• Interests aligning  - Ashraf Khalil
It's becoming harder for Cairo to hide the fact that its foreign policy interests are more in line with Tel Aviv than ever.

• Overcoming the constraints  - James A. Larocco
Egypt is not even a priority to the Israel Defense Forces.

• Egypt wants to remain a regional player  - an interview with Mustafa al-Sawwaf
The tense relations between the Egyptian leadership and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are reflected in relations between Egypt and Gaza.

• The elusive alliance  - Ephraim Sneh
The immediate order of the day is to formulate a shared strategy for ending Hamas rule in Gaza.

Interests aligning
 Ashraf Khalil

The Israelis like to call it the "cold peace". The Egyptians would rather not call it anything at all because that would admit there's actually something there to name.

For years the exact extent of political and economic cooperation between the two neighbors has been a subject of hot-button speculation and the occasional press campaign in Cairo. The government of President Hosni Mubarak, whose predecessor Anwar Sadat signed the 1978 Camp David accords, generally tries to keep the specifics of the two countries' relationship low-key, only admitting it when things become too obvious to deny.

"An Israeli is not the type of person that you want all your neighbors to know you're dating," chuckled Menachim Klein, a former Israeli negotiator and Bar-Ilan University political science professor.

Several years ago, a former agriculture minister fended off a prolonged opposition media campaign calling him a secret normalizer for his ministry's working relationship with its Israeli counterpart. Popular reaction was straight out of the movie Casablanca: people were shocked to discover something that most regional observers already saw as patently obvious. More recently, the local press has accused the government of selling natural gas to Israel for sweetheart prices.

Egyptians in general do know that there are extensive economic and agricultural ties with Israel, but prefer not to think too hard about it. (A personal example: when I first moved to Jerusalem in February 2008 as a correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, my Egyptian relatives were genuinely curious as to what route I used to visit Cairo. They honestly had no idea that there are multiple EgyptAir and El Al flights every week between Cairo and Tel Aviv.)

But now, something seems to be changing in the usual don't ask/don't tell nature of the Egyptian-Israeli partnership. It's becoming harder for Cairo to hide the fact that its foreign policy interests are more in line with Tel Aviv than ever. The main source of common ground is a mutual desire to contain Iran's regional and nuclear ambitions. Both governments have arrived at this place via different routes. Israel fears an Iranian nuclear capability will challenge its own (nominally secret) nuclear arsenal and open the door to a devastating attack on the Jewish state. Egypt doesn't fear Iran militarily, but dreads the gradual expansion of revolutionary Shi'ite ideology into the Sunni sphere.

Egypt's own bilateral relations with Tehran are fraught with tension--partially stemming from Iran's insistence on glorifying Sadat's assassins. "The way Iran acts has actually pulled (Egypt and Israel) closer together," said Meir Javedanfar, an Iranian-born Israeli political analyst.

This common interest has already produced some interesting public displays of cooperation. Earlier this summer, an Israeli submarine passed through the Suez Canal from the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, touching off a weeklong media firestorm in Egypt. Israeli warships have traversed the canal for years, but this was the first submarine passage. The hype surrounding the event was only intensified by the fact that no one seems to know for sure the exact capabilities of the German-made Dolphin class sub.

Egyptian officials were generally tight-lipped, saying that the two countries have a peace treaty and the canal is open for all nations. But Israeli media openly declared the passage a coordinated message aimed directly at Tehran. "They want Iran to realize that nothing is impossible," Javedanfar said. Does that include a scenario where Egypt actively assists an Israeli preemptive strike on Iran? Nobody is sure and Javedanfar says that is exactly how both governments want it.

The submarine passage was far more than a symbolic show of cooperation. Usage of the Suez Canal would enable the Israeli navy to quickly get in position for a naval strike or blockade against Iranian ports. Without the canal, Israeli ships would have to make a weeks-long voyage around Africa in order to attack Iranian shores.

Emad Gad, an expert on Israeli policy with Cairo-based Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, warns not to read too much into the submarine incident. "There may be some Egyptian cooperation," with Israel, he says. "But it hasn't reached the level of joint planning." Gad believes Egypt's permitting the submarine to use the canal, "was more for the Americans than for the Israelis".

The two countries still have just as many points of conflict as they do areas of common interest. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a sore spot, with each government seemingly pulling in opposite directions. Egypt has worked (unsuccessfully) for years to produce a reconciliation and unity government between Hamas and Fateh--something that Israel staunchly opposes.

Earlier this month, President Mubarak lobbied US President Barack Obama to push Israel for an immediate jump to final status negotiations with the Palestinians. That would essentially be a direct repudiation of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's plan to delay final status talks for years while building up the economy and infrastructure of the occupied West Bank.- Published 27/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Ashraf Khalil is the news editor for the English-language edition of Al Masry Al Youm newspaper.

Egypt and Israel currently have a confluence of strategic interests unparalleled in their histories as nation-states. And those shared interests are increasing, driven by events and trends, both positive and negative, within the region and elsewhere.

These shared strategic interests also happen to be among the top priorities of both nations: Iran; Gaza/Hamas; border control (smuggling, including and especially weapons, trafficking in persons, infiltration); counterterrorism (including and especially Hizballah and al-Qaeda); and Israeli/Egyptian/Palestinian relations and the peace process.

The natural conclusion one might draw from the above is that Egypt and Israel, acting in their own national interests, have been working assiduously to upgrade their strategic relations. To be sure, there have been some notable achievements in recent years, and the current period is arguably the most productive. In my own review, however, the record indicates that these efforts are episodic, marked by profound distrust on both sides, an unwillingness by some in the senior political and military leaderships to accept any upgrading and a weakness in the bilateral institutional framework that thwarts efforts to build on achievements.

There are a number of major constraints on translating these shared interests into concrete actions. For one, leaders and citizens of both nations remain deeply distrustful of the intentions of the other side. This is so visceral that it colors virtually every conversation, every private meeting and every public commentary. While Egyptians understand the strategic value of their cold peace with Israel, they are extremely reluctant to deal with Israelis on anything beyond their most important interests. To Israelis, Egyptians remain a frustrating enigma. As for Egypt's leadership, Israelis feel they can trust President Hosni Mubarak but wonder what will happen when he leaves the scene.

Then too, Egypt cannot be seen publicly as doing Israel's bidding. This constraint limits dramatically what Egypt is prepared to do. It therefore is no surprise that Egyptian-Israeli intelligence cooperation is by far the most developed, the most frequent, the most institutionalized, the most personalized and without question the most productive of all bilateral ties. It is largely outside public scrutiny, and there is always plausible deniability by either side. Military-to-military ties have some institutional framework, but they are extremely weak and limited largely to liaison. There is no ongoing cooperation in this area of any major significance.

Further, Israel does not devote priority to nurturing the relationship with Egypt. Israeli leaders occasionally "rediscover" Egypt, but all too often that does not come from anything positive that has happened, but rather from negative trends in the relationship. Ties are simply not pursued on a sustained basis. And even when they are pursued by individual Israeli leaders, the Egyptian leaders, who stay in place for decades, see their Israeli counterparts shifting seemingly at the blink of an eye as political coalitions keep changing. There are no parliamentary ties, and comments from the Knesset, when they are made about Egypt at all, are usually negative.

Egypt is not even a priority to the Israel Defense Forces. This may seem a harsh assessment, but it's a fact. The IDF spends the majority of its attention on Israel's northern border, with longer-range concerns like Iran gobbling up senior attention. Particularly devastating was a downsizing of the IDF three years ago that led to the shifting of the liaison staff from the Operations Directorate to the Planning Directorate and the abolishment of the only flag-rank officer devoted exclusively to liaison. In fact, because of the crushing demands on the understaffed Planning Directorate, even the colonel ostensibly assigned for liaison is often required to devote time to other tasks. In contrast, the Egyptian liaison staff recently had three flag-rank officers at the top; it currently has two.

Personal relationships are also lacking. It is not mere conventional wisdom that personal relationships are vital both for mutual understanding and for any hope of sustained achievements. While such relationships do exist between some key intelligence officials, they rarely exist elsewhere. Israeli officers and officials at all levels rotate far too quickly.

Despite these constraints, some of which cannot or will not be overcome, I believe there is an urgent imperative to move as far and as quickly as politically possible to strengthen the strategic relationship. I am concerned that with the frequent transitions in Israel and the lack of an institutionalized dialogue, Egypt cannot benefit fully from achievements in its interest. Similarly, this lack of institutionalization of security ties as well as the failure on Israel's part to place very high priority on upgrading security ties may well prove a costly mistake for Israel's interests as Egypt draws closer to its first senior leadership transition in a generation.

With these thoughts in mind, both sides need to act:

* The Israeli leadership must make clear that upgrading the security relationship with Egypt is a key short- and long-term national security priority, and be prepared to devote the necessary time and human resources on a sustained basis. There should be a holistic approach, starting with the leaders themselves but bringing together all elements at all levels, within and outside the government.
* The IDF should establish a true liaison office, in the Operations Directorate, headed by a flag-rank officer. That office should retain key staff as long as possible, allowing for the building and maintaining of personal and professional relationships with their Egyptian counterparts. If necessary, retired officers with existing ties should be brought into the office.
* Egypt should accept the institutionalization of military-to-military ties, especially between operational officers at all levels, recognizing this is not only key to building trust during a time of transition but is also essential for any prospect of achieving the longer-term goal of replicating what Israel has with Jordan: no demilitarized zone and no foreign forces.
* Egypt should be open to expanding bilateral intelligence cooperation, to include intelligence agencies that have a key role in the Sinai and other border areas.
* Israel should consider ways to ease the burden of Gaza on Egypt, perhaps through the establishment of a border crossing regime that ensures that Gazans have sustained access to needed goods and services. In exchange, Egypt must convincingly do all it can to stop smuggling of certain items into Gaza.
* Both sides should expand their dialogue on their shared border, with regular biannual meetings chaired by senior operational military leadership and quarterly meetings at the technical level.

All of the above should be carried out with a full appreciation for the sensitivities of both sides. While maximum secrecy should be the watchword for ongoing discussions, it must be conveyed to outside observers when any steps are agreed upon and implemented that they are in each country's individual national interest.

In conclusion, we have already entered a historic window of opportunity for a meaningful and sustained upgrading of bilateral Egyptian-Israeli security cooperation based on shared and individual interests. Let there be no misunderstanding: significant constraints will limit the scope of this cooperation. That said, there are steps that can be taken within those constraints today to fulfill what so many had hoped would be key fruits of the Camp David treaty.- Published 27/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org


Ambassador James A. Larocco served from 2004 until July 2009 as director general of the MFO in Sinai. Since August 3 he is distinguished professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the United States Government.