• Confederation could smooth the transition  - John A. Akec
It is unlikely that many Arab countries would shed tears over the South's secession.

• Darfur and the worst-case scenario  - Ahmed Elzobier
Sudan could disintegrate as a country.

• The aftermath  - Modibo Goita
The most dangerous scenario may come from Sahelo-Saharan states failing to control their territory.

• Egypt: from rejection to reluctant accommodation  - Gamal A. G. Soltan
Secession seriously challenges the normative dimension of Egypt's dominant political culture.

Confederation could smooth the transition
 John A. Akec

An overwhelming majority of South Sudanese call January 9, 2011 the day of deliverance. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described it as a "ticking bomb"; Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul Gheit referred to it as the remaking of Sudan; and US President Barack Obama told a United Nations Security Council meeting in New York on September 24, "What happens in Sudan in the days ahead may decide whether a people who have endured too much war move towards peace or slip backwards into bloodshed."

This event is of immense significance to Sudan. Depending how one looks at it, it appears to mean different things to different people--in a way akin to the ten blind men guessing what an elephant looks like. This is not surprising, given the far- reaching implications the January 9 referendum outcome might entail for Sudan, Africa and the Middle East.

The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on January 9, 2005 in the Kenyan town of Naivasha brought to an end a 22-year conflict that cost two million South Sudanese lives. The agreement, which was internationally brokered under the leadership of the Bush administration, was also recognized by UNSC Resolution 1574. A core CPA provision is that six years from the date of its signing, namely on January 9, 2011, South Sudanese vote in an internationally supervised referendum to either confirm the unity of Sudan or opt for their own independent sovereign state.

While the CPA encourages the signatories (the National Congress Party and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement) to strive to create an environment that will tilt the balance in favor of a unity vote, it is now a foregone conclusion that, after six years of wrangling between the two peace partners, the world must brace itself for a secession vote if and when the referendum takes place.

Thus the focus has turned to understanding the implications of the South Sudan secession for Sudan, its immediate neighbors, the African continent and the Arab world.

For Sudan, there is a widespread fear that a land of one million square miles will cease to be the largest African nation.

The secession vote may lead to formation of a hostile state in South Sudan that in turn works to undermine the North and pave the way for further disintegration of the country. Other regions in the West, East and North-South transition zone could decide to follow suit, as happened in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and previously in the Soviet Union. This view is prevalent among the northern Sudanese elite; it fears an international conspiracy, led by the US and its Zionist allies, to break up an Arab nation.

Others, however, particularly in the South, believe the independence of their region will end a half-century of irreconcilable differences over the political, social, cultural and religious orientation of Sudan, especially with regard to adopting a secular as opposed to an Islamic-theocratic constitution. Moreover, complete independence is seen as the only way South Sudan can rid itself of chronic political, cultural and socio-economic marginalization by the North.

A number of Sudan's neighbors, such as Chad, Ethiopia and Eritrea, shy away from openly endorsing secession of the South lest it provoke their erstwhile neighbor into supporting secessionist movements in their countries. Egypt fears that independence of South Sudan will strengthen the Nile basin countries that are pushing for review of the outmoded Nile water agreements that gave it and Sudan a lion's share. A new South Sudan may wish to use Nile waters for its economic development, making South Sudan's gain appear to count as a loss for Egypt. However, Egypt is striving to establish a good relationship with the new government in South Sudan in order to protect its interests. As for Uganda and Kenya, they see secession as the opening up of a new export market for their goods and services.

In the Arab world as a whole, many have committed to respect the choice of the people of South Sudan. Having been a witness to the signing of the peace agreement in 2005, the Arab League is not too vocal about the possible splitting up of Sudan. This is probably because many of its members have not recovered from the scars left by the polarization of public opinion surrounding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent western-led Gulf wars that eventually resulted in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Therefore, it is unlikely that many Arab countries, some of which fear the influence of Sudan's Islamist movement, would shed tears over the South's secession. That many Arab countries have launched development initiatives for South Sudan bears witness to this hard reality.

The international community, while committed to the referendum process, is concerned that secession will not be sufficient to handle all contradictions that arise from the splitting of what was once a united country, such as citizenship and residence rights for South Sudanese in the North and vice-versa. Accommodating the Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions in a divided Sudan will present many challenges to peace brokers. Economic interdependence between the South and the North in the exploitation of oil and other shared natural resources such as water and pastures complicates matters further and renders renewed conflict in Sudan probable.

For all these reasons, and in order to ensure the sustainability of peace in South Sudan and in Sudan at-large, confederation with the North after secession is being put forward as a smart choice the South could make: a tool for political accommodation and a way of smoothing the transition to independence.

While this might open up a window for the continued Islamization and Arabization of South Sudan, it could also lead in the long term to the secularization and Africanization of North Sudan. Given a financially strong and stable South that is open to East Africa, the latter of these two scenarios is more likely.-Published 25/11/2010 © bitterlemons-international.org

John Akec is vice chancellor of the newly-instituted University of Northern Bahr El Ghazal in Sudan.

Lord Cromer, the author of the condominium agreement in 1899, described the birth of the new country Sudan as a "child of opportunism" that might "eventually die".

Only weeks remain before the referendum of January 9, 2011. The ultimate right of self-determination will be given to ordinary South Sudanese; they will decide for the first time their destiny and the fate of Sudan. Most analysts and observers agree that the majority of South Sudanese will vote for the independence of South Sudan and the dream of southern nationalists will finally come true. To describe the current situation in Sudan, pre-referendum, as uncertain doesn't convey the reality; new adjectives need to be invented to reflect the magnitude of the dilemma. The implications of the separation for both North and South Sudan, for the region and for Africa in general are far-reaching.

The prospect of separation has never been a secret. The rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement has not minced words about separation since September 1991, when it announced in Torit, in East Equatoria in South Sudan, that the latter's independence and separation would be the likely outcome if there were no democratic and secular Sudan. So far, despite the peace agreement that was intended to make unity attractive, there is no democracy to speak of and no secularism in Sudan. Furthermore, the SPLM succeeded in bringing all opposition parties to agree on the issue of self-determination in what is known as the Asmara declaration of June 1995.

The breakthrough came in 2002, after high-level US intervention in the Sudan peace process. At the time, the regime had its back against the wall, especially after 9/11. The Machakos protocol signed on July 20, 2002 between the government of Sudan and the SPLM emphasized the right of self-determination for South Sudan. However, eight months later the conflict in Darfur erupted.

The fate of Darfur is relevant to the issue of the South. The rebels of Darfur, inspired by the SPLM, called themselves the Sudan Liberation Movement. The grievances they raised were similar to those of South Sudan, including political and socio-economic marginalization. The SPLM supported them politically and militarily.

But the hastily concluded Darfur Peace Agreement of 2006 made things worse and is recognized now by most observers to be a complete failure. Back in 2003, there were only two major rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement. Since then, the Darfur insurgents have split into an array of competing factions, as many as 30 rebel groups--many people have given up counting. This has rendered any deal with the government meaningless. Furthermore, peace talks in Doha that began in early 2009, between the government and the Liberation and Justice Movement led by El-Tijani El-Sissi, seem to have gone nowhere. Progress in the near future is not imaginable even among those who are hopelessly optimistic.

Violence, displacement and civilian deaths in Darfur have significantly increased in the last two months. In early September, the Janjaweed forces attacked a village in North Darfur, executing 58 unarmed men and boys and wounding 86, according to the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies. From August through November, the government attacked populated areas in the Jebel Marra area in Darfur. The attacks resulted in civilian deaths and injuries, mass displacement and destruction of property.

On November 14, Ibrahim Gambari, the head of Darfur's joint UN/African Union UNAMID, raised the alarm in a press conference in Khartoum. He expressed fear that recent fighting between the Sudanese government and rebels in Darfur as well as tensions along shared borders with South Sudan had exacerbated the security situation in Darfur. He voiced fears that the "old alignment" between South Sudan and Darfur rebels could be "rekindled" and result in further complication of the situation in Darfur. More alarming, the Sudanese government accused the South Sudan army of aiding Justice and Equality rebels, while South Sudan accused the Sudanese army of dropping bombs inside its territory in the course of aerial bombardments against Darfur rebels.

It is hard to believe that the political elites who currently rule Sudan and who miserably failed to respect the wishes of South Sudan for decades until millions had died and many more were displaced, will be able to resolve the problem in Darfur soon.

In a worst-case scenario, but not an exaggerated one, Sudan is likely to disintegrate as a country after the separation of the South, thereby sadly vindicating Lord Cromer's cynical prophecy. But let us pretend to fool ourselves; maybe our politicians are doing reverse engineering: taking the country apart to see how it works and then reassembling it.-Published 25/11/2010 © bitterlemons-international.org

Ahmed Elzobier is a Sudan Tribune journalist and Darfurian human rights activist.

Sudan is the largest African state. It became independent in 1956. Its present population is over 42 million, its major religions are Islam, Christianity, and animism, and its major languages are Arabic (official), English and Dinka (the language of the largest ethnic group in the South) along with 200 additional dialects.

In 1983, the imposition of Sharia law on the entire country provoked an armed struggle led by the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army. In 2005, the United States brokered a peace agreement signed by the rebels and the government. It ended the civil war and projected a referendum for January 2011. For US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the outcome of that vote will be "inevitable" secession.

Both the United Nations and the African Union tried to prevent the South from seceding from the North, then announced they were ready to accept the outcome. AU concerns focus on the effect of southern secession on African borders produced by colonialism that divide many ethnic groups among multiple states: a South Sudan precedent could encourage separatism elsewhere and breed chaos.

This fear has affected African positions. Thus, for many years, Sudan and Chad have accused one another of cross-border incursion and have been on the brink of open war. Now, unexpectedly, Chadian President Idriss Deby has decided to improve the strained relations. This step has been explained by some experts with reference to his fear that the domino effect of the referendum would be "catastrophic for Africa". Another strong opponent is Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi, who believes that a vote of independence in South Sudan could create a dangerous precedent. He has warned that the disintegration of the entire African continent will follow. In reaction, Southern Sudan Information Minister Barnaba Benjamin rejected Gaddafi's warning, arguing that Africa had not broken up when Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1993.

In contrast, we note that unilateral declarations of independence in Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were supported by a ruling of the International Court of Justice that Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia did not violate international law. Russia, accordingly, compared its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the West's recognition of Kosovo.

Egypt and Sudan should be the first to wonder about the future position of a new Nile riparian state regarding the1959 agreement that stipulates that they should receive 55.5 and 18.5 billion cubic meters of Nile waters, respectively. This "historic right" has been rejected by Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. So emergence of a new actor may be an opportunity to restart negotiations for a just redistribution of Nile waters. Otherwise, we may have to recall the warning of then UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali that competition for water resources could provoke wars in Africa and the Middle East.

It is urgent for Salva Kiir, the favorite to become president of this land-locked country, to learn quickly from the failures of many African states gifted with huge mineral resources and energies but struggling to organize free and fair elections.

While there are no military solutions for peoples struggling to separate from a central power with which they don't share any cultural or religious identity, South Sudanese independence is nevertheless almost certain to fuel the escalation of internal armed conflicts elsewhere: the strategy of armed groups will be to gain control of the territory they claim for self-determination by referring to the Sudanese precedent. In response, states involved in such internal strife and conflicts will face limited options: either defeat armed rebel groups militarily, improve living conditions and provide more autonomy for minorities, or negotiate peaceful separation by means of a referendum on self-determination.

The most dangerous scenario may come from Sahelo-Saharan states failing to control their territory, wherein it becomes a safe haven for armed rebel groups colluding with drug trafficking. In this context, even terrorist groups could conceivably assert the right to self-determination.

We can forecast that only strong homogeneous African states will successfully resist breakaway movements, and only if they improve the welfare of the population. In a worst-case scenario, some states may disappear from the African map. On the other hand, it is helpful to recall that in some cases--Vietnam, Yemen, Germany--self-determination has implied not separatism but the reunification of peoples.

Finally, and paradoxically, history might recall Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir not only as a leader who faced two international arrest warrants for charges on genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. He may also be remembered as the president who ended Africa's longest-running civil war and accepted a referendum that could lead to separation and the creation of a new state in Africa.-Published 25/11/2010 © bitterlemons-international.org


Modibo Goita is a professor at the Peacekeeping School in Bamako, Mali. The positions presented here are personal and represent no official point of view.

It is certain that in a few weeks, South Sudan will become an independent state. The appearance of a new state will change the geopolitical landscape of the Nile basin. Countries in the region are either concerned or extremely concerned. Egypt is among the latter group.

The independence of South Sudan is the most recent phase in the long historic process of reversing Egypt's designs in the Nile basin. With the formation of the modern state of Egypt early in the nineteenth century, Cairo embarked upon an ambitious endeavor to unite the largest part of the basin under its leadership. Securing the sources of the Nile was the rationale behind Egyptian expansion southward. After Egyptian hegemony in the Nile basin reached its zenith in the seventies of the nineteenth century, the reversal began. The creation of an independent state in South Sudan is the third and most recent phase of this historic process.

In the first phase, Egyptian designs for the Nile basin were set back by colonial Britain, which demanded a British-Egyptian co-dominion in the Sudan. In the second phase, nationalism directed another blow to Egypt's design when, in the mid-1950s, Sudanese nationalists opted for the independence of the Sudan rather than remaining united with Egypt. In the third and final phase, the ethnic nationalists of South Sudan are bringing to an end the era of post-colonial Sudan and further reversing Egypt's nineteenth century design for its southern neighborhood.

The changing regional political terrain is making Egypt apprehensive. This is partly caused by the magnitude of the anticipated regional change and partly by the actual risks implied. "Favoring unity over division" has been among the main premises of Egypt's political culture. By the mid-1960s, the ambitious goals of Egyptian-Sudanese unity and Egypt-led Arab unity were thwarted. Egypt adjusted to the changing reality by reinterpreting unity so that it became synonymous with maintaining the territorial integrity of existing states. Thus, secession of the Sudanese south seriously challenges the normative dimension of Egypt's dominant political culture.

Normative and ideological challenges, though important, do not exhaust the different causes of concern in Egypt regarding the independence of South Sudan. Three additional concerns have been expressed by Egyptian officials and political analysts in this regard.

First, there is concern over the possible spillover effect from the South to other parts of the Sudan. Considering the troubles in western Sudan and to some extent in eastern Sudan as well, fears of further disintegration of the Sudan are not unsubstantiated. It follows that bringing Sudan's instability closer to its border with Egypt implies serious risks to the security of Egypt.

The independence of South Sudan is not the kind of civilized divorce that could have helped mitigate Egypt's apprehensions and concerns. The independence of South Sudan is rather a manifestation of the failure of the Sudanese state. In a region where failing states represent one of the most serious security threats, Egypt's concerns about further Sudanese disintegration are by no means exaggerated.

A failing state is like a magnet attracting the intervention of regional powers and many others from outside the region. For decades, foreign intervention in the conflict over the future of the Sudanese south was mostly confined to the southern provinces, far away from Egypt's borders. The spreading of conflict and instability to other Sudanese provinces is likely to bring the influence of remote regional powers to Egypt's near abroad.

Second, there is the concern over the future orientation of the new state of South Sudan. Whether or not that state will be a force for moderation and regional stability is a serious question with no ready answer. Newly-created states have a tendency to pursue an assertive or even aggressive foreign policy geared toward the consolidation of their national identity and the protection of their newly-gained sovereignty. This is particularly the case in troubled regions such as East Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Nile basin. The experience of Eritrea is a case in point.

Third, adding a new state actor to a Nile basin that is already divided between upstream and downstream states could further complicate the hydro-politics of the troubled basin. The new state could make fresh claims regarding the redistribution of Nile waters among riparian states. It could raise further doubts about the loose water regime governing the usage and distribution of water resources in the Nile basin. For this reason alone Egypt, which is almost completely dependent on the Nile's water, is expected to be extremely concerned about the birth of the new state of South Sudan.

For years, the right to self-determination was not among the options Egypt conceived of for settling the conflict in South Sudan. The inclusion of the right to self-determination in the 2005 peace agreement between the government of Sudan and the SPLM invited nervous reaction in Egypt. But Cairo quickly adjusted to the new reality through the consolidation of its relationship with the southerners. Generous incentives have been offered to the provisional government there in the hope of influencing South Sudan's policy and attitudes toward Egypt. Within this new policy, Egypt for the first time has opted for establishing direct links with the South, independent of the Sudanese government in Khartoum.

President Hosni Mubarak's visit to Juba, the capital of South Sudan, in November 2008 was a landmark in Egypt's new policy in the Sudan. Unfortunately, that policy shift was late and therefore not sufficient to reverse the drive toward independence in the South. Consequently, Egyptian policy focused on accommodating the ambitions for independence in the South and sought to lay the groundwork for relations with the future independent state.

Egypt made a complete policy shift in the Sudan. However, signs of reluctance can be detected every now and then. Egypt's official position is still in favor of maintaining Sudan's unity even though it is obvious that the referendum scheduled for January 9 is not likely to bring about such an outcome. Further signs of reluctance can also be found in Egypt's proposal to reestablish the Sudan as a confederation between the North and the South. This came as a reaction to the difficulties facing the Sudanese rivals in working out their differences regarding borders, oil resources, movement of peoples and the administration of the referendum itself. Instead of trying to settle these differences within the framework of the 2005 Naivasha peace agreement, Egypt has in effect sought to bring new food to the dinner table.

This attempt to resurrect Sudan's unity demonstrates the strong impact of Egypt's political legacy and culture on its foreign policy. Further manifestations can be found in other dimensions of Egypt's foreign policy, but the Sudan will continue to be the place where Egypt has to reconcile a changing regional reality with an old national legacy.- Published 25/11/2010 © bitterlemons-international.org

Gamal A. G. Soltan is director of al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo.