Edition 14 Volume 9 - May 19, 2011
Has Arab revolution replaced militant Islam?
• After Bin Laden: has militant Islam failed? -
Mustafa Akyol
Now, a democratic space is being opened that can help Islamists become peaceful partners in democracy.
• "Resistance is our legitimate right" -
an interview with Salah Bardawil
Our project preceded Bin Laden's and is part of our legal right to end the occupation
• Far from extinguished -
Bernard Haykel
The predominance of Islamists in the new configurations of power is to be expected.
• In Egypt, the issue is the economy -
an interview with Hisham Kassem
The Brothers will get at most 20 percent of the vote.
After Bin Laden: has militant Islam failed?
Mustafa Akyol Among the dozens of tweets that I received from fellow Turks following the breaking news of Osama Bin Laden's death, one was a bit uncommon. While most others expressed relief when confronted with the demise of a man "who brought only trouble to the world", this particular message rather expressed sympathy for the slain al-Qaeda leader. "He will be remembered as a hero," it bluntly argued, "a hero who dared to challenge the world's mightiest imperialists."
Now, before moving on, here is a very simple hint: the term "imperialist" does not exist in the Quran. It is rather a very modern and a very political term. Besides, you don't have to be an Islamist--or even a Muslim--to see the world in an evil-imperialists-versus-heroic-insurgents dichotomy. You just have to be angry at the West for some reason.
That's why Bin Laden's radical message and terrorist acts found sympathy not only among some of the Muslim pious, but also some of the secular yet "anti-imperialist"-minded within the Muslim world. "Even young Arab girls in tight jeans", as American scholar Henry Munson reminds us, "praise Bin Laden as an anti-imperialist hero". And in Turkey, where I live, even a marginal secular leftwing publication like "Turk Solu", which takes not only Che Guevara but also Kemal Ataturk as its hero, can praise Bin Laden after his death.
Such signals should lead us to reconsider the emphasis on the religious nature of al-Qaeda--an emphasis that became almost common wisdom in the West in the aftermath of 9/11. Since then, we have all heard that Bin Laden promoted jihad, the Islamic call to holy war, or that he wanted a global caliphate, the Islamic notion of a rightful state. On a more popular level, it became famous that al-Qaeda's suicide bombers anticipated some 72 beautiful virgins in heaven as a reward for their sacrifice.
All these popular themes had an implicit message: "the problem" was Islam, or, at least, some particular teachings in Islam. In other words, al-Qaeda militants would have been normal, serene, peace-loving people had they not read the war verses in the Quran or not been inspired by the Prophet Mohammed's wars with the infidels. And since the trouble was in the Muslim texts, the solution would be a "reform" in those texts--a reform that "moderate Muslims" would hastily accomplish and others would monitor with concern.
However, a careful observation of Bin Laden's message reveals a different picture: the man was speaking about the context of today's Muslims first, before calling them to fight in the light of sacred texts. "Osama bin Laden's central theme is the suffering and humiliation of the Muslim nation (the umma) at the hands of non-Muslims," notes Thomas Hegghammer, a specialist in the study of violent Islamism. The United States' role in this "suffering and humiliation," real or perceived, was the main reason for the call for jihad--a call whose appeal would decline only when Muslims around the world felt more secure and more dignified.
That's why the "Arab spring," the series of popular uprisings against longtime dictators in the Middle East, is a significant antidote to al-Qaeda and similar groups that aspire to violent jihad. The alliance between the secular dictators in the Muslim world--such as the recently deposed ones in Tunisia and Egypt--and the West has been one of the main sources of Islamists' anti-westernism. Now, a democratic space is being opened up both in Tunisia and Egypt that can help the Islamists of those countries to become peaceful partners of the democratic game--a route hopefully similar to the one taken by the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey. Such transformations in the political context of Muslims--including a much-needed solution to the Arab-Israel conflict--are the steps that will decrease the sense of "suffering and humiliation" and thus render jihadism unappealing.
None of this means that there are no doctrinal problems in Islam. Quite the contrary, the self-righteous Salafis, who denounce every individual and every idea that deviate from their strict ways, are a source of fanaticism that threatens Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Even in mainstream Sunni and Shiite Islam there is a need to question and revise some of the misogynistic, brutal or oppressive elements within the Sharia. The bans on apostasy and blasphemy, which derive not from the Quran but from the political considerations of the early Muslim community, should be reinterpreted in the light of religious freedom. Muslims should even revise the idea of imposing piety on fellow believers, and consider what I call "the freedom to sin".
Yet the need for reform within Islam is one thing; tensions between the Islamic world and the West are another. Arguably, there is some connection between the two, but probably not in the way that is often suggested: that Islam needs a doctrinal reform first in order to be at peace with the West or Israel. On the contrary, peace with the West or Israel and the end of tyrannies within the Muslim world will create the medium in which more liberal interpretations of Islam are likely to flourish.-Published 19/5/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org
Mustafa Akyol is a journalist and author of "Islam without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty".
"Resistance is our legitimate right"
an interview with Salah BardawilBI: The US killing of Osama bin Laden provides an opportunity to look back at recent years. What are the lessons that Hamas learned in the period after September 11 until today? Specifically, what has Hamas learned about its program of resistance?
Bardawil: First of all, we have to distinguish between Hamas' project of resistance against the occupation and Bin Laden's project of global jihad. Our project preceded Bin Laden's [and is] part of our legal right to end the occupation and get our freedom.
Therefore, it's not fair to ask about the lessons Hamas learned from Bin Laden's assassination by the US. Israel assassinated Sheikh Yassin, Abu Shanab, Rantisi, Maqadma and a lot of Hamas leaders in Gaza and the West Bank. Does that mean that we should be frightened and stop our resistance and stop seeking to free ourselves and our land?
Hamas doesn't related to [people who are] Jewish, American, Christian or any other group through race or religion. Hamas' war is with those who are occupying our land and our resistance activities are limited to Palestine. Bin Laden's conflict with the West is ideological, while ours is political. There is no comparison or relationship between them. I don't think there are lessons for us to learn from his assassination.
BI: Many people have said that bin Laden was not so important any more as a leader for al-Qaeda and Islamists. Do you think this is true and why or why not?
Bardawil: The importance of Bin Laden comes from his opposition to the American project. America, when it practices its oppression and injustice against Muslim and Arab countries, increases Bin Laden's supporters. I don't mean ideological supporters, but I mean those who can meet over the idea of opposing the American project and its dominance over the region. America's support for Israel and the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan increase the numbers of those who unite under hatred for America.
BI: After a rocket killed an Israeli schoolboy earlier this year, Hamas said that it never targets civilians. This is different from how Hamas used to defend its suicide bombings in Israeli cities. Why the change? Are some forms of resistance more acceptable (morally) than others, or is it all about the current balance of power and pragmatism?
Bardawil: Neither war nor fighting are goals for Hamas. Hamas seeks freedom for the Palestinian people. We have participated in all peaceful resistance activities, but at the end of the day we were also obliged to defend our people through violent resistance.
Israel always uses force, even against peaceful resistance, killing a lot of Palestinians. The first Intifada was the best evidence of that. The Israelis used to kill Palestinian children for carrying the Palestinian flag.
Now things are developing. Hamas began to follow violent means for defending people. But Hamas still doesn't have F16 warplanes or tanks or smart rockets like Israel, which uses all of these weapons to kill innocent people. There was a time when Hamas used suicide bombings, then [it turned to] home-made rockets. But those rockets are not smart rockets like the ones Israel uses to kill civilians.
Regarding the bus incident: this bus was using a military road. When the Qassam Brigades fired at the bus (because no normal bus could use such a military road), it was Hamas' retaliation for the assassination of three of its fighters days before. Israel tried to distract the attention of the international community from its crime, convincing the world that [Hamas'] target was a children's bus to mislead them, all the while there was a ceasefire that had been broken by Israel.
BI: How should we understand the Hamas statements about bin Laden's death? Gaza Prime Minister Ismail Hanieh called him a "holy warrior", but Hamas prevented demonstrators from protesting his death in Gaza.
Bardawil: When the assassinator of Bin Laden antagonizes the Palestinian people and Arab nations, then they will consider the assassination of Bin Laden a brutal act just because the Americans did it. Palestinians and Arabs hate American policy--but of course, not the American people. Hanieh criticized the way America killed Ben Laden because Hamas has paid a high price from Israel, which also uses assassination without trial. We consider this a purely American-Israeli invention.
Hamas has nothing to do with Bin Laden's ideology. America was telling Israel, through its assassination, that "Your means are successful. Go ahead."
Then Moussa Abu Marzouk explained that what Hanieh said didn't represent Hamas' position on Bin Laden and his assassination.
BI: Looking at Tunis and Egypt and probably Yemen, one could argue that peaceful public demonstrations have done more to change the region than years of violent resistance by Hamas. What do you say to this?
Bardawil: We resist the occupation, while the Arab revolutions were against their regimes. Is Israel our regime to resist peacefully? Ask all the European nations how they achieved freedom from the occupation.
There is a big difference between revolution against regimes and resisting the occupation. Israel kills women and children who carry out peaceful resistance against the apartheid wall in the West Bank. There is no comparison. -Published 19/5/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org
Salah Bardawil is a leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and was elected to the Palestinian Legislative Council in 2006.
Far from extinguished
Bernard HaykelMany pundits have rushed to the conclusion that the death of Osama Bin Laden and the uprisings of the "Arab spring" spell the end of Islamism and the dawn of a new era of democratic politics in the Arab world. The Arab spring revolutions have certainly proved Bin Laden wrong on a number of fronts: regimes can be changed without resort to violence and terrorism; Arab citizens care more about individual freedom and rights than about the establishment of the Muslim Caliphate; and the demand for change does not necessarily involve hatred for America and Israel because of their alleged domination and humiliation of Muslims. Personal dignity and freedom from authoritarian brutality, better governance and greater economic opportunity are the demands of the people, not al-Qaeda's agenda. So Bin Laden's demise may spell the death of his ideology and perhaps, in time, that of his movement and its affiliates.
Political Islam or Islamism, a much broader current than al-Qaeda, is far from extinguished, however. Recent developments in Tunisia, Egypt, Gaza and Jordan show this clearly. The Muslim Brotherhood is playing an important role in Egyptian politics and (to the surprise of many) has helped broker an agreement between the feuding Palestinian factions of Fateh and Hamas. The predominance of Islamists in the new configurations of power is to be expected since its adherents, whether in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria or elsewhere, have paid the heaviest price in resisting Arab authoritarianism as measured by lives lost, imprisonment, torture and exile. And while the question still hangs as to whether the Muslim Brotherhood will adhere to democratic principles and practices, Salafis, another important and resurgent Islamist force, are making their influence felt and refuse all accommodation with democratic principles. The Salafis, who share theological beliefs with al-Qaeda, though not its political tactics or program, have been behind rising tensions with Christians, Sufis and secularists in Egypt, the police and state in Jordan, and even Hamas in Gaza.
Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi influence is difficult to gauge because, by and large, Salafis refuse to organize into a political party or to engage in formal electoral politics. They appear nonetheless to have a sizeable following throughout the Middle East as well as considerable ideological influence. In practical terms, the Salafis are akin to the Tea Party in the United States, in that they are doctrinarians committed to uncompromising principles about the necessary role of Islam in politics and society. And while not advocating violence, Salafi pressure and influence might prevent groups like the Muslim Brotherhood from adopting more tolerant political values and practices. Furthermore, Salafis are strongly anti-American, and like Bin Laden, posit the West as an eternal enemy of Islam and Muslims. In other words, they have a radicalizing effect on politics.
The influence of the Salafis is not confined to Egypt. In Gaza, for example, Salafi power has been on the rise for a number of years, much to Hamas's distress. When Ismail Hanieh, the Hamas leader in Gaza, recently condemned Bin Laden's killing and praised him as a martyr of Islam, he was probably playing to his support base that is being lured by the Salafis. In Jordan, too, the Salafis have become more influential among both the Palestinian and East Bank populations. Their recent riot in Zarqa is a manifestation of this.
The Salafis may also obtain an unexpected but significant boost because of a new geo-political development in Middle Eastern politics. Saudi Arabia has effectively declared a cold war on Iran after the fall of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and the February 14 uprising in Bahrain. Riyadh sees Iran as the great beneficiary of these events, as it was from the US invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. The kingdom now wishes to roll back this tide while bolstering its own political legitimacy. This is bound to involve a ramping up of anti-Shiite rhetoric and activities, and the Salafis are tailor-made clients for such an agenda. Saudi Arabia is already being depicted as leading the "counter-reform" forces, reversing the "Arab spring" momentum. This remains to be seen, but what is becoming clearer is that the influence of Islamists of various kinds as well as the ramping up of the Saudi-Iranian conflict are likely to keep democratic forces at bay for some time longer.-Published 19/5/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org
Bernard Haykel is professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University and director of the Transregional Institute for the Study of the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia.
In Egypt, the issue is the economy
an interview with Hisham KassemBI: We last interviewed you in mid-February of this year. Are you still as optimistic as you were then about the building of civil society in Egypt and a successful transfer of power to a democracy?
Kassem: As far as the military is concerned, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, I trust 100 percent that it is their intention to go back once there are elections. There was no other entity that could take over running the country after [President Hosni] Mubarak. They are professional soldiers who want to go back to their barracks.
BI: And the rest of Egyptian civil society and the way politics are developing?
Kassem: In many ways, we've been taken by surprise. One thing I find very disturbing is something that's almost like a political tidal wave. A lot of new faces have appeared on the scene with little political experience. The opposition has what I call "prolonged opposition trauma"--difficulty making the switch from the politics of opposition where you're always looking for something to oppose instead of initiating a political process. I'm talking about all the opposition, across the board.
We don't truly understand what's happening. I find very disturbing the personal demands of demonstrators who weren't part of the uprising. The poverty line is up to 40 percent. No one can meet all these demands, which are very selfish. So in the short term, the issue is the economy. This is what Egyptians need to focus on.
BI: In February, you stated that the "fear of Islamists [in Egypt] is completely unfounded". Do you still hold to this view?
Kassem: I still feel that way. The fear is unfounded, and based on three main factors. One is the Salafists, who are obnoxious and harassing women but won't participate in the process. They basically criticize the Muslim Brothers for wearing western suits instead of Afghani attire and are creating a social backlash against themselves. Second is the Brotherhood, which is split into five internal factions and is falsely credited with deciding the "yes" vote on the referendum; they didn't affect the vote, which was about stability. Their electoral influence has been seriously diluted by mass participation in voting. And third are a few thousand returning "Afghanis" and released prisoners who might get one or two people into parliament.
BI: But the Brotherhood is running for parliament and possibly the presidency.
Kassem: The Brothers will get at most 20 percent of the vote in the coming elections--probably closer to 10 percent.
BI: Was the elimination of Osama Bin Laden a milestone in terms of the institutionalization of Arab democracy as opposed to militant Islam?
Kassem: There was hardly any reaction in Egypt to the death of Bin Laden. Only 150 people demonstrated outside the United States embassy. Former followers of Bin Laden who are now returning to Egypt oppose fighting the system and favor entering politics, where they won't do well. Here in the cafes of Cairo, people watched football [the night the US operation was announced], not assassination footage.
BI: And in the Arab world outside of Egypt?
Kassem: Other than Egypt and Tunisia, the rest are still in the throes of revolution. Once their regimes collapse, [the Egyptian model] will be influential. Already on May 15, the foreign minister of the uprising [Nabil al-Araby] was chosen the new head of the Arab League. Ultimately, it's difficult to see the Brothers getting a majority of votes in any Arab country.-Published 19/5/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org
Hisham Kassem was founder and publisher of the Cairo Times and al-Masry al-Youm, and is former vice-president of the Ghad party. He is currently setting up a new media house.
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