• At the point of no return  - Nizar Abdel-Kader
The Assad regime does not have effective means to find a long-term solution.

• A twist in Syria's sobriety  - Rime Allaf
Syrians have already achieved phenomenal changes, despite paying a heavy price.

• Paying lip service to resistance does not provide immunity  - Karim Emile Bitar
Foreign powers may allow the Syrian regime to survive or at least gain time.

• Weathering the storm  - Elias Samo
With prompt reforms, Assad will survive the domestic challenge.

At the point of no return
 Nizar Abdel-Kader

As millions of Tunisians, Egyptians, Yemenis, and Libyans protested with demonstrations and calls for reform and change, many analysts speculated that Syria was unlikely to be next. Five weeks ago, Syria appeared to be a powerful regional player with a domestic political status that left very little possibility for surprise. Snowballing demonstrations that would bring brutal reaction from the strong security organs were unlikely.

Syria under the Assad family remains under tight control. The army as well as the security apparatus is run by trusted Alawite leaders. In addition, the legacy of brutality against internal opponents is well-known from the time of President Hafez Assad.

In 2005, President Bashar Assad, without any political discussion, decided on his own to move towards what was viewed as economic liberalization. Such a step should have been linked to political reform, but nothing of that happened. Systemic corruption in the regime led to an economic justification for the birth of a new class of powerful elites in the immediate entourage of the president's family. The idea that Syrian society would no longer tolerate all the forms of abuse and economic exploitation to which it had been subjected completely escaped Bashar.

When violence first broke out in Daraa, rather than undertaking steps towards reforms and making concessions to absorb the demands of protestors, Assad reacted with excessive violence and repression. The disproportionately brutal reaction in Daraa caused snowballing demonstrations in many cities and towns.

Assad's speech at the parliament on March 30 was a disappointment. Contrary to all expectations, it did not even fulfill any of the public promises made earlier by his advisor Bouthaina Shaaban. He did not repeal the emergency law and he went as far as accusing the protestors of being part of an external anti-Syria conspiracy hatched by the United States and Israel.

In the past two weeks, Assad has sought to respond to the growing number of protestors with limited concessions through granting citizenship to stateless Kurds and establishing a special committee to study the lifting of the emergency law in effect for the past 48 years.

In reality, Assad enjoys broader popular support than did President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt or President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia. But he made a grave mistake when he decided to rely on his security organizations to quell the protests. He should have grasped from the beginning that in order to maintain his regime's legitimacy he should recognize the quest of the protestors for freedom, dignity, and reforms. He still fails to see that the resort to violence and the consequent increased loss of lives will galvanize new segments among the population.

The regime is now facing three different challenges. The first is resentment by a very large segment of the people who deplore the lack of freedom and justice. The second is the growing desperation of the poor due to the high rate of unemployment, low wages, and soaring prices of commodities. And the third challenge is the staunch opposition to the regime on the part of thousands of dissidents living abroad, along with Islamists, Muslim Brothers, Kurds, and Palestinians in Syria.

As the Syrian people continue to challenge Assad's regime, the United States and the European Union are in no hurry to step forward to back the protestors and condemn atrocities committed on the Syrian streets. The reason behind such a policy seems to be a concern that change might bring about a government more hostile to western interests. The nightmare scenario seems to be centered on the possibility of an Islamic theocracy led by the Muslim Brotherhood ruling in Damascus. Although the US and the EU have very little influence over what is going on right now in Syria, they should call on Assad to make meaningful political reforms and should use the threat of increased sanctions.

In Lebanon, there is general concern over what is happening in Syria as future developments may have a direct effect on the political, social, and economic stability of the country. Lebanese political factions are not unified in their interpretation of the Syrian crisis. While the March 8 majority perceives that the stability of Lebanon and its well-being depend greatly on the strength and stability of the Assad regime, the March 14 coalition sees the weakening of the Assad regime as a catalyst to achieving its objectives in sovereignty and independence of Lebanon. Additionally, many analysts link the present difficulties facing prime minister-designate Najib Mikati in forming a new government to the fallout from Syria.

To sum up, looking at the way events are evolving, the Assad regime does not have effective means to find a long-term solution. If there is one thing that we can now predict, it is that the regime will do everything necessary to remain immune to popular demands for freedom and reforms. Assad saw what happened to Mubarak and Ben Ali when they began offering concessions. He has opted to project an image of strength and tight control. This policy may enable him to hold on to power for longer. On the other hand, as in Egypt and Tunisia, the regime may prove more brittle than we can predict right now.-Published 14/4/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Nizar Abdel-Kader is a political analyst/columnist at Ad-Diyar newspaper in Beirut. He has authored four books on Lebanon and regional political and strategic issues.

Even with the benefit of recent regional experience, the Syrian regime has been quite stunned by the protests shaking the country--but not nearly half as stunned as the Syrian people themselves.

Having spent the last half century under martial law and under the heavy thumb of a very authoritarian regime, Syrians had for the most part adapted to their reality and formed a semi-positive perspective: they had neither the proverbial bread nor freedom, but it was still better than being like Iraq or Lebanon, especially as the country remained under permanent pressure from Israel and its allies.

These factors were little consolation, however, when people under similar regimes began to manufacture their own future and impose their own demands; were Syrians doomed to watch from afar, with the only characters with the guts to stand up to injustice relegated to the TV series Bab al-Hara and similar fictional places? While the full answer to this question can't yet be given, the exasperation that is surfacing brings with it a certainty that no matter what happens next, some things have already changed forever.

The first major change, of course, is in the threshold of fear. Even with dire warnings about the potential for lost stability through a spectrum of social and religious ills (and with the threatened sectarian "fitna" the regime is marketing), it seems the Syrians who have already come out will stay out, confidently recruiting more people to their cause. Indeed, heavy repression from security forces has so far merely served to attract more protesters, and to spread outrage across the country at the huge number of casualties at the hands of Syrian security forces.

That such an openly heavy-handed response would follow peaceful protests, and would even target the martyrs' funerals, has shocked many Syrians to their core, jolting them into action and pushing them into the unchartered territory of trying to impose their will on the regime. In doing so, their expectations have also changed over what the regime is capable of, or willing to do.

For one, the decade-old belief held by many that there was an old guard hindering the reform process was shattered by the president himself, whose speech turned several commonly-held notions into immediate urban myths. In very clear words, the president explained that, contrary to rumors that he was held back, his entourage actually pushed him towards reform. In other words, the buck stopped with him, and people would be informed when the government, at its discretion, was ready to make reforms.

This could have been understood as contradicting earlier promises made by various Syrian officials. But in fact, serious changes were clearly effected in response to popular pressure, in turn giving protesters more impetus to continue demanding their rights and to keep the pressure up.

Remembering how quickly the regime can act when needed, many people mentioned the fact that the Syrian constitution had been changed in mere minutes in 2000 (to allow for President Assad to take power at the age of 34), and the sudden change from a closed economy into an open one in 2005 (to punish Lebanon by discouraging Syrians from dealing economically with it, following the withdrawal of Syrian troops). However, both these changes had been driven by specific regime needs.

Now, for the first time, a big change has occurred driven purely by the pressure of the Syrian people: not only have officials promised that the hated emergency law would soon disappear, but the regime suddenly granted Syrian citizenship to hundreds of thousands of stateless Syrian Kurds.

In a few short weeks, with protests of a very small size relative to other Arab countries, Syrians have already achieved phenomenal changes, despite paying a heavy price with so many dead, injured and detained. For the first time, Syrians have been able to directly pressure the regime into making immediate changes, a tool they are likely to continue using while the regime responds and acts to save itself from further damage.

The official response, of course, is that this is all a conspiracy threatening the very unity of the nation. While it's not the first time Syrian media has gone into full-blown nationalist frenzy, it's the first time this has happened in direct response to pressure from the Syrian people, making the media campaign anything but deja vu. Unprecedented in scale and in content, and not allowing for a single mea culpa or an Egyptian army-style salute to the fallen martyrs, the current Syrian media campaign is itself an indication of how threatened the regime feels at the prospect of the Arab spring blooming in Syria.

Regardless of the context, what is happening in Syria is truly revolutionary--if not a revolution. But while the regime has not hesitated to crush the protests openly and brutally, it doesn't seem to have realized yet that no amount of force can or will tame the protesters, and that the only way forward is drastic change, rather than inconsequential reform. Syrian officials have started speaking of a second corrective movement, which will do nothing to assuage people's frustration.

With other Arab regimes seemingly throwing their weight behind the Syrian regime, fearful of the reach of this inconvenient Arab spring, the prospect of outside influence to push for real domestic change seems to be practically nil. Save one important regional player with much at stake in its relationship with Syria: Turkey.

Recent statements by the Turkish prime minister, and messages passed by Turkish officials and even Turkish media, have been crystal clear: reform, right now. After years of cultivating this relationship, unable to turn a blind eye to the current repression, it is clear that Turkey is potentially one of the most significant foreign factors to influence Syria, either playing a role in helping save the regime from its own excesses, or helping save the Syrian people from their predicament.

It's difficult at this point to predict which way the wind will blow, but Syrians seem determined to have a lot more than merely the right to remain silent.-Published 14/4/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Rime Allaf is an associate fellow at Chatham House in London.

The refreshing winds blowing from the Atlantic to the Gulf are dealing a serious and hopefully fatal blow to deeply-ingrained western misconceptions about the Middle East. The orientalist dogmas underlying foreign intervention--from Bonaparte's 1798 Egypt expedition to George W. Bush's 2003 Iraq invasion--are shattering. The western gaze will no longer be the same; the times they are a-changin'.

No one can any longer refer to the "Arab street" with condescension. Arab publics can no longer be ignored, described as lethargic, inherently illiberal, fanatical or incapable of taking a hand in their destiny. The Arab revolutions were driven by a moral quest for justice and dignity, and by secular demands that put to rest the theocentric notion that everything that happens in this part of the world is driven exclusively by religious motives.

Recent events also demonstrate that a popular grid of analysis that divides Middle Eastern powers between the so-called "axis of resistance" (mumana'a) and the so-called "moderate Arab regimes," is actually a sinister joke. Whether "moderate" or "radical", the first and foremost priority of every single regime in the Middle East and North Africa region is its own survival. Everything else is negotiable. We have seen that the allegedly "moderate" regimes were among the most ruthless in their repression of political opponents, bloggers, and human rights activists. But while it is true that spineless subservience to Dick Cheney does not equal moderation, it is also true that paying lip service to resistance does not provide immunity from popular anger. Nor can it quell the legitimate aspirations of freedom-hungry new generations.

Herein is the Syrian regime's predicament. Even if many Syrians feel fine about their country's foreign affairs, their wrath over domestic concerns is not appeased.

President Bashar Assad early understood that the United States committed a major strategic blunder by invading Iraq under fallacious pretenses, with disastrous long term consequences. Syria welcomed, assisted and absorbed more than 1.3 million Iraqi refugees, not an easy task for a country of 22 million. Many ordinary Syrians felt this was right. Syria strengthened its strategic partnership with Iran and provided political and logistical support to Hamas and Hizballah, while pursuing indirect negotiations with Israel, even during the July 2006 Lebanon war. The Syrian regime dug in its heels and weathered the storm during the Bush administration's era of hubris. Then Syria broke its isolation thanks to Turkey's "zero problems with neighbors" policy, and to France's impulsive and nervy Nicolas Sarkozy, whose Syria policy consisted in doing the exact opposite of his predecessor.

Today, the domestic situation is much more problematic. But once again, foreign powers may allow the Syrian regime to survive or at least gain time.

Cosmetic changes and minor reforms are no longer sufficient. Syria is in dire need of radical political, social and economic transformation. Politically, younger generations need oxygen. The 48-year-old state of emergency is a symbol of oppression. Syrians who work in agriculture or industry can no longer make ends meet. The informal economy is very large and most workers have no social safety nets. The black market is flourishing. A small group of individuals control the telecom industry, agro-business, commerce and real estate. The Syrian economy needs an overhaul. Crony capitalism and remnants of rigid bureaucratic socialism offer the worst of both worlds. Add to this a set of enormous regional disparities that need to be addressed. The riots started in the small underprivileged agricultural town of Daraa. In other regions, masses of disaffected youth are deprived of basic rights and opportunities; they too dream of a better future, inspired by Tunisia and Egypt. Turning a deaf ear to them is not a realistic option. With courageous reforms, Syria can rapidly move toward economic success. It has assets: high literacy, a young population, tourist potential, and little debt, to name a few.

Yet, to judge from history, the regime seems incapable of reform. If it regains momentum, the protest movement can threaten the regime's survival. Syrians reject the specter of sectarian strife but are nonetheless committed to serious change--today, rather than tomorrow. Bashar Assad cannot meet their demands without hitting close to home and facing powerful vested interests, which he seems unable or unwilling to do.

Here, once again, the Syrian regime's hope comes from abroad. To understand why Hillary Clinton calls Bashar a "reformer", it's important to keep in mind that the Obama administration is under intense pressure from Israeli, Jordanian and Saudi allies who desperately want to maintain the Middle Eastern status quo. During the Egyptian revolution, these states lobbied hard to "Save Private Mubarak". When this became impossible, they asked the US for guarantees against further destabilization. Despite differences with Bashar, most if not all of the regional powers support his stability. And this probably will make the difference.

If so, it would constitute a bitter irony and the ultimate paradox: Syria's foreign policy, while appreciated by the public, is not enough to assuage the protestors. At the same time, foreign powers, who resent Syrian foreign policy, may end up saving the Syrian regime in the name of realpolitik, in this case the "devil we know" or the dubious theory of a "lesser evil".-Published 14/4/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Karim Emile Bitar is a senior fellow at the Institute for International and Strategic Relations in Paris and the editor of "L'ENA hors les murs" monthly magazine. He also published "Regards sur la France" (Seuil).

It started with a brave but desperate act of self-immolation. This time it was not a cry in the wilderness, as is the norm in the Arab world, but a spark that ignited the Arab world, including Syria.

Yet while there are demonstrations in Syrian cities, practically no signs or slogans of "enough" or "leave" have appeared as on the streets of Cairo, Tunis, Benghazi and Sana'a. It should also be noted that no demonstrations to speak of have taken place in Aleppo and Hama, two centers of Islamic activism. This is a good indication that sectarianism is not a factor in the demonstrations. As is well known, the spark for the Muslim Brotherhood's 1978-82 violent confrontation with the Syrian government was in Aleppo, and the finale was in Hama.

The people who are demonstrating in the streets are by and large looking for President Bashar Assad to reform, not to resign, and for several reasons. First, he has cultivated an image that presents him as humble, civil and likeable, unlike the typical arrogant, authoritarian image for which many Arab leaders are known.

Second, he is popular not only with Syrians but with many Arabs. He is viewed as the last warrior facing Israel and refusing to submit to American dictates. He is seen as an Arab leader viewing issues from an Arab nationalist rather than just a Syrian perspective.

Third, it is unfortunately true that blood has been shed in several Syrian cities. Yet pragmatic Syrians appear to have rationalized that the Egyptian-Tunisian scenario is not an available option even if they wanted it. Nor do they relish the bloody Libyan-Yemeni scenario. Thus, they have opted for reform and not regime change. They want less emergency law and more freedom, less corruption and more transparency, less security and more liberty, less of one party and more of multi-party, less nepotism and more competency.

President Bashar has committed himself to reform. If promises become policies--and the sooner the better--he will emerge stronger and more credible. In fact, some promises have become policies already, such as the overdue change of government, the removal of the governors of Daraa and particularly of Homs, and Kurdish citizenship registration.

In a certain respect, the Arab uprisings have worked to Syria's advantage, particularly with regard to Egypt, Bahrain and Israel. The downfall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and his regime is both a victory for Egypt and a blessing for Syria. Syrian-Egyptian relations have been on a roller-coaster for decades, particularly since the break-up of the United Arab Republic in 1961. Strained relations reached a breaking point after the 1973 war with the development of the Sadat model. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat put all his eggs in the American basket and signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, as opposed to Syrian President Hafez Assad's model of leading the steadfastness front against Israel and maintaining his distance from Washington. The Hafez-Sadat conflict was followed in recent years by the Bashar-Mubarak conflict, for similar reasons. Although Mubarak's downfall was due primarily to domestic causes, anti-Israeli and anti-American feelings shared by both peoples might now open the door for rapprochement between Cairo and Damascus.

As for Israel, and in light of changes in Egypt and uncertainty in Jordan, peace with Syria should now become an urgent matter. The Israeli strategic defensive wall is composed of neutralized and demilitarized Sinai in the west, occupied Golan in the northeast and the Jordan River basin in the east. Now, security arrangements regarding Sinai and the Jordan River basin could become problematic. It is true the Golan has been stable and quiet--but certainly not forever.

Bahrain is simmering, as is historic Shiite Farsi vs. Sunni Arab animosity. The introduction of the Gulf Cooperation Council's forces in Bahrain has increased tension between Tehran and Riyadh and could lead to a confrontation. President Bashar is one of the few Arab leaders who maintain good relations with both sides, particularly with Tehran. This affords him leverage with Tehran to help reduce the tension and avert a potential confrontation.

Finally, during the last decade President Bashar faced serious external challenges and threats, particularly from the US, and survived. With prompt reforms, the Syrian domino piece that teetered temporarily will hopefully weather the storm and remain standing and President Bashar will survive the domestic challenge.-Published 14/4/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Elias Samo is professor of international relations at American and Syrian universities.