BI: There has been a lot of controversy over the fact that Egypt is building a wall on its border to Gaza. What is your position?

Abusada: This wall comes more than two-and-a-half years after Hamas took over Gaza. Palestinians in Gaza have broken across the border en masse twice, once right after the Israeli disengagement in 2005 and another time in January 2008.

The Egyptians are clearly not happy with how things are unfolding at the border. They say that in addition to food and commodities, weapons, drugs and even people are being smuggled back and forth. So Cairo wants to protect its border.

Certainly, Egypt is also under intense American pressure to control its border and there is pressure from within Egypt. There are elements in the Egyptian government that want much stricter rules regarding the border.

I also think the wall is a form of punishment for Hamas, after the Islamist movement refused to sign the Egyptian-brokered unity agreement with Fateh.

BI: So there are a number of factors playing a role in Egypt's decision?

Abusada: That's right.

BI: But it's not just any border. Gaza is under blockade and Egypt is the only way out. Does this not figure in Cairo's calculation?

Abusada: I agree it's not a normal border. Gaza has been under severe sanction for the past four years, a blockade that was only tightened after Hamas seized control of Gaza. Egypt has come under intense criticism from Arab and Muslim public opinion for erecting this wall. But Egypt is a sovereign country and has the right to do what it wants on its side of the border.

However, I think Cairo needs to find a solution to the 1.5 million Palestinians trapped in Gaza with nowhere to go, under sanction and isolated. If Egypt wants to put an end to the smuggling between Gaza and Egypt I think the Rafah crossing needs to be opened officially for longer than the three days a month it is currently open.

BI: But there is still an issue of Israeli occupation over Gaza, isn't there?

Abusada: Yes. This is a very important and critical issue. According to international law, Israel continues to be the occupying power over Gaza, even though it withdrew its troops and settlers in 2005. Israel is besieging the Gaza Strip from air, sea and land and it is Israel's responsibility, not Egypt's, to supply Gaza with food and medicine and other basic necessities.

Instead of putting pressure on Egypt, the pressure must be put on Israel, which is responsible for the suffering in Gaza. Israel is trying to throw the Gaza problem into Egypt's hands. Egypt is aware of this and that is why Cairo has been very careful.

Egypt has enough problems and doesn't want more from Gaza with its poverty and extremism. Second, Egypt considers the Gaza Strip and the West Bank as one territorial unit and any solution must be comprehensive and should not separate the two areas, the way Israel is trying.

Unfortunately, Hamas, whether knowingly or unknowingly, is playing into the hands of Israel by putting pressure on Egypt rather than Israel. Israel is the occupying power and is responsible for the welfare of the people under its occupation. Egypt does not want this responsibility for Gaza, nor should it have it.

BI: How great an immediate effect will the wall have on Gaza?

Abusada: Since the boycott and siege of Gaza, hundreds of commodities have crossed from Egypt into Gaza through smuggling tunnels, the only way they can come. Basic food items and most medicines, by and large, come from Israel. But those tunnels have been the lifeline for Gaza for the past several years and if Egypt closes them it will have a dramatic effect on Gazans.

Let me give you one example. Lately, cement has been smuggled through, which means some reconstruction projects have gotten under way. At al-Azhar University we are building new classrooms, since we don't have enough. This, of course, will have to stop if smuggling ends.

If Egypt manages to seal the borders, the effect on Gaza will be immense.- Published 14/1/2010 © bitterlemons-international.org

Mkhaimar Abusada is professor of political science at Al-Azhar University, Gaza.

In the course of the past two weeks, the relationship between Egypt and the Hamas government in Gaza has deteriorated and their latent conflict has become public. The concrete reason for this state of affairs is two decisions taken by the Egyptian government.

The first was a decision to build a new metal wall that penetrates deep into the ground along the Gaza border with the purpose of preventing smuggling from Sinai into the Gaza Strip both above and below ground, through tunnels. The second decision was first to delay and then to prevent the entrance into Gaza of the better part of a large convoy of trucks and a delegation organized by western pro-Hamas organizations to break the so-called "siege" of Gaza. These two decisions led to verbal recriminations between the two sides as well as to violent clashes at El Arish in Sinai and along Egypt's border with Gaza in which an Egyptian soldier was killed by a Palestinian sniper.

Ever since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in 2007, Egypt has had difficulty formulating a coherent policy to deal with the resultant dangers. Cairo's basic attitude toward Hamas as an offshoot and a branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is very wary. The Egyptian Brethren present the greatest challenge to the Egyptian regime, hence the existence of a territory ruled by a sister movement on Egypt's border is a problem: it can serve as a model and a base of operations in Egypt itself, and it threatens Egyptian sovereignty--as manifested in January 2008 by the breaching of an Israeli-built Gaza-Sinai border wall and the inflow of many thousands of Gazans to the Egyptian side.

The close relationship that has developed between Hamas and Iran/Hizballah has only strengthened the perception of the threat posed by Hamas, especially after the uncovering in Egypt of Hizballah cells that were part of a network smuggling weapons to Gaza. Evidence that these cells were planning attacks inside Egypt brought home to the Egyptians that their worst nightmare was coming true: Gaza was becoming an internal Egyptian security problem.

These recent developments prompted a change in the way Egypt dealt with the problem. Until recently, Egypt was looking for a political solution. It invested heavily in mediation attempts aimed at achieving a reconciliation agreement between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. The idea was to for the PA to resume control over Gaza in exchange for Hamas having a share in the PA government and its institutions. As time passed and reconciliation attempts failed, the Egyptians narrowed down their compromise suggestions to the bare minimum needed to enable some sort of modus vivendi between Hamas and the PA in Gaza, but Hamas rejected even these proposals.

Egypt did not hesitate to apply pressure on Hamas throughout this mediation process. It deployed a carrot and stick policy in which the border regime between Egypt and Gaza was an important tool--opening and closing the Rafah crossing and fine-tuning policy toward smuggling operations in accordance with developments in negotiations. Now the Egyptians appear to have concluded that reconciliation efforts are not going to bear fruit any time soon and they have to adopt sterner policies vis-a-vis the Hamas government in Gaza.

The first expression of this newly assertive policy is tough counter-smuggling measures. Egypt understands, particularly after the war in Gaza a year ago, that the smuggling of weapons into Gaza is both highly destabilizing and a source of growing Hamas self-confidence. Stopping the smuggling will weaken Hamas, decrease its self- confidence and make it more dependent on Egypt. It will also render it much more difficult for Iran and Hizballah to aid Hamas. In recent months, Egyptian security forces were unusually active in uncovering and destroying smuggling tunnels. The new metal wall will add to the effectiveness of their operation.

The other steps include sanctions against Hamas in the form of strong restrictions on movement through the Rafah crossing and on the presence in Egypt of persons considered close to Hamas. This even includes the expulsion of relatives of Hamas figures studying in Egypt.

Hamas has raised the level of its anti-Egyptian rhetoric but faces a dilemma. Its leaders fully understand just how dependent they are on Egypt as long as the alternative conduits to Gaza are controlled by Israel. And of course Egypt is an important political power in the Arab world. Hence Hamas must exercise caution not to burn its bridges with Egypt.

In parallel, in Egypt there is some concern that its tough new steps could be used by Islamists to attack and weaken the regime. But regime control appears to be solid enough to deal with the challenge.

The main risk is that a weakened Hamas that feels under pressure from all sides will turn to violence as the only option left. Recent exchanges of fire with Israel may indicate that this is a serious option. Violence would not be an easy decision insofar as Hamas was deterred by its poor showing in the last war. But deterrence, in principle, is less effective against a desperate enemy.

Finally, it remains to be seen how persistent the Egyptians can be with their new policies--especially when the Arab-Israel peace process is frozen and Cairo's actions can be interpreted as collaborating with the "Israeli enemy". This factor will probably continue to hinder cooperation between Israel and Egypt in dealing with Hamas in Gaza.- Published 14/1/2010 © bitterlemons-international.org

Brig. Gen. (ret.) Shlomo Brom is a senior research associate at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv.

No more ad hoc arrangements. This is the message Egypt is sending to Hamas and the other relevant parties by setting up a fortified barrier along Egypt's border with the Gaza Strip.

The Egyptian move marks the end of an era in Egypt's policy toward Gaza and Hamas. In 2005, when Israel was getting ready to evacuate Gaza, Egypt demanded that the Israeli redeployment include the border region or "philadelphi strip" separating Egypt from Gaza. This was the first time since 1967 that Egypt had a direct land link with a Palestinian territory with no Israeli mediation. Egypt sought maximum possible maneuverability in conducting its relations with the narrow Gaza Strip. The arrangements made in 2005 helped enhance Egypt's role in Palestinian politics.

Developments in the ensuing years, however, have rendered Gaza a liability rather than an asset. Following Hamas' victory in Palestine's legislative elections of 2006 and the Islamists' takeover in Gaza the following year, Hamas became Egypt's neighbor. While Egypt's border with Gaza granted Cairo effective leverage against the radical Islamic organization, Hamas was also given an opportunity to press Egypt in exchange.

The past two years have witnessed complex maneuvers between Egypt and the Hamas government in Gaza. While Egypt has tried to accommodate Hamas so that Palestinian unity could be restored, Hamas sought to consolidate its grip on power in Gaza and enhance its position in Palestinian politics. Egypt employed tactics of cooptation and containment while Hamas was buying time, hoping it could exploit opportunities as they arose.

The Egyptian strategy reached deadlock when Hamas defied Cairo's efforts to reconcile rival Palestinian factions. Hamas' ability to balance its commitments toward its radical allies in Tehran and Damascus with the need to avoid alienating its big neighbor came to an end: Egypt chose not to continue the game of running in circles in its relations with Hamas. It was Hamas' reluctance that provoked Egypt to change course. Hamas' policy made it look as if it were taking Egypt for granted; Cairo realized the time had come to send Hamas a strong message.

For the past year, Egypt has been determined to put an end to Hamas' tunnels enterprise. It sought to address the standing issues in Gaza so that it could take its relations with Hamas to the next level. Egypt mediated between Israel and Hamas toward renewal of a ceasefire and an exchange of prisoners. These along with Palestinian reconciliation talks were designed to help stabilize the situation in Gaza so that Egypt could improve border security at a low political cost. Egypt sought a successful conclusion of the three mediated tracks of talks so that the situation in Gaza could be normalized until the time came for a final peace deal between the Palestinians and Israel.

The months-long negotiations, however, did not produce any positive results. Even though various parties shared responsibility for their failure, it was Hamas that was most reluctant to demonstrate the needed flexibility.

Egypt had to choose between proceeding with its plan to secure its Gaza border or putting the plan on hold until the situation in Gaza stabilized. But postponement of border security plans would play into Hamas' hands and allow a Palestinian faction to have a say in Egypt's security plans. The Egyptian decision was to go ahead with the border security barrier regardless of the situation in Gaza.

Thus the failure of national reconciliation talks in Gaza prompted Egypt to begin applying plan B in its dealings with Hamas. The new policy includes less accommodation and more pressure. Partly tolerating the tunnels had been an integral aspect of the earlier policy of accommodation. Shutting them down is an important instrument for forcing Hamas to deal seriously with hard realities. Egypt's harsh policy toward the Viva Palestina convoy is also part of the new policy. No more will such convoys be allowed; all aid supplies should be channeled through Egyptian official channels. This is Egypt's new policy regarding politically motivated convoys of humanitarian aid.

The new policy is a way to make Hamas realize the hard realities of power and geography. Hamas reacted to it with a mixture of reluctance and cooperative gestures. A short-lived period of intensified tension on the Gaza borders was an attempt by Hamas to deter Egypt from carrying out the border security plan. Repeated positive gestures from Hamas leaders and spokesmen regarding the possibility of signing the reconciliation deal with their Fateh rivals in Cairo were also made in an attempt to persuade Egypt not to go ahead with its escalated security plans. These tactics do not appear to be working; Hamas seemingly has to come up with new policy directions.

The tight new controls on the Egypt-Gaza border should redirect Hamas toward paying more attention to the Strip's border with Israel. It is no coincidence that tension is increasing across Gaza's Israel border while Egypt is tightening the screws on Hamas. Escalation with Israel is meant to create circumstances not conducive to completion of Egypt's plan of enhancing its border control.

Driving Hamas into a corner could force the radical Islamic organization into either moderation or new adventures. Plan C will be badly needed should Hamas opt for the latter.- Published 14/1/2010 © bitterlemons-international.org

Gamal A. G. Soltan is director of al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo.