• What makes for an effective mediator: The case of James Wolfensohn  - Nizar Farsakh
His job was to get the parties to cooperate in the withdrawal process.

• Mediators matter, and good mediators can broker agreements  - Daniel Kurtzer
The US has experimented with a variety of mediation models since the early 1970s.

• Time for a different conversation  - Douglas E. Noll
Mediation does not fit into the news cycle, which is why most politicians should stay out of the arena.

• What do we do with our accumulated experience?  - Ron Pundak
The Norwegians succeeded in 1993 because they saw the mediation task as one of facilitation.

What makes for an effective mediator: The case of James Wolfensohn
 Nizar Farsakh

In 2005, the Quartet appointed James Wolfensohn, former head of the World Bank, as special envoy for the Gaza disengagement. His job was to get the parties to cooperate in the withdrawal process, as well as to revive the Palestinian economy post-withdrawal by harnessing the Quartet's resources, both financial and political. In my opinion, his case is illustrative of the conditions for effective mediation and their demise.

The Israeli government's decision to withdraw from the Gaza Strip presented the players in the region with a challenge. If managed well, it could jump start the stalled (if not dead) peace process. The example of Israel actually dismantling settlements and rolling back the occupation coupled with improved mobility and economic conditions for Palestinians would dispel many perceptions of the immutability of certain key facts about the conflict. Conversely, if the withdrawal was mismanaged, it would consolidate the rhetoric of despair and disillusionment over the revival of peace talks, let alone achieving peace. Therefore, there was a rare alignment of interests where all the parties--the Palestinians, Israelis, and international community--had an interest in an improved situation in Gaza or ensuring stability at the very least. This put Wolfensohn in a good place. People wanted him to succeed in facilitating an agreement and he used that to his advantage.

He had open channels with all the parties and had their respect and confidence in his integrity. He went about managing the process as a project with set targets, timelines, roles and responsibilities divided among the different stakeholders. More importantly, he diligently held people accountable to their part of the work. Every meeting would start with each party reporting on where they were in implementing what they had committed to in the previous meeting and would end with what was expected of each party by the next meeting. When there were sticking points, Wolfensohn would disaggregate the technical from the political, try to resolve whatever he could of those issues in that meeting and take what's left to the appropriate channels. If the problem was technical, he would look for experts and/or resources that could fix it by tapping into the reservoirs of the Quartet members or even his own networks in the World Bank and elsewhere. The fact that he had the full backing of the Quartet members meant that he could get them to weigh in when the parties were stuck on a political issue.

This factor, I believe, was critical in making the Agreement on Movement and Access in November 2005 possible. His positions and demands carried the necessary political weight to get all players paying attention and seriously considering the consequences of failing to follow through on their commitments. For the Israeli government, however, its main focus was carrying out the withdrawal as smoothly as possible. Therefore, once this was done in September, Israel's incentives changed, which in turn changed the environment Wolfensohn operated in. The American secretary of state took over the mediation and it was she, not Wolfensohn, who finalized the AMA while he was sidelined. From that point on, interests diverged and the consensus around getting an agreement morphed into a debate on the extent to which it was important, if at all, to pursue its implementation.

While many were critical of the Agreement on Movement and Access, it still was, on paper at least, far better than the original plan the Israeli government had drafted for the withdrawal and its aftermath. For example, the original plan drafted by the Israeli government was to close the Rafah crossing completely and channel the movement of all goods and people through the Israeli Kerem Shalom military base. The agreement reduced that to only letting imports go through Kerem Shalom and for one year only. Wolfensohn was able to get to that point because he was well-respected, transparent, unbiased, and relentless in following up all sticking issues. More importantly, he had effective political backing by the critical players that empowered him to bring that weight to bear in the negotiating room. Once that was withdrawn, all his laudable qualities as a mediator could not make up for the lack of political will by the relevant actors.-Published 7/7/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Nizar Farsakh was a policy advisor on border issues for the Palestinian Negotiations Support Unit from 2003 to 2008 and was intimately involved in the talks leading to the Agreement on Movement and Access and later attempts at its implementation.

Mediators matter, especially in the Arab-Israel conflict, where all parties have looked to the United States to play the role of third party helper. During the more than 30 years of active American mediation, the parties have sometimes defined what they wanted the US to do or to avoid doing, but they have not defined clearly the structure or functioning of the mediator's role. It is time to consider these issues, at least because successful American mediation has helped broker agreements in the past, and unsuccessful American mediation efforts have contributed to the failure of peace talks during the past 20 years.

The United States has experimented with a variety of mediation models since the early 1970s. After the 1973 war, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger expended enormous time and effort in shuttle diplomacy, resulting in three disengagement agreements involving Israel, Egypt and Syria. The Egyptian-Israeli agreements laid the foundation for the 1979 peace treaty, and the Syrian-Israeli agreement has proved remarkably durable for more than three decades. Kissinger, as mediator, displayed remarkable negotiation prowess and staying power, but he also benefited from a strong supporting staff and from the intimate relationship he had with President Richard Nixon.

President Jimmy Carter was, in many ways, his own negotiator, playing a hands-on role during the protracted Camp David negotiations in 1978 and the peace treaty endgame in 1979. Carter, too, had a very strong team, and he empowered them to do the necessary pre-negotiations work that helped prepare for Camp David. It cannot be forgotten that the parties went to Camp David having already discussed a detailed US draft at Leeds Castle.

A third American success was registered during the administration of President George H.W. Bush, when Secretary of State James A. Baker III acted as the primary American mediator in constructing the terms of reference and agreed structure of the Madrid peace conference. Baker shuttled to the Middle East eight times, assisted by a small group of trusted aides and supported by US ambassadors in the field. Throughout, he enjoyed the trust and confidence of the president.

While each of these successful mediations was different, there were some key commonalities:

• Clear empowerment of the mediator, whether by the president or secretary of state. In none of these cases did inter-agency squabbling or backbiting inhibit the American diplomatic effort.
  
• Persistence and determination. None of these cases was a guaranteed success, and each presented formidable obstacles--substantive and political--for the parties. Yet the American mediators did not take "no" for an answer, but rather persisted and showed backbone.
  
• Strong sense of strategy and tactics, including flexibility. In all cases, American strategy was clear and tactics made sense, but also changed as a result of circumstances. Objectives remained, even as tactical flexibility was evident.
  
• Ability to weather crises. In each case, there was a US-Israel crisis of one kind or another. The 1975 Sinai II accord was held up by severe disagreement, leading to an American "reassessment" that included delayed delivery of needed aircraft. The peace treaty talks in 1978-79 were marked by sharp differences over settlements. And the Madrid process almost faltered over a blow-up in bilateral ties relating to loan guarantees and settlements. Yet, the American mediators, working with willing Israeli leaders, overcame these crises and achieved the desired objective.
  
• Strong negotiating skills. Kissinger, Carter and Baker were all exemplary negotiators and, in many respects, consummate actors. They all knew how to negotiate and how to interact with the diverse leaders across the table. Not all strategies and tactics worked, but these mediators proved to be adept and adaptable, always keeping their eye on the objective.
  
• Strong, diverse and professional staffs. The roster of senior aides and ambassadors who assisted the US mediators reads like a "Who's Who" of American diplomacy. Although the three mediators were outsized personalities in their own right, they were wise enough to surround themselves with knowledgeable aides and to rely heavily on the ambassadors in the field.

The recent Middle East events in Washington, starting with the resignation of George Mitchell as President Barack Obama's special envoy to the Middle East and ending with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's address to the US Congress, have created a moment in which a different conversation about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict might be useful.

All intense conflicts have universal characteristics. The parties deeply mistrust each other. The parties feel animosity and hatred for each other. They believe that the differences between them are irreconcilable. They believe that their own positions are non-negotiable. They fear peace talks because settlement may require unacceptable compromises. They fear loss of their lives (assassination), prosecution for war crimes or human rights abuses, loss of power, loss of status and prestige, loss of political support, loss of security, loss of resources (land, water), and loss of identity. The parties share a history of abuse and violence that create opposing narratives as to cause and effect. Finally, the parties believe that coercive power is the only way ultimately to win the conflict.

There has not been an intense conflict between two people, two nations, or two groups that have not had most, if not all, of these characteristics defining them. They are present in the schoolyard sandbox as well as in prolonged regional conflicts.

These characteristics can be found in any of the conflicts in the news of 2011. Certainly, they are present in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. They are present in the Libyan crisis, the Ivory Coast presidential crisis, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Yemen, Madagascar, and just about everywhere else where conflict exists. What is interesting is how surprised and stunned people seem to be at these normal, predictable characteristics of conflict. To professional mediators, however, this is the standard operating environment. After all, if these characteristics did not exist, our services would not be needed.

These characteristics are not easily amenable to political solutions. Land for peace doesn't work when hatred, fear, and anger dominate a crisis. Conflict generates emotions, biases, and beliefs that badly distort rational decision-making. We should not be surprised that the simplistic distributive bargaining models that are the basis of international diplomacy fail to work in these difficult conflicts. Yet the international community persists in using an outdated, flawed process to resolve them. The failure rates are astronomical. For example, the United Nations has a failure rate of 91 percent in peace mediations. The regional organizations are not much better.

Such is the case with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Netanyahu's government persists in building settlements, knowing full well the effect on the Palestinians. Hamas continues its campaign of violence, knowing full well that terrorism further entrenches the hard core Zionist elements of Israeli society. Neither side wishes to compromise for fear of sacrificing sacred values, meaning, and identity for the "expediency" of peace. The United States has tried to mediate by getting one side to give up something in exchange for receiving something back. It hasn't worked so far and probably will not work in the future. Perhaps another approach is needed.

If mediation is to be tried again, maybe empowering the parties to help design the process might be useful. Instead of tackling the substantive issues head on, why not focus on other important, but less emotional decisions? For example, in a general conversation about where the peace process should go, a trusted person might ask each side (in separate conversations), "What are the most important qualities you seek in a mediator?" Just knowing what the parties value in a mediator would be important information.

That conversation could continue by asking the question, "Who would be the very best mediator for both sides?" Who would Netanyahu say is the very best mediator for both sides? What would Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas say? What would Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal say?

Maybe they would repudiate mediation as a process. That would lead to a conversation exploring what kind of process would be best to find peace, if not mediation. Do the parties really think that unlimited and unending violence will result in durable peace? Why? What are their unstated assumptions underlying those beliefs? The key is to ask questions, be quiet, and listen deeply. Persistence and patience are required when the parties inevitably revert to their conflict characteristics. What is learned could be hugely valuable.

If the leaders could accept mediation as a potential process, the trusted person could ask, "What do you require to achieve fairness, efficiency, satisfaction, and durability in the peace process?" Forget about outcomes for the moment. Just focus on what the parties believe would be an effective process for them.

"Who needs to attend? Can the process succeed if parties are missing?" The US and Israel do not want to legitimize terrorism so they refuse to deal with Hamas unless Hamas renounces violence. Is a peace process possible without Hamas? Is terror really being legitimized by talking with Hamas? Again, a trusted person might be able to uncover unstated assumptions on both sides.

This work is delicate, time-consuming, fraught with political perils, and exhausting. It's what professional mediators are trained to do. It does not fit into the news cycle or the political election cycle, which is why most politicians should stay out of the arena. Finally, it takes enormous personal courage to initiate and maintain these conversations. I wonder if the Nobel Peace Prize confers that kind of courage to its recipients?-Published 7/7/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Douglas E. Noll is a professional mediator and the author of "Elusive Peace: How Modern Diplomatic Strategies Could Better Resolve World Conflicts" (Prometheus, 2011).

When I think back and analyze the Oslo negotiations with regard to the task of the mediator, I recall three episodes that best describe the mission the Norwegians took upon themselves.

The first took place on the first day of our meetings. Following an official event that provided cover for the Israelis and Palestinians to come to Oslo, the Norwegians left us in the room and our host Terje Roed-Larsen said, "We'll return only if you summon us or if we hear you quarreling . . ."

The second episode happened at a farm far from the capital, where we held a prolonged discussion that went on without a break from morning into the night and the following morning. Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Jan Egeland, a man of both great abilities and broad knowledge of the Middle East, sat throughout these long hours outside the meeting room and at one point appointed himself to pour coffee and serve sandwiches. His understanding of his task was clear: make sure the negotiations proceed successfully and be available right next door as a diplomat or statesman if needed.

The third episode took place in Sweden; this was the moment when the two sides actually reached final agreement on the Oslo document. Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst arrived at the residence where Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres was staying while coincidentally on an official visit to Sweden. Holst proceeded to mediate by phone a conversation that linked Peres--who was also consulting in real time with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin--with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in Tunis. It was this conversation that produced agreement regarding the few issues that had been left open by the negotiators in Oslo.

The Norwegians succeeded in 1993 because they saw the mediation task they took upon themselves as one of facilitation. They identified the strengths and weaknesses of their position, understood they had no real leverage over the negotiating parties, and did their job as successfully as one could imagine.

Yet mediation as a concept in the Middle East peace process can also find expression in different ways than those adopted by the Norwegians. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the mediation approach adopted by two American presidents, Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton in Camp David. Carter was involved in the course of negotiations to the extent of helping draft documents and creating the environment that enabled the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. There is also the model of the negotiator who generates diplomatic plans and proposals for agreement. Here we recall the Swede Gunnar Jaring and the "traveling mediator" Henry Kissinger who produced the Israel-Egypt and Israel-Syria disengagement agreements after the 1973 war.

These and other models that were evoked in the past remain optional. The preferable model must be adapted to the emerging dynamic reality. The real question that should concern us is, what do we do in the present context with all this accumulated experience? A quick analysis of the situation leads to the conclusion that the Norwegian model won't work this time.

Back in 1993, there were two actors that both desired an interim agreement and had decided the time was ripe to risk leading their respective publics in that direction. Today, in contrast, the Israeli side is making every effort to avoid a permanent status agreement, primarily because of the territorial ramifications of a deal based on the 1967 boundaries, including Jerusalem, and the resultant need to remove many settlements. The Palestinian side is prepared to move forward and its leadership is courageous enough to do it, but the rivalry with Hamas, the West Bank-Gaza split and the increasingly extreme positions adopted in the refugee camps beyond the territories, render it difficult for the Palestinians to display the additional flexibility required of them as well in the negotiations.

The conclusion is that, this time around, the mediator's task is doubled. In the first, immediate phase, the mediator must present a peace plan for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The plan has to be drawn up and delivered by a significant international actor. The three candidates are the president of the United States, the United Nations Security Council and the Quartet.

Unlike the Quartet's roadmap of 2003, the proposal in question must deal only with the principled parameters of a final status agreement. This means a brief document that presents concepts for borders, territorial swaps, the partition of Jerusalem, issues of demilitarization and security, and a solution for the refugees. These will constitute the first foundation for negotiating final status. No more preconditions on the part of any party and no more possibility of entering negotiations with the objective of managing the conflict at the expense of ending the conflict.

In the event the two sides do enter into serious negotiations based on these principles--which looks unlikely with the present Israeli government--there will come a moment when the American president will have to join the fray as an active mediator and invite the sides to a summit dedicated to concluding negotiations. At the end of the day, without American presidential involvement that is at one and the same time enticing, threatening and decisive, there is no chance of reaching an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.-Published 7/7/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Ron Pundak is chairman of the Palestinian-Israeli Peace NGO Forum.