• Out of Arabia  - Issandr El Amrani
President Obama's latest speech on the Middle East generated a shrug from the region.

• The voice is Obama's; the hands are Bush's  - Joel Beinin
Obama's support for democracy in the Arab world sounded like Bush-era rhetoric.

• Much ado about very little  - Chuck Freilich
The US will support reform where it serves its interests and as long as the price is minimal.

• Obama's emerging philosophy of self-determination  - Daniel Kurtzer
Obama articulated a kind of political "liberation theology" that he says will guide US policy.

Out of Arabia
 Issandr El Amrani

Seen from the Middle East, the American debate on US foreign policy in the region is frequently tiresome, even if it can often have radical consequences on the lives of millions. President Barack Obama's latest speech on the Middle East on May 19 generated a shrug from the region that is neither looking to Washington for leadership nor particularly convinced this American president has much to offer. Most of all, the public does not see the radical break in American foreign policy that could match the rupture of the recent Arab uprisings.

The US foreign policy establishment not only failed (as did most analysts) to predict the "Arab spring" of 2011, but also continues to struggle to devise an appropriate response to it. This was evident not only in the halting (and at times contradictory) reaction of the Obama administration to developments in Egypt and elsewhere, but also in the admission of uneven standards across the region that the president acknowledged in his speech, tergiversating between a focus on ideals and a commitment to exiting allies. Hence the standard for Egypt does not hold in Bahrain, what made intervention necessary in Libya does not apply to Syria, and so on, realpolitik oblige.

Most of all, consider the treatment meted out to America's two closest allies in the region--both of whom are also its most destructive forces. Israel gets 29 mentions (the most of any country) and repeated pledges of undying loyalty. Saudi Arabia is not mentioned at all, the elephant in the room as its troops crush the uprising in Bahrain. That these two countries, which benefited most from the old Middle Eastern order, now more than ever have a convergence of interests is a common analysis in the region. The US, for now, appears to remain at their side.

"There will be times when our short-term interests don't align perfectly with our long-term vision for the region," Obama says understatedly, even as he sets out the moral principles that will guide US policy in the region. He speaks of the right of peoples to elect their own leaders, but speaks nothing of Palestinians punished in Gaza for having done just that (or their counterparts in the West Bank who continue to live under military occupation), or of the absolute monarchies led by Saudi Arabia that offer meaningless elections when they offer them at all.

It is easy to pick at these inconsistencies. But doing so distracts from a more important point: that Obama, like recent presidents, is unable to chart an end to America's imperial mission in the Middle East--to get "out of Arabia".

This is as important to the region's people as it is to Americans, who for the last decade in particular have been financing ruinous wars, subsidizing slow but steady ethnic cleansing in Palestine, and underwriting weapons sales to various regimes that line the pockets of arms manufacturers. The American taxpayer underwrites an archipelago of air and naval bases across the region, two naval fleets permanently deployed in the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf, some of the largest US embassies in the world (Baghdad having only recently beat Cairo to the top position), and countless other ways the US maintains its influence in the region.

It is difficult to place when the American imperium in the Middle East began: 1956 is the earliest date, signaling the defeat of the British empire over the Suez crisis, but 1967, 1973, 1980 or even the Gulf War of 1991 could be starting points. If we take the last of these dates, since it marks the beginning of uncontested American dominion over the region after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there have been 20 years of Middle Eastern Pax Americana. At some point between the quagmire of Iraq and the Arab spring, this empire began to unravel. What will emerge is a new Middle East, although certainly not that dreamed by neo-conservatives who cheered the invasion of Iraq in 2003 or Israel's war in Lebanon in 2006.

In his speech, Obama could have charted out a responsible end to this imperial posture--perhaps tinged with the multilateralism he has frequently embraced. Instead, he has offered more of the same. In doing so, he does a disservice to both the American people and Middle Easterners he claims to want to help.-Published 9/6/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Issandr El Amrani is a writer on Middle East affairs and editor of the Arabist.

US President Barack Obama's June 2009 speech in Cairo was widely received as a sincere expression of his desire for a "new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world." He acknowledged the historic injuries of colonialism, quoted the Quranic injunction to "speak always the truth," recognized the plight of the Palestinian refugees, allowed for the possibility of Hamas participating in realizing the aspirations of the Palestinian people, and clearly called for a halt to Israeli settlement, even as he reaffirmed the US cultural and historical ties and commitment to the security of Israel. Far less bombastically than his predecessor, Obama also proclaimed US support for freedom of speech, the rule of law, transparent government, and personal liberty as universal human rights.

Then came the failure to stand firm on his call for a West Bank settlement freeze, the failure to close Guantanamo, the inability to acknowledge that the war in Afghanistan is unwinnable, and proliferating hints that perhaps 20,000 US soldiers and an indefinite number of contractors will remain in Iraq past the December 2011 deadline set for their withdrawal.

In his May 2011 speech at the State Department, the president acknowledged the "extraordinary change" that has taken place in the Middle East. But having failed to fulfill most of the Middle East policy promises he made previously, his verbal support for democracy in the Arab world sounded like a more articulate version of Bush-era rhetoric. Departing from his Cairo pledge to speak the truth, Obama did not acknowledge that the balance sheet of his administration on the "Arab spring" is far less rosy than he claimed and not very different than what any post-Vietnam president would have done.

The president lauded Muhammad Bouazizi, the Tunisian fruit and vegetable vendor whose self-immolation ignited popular movements across the Arab world. In real time, he said virtually nothing about Tunisia until its despot and long-time US ally, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, departed on January 14.

On January 25, as the movement that led to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's demise officially began, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proclaimed that the Egyptian regime was "stable." Days later Vice-President Joe Biden opined that Mubarak was "not a dictator". Frank Wisner, Obama's personal envoy to Egypt during the crisis concluded that "Mubarak must stay in office." The White House disavowed Wisner's statement. But it did not acknowledge that Wisner is employed by Patton Boggs, a firm which has engaged in lobbying and litigation for the Mubarak regime. Change we can believe in, or business as usual in Washington?

Denouncing Muammar Gaddafi--a brutal lunatic brought into the western fold by President Bush II so that US oil companies could return to Libya--was relatively easy. Obama hesitated before committing US forces to the air campaign in Libya. It would not be very convincing to assert that the US seeks good relations with Muslim countries while openly conducting military operations in three of them (and semi-covertly in Yemen and Pakistan). Calling for the departure of Syria's Bashar Assad was likewise a relatively easy call, despite Israel's apprehensions that the enemy they know--and prefer to keep since Israel has rejected recent Syrian peace overtures--is better than the one they don't.

The Obama administration stood by, whether or not it approved, as Saudi soldiers and mercenaries crushed the democratic movement in Bahrain, the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet. There is no question that stability takes precedence over democracy there. Like every president before him, Obama has never uttered the words "democracy" and "Saudi Arabia" in the same sentence.

Obama has also failed to acknowledge the March 15 Palestinian youth movement, whose name comes from demonstrations held in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that day to demand unity between Fateh and Hamas. At American and Israeli behest, Egypt's former intelligence chief Omar Suleiman apparently acted to forestall Palestinian national reconciliation in negotiations he putatively mediated. A pact was made three months after Suleiman left the scene with his boss. President Obama has not explained why the Palestinian people deserve only as much democracy as Israel chooses to allow them.

Only some two months after protests against Yemeni dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh began did the Obama administration signal support for a negotiated end to his regime. Saleh's assistance in combating al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was considered too valuable to abandon him until he became an embarrassment. One young Yemeni complained to the New York Times, "We are really very, very angry because America until now didn't help us. . . . Obama says he appreciated the courage and dignity of Tunisian people. He didn't say that for Yemeni people."

Similar sentiments about American hypocrisy are once again coursing through the Arab world, especially in Palestine. President Obama has squandered the opportunity for any speech to change that now.-Published 9/6/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Joel Beinin is Donald J. McLachlan Professor of History at Stanford University. His most recent books are "Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa" (Stanford University Press, 2011) co-edited with Frederic Vairel; and "The Struggle for Worker Rights in Egypt" (Solidarity Center, 2010).

President Barack Obama's recent speech on the "Arab spring" was billed as a bold vision of American policy towards a Middle East undergoing revolutionary change, a first conceptually comprehensive statement of the US view of the dramatic events in the region. In the end, it was much ado about very little.

Denuded of the boilerplate rhetoric, the president's message was clear: the United States will continue to pursue the same policy it has adopted since the Arab spring began. Events in each country will be treated as discrete policy issues, not as part of a broad regional vision or normative commitment, and the US will support reform where it serves its interests and as long as the price--politically, economically and especially militarily--is minimal. No clarion call for democracy, no broad strategic vision, just reactive realpolitik, with best wishes.

The president did not even mention Saudi Arabia, let alone encourage reform of what is arguably the most heinous regime on earth. Not a word about Saudi military suppression of Bahrain. His support for reform in Iran did not even reach the level of half-hearted, once again missing the opportunity to take the high moral ground and promote regime change in the ultimate strategic prize in the region. He offered an uninspired aid package for Egypt and others.

On Iraq, whose semi-democracy was achieved at a heavy price in American blood, Obama's only operative statement was a reminder of the withdrawal of US troops, along with a vapid commitment to remain a "steadfast partner". Yemen's brutal dictator "needs" to step down.

On Libya and Syria, the inconsistencies in Obama's policy were starkest. While Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, who gave up his nukes, ceased terrorism and sought renewed international acceptance, has been "wimp-whacked" by NATO, Obama offered no new US prescriptions, merely the unsubstantiated conviction that time is working against Gaddafi. Syrian President Bashar Assad, who killed far more innocent civilians than Gaddafi prior to the NATO operation, pursued a secret nuclear capability, actively supports terrorists, raped Lebanon and is virulently anti-Israel, was given a mild dressing down, with meaningless sanctions.

Obama correctly noted that the US cannot prevent every injustice perpetrated by a regime and has learned from experience how costly and difficult regime change is. As a result, his "message is simple: If YOU [emphasis added] take the risks that reform entails, you will have the full support of the US." In other words, the reformists are on their own.

It is easy to criticize. A broad regional vision is extremely hard to devise. Each country does, indeed, present the US with different challenges, and the costs and benefits of change in each are widely disparate. The mistake may have been in attempting to present an overarching strategy to begin with.

For Israel, a democratizing Middle East portends medium-term instability and great danger, but also long-term hope. An unstable or new Syria could be more bellicose, but might seek to distance itself from Iran and Hizballah. Regime change in Iran would only be for the better. Egypt could take dire new directions, but renewed Egyptian regional leadership might prove beneficial.

The events of the Arab spring will continue to unfold whether or not the US chooses to lead and try to shape them. America's ability to do so is significant, if limited, whereas Israel's ability, other than to act negatively, is almost non-existent. As the Arab spring gives way to what increasingly looks like "autumn", the course of events may be mostly for the worse, certainly from an American and Israeli perspective.

Israel needs clear American leadership--something like, "yes, we are in for a very rough ride but will work together very closely in the hopes of minimizing the dangers and shaping a better Middle East future." Only then would it be justified in supporting a policy based on promoting change. When even the US, with its infinitely greater security margins, adopts a cautious approach, Israel can only hunker down. Specious attempts to link the Arab spring to the peace process only strengthen Israel's concerns.

Under Obama, justified pragmatism threatens to become an abdication of US leadership. Instead of a proactive approach to try to influence the most dramatic developments in the region in decades, the US will largely sit it out and let the chips fall where they may. A Middle East in which the US does not lead, especially a revolutionary one, is a dangerous Middle East--for the US, Israel and the region itself.

Already today, Saudi Arabia and Iran, the hearts of two dark, oppressive and radical Islamist visions of the Middle East and hardly desirable regional leaders, are acting to fill the vacuum, as is Turkey, no longer a force for regional moderation. The prospects for favorable change in Egypt, Syria, Iran, Libya, Yemen--the entire Middle East--are directly tied to the American role.-Published 9/6/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Chuck Freilich, a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, was a deputy national security advisor in Israel.

President Barack Obama's May 19, 2011 speech at the State Department--which evoked a highly negative reaction from Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu for what was said about the Middle East peace process--was actually designed to lay out American thinking regarding the so-called "Arab spring".

The president outlined traditional American interests in the region--counter-terrorism, stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, assuring the free flow of commerce, safeguarding Israel's security and advancing the cause of Middle East peace--and said these would continue to be pursued. He associated the United States more directly with the forces of change in the region, thereby answering those critics who had complained that the president had been sitting on the fence, unable to choose between the stability provided by authoritarian friends and the democratic possibilities offered by the new agents of change. And Obama expressed sharp opposition to the repression and corruption of most Middle Eastern regimes, especially Libya, Syria and Iran, which are stifling democracy through coercive force.

As important as these elements of the speech were, the fact is that Obama also articulated a radical definition of change, a kind of political "liberation theology" that he says will guide US policy. Expanding on traditional themes of freedom and democratization, Obama established a new metric for evaluating change: what he called "self-determination" of individuals, or the "chance to make your life what you will".

In more traditional definitions of self-determination, people are given the choice of government and governance under which they prefer to live. These definitions refer to the kind of states and governments that emerge from periods of change. In response to such acts of self-determination, other states make choices whether to confer or withhold recognition, provide assistance, and the like.

Obama's definition of self-determination expands the universe immeasurably, for it seems to refer to individual choice. The US will measure change not just according to the decisions of peoples with respect to their governance, but also with respect to the ability of individuals to achieve their own aspirations within their societies. While on the one hand Obama acknowledged with humility the limited role of the United States in encouraging or leading change in the Arab world, he extended on the other hand the potential purview of US policy responses deep into Arab societies. Far from content with supporting a certain outcome in the exercise of self-determination, it appears that Obama's America will judge acts of self-determination by the degree to which they achieve human dignity, universal rights and a vibrant civil society. The judgments to be made by US policymakers, therefore, will be far more intrusive and demanding than in any previous assessment of whether an act of self-determination by a nation has been undertaken in a free, fair and democratic manner.

The immediate consequences of Obama's dramatic policy shift are likely to be modest. Obama in fact called for "free and fair elections", "accountable and effective democratic institutions", and "responsible regional leadership"--the stuff by which states traditionally assess whether an act of self-determination merits support. Obama will be watching carefully as the democratic transitions in Egypt and Tunisia unfold; whether the monarchies start to open up domestic politics; and whether the repressive republics can be defeated by the forces of change. In this respect, Obama outlined rather conventional US incentives and responses: US economic and political support geared to the specific requirements of each country. He tinged the idealism of the democratic dream with the realism that recognizes that sometimes hard national interests of the US will trump even a freedom agenda.

The longer-term consequences of Obama's emerging philosophy of self-determination are far less clear. Take the following quite realistic scenario. A free, fair and democratic election in Egypt produces a coalition government in which the Muslim Brotherhood plays an important role. In formulating the policy guidelines of this coalition government, the Brotherhood demands initially modest restrictions on personal liberty, such as a dress code or some other behavioral requirement consistent with its interpretation of Islamic Sharia. This coalition government, charged also with amending the Egyptian constitution, convenes an assembly reflecting the popular vote that then seeks to incorporate such behavioral strictures into the very fabric of the new constitution. Where would these measures fit on the Obama scale of self-determination--as legitimate expressions of the majority will or as infringements of the individual's right of self-determination through acts of state power?

Expressing support for the Arab spring has been the easy part for the Obama administration. The hard part will be defining what this means under circumstances that challenge conventional American thinking.-Published 9/6/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Formerly US ambassador to Israel and Egypt, Daniel Kurtzer is the S. Daniel Abraham Professor in Middle Eastern Policy Studies at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.