• Democratic Arab world to embrace peace with Israel  - Hamid Alkifaey
Prosperity increases the public's stake in a stable economy, and this will make people want to compromise.

• Revolution and oppression in the Arab world  - Shlomo Avineri
For the West the agenda was about democracy; for Israel, it was peace.

• The Arab spring and Israel-Palestine  - Rami G. Khouri
Several consequences of the Arab spring are already visible in the Arab-Israel arena.

• Democracy-based Arab-Israel conflict?  - Abdel Monem Said Aly
Israel will only find the next opportunity for peace in the distant future, if at all.

Democratic Arab world to embrace peace with Israel
 Hamid Alkifaey

One could reasonably argue that the golden opportunity for peace in the Middle East was blown away when Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated on November 4, 1995. He was the only Israeli leader capable of making peace with the Palestinians, and was about to do so had it not been for the bullets of Yigal Amir, the rightwing religious zealot who believed in the "winner takes all" principle.

One could also claim that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its world-wide ramifications are responsible for agitating religious extremism in the Muslim world as a whole, and among Palestinians in particular. Prior to 1987, there was hardly any Islamic factor in Palestinian resistance. The Hamas and Islamic Jihad groups were established after the 1987 intifada. From this we deduce that extremism on the Israeli side led to the same on the Palestinian side, and consequently in other Muslim countries, which manifests in popular opposition to traditional and despotic regimes.

The Arab world is currently going through a social and political revolution that has so far claimed two "entrenched" regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. At least three other regimes in the region are fighting for their lives, and are not expected to survive. There will soon be different styles of government in Libya, Yemen and Syria. This much is certain.

Will there be a different policy towards Israel? Certainly. But this will take time to take shape, since there are more pressing national priorities, such as political and economic reforms. Israel has long branded the Arab world as tribal and undemocratic, in order to brand itself the only democracy in the Middle East. Well, soon enough it won't be. Many of its neighbors will soon join the democratic world as demands for democracy grow. Democracy will mean more development, prosperity and people's power. It means more popular participation in decision-making and awareness of the possibilities of the nation and what it can and cannot do. It may not mean more hostility towards Israel if the latter knows how to deal with it. But there will be tension if Israel continues to follow extreme policies, which it will under the current leadership of Binyamin Netanyahu.

The Palestinians must achieve their right to establish their own state on their land. This right has been recognized by almost everyone except a minority of extremists in Israel, led by Netanyahu. Free and democratic Arab countries won't shrink from supporting this Palestinian right under any circumstances. Muslims will not give up on East Jerusalem, either. Arab regimes have been weak in the past. Democracy will strengthen them, but also add reason to Arab governance. Most Arabs have accepted Israel's right to exist, and accepted United Nations resolutions 242 and 338, but Israeli intransigence is not helping them formulate a unified position.

Democratic Egypt won't be a threat to Israel as the Egyptian military, which will continue to be highly influential in Egypt's politics in the foreseeable future, will not risk another war with Israel. Egyptians under a democratic regime will be seeking better living standards, better laws to govern the country and more rights as citizens. They won't be pressing their government to fight Israel, on the contrary, they want a stable economy where things will be better for future generations. But Israel may aggravate the situation by electing extremists and following extreme policies. This will strengthen the hands of the hawks in the Arab world. Moderate Israel under reasonable and realistic leaders should have nothing to fear from Egypt, with which it has an enduring peace treaty.

The situation with Syria may not be exactly the same, however, especially when the two countries are still officially in a state of war. The regime of Bashar al-Assad, and his father before him, would have never started a war with Israel unilaterally. It also suited them not to have a peace treaty. Any new Syrian leader is not likely (for a considerable period of time) to initiate a move towards a peace agreement with Israel as this will weaken his position domestically. Nor will he launch a war, however, since such a war will not result in victory. A democratic regime in Syria, or any other Arab country for that matter, will need a good ten years to build democratic institutions and stabilize a modern market economy needed in any democracy. So, war won't be on the agenda for the foreseeable future.

Prosperity increases the public's stake in a stable economy, and this will make people want to compromise to make the country more prosperous and stable. However, everything will depend on how prepared the free world is to help new democracies in the Middle East survive and prosper. Small Islamic groups, organized and armed with religious zeal, could hijack power from the moderates; this would lead to a disaster for the whole region. Therefore, it is imperative for the free world, Israel included, not to leave matters to chance. A proactive stance is needed to nurture democracy and help moderate forces organize themselves in order to govern the region.-Published 5/5/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Hamid Alkifaey is a writer and journalist. He was the first government spokesman of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq and founder-leader of the Movement for Democratic Society. Currently, he is researching democratization at the University of Exeter in the UK.

When the first revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt occurred, the initial responses from Israel appeared distinct from those in the West. While European and American reactions were enthusiastic, a whiff of skepticism, if not concern, could be discerned in the responses of both politicians and commentators in Israel.

The reasons were not always understood. In the West, the emergence--for the first time in Arab history--of popular mass movements threatening and eventually toppling autocratic leaders was a welcome development. It finally put the Arab region on a par with developments that had engulfed most other regions of the world--Eastern Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia--in the 1990s. In Israel, the sudden overthrow of a leader who kept peace with Israel, sometimes under difficult conditions, for 30 years, appeared as threatening the strategic and moral achievement of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's momentous move of 1977 to reach out to the Jewish state.

In other words, for the West the agenda was about democracy; for Israel, it was peace. For Europeans and Americans, achieving democracy in a country like Egypt was a vindication of an ideological belief, embedded in lofty ideals, but with little consequence for the Europeans or Americans themselves. In Israel, the issue was inextricably bound up with the daily existence of its population.

With the spread of the revolutionary wave into more Arab countries, it was clear that the comfortable cohabitation of western democracies with Arab autocratic rulers--from traditional monarchies to military-led revolutionary republics--was about to come to an end. Yet nobody is able to give a satisfactory answer about the outcome. While some European anti-Muslim knee-jerk reactions were obviously exaggerated, a legitimate set of questions was raised. Western enthusiasm might now be accompanied by the kind of skepticism that characterized the initial Israeli response.

Developments in Egypt are, on the one hand, encouraging--but also pose serious questions. With public opinion focused on investigations and possible trials for former president Hosni Mubarak, his sons and some of his ministers, it appears that vindictiveness rather than democratic consolidation is at the top of the public discourse. Elections are promised for September, but it is still unclear who the effective contenders may be: the youthful Facebook generation, so central to mobilizing enormous crowds on Tahrir Square for demonstrations, is much less capable of the hard and grinding work of building up coherent political parties. With the National Democratic Party dismantled, this leaves the Muslim Brotherhood as the only major public force, and given its widespread networks--which already proved their effectiveness in the constitutional referendum--it is difficult to see how anyone can prevent it from becoming the hegemonic power in a future structure of Egyptian politics: its newly formed Freedom and Justice Party has a good chance of attaining such a position.

This does not mean that Egypt will go the way of Iran--the differences are obvious. But the lack of a coherent, secular and liberal counterweight gives cause for legitimate concern about Egypt's future relationship with Europe and the United States. Certainly the regional position of the United States has been weakened, regardless of what happens next in Egypt, as the emerging rapprochement of the ruling Military Council in Cairo with Iran has already indicated.

On the other hand, the ability of rulers in Bahrain, Yemen, Libya and Syria to withstand--until now--popular demonstrations suggests that the forces of democracy are still weak in many Arab countries, and the willingness of oppressive regimes to use ruthless power should not be underrated. Even NATO's intervention in Libya does not yet guarantee the end of Gaddafi's rule. After all, the only two regimes toppled until now--Bin Ali's and Mubarak's--were much less oppressive than the ones that now prove their willingness and ability to suppress their own people with little room for moral considerations. They may, unfortunately, succeed.

On a global level, it is surprising that it is European powers like France and Britain that seem to be much more willing to use force in this situation than the US. Beyond US President Barack Obama's reluctance to use force, one fails to see a clear American strategy of how to deal with the issues involved; even the killing of Osama Bin Laden may have unforeseen consequences. Nor will pious hopes for demonstrations spreading to Iran bring down the ayatollahs. The Islamic Republic is a truly revolutionary regime, which for all its authoritarian characteristics is deeply embedded in a social vision: it is not a personal autocracy.

Similarly, despite some surprising developments like the Fateh-Hamas rapprochement, it is still unclear how all this will impact issues like the Israeli-Palestinian peace process or internal developments in Lebanon. It is, however, clear that Egypt will develop a much more critical approach to Israel: while popular in Egypt, this approach will not enhance the peace process. The "Arab spring" is still navigating in uncharted waters, and many surprises--some encouraging and some disappointing--may still be in store.-Published 5/5/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Shlomo Avineri, professor of political science at the Hebrew University and former director-general of Israel's Foreign Ministry, is the author, among others, of "The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx".

The upheavals throughout parts of the Arab world caused by millions of people demonstrating for their citizenship rights can only impact positively on the Palestinian-Israeli and wider Arab-Israel conflicts, though short-term tensions are likely to escalate before longer-term benefits materialize. A more democratic Arab world can only be a plus for all in the region, primarily the Arab people themselves but also their neighbors, including Israelis. This is because governments that are truly representative of their people, and are held accountable through credible political processes, are likely to pursue more reasonable, rational and law-based policies that respond to both the will of their citizens and the dictates of international law.

The majority of Arab people clearly are fed up with and wish to throw into the dustbin of history the modern Arab security state and autocratic political order that have driven most Arab countries into a state of socio-economic distress, intellectual poverty, managerial incompetence, and political mediocrity, while allowing the Arab-Israel conflict to fester as a chronic source of humiliation, radicalization and destabilization. While the current uprisings are purely about domestic political issues, the nature of governance and the rights of citizens, more legitimate and democratic Arab governments will inevitably adjust their shoddy foreign policies towards the challenge that Israel poses.

In the short run, as we already witness in Egypt, Arab democracies will reflect the widespread popular desire to support the Palestinians politically and economically, without returning to a state of active war with Israel. Democratic Arabs will be more politically sensible and diplomatically astute actors, who are more likely to be able to strike the heretofore elusive balance between coming to terms with Israel while preserving Arab dignity and rights, and also responding to domestic Arab needs for balanced and equitable national development. Arab public opinion has made it clear in the last decade or so that it is prepared to live in peace with a Jewish-majority Israeli state within its pre-1967 borders, on condition that Israel also accepts a sovereign Palestinian state and a fair, negotiated resolution to the end of Palestinian refugeehood.

Several consequences of the "Arab spring" are already visible in the Arab-Israel arena. In line with public demonstrations in many other Arab countries, popular pressure has been exerted on the Fateh and Hamas movements within Palestine to reconcile, which has started to happen. This has occurred in part because of another consequence of the Arab spring--the new government in Egypt and the distracted government in Syria. The Cairo government, reflecting popular opinion, has adopted a more balanced position in mediating the Fateh-Hamas split, and has also signaled plans to open the border with Gaza and move towards normalization of relations with Iran (after allowing Iranian vessels to pass through the Suez Canal a few months ago).

With a new foreign policy in Egypt and the Syrian government preoccupied with its own domestic uprising, Fateh and Hamas have both had to adjust to the reality that two of their important Arab supporters no longer persist in their previous policies. The speedy reconciliation agreement is partly due to this reality. The reunified Palestinian government is likely to clarify a common national position on making war or peace with Israel, which can only augur well for all concerned because it means the Palestinians once again field a credible player in the peace-making dynamic. The Palestinians have previously made it clear that they are all prepared to accept a West Bank-Gaza-East Jerusalem state and a just resolution of the refugee issue as the basis for a comprehensive and permanent peace agreement with Israel. The unified Palestinian government makes it more likely that this position will be articulated with more credibility, even if Hamas as a party does not recognize Israel.

The ripples of the ongoing Arab spring will also go beyond the Hamas-Fateh reconciliation to trigger a gradual reconstitution and relegitimization of the institutions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). This is significant because it will allow Palestinians throughout the world to add their voice to the deliberations on Palestinian national policies towards Israel, making the PLO position a truly national and legitimate one once again--an indispensible element in any serious quest for lasting peace.

These are some of the most obvious ways in which the Arab spring dynamic has impacted the Arab-Israel conflict in the last four months, and we should expect other such developments in the months and years ahead. It remains to be seen if the more sensible and legitimate policies that emanate from Palestine and other Arab countries in the wake of the Arab spring's democratic wave will be reciprocated by a similar shift towards more constructive and realistic policies by Israel.-Published 5/5/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Rami G. Khouri is director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, and a book author and syndicated columnist.

Predictions and speculations are the nightmare of scholars and analysts alike. The case is doubly horrifying when events are in motion and nothing seems to stand still for a snapshot. The Middle East is currently going through such a dynamic and there is no indication that the situation will stabilize any time soon.

Revolutions in the region either have already toppled regimes while still defining what they want, or they are still in the process of struggle and bloody confrontation with a regime. Whether the revolution is over as in Tunisia and Egypt, underway as in Yemen, Syria or Libya, still budding as in Algeria, Morocco or Bahrain, or even yet to commence, as in Oman, Kuwait, the UAE and Saudi Arabia--uncertainty remains high. The only obvious conclusions are that the Arab Middle East will never be the same again. The regional environment has changed once and for all, and with it the regional balance and modes of state behavior.

The future of the state systems in the Middle East depends largely on the direction the revolutions take: Islamic or democratic. There may of course be variations: Islamic political parties and movements will have a considerable voice in a democratic country, while democratic practices cannot be avoided in a country powered by the Sharia.

Whatever the direction taken, the politics of the Middle East will be much more complicated than before. Not only will the actors increase in number and orientation and the media be even more extensive than its current wild character. But we shall also see changes in the definition of major issues like war, peace, development, intra-Arab relations, relations with neighboring countries like Turkey and Iran, and above all Arab-Israel interactions. Relationships with the rest of the world are bound to be different from those prevailing now, particularly with the West and especially with the United States.

The biggest loser will be Israel. In many ways Israel, which missed its greatest opportunity for peace in recent years, will only find the next opportunity in the much more distant future, if at all. What has been achieved in peace treaties will be respected. After all, the countries that signed them understand the price of war, and democracies are usually busy with internal affairs. But peace will be colder than ever before, indeed freezing. Conflict will take new and different shapes. Democracies, Islamic or not, are capable of innovating and improvising on how to make Israeli occupation costly and miserable.

The recent reconciliation between Hamas and Fateh offers a clue as to the future. Revolutionary Egypt has succeeded in completing a deal that could not be accomplished under the toppled Mubarak regime. New-found Palestinian unity could not have happened without the revolutions in Egypt, which made the deal, and in Syria, which could not prevent it. The deal and everything surrounding it set the stage for the coming United Nations General Assembly meeting in September, when Arab delegations will seek international recognition for a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. After that, all Israeli settlements within those borders will be null and void.

None of this will be accepted by Israel. But the international system and its moral values will be put to the test. The new democratic Arab regimes will seek to deprive Israel of its exclusive status as the only democracy in the region. Although this was already brought into question by the Turkish presence in Middle East politics, it will now be compromised further by a number of Arab countries that are democratic.

On the ground, the "liberation of Palestine" can take on a different meaning than it has had in the last six decades of Palestinian struggle for statehood. Although intifada has been practiced before as a form of resistance, peaceful or violent, this time it will ignite new forms of pressure on the Israeli government and probably on Israeli politics in general.

While all the changes in Arab countries are welcomed in Turkey, where a model of Islam and democracy has developed, Iran faces a difficult dilemma in attaching itself to the revolutions while at the same time fearing their democratic possibilities. For all actors, there will be risks to encounter and opportunities to take. The US and European Union and other western countries have their work cut out for them in evaluating the authenticity of democracy in Arab countries while wondering what to do if one democracy--Israel--is occupying the land of other democratic countries. For the first time in the Arab-Israel saga, the conflict will be judged on the basis of democratic principles.-Published 5/5/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Abdel Monem Said Aly is a writer and political analyst at Al Ahram newspaper in Cairo.