• Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey  - Saad N. Jawad
Turkey prefers to deal with a strong central Iraqi government rather than a federal Kurdish authority.

• A new beginning  - Ibrahim Kalin
Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish leaders seem to have finally realized the benefits of acting wisely.

• A changing environment  - Khaled Salih
Erdogan's initiative could adapt elements of the British, Spanish or Belgian systems.

Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey
 Saad N. Jawad

Following the end of World War I and the division of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurdish areas were re-divided between modern Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, with further enclaves inside the old Soviet Union. Soon the Kurdish areas of the new state of Iraq, mainly the old Ottoman Wilayat of Mosul, became a bone of contention between Turkey and Iraq.

Turkey claimed the whole of the Mosul Wilayat, which included the majority of Iraq's Kurds. The matter was finally settled by the League of Nations, which rejected Turkish claims. Turkey grudgingly accepted the decision but still had to be pacified with Iraqi compensation. (It is not surprising that the Turkish government until now occasionally claims the Mosul Wilayat whenever it feels that the Iraqi state is weak and unable to defend its northern borders.)

Turkey waged a tough war against Kurdish uprisings in the southeastern part of Turkey. It called Kurds "Mountain Turks" and refused them any political, social or cultural rights. It was not until 1930 that the Turkish government was able to militarily end the Kurdish uprisings and resistance. And while the Iraqi government had a similar experience, successive Turkish governments were unhappy about the amount of freedom and official recognition Iraq's Kurds got. They felt this would only encourage their own Kurdish populations to ask for the same. Conversely, the Turks were always happy to cooperate with Iraq to crush any Kurdish uprising whenever they were asked.

By contrast, Turkish politicians always showed their concern and support for the Iraqi Turkoman community living in the oil rich province of Kirkuk, which was also part of the old Mosul Wilayat. Turkish fears for that community have increased in tandem with the fortunes of Kurdish nationalism in Iraqi Kurdistan, which have gone from decentralization to autonomy and lately to federal statehood. Thus, Turkish fears increased again following the US occupation of Iraq in 2003. Without a central Iraqi government, Iraqi Kurdish influence would increase, not only over Kurdish areas but over Iraq itself. To add to Turkey's concerns were the activities of the PKK, the Kurdish Workers Party, and the assistance they were getting from inside Iraqi Kurdistan including being offered safe shelter inside northern Iraq. This enabled PKK fighters to revive their armed activities in southeastern Turkey.

The Turkish solution was to wage a massive attack on targets in northeastern Iraq where PKK fighters were hiding, with tensions at times escalated to include threats to the Kurdish regional government and the two political parties dominating it. Since then, Turkey has tried to improve relations with the central government and encourage it to take full control of all Iraqi territory, though this policy has proved hard to pursue due to the influence Kurdish parties wield inside the government. In an extreme change of policy, Ankara also tried to open a dialogue and improve relations with the regional government. Nevertheless, it is obvious that Turkey is uneasy about the growing power and influence of Iraq's Kurds. Turkey prefers to deal with a strong central Iraqi government rather than a federal Kurdish authority. Turkey is also uneasy about the strong relations between the federal Kurdish authority and the United States and Israel.

Clearly, Turkey is not prepared to accept a semi-independent or fully autonomous Kurdish region or state on its southern border, as some Iraqi Kurdish leaders are aiming for. This will remain the main concern for Turkey and it will increase as long as the rising power and influence of the Iraqi Kurds and the growing weakness of the central Iraqi government continue.

Indeed, on several occasions Turkey has threatened to invade Iraqi Kurdistan, as it did repeatedly in the 1990s to put an end to rising Iraqi Kurdish expectations. Some Iraqi politicians have already shown tacit support for such a move, but it will likely be opposed by the US and Israel, since it would defy the former and represent an important and unacceptable step to re-establishing a stable and able central government in Iraq to the latter.- Published 10/12/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org


Saad N. Jawad is a professor of political science at Baghdad University.

After several years of acute tensions, there is an accelerating rapprochement between Turkey and the Kurds of Iraq. This new policy comes as part of a new initiative by the ruling Justice and Development Party to find a lasting solution to Turkey's decades' old Kurdish issue. It is also an extension of the policy of zero-problems with neighbors, a policy Turkey has been pursuing with all of its neighbors including Syria, Greece and Armenia. While an improved state of relations between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds is a welcome development, it also presents a number of challenges and opportunities for the future of Iraq, the Kurdish issue in the region, and Turkey's own process of democratization.

Turkey has historically been aware of the Kurdish issue in Iraq. Turgut Ozal (d. 1993), the eighth Turkish president, was the first highest-ranking Turkish leader to publicly welcome the Kurdish leaders of Iraq in Turkey in the early 1990s. As part of a policy of embracing all the Kurds in the region, Ozal developed warm relations with the two Kurdish leaders Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani to the point of giving them Turkish passports when Saddam Hussein cracked down on the Kurds in Iraq. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds took refuge in Turkey when they were attacked by Saddam's forces in the 1980s and 1990s. Ozal largely succeeded in turning the Iraqi Kurds, the second largest Kurdish group in the Middle East, into an opportunity rather than a threat for Turkey.

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a turning point. Acting with a sense of triumph but also insecurity, the Iraqi Kurds took a hostile attitude toward Turkey, which refused to be part of George W. Bush's Iraq war. Some Kurdish circles interpreted Turkey's concerns over the territorial unity of Iraq as a refusal to recognize the Kurds' new gains in Iraq. The Bush administration followed policies that encouraged Iraqi Kurdish aspirations for independence but they turned out to have disastrous consequences for all Iraqis. By contrast, Turkey sees the disintegration of Iraq and the weakening of its central government as a major threat to all Iraqi groups including the Kurds. Furthermore, Turkey's security concerns over the terrorist activities of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in northern Iraq and the policy of inaction by Erbil until recently have further created mistrust between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds. Finally, the row over the status of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk is another point of contention between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds. But over the last two years, the Kirkuk issue has also caused major rifts between Baghdad and Erbil.

Turks and Iraqi Kurds are moving fast to address these issues through open diplomacy and dialogue. Several verbal gestures by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and President of the Kurdistan Regional Government Massoud Barzani were followed by the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu together with the trade minister Zafer Caglayan to Erbil on October 31, 2009. The choice of the two ministers was not random: Turkey wants to engage the KRG through diplomacy and trade. The Iraqi Kurdish leaders express greater understanding of Turkey's security concerns over the PKK installments in northern Iraq. They have pledged to help Turkey evacuate the Mahmur camp, a refugee camp populated by about 12,000 Kurds from Turkey who had fled the country in the 1990s because of the fierce fighting between the PKK and the Turkish armed forces. The final status of Kirkuk remains a point of tension but it looks like Erbil realizes that a full annexation of Kirkuk to the KRG will create more problems than it will bring benefits to Iraqi Kurds.

The future of relations between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds will be determined by four principles that Turkey has outlined in its relations with all of its neighbors. The first principle is security for all. An insecure and unstable Middle East will only create further disenfranchisement and conflict in the region. A comprehensive regional security perspective is needed to avoid zero-sum games. This applies mutadis mutandis to Turkish-Iraqi Kurdish relations. The second principle is the territorial integrity of all countries in the region. Maps in the Middle East have been drawn and redrawn too many times to produce any lasting results. Any change in the map of Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Iran or any other country will only trigger further territorial conflicts. Iraq must maintain its territorial integrity with an effective political capital.

The third principle is economic integration. This is a key element for political stability and social harmony across the Middle East. Economic interdependence could be a safety valve against fantasy policies in the region. Turkey has already made some major strides in this venue. There are more than 400 Turkish companies doing business in the KRG and business continues to boom. Iraqi Kurds love Turkish products for both their quality and their political relevance. The fourth principle that will shape the relations between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds is the deepening of social and cultural relations among the peoples. The religious, historical and cultural ties between the Kurds of Turkey and Iraq as well as with the general Turkish public are an important asset for fostering a new social imagery in the region. The Kurdish broadcasting TV channel TRT 6, a publicly funded media outlet in Turkey, serves not only the Kurds of Turkey but also those of Iraq. Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the father of Massoud Barzani, is a household name among many Turkish Kurds who see him not only as a Kurdish leader but also as a spiritual guide.

The new rapprochement between Ankara and Erbil presents numerous opportunities. A strong and prosperous Iraq where Kurds and others exercise their cultural and political rights is of vital importance for peace and stability in the region. A Turkey that has made peace with its Kurds can further contribute to regional security and prosperity. Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish leaders seem to have finally realized the benefits of acting wisely.- Published 10/12/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Ibrahim Kalin, Ph. D., is a faculty member at the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University and chief advisor to the prime minister of Turkey.

In October 2004, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan opined that "there is nothing permanent except change. Give Turkey three years, and it will be a totally different country. Whatever happens we are going to change."

In fact, it was in 2009 that Erdogan's government took the initiative to start a process that most probably will bring about major change in Turkey's Kurdish policy. The current government is clearly serious about the desirability and usefulness of a dialogue to bring about such change. One clear element in this on-going process is the realization that in the current climate of mistrust, neither the government nor civil society can contribute to a viable and constructive policy change without creating a new climate based on trust. The discussions and debates of the past few months are designed to create that new environment. Changes in attitude and in the tone of the discussions and debates are already visible both inside and outside Turkey.

Erdogan's government has made clear that the country needs a new, strong and inclusive vision in order to effectively deliver the new initiative. This new vision seems to entail a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish issue that will increase stability in the country and enhance democratic governance. The government seems to be fully aware of the fact that strengthening liberal democratic legislation, standards and values with also help the country's relationship with the European Union and boost the accession process. If and when this initiative is implemented satisfactorily, we will witness a transformation in which Kurds in Turkey view themselves as citizens rather than subjects.

At this juncture, Turkey appears likely to adopt a combination of democratization and decentralization in which the unitary nature of the Turkish state remains its main characteristic. In this context, a decentralization mechanism will devolve powers to administrative units without recognizing group identities. Centralist state tradition and the fear of breaking up the country will be used to justify such an approach. But the evidence provided by genuinely democratizing countries that are linked to EU mechanisms of regional cooperation will undermine such reasoning. Spain and Greece provide two examples that mitigate against traditional resistance to reforms and democratization based on shallow arguments and the exploitation of fear.

Thus, Turkey can combine democratization and decentralization with the recognition of group identities. Loyalty to the state and its institutions would be based on the notion of democratic citizenship in which shared interests, values and necessity would not only keep the state and its institutions together but strengthen the ties and links for the benefit of all groups in Turkey. References to historical traditions of recognition in the Middle East and the decentralized characteristics of the Ottoman past can serve this purpose. So can contemporary European models such as arrangements in the UK to meet Scottish, Welsh, and Irish national aspirations.

Another possibility is to look closely into the Spanish constitutional revolution of 1978. Spain has become increasingly federal in everything but name. Politicians have recognized the need to integrate democracy and decentralization with recognition of historical nationalities. The 1978 Spanish constitution created a decentralized, democratic political order in Spain that political scientists characterize as "a pluri-national and multilingual state". The most interesting element of developments in Spain is the recognition of the need to build self-government into the fabric of the new polity by recognizing the unity of the nation (or more appropriately the state) as well as the right to autonomy of nationalities and regions. The right to self-government of municipalities, provinces and autonomous communities has in fact strengthened both democracy and stability in Spain through a mechanism and process of differentiation of the country's previously unitary state structure. More than two decades of negotiations and agreements have reinforced self-government and power sharing with the regions, adopting federal arrangements.

Local and regional units' rights to make decisions independent of central government supervision and control have contributed to deepening constitutional democracy in Spain. The political redistribution of power between Madrid and 17 autonomous regions has given the three historic nationalities in the Basque country, Catalonia and Galicia their own statute of autonomy tailored to their particular situation. In each case, the "central" government and the autonomous regions have a range of exclusive powers but also function jointly in several spheres.

Turkey can also learn from developments in Belgium, although this model might be regarded as too radical a departure from the Turkish state tradition. The Belgian federation (since 1993) is based on three territorially-defined regions (Flemish, Brussels-Capital and Walloon [French]), and three non-territorial language-based communities (Flemish, French and German-speaking). Distribution of exclusive powers is between the federal government and two other kinds of governments: while the three territorially-delineated governments are mainly responsible for regional economic matters, the three non-territorial communities are mainly responsible for linguistic and cultural matters.

Erdogan's democratic/Kurdish initiative could adapt elements of the British, Spanish or Belgian systems into its own restructured and transformed political system. Under liberal democratic conditions this could be achieved without overtly opting for federalization of the country.- Published 10/12/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org


Khaled Salih is an independent analyst and consultant based in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. He is former senior advisor to the prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government.