military campaign.

All these sanctions together will place growing economic pressure on a regime that is already suffering from serious economic difficulties. The latest financial reports from Damascus indicate the transfer of huge deposits from the Syrian banking system to foreign banks, including Lebanese banks. These developments place growing pressure on the Sunni business elites in Damascus and Aleppo and could weaken their backing for Assad and his regime.

Assad appeared on television the evening of August 21 as defiant as in his previous appearance on June 20 and ruled out bowing to western demands or stepping down. Assad, like Iraq's Saddam Hussein before him, dismissed the possibility of any foreign military intervention in Syria, saying, "Syria wouldn't succumb to [such] pressure as the West faces a domestic economic crisis and military failure in the region." Assad's rhetoric did not change, and he kept blaming "saboteurs" for continued violence. On the other hand, he again promised reform, yet always short of abolishing Article 8 of the constitution that categorizes the Baath as Syria's ruling party.

Assad's rhetoric underlines the urgency of further diminishing his regime's capacity to campaign against its own people. The Turkish role, as well as that of the Arab countries and especially the Gulf states, is of great importance in escalating pressure on the Syrian president. The Syrian people expect these governments to take all possible action to hasten the collapse of the regime.

Lebanon should follow other Arab governments in condemning the use of military force to crack down on protesters throughout Syria. Politically, Lebanon is split into two distinct camps on the matter: the March 14 coalition that has made a strong statement of solidarity with the Syrian people; and the March 8 coalition that, with the present government of Najib Mikati, is seeking more room for maneuver and waiting for a clearer view of the situation in Syria.

Hizballah, in turn, is cornered as it seemingly applies a double standard regarding the Arab uprisings. Hizballah officials have cheered all the Arab revolts except the one taking place in Syria. Their support for the Assad regime is causing deep confusion among Hizballah supporters and among Shiites in general.

As a neighboring state, Lebanon has an enormous stake in averting enduring instability in Syria. Chaos in Syria would have a swift and potentially devastating impact on Lebanon. Consequently, the Lebanese should strive to prevent any cross-border trafficking involving weapons or money.

To conclude, the major powers along with Turkey and the Arab countries should exercise the utmost pressure on Bashar Assad to make him understand that continued violence will only further deepen his crisis and that his fate will not be any different than that of the Libyan leader--regardless of the differences between the two countries.-Published 25/8/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Nizar Abdel-Kader is a political analyst/columnist at Ad-Diyar newspaper in Beirut. He has authored four books on Lebanon and regional political and strategic issues.

For years, it seemed that nothing could happen in the Levant without the involvement of Syria, according to its regular critics--a claim that simultaneously annoyed and pleased the Syrian regime. On the one hand, the regime protested the automatic assumption that Syria was to blame for everything that went wrong. On the other hand, however, with the proverbial cards at its disposal in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and beyond, the Syrian regime never tired of alluding to its own importance in maintaining a status quo that was supposed to benefit everyone concerned.

Because of these cards, both real and imagined, there has been a concerted effort over decades to get Syria out of its self-described resistance camp and into the so-called moderate allies-of-the-US camp. This is what Syria calls, rightly, the "conspiracy". Whether going back to 1996 and the "clean break" strategy peddled by neocons to then-Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, or whether thinking more recently to the stringent isolation of Syria in the aftermath of the assassination of Rafik Hariri in 2005, there has been no shortage of occasions for numerous countries to declare their opposition to the Syrian regime. Despite their apparent determination to sideline Syria, they failed repeatedly to do so.

Even with hundreds of thousands of coalition troops on the other side of Syria's border following Iraq's invasion in 2003, even with the full might of Israeli aggression on Lebanon inferring a trespass into Syria in 2006, and even with the spectacular defection of former vice president Abdulhalim Khaddam and his alliance with the regime's sworn enemy, the Muslim Brothers, the Syrian regime was shaken, but it hardly stirred.

To the frustration of all those attempting its destabilization, the Syrian regime repeatedly managed to weather the storms and come out steady again after periods of loneliness. This was not a case of the survival of the strongest or of the fittest--on the contrary, the Syrian regime seemed to commit every mistake possible and repeatedly dug itself into its own hole. Indeed, Syria survived not because its regime knew what it was doing or followed a strategic plan; it survived because everyone else made bigger mistakes, and because others consistently failed to differentiate between regime, state and country.

In some ways, there has been--to put it irreverently--a conspiracy of dunces surrounding Syria, heavy on theory but short on workable strategy. For all their frustrated desire to see the Assad regime fall, they miscalculated not only the foreign factors impeding this, but the domestic one as well: until now, of course, the Syrian people stood squarely behind the regime, either because they truly and patriotically rallied behind the cause of the moment, believing there was a concerted effort to attack Syria, or because they had no choice in the matter.

Suddenly, like many in the Arab world, many Syrians have decided that enough is enough, and that the only way forward is with the regime's ouster. After 40 years, the failed conspiracy dissipated to make place for a full-blown home-made mutiny, and there is every reason to believe that it will be much more successful than previous attempts to unseat the Syrian regime. For all the voices claiming that after the Assad regime will come the deluge, there are many more ready to prove the contrary.

The shock that nobody expected was that the support of the international community (which had been taken for granted) suddenly seemed subdued and hesitant. Having for years accused the Syrian president of every misdemeanor in the region, the US secretary of state was surprisingly calling Assad "a reformer" while dozens of Syrians fell dead under the fire of the security forces. The US and its main allies seemed to favor the devil they knew, rather than risk making waves with the unknown, especially when Israel was so obviously in favor of maintaining the regime that had guaranteed its safe borders for decades.

Were it not for a rather late redressing of its position, Washington appeared to be sticking to its history of mistakes in the region, with the Syrian regime continuing to benefit from such miscalculations. Some think that the delay in the US reaction has cost many Syrian lives and that an earlier strong condemnation would have forced the Syrian regime to better consider the international voices. The contrary can also be argued, however. By taking so long to push the Syrian regime, the US and its allies gave the regime a false sense of security and the notion that the world was impotent while it conducted its rampage against a civilian population. Consequently, because it went so far in its repression, believing it had a free hand, the Syrian regime left the international community no choice but to intervene diplomatically and economically.

So far, the sheer determination of the Syrian people courageously protesting week after week has convinced many that there is no going back and that the regime as we know it cannot be a part of Syria anymore. With a formal opposition determined to organize itself and to group those inside and outside the country while continuing to preach non-violence and non-interference, the incredible seems to be happening. It took 40 years, but the people are finally doing what decades of conspiracy couldn't achieve.-Published 25/8/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Rime Allaf is an associate fellow at Chatham House in London.

It began with an incident in March in the southern Syrian city of Daraa. It could have ended right then and there were it not for the arrogance and mismanagement of the local authorities. What followed was a demonstration in Daraa calling for the removal of the local authorities. Here again, a quicker response could have managed and contained the situation; but that was not to be.

Once the age-old "complex of fear" was broken in Daraa, the contagion quickly spread to other Syrian cities. Within a few weeks, the uprising developed into a "weekend ritual", with Muslim worshippers demonstrating following the conclusion of their Friday noon prayers. The "viral" breakdown of the fear element was shocking. In fact, merely days before the uprising in Daraa, the answer to the seemingly obvious question as to whether what was happening in Egypt and Tunisia could happen in Syria, was an unequivocal "no".

This "weekend ritual" lasted for a couple of months. What the demonstrators called for, as indicated by their chants and placards, were basic civil rights and political reforms and not the regime's demise. They specifically wanted, as I noted in a prior analysis entitled "Weathering the storm" published in bitterlemons-international in April, "less emergency law and more freedom, less corruption and more transparency, less security and more liberty, less of one party and more of multi-party, less nepotism and more competency".

In retrospect--and hindsight of course is "20-20"--had President Bashar Assad, having succeeded in cultivating an image of a humble, civil and likeable person, pro-actively taken the initiative and dealt with the responsible opposition leadership, crisis might have been averted. Assad acknowledged that mistakes were committed; probably one of these was the regime's slow response to the responsible opposition's original demand for freedom and reforms. In essence, it was a case of the leadership catching up with the opposition rather than leading it.

With the passage of time, the system's slow process of enacting reform measures compounded growing international pressure on the regime to speed up the reform process, emboldening the opposition along the way. The street's calls for "freedom and reforms" evolved into demands for "the removal of the system". The transformation was marked by daily confrontations in many Syrian cities. The opposition has become an irresistible force colliding with an immovable object, the system.

Although both sides in the conflict--the system and the opposition--are suffering, the biggest loser by far is society-at-large: the silent, helpless and anguished majority that is watching the daily casualties and destruction caused by this collision. When the elephants fight, the grass suffers. No one is certain of the desires of the silent majority. There is a definite longing for the old days, actually not so long ago, when people could move about day and night, feeling safe and secure. But there is also a desire for a fresh breeze of liberty--more precisely, a balance between security and liberty that is the essence of reform and that was missing in the past.

This balance is unattainable if the present violent deadlock continues and each side seeks to impose its will on the other. Although they have spilled a lot of blood, both sides have to recognize the greater need for a compromise. The outcome cannot be zero-sum because that would be a prescription for continued and escalating violence, threatening not only the social structure but ultimately the state itself. The outcome has to be win-win, which requires both sides to marginalize their respective radicals and accept the reality that neither side will achieve maximum expectations: the system won't crush the opposition and the opposition won't bring down the system.

Several reform laws have been enacted, of which two are particularly notable: a multi-party law and an election law. Yet the opposition considers these to be cosmetic changes so long as the one-party system enshrined in Article 8 of the constitution remains intact. For the opposition, the litmus test of the real intention of the system is the removal of Article 8 and related articles from the constitution or, better yet, rewriting the entire constitution to signal a genuine desire for reform.

Once that happens, the silent majority represented by credible religious and community leaders and intellectuals would become matchmakers for an urgently-needed dialogue. They would become more active and vocal in support of the enacted reforms. This in turn would hopefully help the country side-step the trials and tribulations of violent change and instead launch a peaceful transition to a modern Syria.

A fairy tale? Definitely doable.-Published 25/8/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Elias Samo is professor of international relations at American and Syrian universities.