• Egypt inspired people to change things  - an interview with Mustapha Kamel al-Sayyid
There is a link between Netanyahu policies and the deterioration of Israeli living conditions.

• Spring, the tents and the occupation  - Yossi Beilin
Whether they wish it or not, this is the most political demonstration Israel has ever witnessed.

• The Israeli protest is indifferent to the Palestinians  - Yisrael Harel
Most Israelis want to concentrate on domestic affairs like the economy, education and welfare.

• The boundaries of July 14  - Abir Kopty
Israeli limits are well known to the Palestinian community within Israel

Egypt inspired people to change things
an interview with  Mustapha Kamel al-Sayyid

BI: How do Israel's protests look from where you are in Egypt?

Al-Sayyid: These protests have raised some interest in Egypt. On the one hand, some people consider the protests to be the inevitable outcome of [Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin] Netanyahu's policies of stressing the importance of military expenditures and expansion of settlements. Besides this, Netanyahu has adopted an extremely liberal economic policy--different from the policies adopted by the Labor government. Add to this that the standard of living of the middle classes in Israel has [declined] tremendously. So there is a link between the expansionist colonial policies of Netanyahu and the deterioration of living conditions of people in Israel. This is one impression that people here have.

The second is that the Egyptian revolution has inspired many people all over the world, even in Israel. The Egyptian revolution has led people to believe that they can change things. The revolution is a sort of model for the protests in Israel and some militants have even tried to offer advice to demonstrators in Israel.

What will be the effect of all this on the Palestinians? I don't think there has been much thinking about that, although [the protests] should get the Israeli government to focus less on defense and to try to promote a peaceful settlement with Palestinians and other Arab governments so that it can devote more resources to improving social conditions in Israel.

BI: You mentioned the relationship between the revolution in Egypt and the protests in Israel. Can you talk more about that?

Al-Sayyid: Apparently the slogans used by the protesters in Israel echoed the slogans raised during the Egyptian revolution. One major one in Egypt was, "The people want the fall of the regime," and apparently the same was used in Israel, but adapted to Israeli needs. Also, the idea that people would just sit in, and stay on the streets for days--this showed the power of ordinary people and was an important lesson of the Egyptian revolution.

BI: Now that we are a few months down the road, how do you think the Egyptian revolution will affect Palestinians?

Al-Sayyid: The Egyptian government now and in the future after the elections will not adopt the policies that [former president] Hosni Mubarak did--the blockade on people in Gaza and approving whatever policies Israel decides on for Palestinians. The feeling of sympathy for Palestinians is guiding the actions of the Egyptian government and the kind of hostility that Mubarak's regime showed towards Hamas is a thing of the past.

I even read recently that Hamas may decide to move its office from Damascus to Cairo. Yesterday there was a meeting between [Hamas leader] Khaled Meshaal and the leaders of Hamas and the heads of Egyptian intelligence. Such meetings were held before between Omar Suleiman and leaders of Hamas, but in the past Omar Suleiman suspected Hamas of being a hostile force on the borders of Egypt. I don't think this is the view of the Egyptian government now.

BI: In general, what is your view of the Egyptian revolution--its successes and failures?

Al-Sayyid: Any revolution goes through stages. First there was the triumph of the revolution, overthrowing the regime of Mubarak. Then we went to a second stage, with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces dragging its feet in fulfilling the objectives of the revolution. With pressure from people on the streets in Cairo and other places in Egypt, the Supreme Council has proceeded with some of the demands of the revolutionaries and put Mubarak on trial.

The scene in Egypt now is dominated by a sort of polarization between the Islamists on the one hand (some of whom took part in the revolution, like the Muslim Brotherhood, and others who did not take part in the revolution and opposed it, like the Salafists), and on the other hand the secular forces, including the liberals, the leftists and the nationalists. The object of polarization is the nature of the future constitution of Egypt. The secularists would like guarantees that it will be a secular constitution and the Islamists say that the new constitution should be left entirely to the new parliament. They feel that they are going to get a majority in the parliament and so they will have more freedom in drafting the constitution towards an Islamic revolution.

The revolution is a long-term process and we have not yet seen the impact of the revolution on the economic and political system. We have to wait for legislative and presidential elections and the drafting of a constitution to see whether the constitution will establish a sort of state of law in Egypt that respects civil and political rights, or if we will end up with a sort of Islamic constitution in which perhaps some civil and political rights will be sacrificed.

BI: Are you hopeful or are you worried?

Al-Sayyid: I am hopeful in the long term. I think we may have some set-backs, but in the long term I am quite hopeful.-Published 18/8/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Mustapha Kamel al-Sayyid teaches political science at Cairo University.

Endless tracts have been written in recent years about the Israeli public's indifference, its submissiveness and complacency, its capacity to swallow its discontent and leave to the politicians--even if it has no faith in them--the decisions that determine its fate. The excuses the public made for itself were so persuasive that we are still surprised to witness masses of mostly young adults filling the streets of our cities and refusing to go home until they are assured of "social justice". Israel's middle class is dwelling in tents, demonstrating every Saturday night and, though some commentators announce every week that this is the last week of protest, the protesters' presence on the streets merely expands day by day.

As with many such protests, it's hard to believe that what brought people out to the streets and caused them to tear themselves away from Facebook is the price of cottage cheese, their success in reducing it, or even the price of rental apartments in Tel Aviv. As always, we confront an accumulation of many economic, political and social complaints. People did not take to the streets because of extreme right-wing legislation, the cessation of the peace process, ongoing construction in settlements, or tense relations between the government of Israel and the US administration--but rather, here and now, because of the unjust distribution of resources in Israel.

Why did this happen in the summer of 2011? It's hard to believe there is no link between the "Arab spring" and the Israeli tent protest.

Of course, the situation in Israel is totally different: citizens can express their views in demonstrations, in elections, through non-governmental organizations, by appealing to the High Court of Justice, and by writing newspaper op-eds--acts that are impossible or barely possible under authoritarian regimes. But one thing is similar: in both the Arab world and Israel, many people had persuaded themselves that they were powerless to make the necessary changes; then, when something did happen and the fire was ignited, they discovered the near-unbearable ease of the capacity to change.

Suddenly people realized that no one could hold back the masses. In a dictatorship, the masses project a threat to the very regime; in a democracy, to whoever is in power. In both cases, the powers-that-be understand the message of the masses: compromise or lose power. Of course there is another way: exercise brutal force and be repudiated by the community of nations.

This sense of power that has suddenly emerged in the Arab capitals and emerged anew in Israel is catching. Another similarity is that no mass display of power in our region is identified with a specific leader. This weakness is exploited by those in power, along with the fact that the demonstrating masses are hard put to play the role of drafting committee and to distill, clarify and express their demands. Inevitably, the lowest common denominator is the demand to remove whoever is in power without knowing who would replace them.

The lack of leadership and absence of clarity are liable to generate a second common denominator: frustration. Change may indeed take place, but it is liable to be smaller than anticipated, and the new leaders may not be that different from those who lost power, democratically or otherwise.

Does the occupation play a role in the Israeli protest arena? Ostensibly, it does not. Israeli demonstrators and protesters are careful not to integrate political issues into their struggle. Their hand is outstretched to settler demonstrators in the West Bank, and some settlers have joined demonstrations in Israeli cities. The simple fact that nearly all inexpensive housing is in West Bank settlements--and was, in the past, in the Gaza Strip--is not on the agenda. Many of the protesters understand full well that, had the right wing not encouraged hundreds of thousands of Israelis to live in settlements and invested a fortune in infrastructure there, much cheaper housing would be available inside sovereign Israel. But they fear lest raising the issue paint them in the colors that the Netanyahu government would prefer to paint them with: leftists and doves.

Nevertheless, any objective observer very quickly grasps what is happening. It's enough to observe the masses of demonstrators and tent dwellers to understand that they are mainly young, secular, living in the heart of Israel, bearing the primary burden of taxes and reserve duty, and struggling to lead the lives they have a right to live. Whether they wish it or not, this is the most political demonstration Israel has ever witnessed.-Published 18/8/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Yossi Beilin, a former minister of justice, currently chairs the Geneva initiative and is president of Beilink.

Until Barack Obama entered the White House, Abu Mazen (PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas) was obliged, under pressure from the United States and the Quartet, to negotiate with Israel. But his goal was never to reach agreement. This was graphically illustrated in late 2008 by his refusal to accept the most generous set of principles ever proposed by an Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert. Hence Abu Mazen exploited the irresponsible decision by an inexperienced American president to back the Palestinian position, ceased direct contact with Israel, maneuvered it into a corner and proclaimed that it rejected peace.

This was yet another demonstration that the long-term strategy of the Palestinians is to wait. The future, they believe, is on their side, whether for demographic reasons or because of the well-established theory that Israel is growing weaker due to drastic internal polarization and endless, exhausting struggles with the Arabs, and that it will therefore eventually lose its will to survive: the crusader doctrine at its best.

Quite a few Israelis anticipated that the "Arab spring" would generate, alongside a flowering of democracy among our neighbors, more openness and tolerance, less hatred toward the Jewish state on the part of Arabs and particularly Palestinians, and less inclination to negate its very existence. In reality, the outcome was the opposite. Mass demonstrations on the streets of Tunis, Cairo, Tripoli and Homs added yet another dimension to Abu Mazen's reticence to negotiate: a fear that the muqataa in Ramallah would become another Tahrir Square. If the demonstrations threaten veteran regimes that are ten times stronger than that of Abu Mazen, then this would undoubtedly happen to him, too--with Hamas and Islamic Jihad fanning the flames.

The unilateral appeal to the United Nations to recognize a Palestinian state offers clear proof of the PLO leadership's submission to the hysteria of the masses. This is the main reason why the senior echelon of the PLO rejects the heavy pressure applied by the US to avoid this hasty step. Indeed, a sudden change of direction now, when the train is speeding forward, could derail Abu Mazen, with an uprising toppling the Palestinian Authority. This may not be the main reason for the Palestinian refusal to negotiate, but it undoubtedly strengthens the strategy of a total break in contact, at least at the official level, with regard to a permanent status agreement between the state of Israel and the PLO.

Here there enters into the picture another variable, a particularly interesting yet not quite decipherable one, that could affect events. The Israeli protest movement recently presented the government with demands that are restricted solely to economic welfare, particularly that of the middle class with its claim that it is discriminated against. Not a word about the peace process. Indeed, even though the protest movement's originators and leaders are leftists--in some cases on the extreme left--they insist on not allowing their protest to touch the Palestinian issue.

This is not easy: the protesters are subject to heavy political and media pressures to do so. After all, they read in the columns of the most senior commentators and in the "fatwas" of renowned authors like Amos Oz and Meir Shalev that all their economic troubles can be traced to the settlements. The erosion of the middle class, like the pitiful salaries of the hospital interns, are caused by the over-funding of the settlement project. If Israel would just dismantle the settlements and withdraw from the West Bank, huge resources currently invested there would be freed up for funding cheap housing, improving education, health and welfare, and strengthening deprived sectors of society. Indeed, since complete withdrawal would bring about peace with the Palestinians, it would be possible to move funds from defense spending and settlements toward establishing a welfare state without parallel.

To date--mid-August--the smart young demonstrators have rejected this advice and refused to present these simplistic ideas to the government. Of course it's still possible that the protest movement will become enmeshed in routine, yield to the media and embrace this demagogic theory. At that point, it will be interesting to see the result. Will this protest movement, having proved its roots among the people and united many diverse sectors of Israeli society, remain united? Or will it disintegrate along the lines of the political views that divide Israeli society when it comes to issues of peace and security?

My sense is that the Israeli public is fed up with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and no longer obsessed with it. Most Israelis want to concentrate on domestic affairs like the economy, education and welfare. The protest leaders are well aware of this, which is why they keep asking: why aren't the settlers joining our tent cities of protest? Why don't they join our demonstrations? After all, spiritual leaders of the religious right like rabbis Beni Lau, Yuval Sherlo and Avi Gisser were warmly received when they addressed protest demonstrations.

If indeed the protest movement avoids taking a stand concerning the conflict with the Palestinians, we may encounter another interesting scenario: the Palestinians are liable to discover that they went too far in rejecting the opportunity offered by the generous proposals of Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert. Gone are the days when most Israeli and international media could compel Israelis to concentrate only on the conflict, at the expense of their economic well being.

The current combination of a Likud government and a public that is fed up with focusing solely on the future of the territories is not good news for the Palestinians. If the Palestinians try, by renewing violence, to refocus attention on the conflict, they may be bitterly disappointed. The Israel Defense Forces are preparing to deal sharply with this threat and end it quickly--certainly faster than the first intifada and faster than the terrorist war of the early years of this century, when Palestinian terrorism drowned the Oslo accords in rivers of blood and fire.-Published 18/8/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Yisrael Harel heads the Institute for Zionist Strategy in Jerusalem and writes a weekly political column in Haaretz. He founded the Yesha Council (Council of Jewish Settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District) and headed it for 15 years.

Although some Israelis are calling for making a clear connection to Israel's occupation, the July 14 movement for "social justice" is far from endorsing a position on this, for many reasons.

First, July 14 is not a united movement. Over time, the Israeli neo-liberal and capitalist regime has increased individualism. In Tel Aviv boulevards, one can find tents identified with many different groups and issues and demands: single mothers, teachers, students, social workers, the disabled, pensioners, etc. Israel has not only built cement apartheid walls, it has also created many psychological barriers and walls between its own citizens

The movement is trying hard to be inclusive, from right to left, in fact. It is true that all these groups have come together and rallied, chanting, "the people want social justice". But when it comes to forming a list of demands, the divergent groups raise different interests--in some cases even conflicting ones. Consequently, major effort is put into finding common ground and agreeing on joint demands rather than addressing historical injustices and structural change.

Second, Israelis separate between the "social" and the "political". Many people who are taking part in the movement keep repeating "the struggle is not political". This will prevent many from questioning state priorities, which certainly entails questioning its politics. Furthermore, this mantra, along with the general inclusiveness, makes settlers, who are trampling on Palestinian rights on a daily basis, feel included. But this, of course, is political not social.

Third, the left in Israel (especially the non-Zionist left) has been delegitimized. The Israeli left is now labeled as "haters of Israel" after massive systematic campaigning by the right wing, backed by political parties like the Likud and supported by a wide range of organizations promoting the rightist agenda. The protesters of July 14 do not want to be affiliated or labeled as "anti-Israel extremists".

Finally, Israeli protestors are not calling for the fall of the regime, as did protestors in Arab countries. If they were, I am not sure Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and the state security apparatuses would be as tolerant. Netanyahu and Israeli "hasbara" (roughly "propaganda" in Hebrew) will do their utmost to distinguish Israeli democracy and freedom of speech from neighboring oppressive and criminal Arab regimes. Israelis remain eager to celebrate their democracy, and continue to deny their state's lack of democracy or tolerance when it comes to Palestinians.

These Israeli limits are well known to the Palestinian community within Israel. This is why our reaction took some time. Currently, there are many Arab/Palestinian encampments in major towns like Nazareth, Baqa al-Gharabiya, Sakhnin, Arrabeh, Haifa, Jaffa, Led, Hurfeich, Yerka, Majd al-Krom, Qalansaweh, Um al-Fahem, Jaljuliya, al-Alaraqib and more.

These demonstrators did not go to Tel Aviv's boulevards but decided to set up their own tents in Palestinian towns and neighborhoods. In Tel Aviv, the protests are about housing. For Palestinians, it is about house demolitions and land grabs. In Tel Aviv, protests are about the high price of apartments; for Palestinians, it is about the lack of housing and planning. In Tel Aviv, protests are about "cottage cheese"; for Palestinians, it is about the 60 percent of children living under the poverty line.

The discourse in the Palestinian tents is totally different than that in the Tel Aviv tents. Occupation and historical injustices are on the table, the connection between the social and political is very clear, and the demands are the same in Sakhnin, Nazareth, Haifa, Um al-Fahem, Jaffa or the Naqab: they are collective, not individual.

In addition, these encampments are a great opportunity to bring together Palestinian youth and mobilize them. Most tents offer different cultural and political activities--from demonstrations to lectures on planning and housing to commemorations for poet Mahmoud Darwish, film screenings, and musical events.

Many tents have even managed to bring together the various parties and political movements that represent the Palestinian community to cooperate and mobilize, which is in itself a blessing. Many tents have engaged Jewish activists, which creates an alternative and challenges the existing structure of separation.

To summarize, most Palestinians are choosing to bring their voice to this movement and not isolate themselves. July 14 is an opportunity for Palestinians to organize and motivate themselves. It will not, however, bring the change Palestinians seek. Our struggle did not start today; it started before 1948 and will probably continue after July 14.

July 14 has created opportunities for activism that the Israeli regime has worked long and hard to prevent. People have come together, and this is already power. Yet this movement will not go beyond the Zionist boundaries; it might achieve concrete demands, but it will not change the dominant social, economic and political structures. It won't do so until it addresses the injustice underway since 1948 and comes to terms with Friedrich Engels' famous saying: "A nation cannot become free and at the same time continue to oppress other nations."-Published 18/8/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Abir Kopty is a media analyst and consultant and political activist.