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Edition 4 Volume 9 - February 03, 2011

How a failed Palestinian-Israeli peace process and regional unrest affect Jordan

• Between the hammer and the anvil - Oraib Al-Rantawi
Jordan has its own overwhelming fears and anxieties regarding the failure of the peace process.

• Change in Egypt casts dark shadow over Jordan - Salameh Nematt
Jordan's credibility has been adversely affected by Israel's failure to respond.

• A sense of urgency - Mohammad K. Shiyyab
Today, relations between Jordan and Israel are at their lowest point.

• Fear and uncertainty - an interview with Azmi Shuaibi
Jordanians have built a segment of their internal politics on support for the Palestinians.

• Uneasy lies the head - Asher Susser
Today, shared fears are actually driving Jordan and Israel apart.

Between the hammer and the anvil
Oraib Al-Rantawi

Over the last decade, Jordan's policies have centered on a single assumption: that the creation of a viable Palestinian state is a major pillar of Jordan's security and stability. Even more so, it is vital to Jordan's existence and identity.

Based on this assumption, Jordan stood firm behind the peace process and was a strong supporter of the two-state solution. In that light, Jordan supported the Arab Peace Initiative and US President George W. Bush's vision for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Equally, Jordan called for the implementation of the roadmap and signed agreements.

From Jordan's perspective, the failure of the peace process would lead to regional chaos, the spread of fundamentalism, violence and extremism and endanger the moderate camp in the Middle East. Jordan's decision-makers strongly believe that if the peace process comes to nothing, then it will pay a price greater than others.

These fears are among the factors that unite Jordan with moderate forces in the region. Nonetheless, Jordan has its own overwhelming fears and anxieties regarding the failure of the peace process, in case Israeli-Palestinian talks reach a deadlock or impasse.

The more the prospect of a two-state solution recedes, the more other options and solutions loom in the horizon at the expense of Jordan. Among such options are looking for a resolution of the Palestinian problem outside Palestine, including knocking on the doors of Jordan.

The fears of Jordan being viewed as an "alternative home" and of "tawtin", i.e. settling refugees in Jordan, have in the last decade become a pressing issue on the agenda of the Jordanian political elite and media. This has become even more profound and acute in light of the failure of political reforms and democratic change. In addition, there is the failure of successive governments in addressing social imbalances that color the relationship between state and citizens. Moreover, there is the failure to integrate citizens of Palestinian origin in the state and society structure.

Strikingly, the moment there appears to be a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the more the debate heats up over who is Jordanian and who is Palestinian, the refugee right of return and political and civil rights. Paradoxically, when negotiations reach a deadlock, the questions resurface about what will be the fate of more than three million Palestinians in Jordan.

Lack of progress in resolving the Palestinian problem has retarded issues of political reform and democratic change. This has in turn led to social and political stagnation, manifesting itself in protest centered around "protecting Jordan's national identity" and reducing the level of representation or participation by Jordanians from Palestinian origin in Jordan's political system and state institutions. This is expressed in disturbing forms of protest, as seen at football matches and on university campuses.

The deadlock in peace talks and the receding prospects for the creation of a Palestinian state make the chances for comprehensive reforms dim indeed.

Today, Jordan's decision-makers find themselves in a difficult and critical situation. On the one hand, there is a need for comprehensive political reforms and on the other hand, the leadership feels the pressure of the street and the impact of the tsunami waves of change that started in Tunisia and endanger the regime of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. Then there is the deadlock and impasse in the peace process.

To sum up the situation, Jordan views the success of the peace process and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state as a safe outlet for many chronic and pressing problems and a healthy solution to the challenges Jordan is facing. The fact that there is a deadlock alongside the deepening economic and social crises Jordan is facing and growing social and political protest in the Middle East means the winds of political change are blowing across the Arab region.-Published 3/2/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Oraib Al-Rantawi is director of Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, Amman.

Change in Egypt casts dark shadow over Jordan
Salameh Nematt

The stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace process has heightened tension in Jordan over the past several months, deepening local fears that a worsening situation in the occupied Palestinian territories may spill over to the kingdom, where nearly half of the population is of Palestinian origin. Then came the events in Tunisia and Egypt, where the popular uprising there has shaken ruling regimes in the entire region, including Jordan. On Tuesday, King Abdullah sacked his government headed by Prime Minister Samir Rifai, and asked former prime minister and former ambassador to Israel, Marouf Al-Bakhit, to form a new government entrusted with the task of affecting "immediate political and economic reforms".

It is highly doubtful the new government can offer quick solutions to chronic problems, or whether the king's pro-active move to contain the popular anger would appease the protesters who have been agitating for change in Amman and several cities in the kingdom for the past three weeks. But one thing is clear: the establishment has been jolted by the recent events, which explains the king's drastic move to dismiss the government only 40 days after it received an overwhelming vote of confidence from the Lower House of Parliament, with a vote of 111 deputies against nine. Part of the reason why the government received this massive vote of confidence is that most opposition parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, boycotted the elections, in protest against the electoral law and the government's refusal to introduce political reforms. This in turn, weakened the credibility of the parliament as well as the whole political establishment in the eyes of most Jordanians. The fact that Jordanians of Palestinian origin have barely ten percent representation in parliament, also raised questions as to the integrity of the election process.

With events in nearby Egypt threatening to escalate in view of President Hosni Mubarak's refusal to step down, the government in Amman may be hesitant to introduce political reforms that would provide a proportionate political representation for Jordanians of Palestinian origin. These are essential for internal stability, especially that the popular protests have been coming from East Bank Jordanians, who fear that such a move would be tantamount to turning Jordan into a Palestinian state. The current polarization of Jordanian society is exacerbated by the Islamic movement, which not only boycotted the elections, but now stands to benefit from the failure of secular regimes, whether in Egypt or Tunisia, or elsewhere in the region, to provide a better life for their citizens. This clearly ties the Jordanian government's hands in any role it may want to play to support efforts towards relaunching the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.

Having supported the Palestinian Authority and President Mahmoud Abbas in its preconditions for launching the peace process, namely a freeze of settlement activity in the Palestinian territories, Jordan's credibility has been adversely affected by Israel's failure to respond adequately, and Washington's inability to exercise enough pressure on the rightist government of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to respond to regional and international demands.

As it stands, Amman will be watching developments in Egypt and Israel's response in view of the possibility that Egypt may take on a more negative view towards peace with Israel in the future. If Cairo moves in that direction, being the first country to sign a peace treaty with Israel, the pressure will increase on Jordan, the only other country to sign such a treaty, to follow suit. This could hardly serve the interests of anybody involved. But when it comes to the survival of regimes, external treaties might become less and less important. -Published 3/02/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Salameh Nematt is a political analyst and communications strategist. He is the former Washington bureau chief for al-Hayat international daily newspaper, and former international editor of The Daily Beast.

A sense of urgency
Mohammad K. Shiyyab

Jordan has a vital interest in concluding a Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit. To that effect, Jordan's commitment and efforts have been widely recognized, not only regionally but also internationally. Jordan's King Abdullah II has always emphasized that "regional as well as key international actors must play a constructive role in reducing regional friction, thus increasing the stability and the probability of a successful peace between Israel and the Palestinians." Failing to achieve such a peace is likely to result in many negative impacts and undesirable consequences.

To start with, the three states, Jordan, Israel and Palestine, enjoy close geographic proximity and are directly involved in the Palestinian question. Jordan is deeply concerned due to the lack of progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as this has a negative impact on Jordan's national development efforts politically, socially and economically. The large Palestinian population already residing in Jordan and the fear of a new wave of Palestinian refugees moving into the country in the event of an extremely dramatic escalation shape the kingdom's thinking regarding these issues.

Those Palestinian refugees would join the huge number of refugees from Iraq entering Jordan in recent years. From Jordan's point of view, those Palestinian refugees would be a more serious problem because they would lack their own resources and would threaten to upset the delicate demographic balance between East Bank Jordanians and those of Palestinian origin. Jordan would not want to lose the separate character and independent identity it has managed to formulate. In Jordanian eyes, the movement of Palestinians from Jordan to the West Bank and Gaza rather than the other way around would be a welcome change.

Secondly, any new wave of bloody Israeli-Palestinian violence would inflame public opinion in Jordan and in the region at large, aggravating radical groups' activities that affect Jordan's domestic security and the stability of the region. If such instability is not faced with an effective response, it might provide more leverage for militant elements and radicals to operate against domestic targets. The high public support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan might at some point lead to wide-scale rallies and protests on the streets of Amman. Based on previous experience, it is possible to foresee the potential for a tough response from the local security apparatus, increasing the probability of domestic political and security unrest that might undermine the security situation further.

Thirdly, extremists and radical elements associated with global jihad that operate in the broader region despise pro-western moderate Arab leaders no less than they despise America and Israel together. In spite of the importance of Jordan's domestic politics, careful attention should be given to the broader regional context in which the current process is taking place. While the peace process will not and cannot completely extinguish terrorism--and it is unrealistic to expect it to do so--the best way to fight terrorism is to involve Arabs in this campaign. A collapsed peace process makes such involvement less likely.

Fourthly, as US troops pull out of Iraq this year, Iran may be looking to dominate Iraq with its version of Shiite ideology. If Iran is able to accomplish this goal through destabilizing Iraq, this will have its impact on neighboring Jordan. If Jordan experiences instability, what assurances would it have that its borders are protected from infiltrators and outside aggression? Meanwhile, Jordan's resources are scarce, and there is already a big burden on Jordan's armed forces to ensure that over 1,700 kilometers of border are secured and protected.

Last but not least, peace as we seek it cannot be attained by signatures alone. It can only come about as the result of a slow process of growth and interaction and based on mutual respect and understanding. The signing of the Jordan-Israel Treaty of Peace on October 26, 1994 made Jordan only the second Arab country (after Egypt) to normalize relations with Israel. Today, as a result of a failing Palestinian-Israeli peace process, relations between Jordan and Israel are at their lowest point. There have been many calls from different political groups in Jordan as well as many other Arab countries, including Egypt, to reconsider the value of the peace treaty and consider terminating Jordan's obligations toward Israel. With the spread of popular uprising in some Arab countries at this moment in time, slogans to that effect are being continually heard.

To sum up, more than any Arab country, Jordan is particularly sensitive to developments surrounding the Palestinian question, mainly because of issues related to Jordan's internal security that are inter-linked with possible demographic changes. Last October, a sense of urgency to conclude an Israeli-Palestinian peace was well reflected in the speeches made by those attending the re-launching ceremony of the peace talks. Standing at the White House next to President Barack Obama, King Abdullah II turned to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and warned: "If hopes are disappointed again, the price of failure will be too high for all." That is exactly how most Jordanians view the issue.-Published 3/2/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

General (rtd) Mohammad K. Shiyyab is managing director of Middle East Security Consultants in Amman.

Fear and uncertainty
an interview with Azmi Shuaibi

BI: How has the halt in the peace process affected Jordan, in your view?

Shuaibi: Jordan is a neighboring Arab state, and is tied to the Palestinian issue in several ways. First, there are numerous Palestinians in Jordan, and the break in the peace process appears to affect them in a negative way.

The second aspect is that the Jordanians have built a segment of their internal politics on support for the Palestinians, intervening with the Israeli side and with the Americans on behalf of Palestinians. This also impacts internal Jordanian politics, showing that they are assisting Palestinians by playing a role. Depending on that role, sometimes the internal politics have been impacted or rejected.

Also, in the past, Jordanians have been fearful of the right-wing Israeli camp that believed the solution for peace was to make Jordan the Palestinian state. The inability to create a Palestinian state in the West Bank [and Gaza Strip] raises the specter that Israel will return to this position. King Hussein was able to stave off this position, but the most recent [Israeli] government shows that this view has returned to power.

BI: Can you give more examples of how the peace process impacts internal Jordanian politics?

Shuaibi: The leadership of the Jordanian regime--those of real Jordanian origin--view themselves as responsible for the state. So you can see how [they] are very concerned about residency in Jordan, the tightening of registration rules for Palestinians, the subject of how Jordanians from Palestinian origin are registered in the books--all of this is related to the fear of the rising number of Palestinians in Jordan.

This [the halt in the peace process] has a negative impact that rattles the regime, and when the regime is rattled it begins to take much stricter policies towards Palestinians in Jordan.

Of course, [Jordan's] role in the peace process also garners them US funding that might come to a halt with a break in the peace process.

BI: Do you see a tie between what is happening in Egypt and the halt in the peace process?

Shuaibi: Each side is going to try to use what is happening in Egypt to its benefit. So certainly the Israelis are trying to say that the problems of the Middle East are varied and not necessarily related to the Palestinian-Israeli problem, and show the falseness of US policies that pressure Israel to create a Palestinian state instead of a crack-down on Iran, which Israelis see as first priority.

I imagine that what is happening in Egypt is going to force the Americans to give first priority to their policies in the Middle East. Yes, Tunis started this, but Egypt is the heart of the Arab world, and what happens in Egypt is going to impact the Arab region more. Previously, the Americans used to take for granted that this area was stable, and they used to make policies on that basis, for example, their withdrawal from Iraq and the policies related to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. In my opinion, this is going to reflect badly on the Palestinian problem in the future.

On the other hand, changes in the Arab world, especially in Egypt, give Palestinians hope and the possibility of depending more on the public rather than the leadership.-Published 3/2/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Azmi Shuaibi is a former Palestinian minister and legislator and now coordinates the AMAN coalition.

Uneasy lies the head
Asher Susser

In the early 1960s, when Jordan's King Hussein was embattled by Nasser's regime in Egypt that was bent on the export of its revolutionary fervor, the young king published an autobiography entitled "Uneasy Lies the Head". Taking his cue from Shakespeare's King Henry IV ("Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown"), Hussein's characterization of his predicament could equally apply today to his son and heir, King Abdullah II. Egypt is once again the source of inspiration for revolutionary fervor. Now, however, the revolutionary spirit is being generated by the masses who seek to overthrow the regime built by Gamal Abdel Nasser and his successors, while Abdullah braces himself to face the fallout from Cairo in the streets of Amman.

Emboldened by the protest movements sweeping the Arab street from Tunisia to Cairo and as far afield as Yemen, demonstrators led by the Muslim Brotherhood have taken to Jordan's streets in recent days, demanding political reform and focusing on reduction of the power of the monarchy. The force and intensity of the protests in Jordan do not compare with the whirlwind of events that have shaken Egypt to the core, but they are surely cause for concern for Abdullah and his new government. This is especially true because of the unsavory combination of potentially destabilizing trends that have simultaneously come to fruition in Jordan in recent years.

Like other Arab states, Jordan faces structural economic difficulties that have resulted in high levels of unemployment and poverty, recently exacerbated by rising food and fuel prices. What makes matters worse from the regime's point of view is that in recent years the original Jordanians of the East Bank, the longstanding bedrock of the regime, have had reason to express serious misgivings about Jordan's domestic politics.

As of the 1970s, a functional cleavage came into being in Jordan whereby the original Jordanians governed and were the unchallenged masters of all spheres of political influence, while the Palestinians in the kingdom, about half (maybe more) of the entire population, dominated the economy and the private sector. When Jordan's economic troubles forced the government to reduce its spending, it was the original Jordanians who generally suffered the consequences more severely than their Palestinian compatriots, who were far less dependent on government largesse, jobs and jobbery.

Over the years, a militant and influential ultra-nationalist Jordanian trend has emerged in the kingdom devoted to the eradication of Palestinian influence and of real and perceived economic advantage. In the long run, it sought the return of as many Palestinians as possible from Jordan to a future state of Palestine in the West Bank and Gaza, and to Israel proper as well. Efforts by the king to introduce political reforms were often stymied by the conservative East Banker elite who feared that a more liberal regime would allow for the greater integration of Palestinians into the kingdom's politics, at their expense.

At the same time, Jordan's expectations from the peace with Israel have remained largely unfulfilled. That peace could not have been and was not a panacea for Jordan's structural economic difficulties. But, even more disturbing for the Jordanians, Israel and the Palestinians failed in their endeavor to transform the Oslo accords into a final agreement.

In the last 25 years or so, the Jordanians have steadily developed an obsessive fear of the "alternative homeland conspiracy" and a vital interest in the creation of a Palestinian state. In their analysis, if no Palestinian state comes into being in the West Bank and Gaza, a confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians would culminate in the massive migration or expulsion of Palestinians eastwards across the river to Jordan. In this nightmare scenario, neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians, but the Jordanians, would end up as the great historical losers.

After the failure of the Camp David talks and the second Palestinian intifada, Jordanian trepidation of this nightmare scenario resurfaced as if the peace treaty with Israel had never been signed. In 2003, the US invasion of Iraq and the consequent perennial threat of Iraqi disintegration, coupled with growing Iranian influence in Iraq and in the region as a whole, severely compounded the Jordanians' sense of strategic suffocation. The Jordanians now found themselves sandwiched between two poles of regional instability, with the chaos of Iraq to the east and the Israeli-Palestinian conundrum to the west. This was the kind of regional predicament that they had certainly not bargained for after the peace with Israel, made infinitely worse today by the tremors shaking much of the Arab world.

One of the keys to the failure of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations was the inability of the parties to agree on the "right of return" of Palestinian refugees. Israel's position was stridently condemned by the Jordanians, who again saw the looming specter of final refugee resettlement in Jordan as the forerunner to the "alternative homeland" scenario. Not only was the Israeli position an obstacle to an agreement with Palestinians, they believed, but it threatened to permanently saddle Jordan with a huge Palestinian population. Thus, the positions of Jordan and Israel are diametrically opposed on an issue that both sides regard as truly existential, touching on the raw nerves of their collective being. It was the Jordanians and the Lebanese who were responsible for adding to the Arab Peace Initiative, in 2002 and again in 2007, the absolute "rejection of all forms of [refugee] resettlement" ("tawtin"), which made the initiative virtually impossible for Israel to accept.

In the past, Jordan and Israel's common fear of being overwhelmed by Palestinian demography led the two countries into covert strategic understandings. Today this shared fear is actually driving Jordan and Israel apart. Surveying an increasingly unstable Arab world from Amman and the implications any regional upheaval might have for Jordan's domestic politics, one may conclude that times for the Hashemite crown are presently "uneasy," to say the least.-Published 3/2/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Asher Susser is a senior fellow and former Director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University. He is presently a visiting professor at the Center for Judaic Studies at the University of Arizona in Tucson.

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