• Young Turks and the Syrian spring  - Rime Allaf
The high-level diplomatic hand that Turkey extended to Syria had no effect.

• Syria and the zero conflict policy  - Murhaf Jouejati
Turkey stands to lose a lot should Syria falter.

• Economic losses, political gains?  - Sema Kalaycioglu
The more tension Turkey has with Israel, the more support the government finds in the Middle East.

• Turkish foreign policy
and the New Middle
East: alive and kicking  - Ziya Meral
Expect to see a new wave of bold moves from Turkey.

Young Turks and the Syrian spring
 Rime Allaf

Since the day Turkish leaders decided to turn their attention to the immediate neighborhood while Europe kept them waiting, Turkey's standing has gone from strength to strength in the Arab and Muslim worlds, even as it remains the only Israeli ally in the region and a member of NATO to boot. The more Turkey adopted regional causes, the more Washington and Tel Aviv worried.

It became clear that Turkey's new position would be problematic for the US even before the Anglo-American invasion and occupation of Iraq. Refusing to allow NATO allies the right to fly over its territory, Turkey made its opposition to the war very public, winning it accolades and gratitude from Arabs and Muslims alike, who suddenly were discovering a country and a people who had been practical aliens a few years before.

In particular, it was during this period that relations started warming with Syria. Going from the brink of war in October 1998 because of Syria's hosting of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, to the signing of the Adana Accords that same month, turning over a new page following Syria's agreement to expel Ocalan, to the arrival to power of the AKP in 2002 and the leadership of Recip Tayyip Erdogan in 2003, there was an exponential improvement in ties between the two countries. With high profile state visits and warm relations between the Turkish and Syrian leaders, Turkey became ever more visible and audible in the region, which lapped up all things Turkish, from holidays to television serials dubbed in a Damascene accent.

With a regionally popular leader taking increasingly populist positions, Turkey found itself at the political helm of a region reeling from the scars of a brutal Israeli war on Gaza in 2008-2009. The mood was somber and spirits down, but when Erdogan walked out of a panel in Davos after having confronted Israeli President Shimon Peres over his lies on the war, the Arab world erupted into a virtual cheer and crowned Erdogan its instant hero and honorary leader.

The following year, when Israel hijacked a Turkish flotilla in international waters on its way to break the siege of Gaza, killing nine Turkish citizens aboard the Mavi Marmara, Turkish flags flooded social networks and Arabs expressed solidarity with the Turks who had so boldly demonstrated solidarity with the Palestinian cause.

And while various Arab potentates watched with shock and awe the scenes emerging from Tunisia and Egypt in quick succession, Turkey's leadership dared to tell the dictators to snap out of self-denial and to simply go.

Indeed, the "Arab spring" was blowing its pleasant breeze of freedom while people in Turkey watched the revolutions and cheered from afar, beseeching their regional friends to attain liberation from outdated despotic regimes. All was relatively well with Turkey's foreign relations. Until 15 school children fooled around by scrawling anti-regime graffiti on a wall, got jailed and tortured in Daraa, far away from the Syrian-Turkish border. Then all hell broke loose.

The "zero problem" foreign policy (save for Israel) that has served Turkey so well was suddenly undone by one huge problem: a close Arab and Muslim ally had turned its fire on its own people, repressing peaceful protests with tanks and guns. Not only didn't the Turks like it, but they couldn't remain quiet about it.

It was clear to everyone but the Syrian regime, apparently, that the Turkish government would never be able to simply look the other way and pretend it hadn't noticed while remaining silent as the repression mounted and the killings intensified.

The high-level diplomatic hand that Turkey extended to Syria had no effect whatsoever on the level of repression. Consequently, the criticism emanating from various figures at the highest echelons of the Turkish government began to rise, and the diplomatic shuttling by senior intelligence and government officials to Damascus began to decrease in the face of stony silence from the Syrian regime and its complete disregard for the suggested urgent reform package that might have changed the course of the protests.

Having already inexplicably cut itself loose from major ally Qatar (thus losing the needed counter balance to Saudi Arabia and its allies), the Syrian regime was left with ever fewer allies, and none with the clout of Turkey. And while Qatar's hypocritical position regarding Bahrain's uprising was not at risk of being contested by the Qatari people, the Turkish government's accountability to its own people continues to trump many other factors.

None of this should have been surprising or unexpected to the Syrian regime. Its reactions to various Turkish statements, however, were surprisingly amateurish and counterproductive. After Prime Minister Erdogan's warning against another Hama massacre, the Syrian ambassador to Ankara claimed that this was political maneuvering from the government and pre-electoral pandering. Was he insinuating that the Turkish government's closeness with the Syrian regime existed despite Turks' dislike of it? And if the Turkish people had their way, would their government not pursue close ties with Syria?

This was not the expected response from a neighbor with whom visa requirements have been dropped and borders removed, and who had been a political and economic supporter for much of the past decade. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu had already pledged Turkey's support for the legitimate demands of the people of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain and Syria.

The Syrian regime's brutal response to the protests has pushed its allies to a new brink. Turkey's position should have been better managed and treasured in light of the cordial relations between the two countries' leaders, and the increasing ties between their business communities. As international pressure mounts on the Syrian regime, with sanctions imposed by both the US and the European Union, it remains to be seen whether and how damage control is possible after Turkey's general election on June 12, and after the cessation of all violence against peaceful protesters. For the time being, "young Turks" all over Syria are still the subject of Ankara's concerns.-Published 26/5/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Rime Allaf is an associate fellow at Chatham House in London.

The popular unrest in Syria and the Assad regime's bloody clampdown on pro-democracy protestors could lead to the unraveling of Turkey's "zero conflict" policy with its neighbors, as Syria is the linchpin of that policy.

After decades of animosity, Turkish-Syrian ties thawed in 1998, when Turkish threats of military action forced Syria to expel PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan from his safe haven in Damascus. Since then, Turkey has transformed the relationship from one of military confrontation to its closest economic partnership today. Bilateral trade has more than tripled, reaching $2.5 billion in 2010, and the two countries have introduced a visa-free travel regime for their citizens. In February, they began the construction of a joint dam at their frontier and announced projects to set up a joint bank, inaugurate a cross-border express rail route and link their natural gas networks. In northern Syria, Aleppo--Syria's second largest city--has been connected to Turkey's southeastern Gaziantep province through new border, rail, and road connections, leading to an economic boom, with Turkish tourists and trade pouring in.

Turkey stands to lose a lot should Syria falter. Syria represents a strategic land route to the rest of the Middle East and its markets. Should anything obstruct that route, Turkey's trade with Jordan and with Lebanon and access to oil in the Gulf would be compromised. Turkey also fears the potential influx of Syrian refugees, to say nothing of the challenge that Syria's PKK-friendly Kurds may pose. Over and above that, the greatest challenge Turkey faces is the damage to its international reputation and growing influence in the region.

In the current political environment, however, maintaining that close relationship with Damascus is proving difficult. When the "Arab awakening" that swept North Africa and much of the Arab Middle East early this year finally reached Syria in mid-March, President Bashar Assad's mix of conciliatory gestures and brutal crowd-control measures was barely tolerable for Ankara. Assad's later use of lethal force to crush the peaceful protest movement was not. Determined to snuff out by force what the Assad regime perceived as an existential threat, Syrian security forces--the fourth division and the presidential guard in particular--did not hesitate to use live ammunition against unarmed civilians, despite escalating international opprobrium. In Homs (Syria's third largest city) among others, security forces used tank fire against residential neighborhoods on more than one occasion. As of this writing, an estimated 1,100 civilians have been killed and over 10,000 arrested.

The Assad regime's brutality against its own people flies in the face of Turkish Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan's appeals to Assad to address the Syrian people's legitimate demands. Turkish delegations sent to Syria to advise on the reform process fared no better. When, earlier, the two countries formed stronger political and economic ties, good chemistry had developed between Erdogan and Assad. Now these close personal relations have given way to mutual recrimination: Erdogan says he is beginning to have doubts that Assad will keep his promises to enact serious government reforms; Assad is furious that Turkey has not been more supportive.

Publicly, the Syrian government blames Erdogan's 180 degree turn on his AK Party's campaign needs in the upcoming general elections. Erdogan's public warning to Syria against a repeat of "Hama" or "Halabja"--the Hama massacre of Muslim Brotherhood activists in 1982 and Saddam Hussein's 1988 massacre of Iraqi Kurds, respectively--was, according to Syrian television, but a domestic political ploy to secure additional Islamist and Kurdish votes. Privately, Assad is also furious that Turkey may actually be preparing for a post-Assad regime. Indeed, Turkey has hosted some of Syria's anti-government figures and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, which is banned in Syria. Another Syrian opposition conference is planned in Turkey in early June.

What this says about Turkey's "zero conflict" policy is that, although lofty in its goals, it has limited utility with authoritarian regimes when under fire. In light of this, the Turkish leadership is said to be optimistic about a new, open, democratic Syria, however messy that transition might be.-Published 26/5/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Murhaf Jouejati is professor of Middle East studies at the National Defense University's NESA Center for Strategic Studies. He also teaches at The George Washington University and is a scholar at the Middle East Institute.

The initial impact of the Arab uprising on Turkey is economic. From Libya alone, Turkey had to evacuate nearly 25,000 workers within two months. Considering the households that had been relying on the salaries and profits of those workers and their contractors, Turkey has to face an unexpected economic contraction for the short and medium terms.

Unless new overseas opportunities are found immediately, Turkey is also likely to experience further deterioration in its current account deficit because of this sharp reduction in workers' remittances and declining exports to countries in turmoil. The preferences of new establishments in Egypt and Tunisia to keep Turkey as a trade partner should not drastically change. However, there is certainly a growing need to replace the Libyan market with new options to avoid further export revenue loss for Turkey. The old political regimes in Libya and Egypt meant certainty and continuity for Turkish contractors, exporters and investors. So far, the interim situation has produced only uncertainty.

The Turkish economy is highly dependent on imported oil. Since the beginning of the Libya crisis in mid-February, Saudi Arabia has boosted production by about 600,000 barrels a day, and the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Iran and Kuwait have followed suit to compensate for the falloff in Libya. Nevertheless, oil prices have risen by about $20 a barrel. This is bound to generate an additional adverse effect on the Turkish economy's already high trade deficit.

The Arab revolt imposes an additional security cost on Turkey. Beyond participating in the NATO mission in Libya, Turkey has to take extra measures to guard its border with Syria against an influx of illegal immigrants and refugees and more importantly against infiltration of terrorists and suicide bombers. Additional tightening of land and naval border controls means cumbersome screening processes by customs and security services, with additional nominal and real costs for the country.

Turkey has displayed a clear preference towards the Middle East in recent years. By turning its back on the International Monetary Fund and proving itself an economic success on its own merits, Turkey has also attracted the appreciation and envy of its Arab neighbors. With its growing anti-Israel gestures, Turkey has found an increasingly favorable atmosphere in the Arab Middle East for its boisterous regional political assertions and economic muscle. However, even if political establishments of a more religious inclination replace the old secular ones in the Arab Middle East, it is not certain whether and for how long such a favorable climate for Turkey will persist.

In Yemen, Tunisia and Egypt, drastic changes that work against Turkey should not be expected. As long as the Assad administration stays in power, the continuity of good relations with Syria is likely to last as well. However, the situation is not clear for Libya; after all, Turkey has changed its diplomatic position regarding Libya four times since the beginning of turmoil there: from supporting Moammar Gaddafi to demanding ardently that he step down. If by any chance Gaddafi wins the struggle, it is not clear how Turkey might mend the loss of confidence. And if the opposition wins in Libya, Turkey may need a new confidence-building strategy despite its humanitarian support for rebel forces and its participation in the NATO campaign against the Gaddafi regime.

All hell has broken loose in the Arab Middle East. As a consequence of political turmoil, the peoples of Syria, Libya and Egypt are further impoverished. This may mean the continuation of social unrest in those countries for the foreseeable future unless foreign aid and assistance arrive. It is not easy to predict at the moment in what direction radical forces will take these societies and their politics. It is not at all implausible that the Arab revolt will trim Turkey's ambitions and chances of becoming a regional leader or power. Therefore it is wiser for Turkey to confine its role to economic rather than political power in the region. Turkey would do well to extend as much aid and assistance as possible to Middle East countries in need.

The lack of democratic practice in most of the Middle East and North Africa still prevents us from knowing how the Arab populations really perceive the role Turkey is to play in the region. Some studies, for example, indicate that countries of the region support and appreciate Turkey and the mediation role it volunteers to play in political disputes between regional countries and/or vis-a-vis the global community. However, in old and new Arab establishments alike, the street (like the masses in Turkey) puts a premium on the Turkish government's policy of condemning Israel. The more tension Turkey seems to have with Israel over issues relating to Palestine in general and Gaza in particular, the more support the Turkish government finds in the Middle East as well as at home.

Therefore, unless there is progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Turkey is likely to continue using its anti-Israel rhetoric in the hope of yielding domestic and regional political reward in the short and medium-run. Yet beyond appreciative responses, no tangible reward is certain. There is no guarantee that Turkey will even get sizable economic contracts from the new Arab regimes. More importantly, if there is no apparent Arab support on unresolved issues like Cyprus or Turkey's European Union membership, the political reward will be confined solely to gains in political prestige by Turkish leaders in the region.

If the ruling AKP wins the elections of June 12, 2011 with an overwhelming majority, it is likely to maintain the same foreign policy line no matter which faction gains power in Libya, Syria, Egypt or elsewhere. In order to maintain its political role in the Arab world, it will continue to institute good relations with new establishments and invest in the anti-Israel sentiments that are so popular with the Arab street. The Turkish government will not officially or unofficially admit disappointment with its attempts at mediating peace initiatives in the Middle East. Its anti-Israel rhetoric shows its determination to keep the Palestinian issue active on the Turkish foreign policy agenda. The government will continue to claim to be "the voice of the most oppressed" until either a two-state solution is reached or the AKP bows out of office--whichever comes first.-Published 26/5/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Sema Kalaycioglu is a professor of economics.

For some observers, the "Arab spring" burst the Turkish foreign policy bubble, exposing its true scope and lack of maturity. While Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan continued to captivate the Arab public across the region by publicly asking Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to resign, he seemed supportive of Syrian leader Bashar Assad and silent over serious human rights abuses unfolding in Syria and Bahrain.

On Libya, Erdogan went from categorically rejecting NATO involvement and condemning military action against his "Libyan brothers" to attempting to play a key role in the growing international tide against Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi, seeking ties with rebels and signaling the need for Gaddafi to leave the country. This caused disillusionment in the streets of the Middle East as Turkey's behavior resembled that of a colonial power, using discourses of human rights and democracy whenever it suited its national interests.

Those ready to declare the end of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's energetic vision also pointed out that his catch phrase "zero conflict" had not achieved any results in the standoff between Armenia and Turkey nor brought the Cyprus problem any closer to resolution. Full European Union membership still looks far away. Israeli-Turkish relations are at a historic low and a return to the level of cooperation of the 1990s seems almost impossible. No one remembers Turkish efforts to settle disputes between Syria, Israel, Hamas and Fateh.

Critics, on reflection, note that Davutoglu's engagement assumed the maintenance of the status quo and thus developed policies on a false assumption, guided by the seeming naivety of a daydreaming academic who finally had a chance to apply his grandiose ideas. Thus, the foreign minister was caught off guard when the Arab spring kicked in.

While all of these observations have a grain of truth, it is too early to declare the end of Turkey's place and influence in the region. True, the matrix of new Turkish foreign policy assumed the region would remain as it was, evolving only in slow motion. However, it was not just Turkey that was caught by surprise; no one foresaw what was coming, not even the Arab leaders themselves. As the events unfolded, all blocs and countries with a stake in the region seemed out of their depth, inconsistent and in a panic to protect their interests.

It is also true that Turkey has been hit hard by the complexities of a fast-changing region and of acting independently in an age of multi-polarity. As Turkish flags were burned in Libya and demonstrations by Cypriot Turks in Northern Cyprus damned Turkey and Erdogan, AKP chiefs were reminded that it is impossible to keep everyone happy. Decisions must be made and in our world, "win-win" remains a much talked about but rarely-seen mystery.

Nevertheless, FM Davutoglu remains the right man to steer Turkey through the complexities of a new era. His analytical depth and pragmatic creativity have shown themselves in how quickly and quietly Turkey turned around its policies towards Iraqi Kurdistan and how quickly the KRG and Turkey became good business partners despite memories of grievances and fears about each other. When PM Erdogan stepped into Shiite shrines in Iraq, he did what no other Sunni Muslim leader had been able to do so publicly. As the Sunni-Shiite fault line deepens between the Arab and Persian worlds, Turkey seems to be the only player who can work with both sides.

With all of the mishaps of the last few months, Turkish soft power in the region is still a point of envy for European and American policymakers, who have learned to let go of speculations that Turkey was turning its face from the West. As Turkey's performance in the region outshines that of the EU and the US, there is now a silent rush by these parties to strengthen relationships with Turkey.

While the developments of the last few months showed the limits of Turkish engagement in the region, they also demonstrated the pivotal place Turkey increasingly occupies in its much-troubled neighborhood. Expect to see a new wave of bold moves from Turkey after the upcoming national elections. -Published 26/5/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Ziya Meral is a London-based esearcher and author of the report "Prospects or Turkey".