• The dilemma of democracy in new Iraq  - Faiza Alaraji
The key to Iraq's future is not in the hands of the Iraqi people anymore.

• Iran-weary Arabs won't be comfortable with a Shiite government in Baghdad  - Hamid Alkifaey
Many believe the current political impasse in Iraq is due to a regional power struggle over control of the country.

• Opportunities for foreign influence  - Safa A. Hussein
It is not difficult to foresee Iraq emerging as an influential regional power.

• Iran's linkages  - Mahjoob Zweiri
Iraq, in Iran's backyard, must not become a source of threat. That is Iran's strategic goal.

The dilemma of democracy in new Iraq
 Faiza Alaraji

When America invaded Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration claimed that they came to liberate Iraq and bring democracy--to make it a shining example in the Middle East.

I believe most Iraqis still remember those rosy promises, and smile with bitterness, wondering to themselves: what kind of democracy have we gained after all our sacrifices?

How many years have we lost since 2003? How many Iraqis were killed? How many millions of dollars were spent?

Now let's talk about the elections in March 2010, when the Iraqi political leaders called for all Iraqis to participate in the elections, to choose the best leaders for the next four years.

As Iraqis we all believed that it was our responsibility to choose good leaders, to be aware and avoid the mistakes of the 2004 and 2005 elections. Back then, sectarian and ethnic parties took the power and the spotlight as representatives of the Iraqi people. But time has shown us that we were misled by those parties, and the country has suffered enough violence and corruption. Now we must start a new era by choosing nationalist leaders, regardless of their ethnicity or sectarian background.

But realistically speaking, this process appears to be very difficult. From March 2010 until now in October, Iraq still has no government.

Political parties and leaders began the debate of who would be prime minister. And who would be the president? Should the prime minister be Shiite or Sunni? Could the president be Arab or Kurd?

This is very frustrating for the Iraqi people, who have tried hard to push the political process from its sectarian and ethnic overlays to be more nationalistic.

Then the situation grew more complicated when Iraqi leaders reached a dead end after months of negotiations.

The neighboring countries started to play roles of their own. It seemed that the key was no longer in the hands of Iraqis, but rather in the hands of Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and possibly Israel as well.

Each country has its special history and experience with Iraq. Some countries, which have had wars with Iraq--such as Iran and Kuwait-- want to be sure that Iraq will never be powerful enough to attack them again. Other countries, which are concerned about their religious role in the region such as Saudi Arabia, are worried that Iraq will be controlled by Iran and Shiite sectarian leaders.

Jordan is also worried about Shiite expansion in the region.

Syria is worried about the Baath party and wants to be sure that no enemies of the party dominate the government in Iraq.

Egypt, as a powerful Arab country, wants to ensure that Iraq is stable and has neutral government that is not extremist, aggressive against its neighbors or part of a coalition with Iran against Arab countries. Egypt is also looking for a passive Iraq, especially with regards to the situation in Palestine, for example. The Arab countries now have a passive attitude toward the problem of Palestine, and if Iraq were to take on a stronger stance like that of Iran it would change the balance in the region.

Turkey is worried about the role of the Kurdistan Labor party on its lands, so Turkey needs a government in Baghdad that is against this party and promises to control its activities near the Turkish border.

Israel definitely wants a friendly government in Iraq, unlike what it saw from the past government of Saddam Hussein.

All those neighbors are now putting their fingers in the Iraqi pie, trying to ensure that the new Iraq will never be as it was in previous decades. At the same time, most of these neighboring countries are not comfortable receiving Iraqi citizens either as workers or visitors as they believe they are a threat to their own national security.

Now, after seven months, the key to Iraq's future is not in the hands of the Iraqi people anymore.

Iraqis are still waiting to see the end of this dilemma, and wondering: why did we sacrifice our lives going to the ballot boxes? Why have international organizations spent $22 million on awareness campaigns in many Iraqi provinces and villages about elections and choosing the appropriate candidate?

If the democratic process passes through our neighboring countries' governments, why should we waste our time and efforts?

Iraq is now a model of instability due to its weak political system. It is based on sectarian and ethnic quotas in all state institutions and this is a big challenge for the future of the Iraqi people--and their neighbors. - Published 28/10/2010 © bitterlemons-international.org

Faiza Alaraji is an Iraqi engineer and mother of three. She has been blogging about her personal experience in Iraq since the American invasion in 2003, and part of her blogs were published as a book, "The Iraq War Blog", in 2008.

Iraq has broken the world record for the time required to form a government, surpassing the Netherlands that in 1977 took 208 days. The March 7 elections were inconclusive, producing a hung parliament with four major blocs, the largest of which is Iraqia of former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. Article 76 of the Iraqi constitution states that the bloc with the most seats forms the government. This means that Allawi should have been asked to form the government.

However the two Shiite lists, State of Law led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (89 seats) and National Alliance led by young cleric Ammar al-Hakim (70 seats), went to the federal court and got a ruling allowing them to join together in a post-election bloc holding the most seats. Iraqia challenged the ruling as "politically motivated", saying it contravenes past parliamentary precedents, and that the existing federal court has no such jurisdiction. This ruling and the two camps' insistence on their right to form the government produced the current impasse.

The Arab world has been highly critical of regime change in Iraq, and opposed the American invasion of the country. It has yet to come to terms with the fact that an Arab regime has been toppled by a foreign power and its opponents installed in power. Another problem is that the democratic regime established in post-invasion Iraq is alien to the region, and many Arab states are wary of its long-term implications in a conflict-prone region. Some regional powers tried, through fair means and foul, to influence events in Iraq. The most influential regional powers in Iraq are believed to be Iran and Syria. Both countries have hosted the opposition to Saddam Hussein's regime, and that opposition is now in government.

Many believe the current political impasse in Iraq is due to a regional power struggle over control of the country. Iran wishes to see a Shiite Islamic government in Baghdad that is in line with its political thinking. Under the current circumstances, such a government can only be led by incumbent Prime Minister Maliki, who wields more power within Shiite circles than any other Islamic leader. While this option might also be acceptable to Iran's main regional ally, Syria, it is anathema to the Arab order in general, which favors an Arab-leaning secular government led by Allawi.

The new post-election Shiite bloc is still deeply divided on who should lead the alliance and then the government. The largest component of the alliance, State of Law, has a tested strong leader in Prime Minister Maliki. The other components, mainly the Sadrist Trend led by firebrand young cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq (ISCI), led by Ammar al-Hakim, have opposed Maliki's candidacy. They both hold grievances against him. The Sadrists say he killed and imprisoned many of their followers, while Hakim says that Maliki's rule over the last four years has been dictatorial, and that he never consulted with those allies who installed him in power. Both parties wanted a different candidate.

However, the Sadrists have finally agreed to support Maliki, yielding to pressure believed to be from Iran, where their leader now pursues his theological studies. Syria also appears to have changed its position on this matter and now appears to support a second term for Maliki. But Hakim, who is adamant in his opposition to Maliki, went so far as to form an alliance with Allawi, which vehemently opposes the renewal of Maliki's term.

Events have moved fast in the last three weeks, and even Iraqia appears to be shifting its position away from its previous insistence on what it calls its "constitutional right" to form the government. It seems that, after giving up hope of forming the government, Iraqia now contemplates supporting ISCI's candidate, Vice President Adil Abdul Mahdi. Amid all this political manoeuvring, the Kurdistan Alliance has emerged as kingmaker. Negotiations have intensified over the last two weeks between the two rival Arab camps, led by Allawi and Maliki, and the Kurdish Alliance, led by Masoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan Regional Government. The Kurds have submitted a list of 19 demands to be met by their prospective partners. Maliki has accepted them all and given this in writing, according to news reports. He has even obtained the approval of Muqtada Sadr. Iraqia is also looking at these demands favourably since accepting them is the only way to get Kurdish backing. Despite all their good relations with Allawi, and even if he accepts all their 19-point paper, the Kurds do not seem to be ready to end their traditional and historic alliance with the Shiite Islamists. This tendency may lead them to favor a pact with Maliki.

The Arab world has been holding its breath. Many Arab countries were waiting, most of them passively, for the outcome of this power struggle between Iraqi factions. Although numerous Arab countries have re-established relations with Iraq and seem to be willing to deal with whoever is in power there, many others are still of two minds. Iraq has been an important player in Arab political and economic affairs and many countries depend on Iraqi oil, or trade for their economic well-being. Arab states, mostly Sunni, won't be very comfortable with an Islamic Shiite government in Baghdad, which is likely to be led by Maliki, who has been critical of the policies of many Arab states toward his country. Iran-weary Arabs won't trust or cooperate with such a government, even though they may deal with it. Sunni-Shiite relations have been marred with mistrust and doubt over the years. It's a centuries-old religious-political schism that can only be healed if religion is kept out of politics, a somewhat far-fetched prospect given current discord and rivalries. -Published 28/10/2010 © bitterlemons-international.org

Hamid Alkifaey is a writer and journalist. He was the first government spokesman of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq and founder-leader of the Movement for Democratic Society. Currently, he is researching democratization at the University of Exeter in the UK.

If government formation in Iraq is to be compared with that of other countries, the two most distinguishing characteristics of the Iraqi case would be the lengthy time involved and the influence of foreign countries.

Since the March 7, 2010 national elections, the number of visits by Iraqi political leaders and delegations to countries in the region has been phenomenal. The daily headlines regularly report on meetings between Iraqi politicians and leaders from the region. Nor is it uncommon to see on television a politician who tries to justify his own or his party members' visits to foreign countries while simultaneously accusing his opponents of compromising Iraq's interests in the course of their visits to recruit foreign support. In a TV interview, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki remarked that the influence of regional countries on Iraqi political parties generates complications in the government formation process because of the conflicting interests of these countries. Politicians from diverse political parties differ on many things, but not on this remark.

After the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, most regional Arab countries did not welcome political change in Iraq. Still, they chose to be passive observers. Iran and Turkey, on the other hand, engaged Iraq very actively, though in different ways. As the security situation in Iraq improved in 2008, the Arab countries, realizing that Iraq had survived and that they would miss the train because of their non-engagement policy, began to interact with Iraq. Their ultimate objective was to influence the Iraqi national elections and attempt to place their allies in key government positions. To the casual observer, Iraq's political space now looks like a political chess board, with many players: the US, Iran, Turkey and the Arab states.

That said, the picture is not as gloomy as it may seem, for three reasons. Firstly, foreign influence on Iraqi political parties has its limits. It is true that each major foreign player in Iraq can put a stick in the wheels of a candidate it opposes. But it is also true that no single foreign player is able alone to maneuver its ally into winning a race. The United States with all its resources did not succeed in bringing the Iraqia list into an alliance with the State of Law list to form a government as it had planned. Nor do Washington's plans to keep the Sadrists out of key government positions appear to be working. Iran, the second big player in Iraq, failed to make the Shiite parties unite and nominate a single candidate for prime minister. Iran's closest Iraqi ally, the Islamic Supreme Council, is now the major obstacle to Iran's plan for government formation. Then too, the Arab countries' plan to maneuver Iraqia leader Iyad Allawi into the prime minister's post is now widely estimated to be infeasible.

Secondly, over the long term, mutual influence between Iraq and regional and other foreign countries will be determined by economic and geopolitical facts, not by opportunities for intervention in Iraq created by the current political divide. It is not difficult to foresee Iraq emerging as an influential regional power within the next few years.

Thirdly, foreign engagement and intervention in Iraqi government formation, with all its negative impact, brings with it an opportunity to improve Iraq's relations with the region once the government is formed. Each political party realizes now more than ever that it needs good relations with all or most of the region's countries if it is going to have a shot at government leadership. Thus, the Iraqia bloc--which is supported by some regional countries--first led an anti-Iran election campaign, then, after the election, began to build bridges to Iran through visits there as well as meetings with the Iranian ambassador in Baghdad.

Iraqis also witnessed Shiite leaders visiting Amman, Damascus, Cairo and other Arab capitals. Generally, the visits aimed to build confidence and gain acceptance by these countries of the Shiite leaders' anticipated roles in the government to be formed. Such outreach activities and partisan and personal-relations building will widen the opportunity of establishing better relations between Iraq and these countries once the government is formed, given that most if not all of these parties will be part of it.

Even before the formation of a government, some positive signs of improved relations with the neighbors have appeared on the horizon. Iraqi officials have reconfirmed Iraq's commitment to recognizing international borders and funding its share in constructing or reconstructing border markers. Kuwait has welcomed this position and expressed its support for Iraq's effort to have Chapter 7 lifted by the United Nations.

PM Maliki's visit to Syria melted the ice between the two countries. An initial agreement to repair and/or construct oil pipelines from Iraq to the Mediterranean Sea through Syria opened a new horizon of strategic economic relations between the two countries.

According to rumors, Iraqia bloc chief Iyad Allawi promised Iranians to build them bridges to the Arabs in the region, using his good personal relations. And though the Saudis remains a challenge, the formation of a representative government in Baghdad may make them, too, change their mind.- Published 28/10/2010 © bitterlemons-international.org


Safa A. Hussein is a former deputy member of the dissolved Iraqi Governing Council. He served as a brigadier general in the Iraqi Air Force. Currently he serves in the Iraqi National Security Council.

More than seven months after the Iraqi parliamentary elections, no government has been formed in Baghdad. Questions regarding the delay are increasingly relevant, yet with the passage of time, the answers have become more and more complicated.

Any attempt to understand the delay must take into consideration two main factors. The first is the nature of the political system created after the occupation. The assumption was that a division of power would facilitate the stabilizing of democracy in Iraq and make it work. That concept has not only failed; it has plunged the country into sectarian violence.

The second factor is the geopolitics of Iraq. This includes the role of neighboring countries in shaping Iraq's internal politics. Since June 2006, the month when al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed, Iran has increasingly been seen as the main player or even main troublemaker in Iraq. It was the United States that needed to shift responsibility for the violence from al-Qaeda to Iran. The George W. Bush administration was originally fascinated with what it perceived as a strong link between the so-called "war on terror" and the war in Iraq; this enabled it to deflect criticism of the legitimacy of the war in Iraq. Yet everything the American administration tried to avoid in Iraq eventually happened, and day by day the issue of the legality of the war became more central. Hence the switch to the centrality of Iran.

Meanwhile, the Iraqi government and some American security circles have also blamed Syria and Saudi Arabia for instability in Iraq, while Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, as well as the United States, believe that Iran is the main neighboring country behind the insecurity in Iraq. All this has made the security of the entire region more vulnerable.

Iran's impact on the internal Iraqi political scene has shaped the dynamic of the Iraqi political process. This makes Iran an unavoidable player in recent and current Iraqi political developments. Iran planned for such a role; it persuaded Washington and London to respect its interests in the new Iraq back in December 2002, when both countries wanted Iran on board before embarking on the war. Iran's calculations were sharp and clear: Iraq, in Iran's backyard, must not become a source of threat. That is Iran's strategic goal.

Of course, this does not mean that Iran has the same level of influence over all forces in Iran: not all Iraqi Shiites are Tehran's "yes persons". Still, if Iran is at the core of the debate over forming the new Iraqi government and exercises one degree or another of strong influence over Iraqi Shiite politicians, we can legitimately ask why a new Iraqi government has not yet been formed? The answer is that Tehran has not always used its influence, and by not using it, has in fact confirmed the importance of its role.

The seven month-long impasse regarding formation of a new Iraqi government demonstrates that the United States lacks the necessary power or will in Iraq as well. The Obama administration seems to be more focused on the timely withdrawal of American troops and "leaving Iraq to the Iraqis." Washington is becoming less interested in influencing the Iraqi political elite. The explanation for this phenomenon goes back to the Status of Forces Agreement, considered the starting point for a new chapter in relations between the United States and Iraq. In other words, the US feels it has guaranteed its own interests in Iraq and no longer seeks to influence the core of the relationship.

It will not be surprising if the deadlock continues until Iran, in keeping with its approach toward the Iraqi situation, decides to make a real effort to end it. That effort will in turn reflect the linkage Iran draws between unsolved issues in Iraq on the one hand, and its own unsolved issues with the US on the other--beginning with the nuclear dilemma.- Published 28/10/2010 © bitterlemons-international.org

Mahjoob Zweiri is assistant professor of the contemporary history of the Middle East at Qatar University.