• Iraq and the end of the empire  - Arshin Adib-Moghaddam
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan eclipsed the strategic options of the United States.

• US and Iran:
working together in Iraq  - Hamid Alkifaey
Cooperation between the US and Iran was most visible in Iraq before, during and after the invasion of 2003.

• When elephants fight, it is only the grass that suffers  - Safa A. Hussein
It would be best for Iraq's interests that the US and Iran realign their relations.

• Avoiding the rational  - John Limbert
Most Iranian policy goals are close to what the US says it wants in Iraq.

Iraq and the end of the empire
 Arshin Adib-Moghaddam

The current crisis in Iraq contains all the factors that are shaping the new political realities in the region. After two invasions of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, an ongoing Cold War against Iran and a war on terror that is losing traction in the mountainous labyrinth of the Hindu Kush along the Afghan-Pakistani border, the United States is finally realizing that the contemporary international system cannot be ruled by military might.

The cost of the uni-polar moment that neo-conservatives indulged in with so much hedonistic violence has plunged the country into an economic crisis. The middle classes in the United States and especially the lower strata of society have paid with blood and sweat for the war on terror. The strategic gain has been nil.

In fact, in addition to the deaths of tens of thousands of people, most of them civilians, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan eclipsed the strategic options of the United States. There is no Saddam or Taliban any more that could be manipulated in order to check Iran and to attack the country if necessary. And now Tunisia's Zine El Abedine Ben Ali and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak are gone, too. Ultimately, the strategic blunder, the inhumanity of the US occupation, changed the perception of the US in the minds of a majority of Arabs and Muslims.

The blunder in Iraq also affected the domestic politics of the US. In many ways, it was the Iraq episode that paved the way for the Obama presidency. The anti-war vote for Obama was a major factor in his success in the elections in 2008. The second factor is intimately related to the emergence of a post-American order.

For over two decades, Saddam Hussein was very functional in containing revolutionary Iran. Lest we forget: President George Bush Sr. betrayed the Kurds and the Shiites in their revolt against Saddam Hussein immediately after the first US invasion of Iraq in 1990 because he needed Saddam Hussein to check Iran and to subdue the Iraqi Shiites who were seen as natural allies of Iran. From an analytical perspective, a Shiite-led Iraq does not translate into subservience to Iran, of course. Alliances are based on interest, not on ethnic or religious affiliation. The "Shiite factor" is a necessary, but not a sufficient, explanation for the emerging Iraqi-Iranian relationship.

Political elites in Iran have known this. They engineered institutional options at quite an early stage during the war with Saddam Hussein (1980-1988), for instance the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq under the leadership of the late Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim (which has now been turned into The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq by his brother Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim). Iran was able to mobilize the vast network of religious foundations (bonyads), non-governmental organizations, charities, and family bonds spanning from Tehran, Qom, Ahvaz and Mashhad in Iran to Baghdad, Kerbala, Kazimiya and Najaf in Iraq. This infrastructure is in many ways "organic". It developed historically, at least since the Safavid dynasty, and it was fortified in the twentieth century through political alliances (for instance, with the Kurdish movements).

And then there are the clerical links. All major sources of emulation in the contemporary history of Iran have had some personal linkages to Najaf and/or Kerbala. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini studied in Najaf and he stayed there in exile. Khomeini was very close to Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr, the father-in-law of Muqtada al-Sadr, who is currently studying in Qom. Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the Iraqi marja al-taqlid (source of emulation, the highest clerical rank in Shiism) was born in Iran. In turn, Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi, a close confidante of the current supreme leader of the Islamic Republic and the former judiciary minister of the country, was born in Iraq. So the Iranian-Iraqi narrative is intensely intermingled beyond mere sectarian dimensions.

The imperial power of the US never translated into a pax Americana for the people of western Asia as it did in post-war Europe. The US did not forge a viable security architecture that would be inclusive and that it would enforce in the name of stability. The Israel lobby and other rightwing constituencies ensure that US foreign policies remain divisive. For the US, regional security interdependencies are problematic exactly because they make it rather more difficult to divide and rule. Conversely, for the people of the region, the Iranian-Iraqi relationship is only a good thing because it creates interdependencies that can translate into a viable regional security order, much in the same way as the Venezuelan-Cuban axis enforced the autonomy of Latin America. After all, it is primarily the people of the region who pay the price of war, and not those outside it. One can only hope that the political elites in Iraq and Iran rise to the occasion and contain the extremists in their ranks. The people on both sides of the Shatt al-Arab deserve peace and reconciliation. To that end, the post-American order provides an opportunity. -Published 4/8/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Arshin Adib-Moghaddam teaches at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London and is author of "A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilizations" (Hurst & Columbia U. Press).

It may sound strange to some, but the United States and Iran have been "working together" ever since the tragic events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. This "cooperation", albeit behind the scenes, can be seen clearly in Iraq. The two countries are officially and actually enemies and no doubt monitor each other's activities and work against each other, especially in the Middle East. But the fact remains that they have been cooperating in Iraq, and not always clandestinely--they entered into direct negotiations in Baghdad in 2008, with the Iraqis as intermediaries.

Iran stands to be the biggest beneficiary of the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, respectively. America did Iran the favor of a lifetime by removing the two bitterest enemies of the Islamic Republic--Saddam Hussein to the west and the Taliban to the east--making it a lot safer for the ayatollahs to rule and enhancing their grip on power, notwithstanding the challenges they face at home. This American action also contributed to the stability of Iran and the strengthening of its economy, assisted by oil prices that have skyrocketed from around $30 per barrel in 2001 to almost $100 today. This has enabled Iran to spend on its nuclear project, which is believed to be nearing completion despite international objections.

The cooperation between the US and Iran was most visible in Iraq before, during and after the invasion of 2003. Some Iraqi opposition leaders acted as intermediaries, and many experts believe that the US would not have invaded Iraq had it not been for the tacit approval of Tehran. In Iraq, the US and Iran rarely clashed (although they are apprehensive of each other's intentions), but both understood that in any clash each would lose badly.

Instead, they have played it safe; the US made friends with all the Iraqi opposition factions that had been propped up, nurtured, and funded by Iran for a quarter of a century. Iran, too, made friends with America's allies in Iraq, such as Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmed Chalabi, believed to be the architect of the invasion of Iraq.

But dynamics in Iraq changed dramatically in Iran's favor after the invasion. New indigenous and independent political forces appeared on the Iraqi scene. Among these was the Sadrist trend led by young cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The American administration in Iraq, acting on the advice of Iraqi allies, ignored this trend and tried to marginalize it. The Americans did not include the Sadrist trend in the Governing Council, cracked down on its activists, and closed its newspapers and media outlets. This US targeting of the movement served to rally its supporters Iraq-wide. The trend formed a militia called the Mahdi Army, which took up arms against the Americans and the newly-formed Iraqi government. Al-Sadr carried enormous weight among his followers, who were ready to obey his orders in any direction.

While the US entered into confrontation with the Sadrist trend, Iran reached out to the movement. In 2006, al-Sadr left Iraq and settled in Qom to "complete his religious studies". When his movement split, Iran is believed to have embraced the new radical offshoot (the Gangs of the Righteous), which is now a secret organization, but still powerful.

Overall, Iran has established relationships with most Iraqi political parties who now listen to it and take its views on board. On the other hand, Iraqi parties and factions have observed that the Americans do not always support their allies, and when they do, they are not as strong and committed as the Iranians. Gradually, most Iraqi factions have begun to believe that the Iranians, not the Americans, are pulling the strings in Iraq. Therefore, it's essential to cooperate with them, rather than with the Americans who have proven themselves to be short-sighted, isolated from political realities, and hastening to leave.

Nevertheless, both the Americans and Iranians are still working hard to enhance their presence in Iraq. After last year's elections, neither the US nor Iran was able to impose its candidate for prime minister, so they settled for Nouri al-Maliki, who is a friend of both, and a coalition government with the participation of nearly every party.

The Americans are trying to supply the Iraqi military with American weapons, which means Iraq will be tied to American military aid and technical assistance indefinitely. They are also trying to establish economic and cultural links with the country. There are now thousands of Iraqi students, judges, academics, journalists, politicians and other professionals who are either studying, visiting, working or have completely moved to live in the US. Thousands of ordinary Iraqis also visit the US every year, some on various programs paid for by American institutions. These links will certainly produce results, but only in the long run.

As things stand, however, the Iranians are cementing their relationships with the Iraqi state and political parties. Many Iranian goods are flooding Iraqi markets. Iran is also supplying Iraq with electricity and oil products. Millions of Iranian pilgrims pour into Iraq every year, providing the country with alternative sources of income to oil. Iran has also become a destination for millions of Iraqi tourists, pilgrims, or those seeking medical treatment. There are still about a million Iraqis in Iran. In sum, the Iranians are winning in Iraq while the Americans are retreating.

But this is not written in stone. It can still change if the burgeoning secular movement in Iraq organizes itself better. Many Iraqis, both Sunni and Shiite, are wary of Iranian influence and do not wish to see their country tied to Iran. They would rather see close relations with the West and the Arab world. But these tendencies are too weak to counter the powerful, and growing, Iranian influence in the country.-Published 4/8/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Hamid Alkifaey is a writer and journalist. He was the first government spokesman of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq and founder-leader of the Movement for Democratic Society. Currently, he is researching democratization at the University of Exeter in the UK.

The geopolitics of the Middle East has changed drastically over the past ten years, and remains unsettled. Soon after the occupation of Iraq in 2003 and the complete destruction of its military capability, the strategic power balance in the region roughly manifested itself in two competing alignments: the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia on one front, and Iran and Syria on the other. Several processes are now reshaping this balance of power.

The first process is the continuing evolution of the political and security situation in Iraq and the reduction of US forces, with their presence likely to end by the close of this year. The second process is Turkey's rapid rise; it has successfully positioned itself as a third competitor in the region. And the third process is the so-called "Arab spring": the uprisings in the Arab states that have created both challenges and opportunities for all sides and, more importantly, have demonstrated the Arab street's relevance and its capacity to play a decisive role in the region's future

The US-Israeli-Saudi alliance maintains sufficient military and economic power, yet for various reasons its influence in the region is declining. Iran and Turkey are taking advantage of this situation and stepping in to fill the vacuum, using their soft power. In Iraq--a key locus of the strategic competition between the United States, Iran, and Turkey--the picture is even sharper.

Saudi Arabia with its narrow sectarian and political structure cannot cope with a Shiite-led government in Iraq, and has thus practically resigned from the competition. The Saudis may be the strongest ally of the US, but other Arab allies have also avoided actively engaging Iraq for similar reasons. Iran and Turkey, on the other hand, have actively engaged, filling the gaps that the US cannot--and its allies are not willing--to fill.

The Saudis still do not have an embassy in Baghdad, while since the fall of Saddam the Iranian and Turkish ambassadors have been very active in reaching out to Iraqi political and social figures and facilitating mutual visits for politicians, businessmen, and common people. It takes one month (and probably a bribe) for an Iraqi to get a visa to Syria or Jordan, while he can get his visa to Iran in a couple of days, and to Turkey in 15 minutes at Istanbul airport. Turkish trade with Iraq is approaching ten billion dollars, while Iranian trade is growing to five billion dollars, thereby exceeding by far the amount of Iraqi trade with all Arab states.

In addition to trade and economic investment, Tehran's political investment is paying off in Iraq: Iran already had very good relations with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and Dawa (now major Shiite political parties) when they operated in exile during Saddam Hussein's time. Iran has also succeeded in establishing strong relationships with the Sadrists, who are known for their anti-occupation stance and their Jaysh al-Mahdi militia. In fact, many leaders of JAM who are wanted for violent crimes now reside in Iran.

Iran also has many friends within Iraq's Kurdish political parties, and is working hard to establish friendships with Sunni political figures. Thus, Iran's political influence in Iraq is sound. But Iran does not suffice with economic and political influence alone. It patronizes Shiite militant groups (Assaib Ahl Alhak, Kataib Hizbullah, and Promised Day Brigade) whose declared objective is to expel the Americans by force. Iran uses these groups to make life difficult for the Americans, to pressure the US in retaliation for its anti-Iran policies elsewhere in the region, and to send a message to Iraqis that Iran can disrupt their security if it chooses to.

The US, for its part, has exploited its status as an occupying power and as Iraq's main source of aid to shape Iraq's political structure, governance, economy, and security. That's why Washington is trying to reach a deal to maintain a meaningful military presence in Iraq. While Iraq does benefit from this presence to complete the development of its own armed forces, the political cost could be high.

It is said that when elephants fight, it is only the grass that suffers. Iraq does not want its land to be a battleground between the US and Iran. Nor does Iraq want to be at war with its big neighbor to the east on behalf of others. Iraq also realizes that a cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia will inevitably manifest itself as Shiite-Sunni tension, with a divisive effect on Iraqi politics and society.

Many Iraqis believe that the best foreign policy for Iraq is to have no enemies, resolve its problems with its neighbors peacefully, and maintain strategic relations with both the US and Iran. This is not easy when those two countries are in a state of confrontation. It would be best for Iraq's interests that the US and Iran realign their relations. Of course, this would require a strategic shift on the part of both countries--a serious challenge given the history of their relations and the anticipated pushback by Israel, the Saudis, and American and Iranian hardliners. But a stalemate, the ongoing rise of Turkey, and changes brought by the Arab spring could cause decisionmakers in both countries to reconsider.-Published 4/8/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Safa A. Hussein is a former deputy member of the dissolved Iraqi Governing Council. He served as a brigadier general in the Iraqi Air Force. Currently he serves in the Iraqi National Security Council.

In a reasonable world, the United States and Iran would long ago have discovered that, as the wise walrus said, "The time has come . . . to talk of many things." Among those many things is Iraq, where both sides' common interests far outnumber their differences. Although both Tehran and Washington recognize the obvious, they have so far been unable to take the next step. The unanswerable question remains: "Even if we (reluctantly) admit that common interests exist, what do we do about them?"

Although experts often refer to Iranian policy as "opaque" and inconsistent, Tehran's aims in Iraq are not secret:

• To prevent the emergence of a new Saddam Hussein, who might be tempted to break the stalemate that ended the long Iran-Iraq war.
• To stop activity of violent, extremist Sunni groups on Iraqi territory.
• To prevent the break-up of Iraq and the emergence of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan on Iran's borders.
• To prevent Iraq from descending into civil war that would threaten Iraqi Shiite and Iranian pilgrims' access to the country's holy sites.
• To prevent Iraq from supporting separatist movements among Iran's ethnic Arabs and Kurds.
• To ensure that no foreign country (i.e., the US) uses Iraqi territory as a base to attack Iran.
• To remove the Mojahedin e-Khalq from its Iraqi base.