Edition 16 Volume 1 - November 06, 2003
The Palestinian issue in Israel-Arab relations
• A twisted logic -
byLamis Andoni
A democratic Arab world with more advanced economies would also be more capable of supporting the Palestinians.
• A regional look at a local conflict -
bySarah Ozacky-Lazar
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not the only factor.
• Normalization, but after a solution -
an interview withVolker Perthes
There are more and more questions from civil society to government, asking whether they haven't hidden behind this conflict.
• From naivetè to skepticism -
an interview withMustafa Kamal al-Sayyid
In the beginning, the Arabs didn't understand the intentions of the Zionist movement.
A twisted logic
by Lamis Andoni Despite increased talk about the need to position economic development and democratization in the Arab world as the major priority of intellectual discourse and government policies, the Palestinian cause remains the single most influential factor on Arab political psyche and life. It is not that most Arabs don’t view progress and the alleviation of poverty as relevant issues, but that the ongoing impact of the Israel-Arab conflict, particularly the Palestinian issue, on the political, economic, and even routine existence of the Arabs underscores--to varying degrees--the continuing conflict as an obstacle to development and political progress.
While it is true that many Arab leaders have used "commitment to the Palestinian cause" to justify measures ranging from martial law to shutting down dissent and press freedoms, the leaders' fear of popular anger against Israel and acquiescence towards Washington have more often been used to justify governmental oppression. In other words, while public opinion in most Arab countries has always favored increased support for the Palestinians and stronger Arab governmental positions vis-à-vis Israel, Arab leaders--bombastic rhetoric not withstanding--have sought to undermine political parties and all forms of popular opposition to their weak policies in addressing the Palestinian plight.
It is important to remember that Israel's establishment in 1948, which involved the dispossession of Palestinians and the slicing off of an important part of the Arab world from its environment, instilled a deep awareness of a residual colonial legacy, despite the nominal or practical independence of most Arab governments from French and British rule after World War II. Therefore, the presence of Israel, with its continued policies of displacement of Palestinians, confiscation of Arab land and alliance with the United States, has become a daily reminder of continued foreign influence and challenge to the Arab identity. The peace treaties between Israel and Egypt and Jordan, respectively, have not succeeded in changing the perception of Israel as an occupier and a foothold for American control over the region. On the contrary, the two peace treaties, while weakening the strategic Arab position vis-a-vis Israel, confirmed to many Egyptians and Jordanians that Israel was demanding and receiving unconditional acceptance for its ideology of expansion and racist policies towards the Palestinians.
Moreover, the treaties are still perceived as a result of an unequal balance of power that gave Israel the upper hand by effectively imposing unilateral agreements that do not address the primary cause of the conflict. This popular sentiment is reflected in the failure of all political, economic, and cultural normalization efforts between the Egyptian and Jordanian peoples, on one hand, and Israel, on the other. Economic incentives such as tying the relationship with Israel to the apportionment of US aid, and setting up a special free zone that exempts joint Jordanian and Israeli-made products from American tariffs have done little to change the Jordanian people's attitude towards Israel. The economic dividend promised by the late King Hussein and former Prime Minister Shimon Peres did not bear fruit for the majority of Jordanians, even as the continued occupation and collective punishment imposed by Israel on the Palestinians has reinforced Israel's role as an enemy and aggressor.
There is no doubt that the Oslo accords of 1993 dampened the popular movement in the Arab countries in support of the Palestinians. It was difficult to demand a better arrangement from Israel than one the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, would settle for. But as it became clear that the accords and the subsequent agreements were not leading to the end of Israeli occupation, movements in solidarity with the Palestinians started regaining their influence and were able to energize new generations when the Palestinians themselves launched their second intifada in September 2000.
It is interesting that American decision makers and some conservative and even liberal pundits argue, often with condescension, that if only the Arabs were to abandon their confrontational mentality towards Israel and focus on the development of democracy, they might reassert their political weight and contribute again towards building the national culture. This is a very twisted argument since a democratic Arab world with more advanced economies would also be more capable of supporting the Palestinians and demanding legitimate Arab rights, not necessarily through war. Many in Israel and the United States know, but are in complete denial, that democratic Arab governments mean governments that are more responsive to public opinion, a public opinion that unequivocally opposes collaboration with Israel and submission to US policies and the conditions placed by international financial institutions that have so far only increased the gap between the regional haves and have-nots.
This leads us to the conclusion that democracy and the search for justice are intertwined. Therefore, the US efforts to divorce what it calls "plans to democratize the Arab world" from a genuine solution that recognizes Palestinian national rights and freedom (and now, of course, the end of US occupation in Iraq) is either an act of deception or at best a futile exercise. -Published 6/11/03©bitterlemons-international.org
Lamis Andoni is a veteran journalist and analyst.
A regional look at a local conflict
by Sarah Ozacky-LazarThe Israel Air Force attack against Syria in early October, in response to a particularly vicious suicide bombing carried out by the Islamic Jihad in Haifa, once again spotlights the close connection between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the one hand, and regional stability and Israel's relations with its Arab neighbors on the other. Middle East communications media feature almost daily declarations by Arab leaders linking the two arenas. Recently we heard comments from King Abdullah of Jordan and Syrian President Bashar al Asad, and before that Arab League Secretary General Amr Musa issued a sharp warning against the opening of an additional Israeli front in the north. In a different context, the Israeli delegation to the recent International Monetary Fund conference in Dubai was told, despite a warm welcome, that the economic ties it sought with the host emirate would become possible only after the Palestinian conflict is solved.
It was the mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, who succeeded in the mid-30s of the previous century to Arabize and Islamicize the local nationalist-ethnic conflict that erupted under the British Mandate. By putting Jerusalem and its mosques at the center of the conflict and by appealing to every Arab and Muslim in the world to join in protecting them against the "Zionist invasion", he ushered in seven decades during which the place occupied by the "Palestine question" in Arab life has grown, along with the depth of Arab and Muslim hostility toward Israel and what it represents.
This link first climaxed in the Arab states’ decision to launch a war against Israel in 1948. It continued with the perpetuation of the refugee problem as an open wound that keeps the conflict aflame, and in a series of direct confrontations between Arab armies and the Israel Defense Forces. Nor are we talking only of regimes and leaders, but rather broad strata of the public that oppose "normalization" (tatbi'a)--now a term of condemnation in Arabic--with Israel, as reflected in periodic opinion polls, intellectual discourse, and the ease with which Arab and Muslim public opinion are incited following every unusual event in Palestine.
Egypt was the first Arab country to shatter these barriers. While it accompanied its signature on a peace agreement with Israel with a demand for talks on "autonomy" for Palestinians, when those negotiations failed it did not back out and cut its diplomatic ties with Israel--nor did it do so in 1982 following the Israeli invasion of south Lebanon.
Egypt and Jordan maintain open channels of communication with Israel despite their criticism of its policy toward the Palestinians. This raises the question: how big is the gap between their declarative level of commitment to the Palestinian cause and their own specific economic and political interests? The determining factors are the need to maintain close relations with the United States, and the desire to continue to play a central role in efforts to solve the conflict.
Today a new dimension has been added to the role of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the regional and international system, one that complicates the picture. This is the US-led global war against Islamic terror. It is no secret that Palestinian terrorism served as a model and inspiration for Muslim groups throughout the world, some of which actually threaten Arab regimes. The conquest of Iraq by western forces, coupled with the massive American military presence in the Middle East, are additional factors of influence that call into question the centrality and exclusivity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the region.
Once this conflict is solved, will there follow peace arrangements between Israel and the remaining Arab countries? This was the common belief in the past, reinforced by Jordan's haste in signing an agreement with Israel after Oslo. But an automatic thawing of relations is not likely. In my opinion, there will be no sweeping opening of the Arab countries to Israel and to Israelis. Deep cultural differences, the fear of penetration by a permissive western lifestyle and by winds of democracy and freedom, along with a great fear of economic colonialism spearheaded by Israel--will all combine to block such a dynamic and will lead, in the best case, to what is called in Israel a "cold peace".
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is indeed a decisive and formative influence in regional relations, and particularly in determining the attitude of Arab countries toward Israel. But it is by no means the only factor. In a changing world, we can expect economic and global factors as well to overshadow this local-tribal conflict and perhaps, inshallah, to oblige the sides to solve it for the sake of regional stability. -Published 6/11/03©bitterlemons.org
Sarah Ozacky-Lazar is the academic director of the Jewish-Arab Center for Peace at Givat Haviva, Israel, and a researcher, writer and educator for peace.
Normalization, but after a solution
an interview with Volker PerthesBI: How central do you judge the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to be to Arab-Israel relations?
Perthes: We will not see any substantial normalization of Israel-Arab relations in general unless there is a solution to the Arab-Israel conflict and particularly the Palestinian conflict. We also see that for Arabs in countries geographically more distant from the conflict theater, Israel is basically perceived not as a neighbor in the region but as a participant in this conflict. This perception has certainly been strengthened through the decades by the fact that Palestinian refugees are all over the place; they form a trans-national element of this international conflict and basically remind their host societies all the time that there is a conflict here that must be solved before normalization.
I would also add a geo-economic factor: as long as there is a state of conflict between Israel and its immediate neighbors, Israel will actually be an obstacle to all kinds of communications between the Arab east and the Arab west. Once there is peace between Israel and Palestine and Syria, [Israel] could theoretically turn into a communications and infrastructure link. When Syria and Israel first started to negotiate after Madrid in 1991 and there were road works on the road from Damascus to Kuneitra, everyone in Damascus thought this was part of a highway to Palestine and Israel, within the framework of social and economic follow-ups to peace. In public parlance they started to call it the highway of peace.
BI: Is this the sort of normalization you visualize beyond the conflict?
Perthes: Not all Arab states and societies will move at the same speed. When we travel to countries like Syria, we sense that when people think about the possible dimensions of peace, they start to remember that there were once all kinds of relations between the inhabitants of Mandatory Palestine and Syria before 1948.
BI: Some say the conflict serves as an excuse for Arab rulers to evade demands for reforms and democratization?
Perthes: Of course it is used as an excuse. This doesn’t mean that the Arab-Israel conflict isn't there and doesn't strain military budgets. But Arab regimes try to use it as a source of legitimacy and a way of postponing reforms and not conceding the control that a strong security state has achieved. Today, particularly after the Iraq war, this discourse on the part of Arab regimes is not very convincing for much of Arab society. Today, in Syria, liberals would say, yes, the conflict should be taken seriously, but we can only participate if we achieve political openness and reform. On a wider Arab scale there are more and more questions from civil society to governments, asking whether they haven't hidden behind this conflict.
BI: In this regard, some Arab regimes are also accused by Israel of perpetuating the refugee issue as part of their reform evasion tactics.
Perthes: This might be so, but the issue is still there and we're now having a debate in which the state of Israel is adamant that the refugees not return to Israel, and Israel wants some control over the possible return of Palestinian refugees to a future state of Palestine. So there is a kind of coalition between the Israeli-right wing and some Arab regimes in not solving this problem.
BI: How would you factor the recent events in Iraq into this discussion?
Perthes: What I find interesting here is that there was an enormous fear on the part of Arab elites that the United States' occupation of Iraq would lead to a premature normalization of Iraqi-Israeli relations, beginning with reopening the Kirkuk-Haifa pipeline. This phenomenon shows us the fears of Arab elites that the West at large and the US in particular would aim to break apart the Arab world and try to achieve partial solutions between Arab states and Israel, thereby weakening the Arab nation as such and the chances of the Palestinians or Syria to get a fair deal. We also see that Israeli politicians were not dealing with the issue in a sober manner, but rather embarrassing their few partners in the Arab world, like the Jordanians, by trumpeting news of opening the pipeline before any Iraqi government had been consulted at all (and ignoring technical questions about the condition of the pipeline). As soon as the current temporary Iraqi government was in place, they made it clear that as far as they were concerned they would not preempt normalization, but rather would work on the basis of the Saudi/Arab League initiative, which calls for normalization in return for Israeli withdrawal.
BI: Finally, Syria appears to be in a pivotal position today vis-à-vis two conflict situations: in Iraq and in Israel/Palestine.
Perthes: And Syria has its own occupation problem with Israel, and a clear priority of regaining its occupied territories on the Golan. I'm not sure the Syrians have really realized that the US no longer sees them as a candidate for a peace process. The irony is that we have a Syrian government that is unable to give the proper signals to Washington and to Tel Aviv that they are interested in a peace process, though this government is probably more interested in a process than its predecessor. The late President Hafez al Asad thought of peace as a strategic option in terms of a regional power equilibrium. President Bashar al Asad uses this same term, but with reference to Syria's need to modernize the economy and the country. The Syrians under Bashar have tried to make clear that they don't want to be dragged into a military confrontation with Israel, but for political reasons they are hardly able to give up their support in principle for the Palestinian cause, which in their thinking includes the right of armed resistance.-Published 6/11/03©bitterlemons-international.org
Volker Perthes is head of the Middle East and Africa Research Group of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. He has published extensively on the questions of Middle East political economy and international relations.
From naivetè to skepticism
an interview with Mustafa Kamal al-SayyidBI: What were the implications of Israel's creation on the Arab states and public opinion?
Said: In the beginning, they didn't understand the intentions of the Zionist movement. There were contacts between the Zionist movement and some Egyptian intellectuals [for example], and some of these Egyptians welcomed the presence of Jews in Palestine in the 19th century and welcomed, in particular, the establishment of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.
However, when it became clear that the intention of the Zionist Agency was to establish a Jewish state at the expense of the Palestinians, Arab countries started to realize the future.
When the state of Israel was established, Arab countries participated in a military effort to end the presence of the Jewish state in Palestine. Despite the fact that Arab governments took the public position of not recognizing Israel, there were secret [Israeli] contacts with King Abdullah of Jordan. There were also some contacts between Israeli groups and American mediators and Egypt in 1955. However, in general, all Arab countries until 1973 took the public position of condemning any attempt to establish contact with Israel or the Israelis. This was reaffirmed in 1965 when Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba said that it was a mistake for the Arabs not to accept the United Nations partition resolution of 1947. Several Arab governments criticized this declaration.
BI: What was the impact of the first peace treaty and Egypt's breaking of the ranks?
Kamal: This was the beginning of a major rift among the Arabs. In the beginning, most Arab countries were opposed. Some, however, refused to break diplomatic relations with Egypt.
After the [1991] second Gulf War, a change started to prevail in the Arab world. Following the Madrid conference, Arab countries started to have diplomatic relations with Israel, particularly after Israel accepted the Oslo agreement in 1993 and allowed the Palestinians to have (formally-speaking, at least) an independent authority in the West Bank and Gaza.
BI: How does Arab public opinion view the prospect of normalization with Israel?
Kamal: The majority of the Arabs view Israel as determined to expand its territories at the expense of the Palestinians. Such policies don't auger well for having cordial and civil relations with Arab countries. I think the Arabs in general would not mind having peace with Israel, if Israel accepts also to recognize and put into effect Palestinian legitimate national rights. This has not happened so far and I think that Arab public opinion is quite skeptical of the sincerity of the Israeli government and of a large part of the Israeli political establishment in making peace with the Arabs by accepting those Arab conditions summarized under the theme of exchanging "territory for peace."
I am quite doubtful also, and my doubts are not based on any suspicion of Israel, but simply the fact that there is a large disparity in power between Israel and Arab countries. This does not persuade Israel to relinquish its control over the occupied territories.
BI: How would you characterize opinion in the Arab world vis-à-vis Israel today?
Kamal: The majority of the Arabs are quite critical of the policies of the Israeli government. However, a certain minority in all Arab countries believes that the Arabs should not sacrifice their future in favor of the Palestinians and that it would be better for Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq to have peace with Israel and to leave the Palestinians on their own.
This minority also "admires" the scientific and technological achievements of the state of Israel. But these Arab intellectuals are not capable of convincing Arab public opinion that it would be beneficial for the Arabs to abandon the Palestinians because the policies of the Israeli government under [Benjamin] Netanyahu and [Ariel] Sharon don't show any consideration for the Arabs. Their policies are basically racist policies and thus the Israeli government is weakening the position of those so-called--I don't like to call them moderates--but those who are in favor of peace with Israel at any price.
BI: Why do certain countries have warmer relations with Israel?
Kamal: Jordan and Egypt signed peace treaties with Israel in which they believe that they gained something in return. Egypt would say that having diplomatic relations with Israel was the price that it paid for getting back the Sinai. The Jordanians would say that, although they did not get back the West Bank, the Israelis were committed to granting the Palestinians autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza and that [since] the Palestinians were negotiating with Israel, diplomatic relations would help Jordan to have a say in those negotiations.
A large number of countries, not only Arab countries, were involved in a global solution [at the Madrid conference]. A lot of Arabs said that it was a good way to avoid full diplomatic relations with Israel, but have some contact as a means of convincing Israeli public opinion of the benefits of peace and thus pushing the Israeli government to offer those so-called "concessions" that are the basis for a lasting peace.
BI: What are the best and worse case scenarios for the future?
Kamal: The best case scenario is for the Israeli government to accept the terms [that were negotiated] between the Palestinians and the Israeli Labor government before the elections that brought Sharon to power. Then Israel could conclude peace treaties with Syria and Lebanon along the terms that were presented by Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia.
The worst case scenario is for Israel to continue the building of what it calls the "security fence", which will ensure continued hostility between Israel and the Palestinians, and continued hostility between Israel and the Arab governments. For me and for many people, this "security fence" means that Israel does not acknowledge the rights of the Palestinians to have sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza; insists on dictating its own terms for relations with the Arabs; and does not show any consideration for legitimate Arab demands.
BI: Do you think there is any chance of all-out war?
Kamal: I don't exclude the likelihood of another war. I think that [United States] President Bush and Sharon would benefit temporarily from a military action launched by Israel on Syria and on Iran. President Bush is having problems convincing American public opinion of the justifications for the Iraq war and maintaining large numbers of troops in Iraq. Syria is considered a country supporting terrorists and I think that this could be presented as another front in the war on terror, especially if Israel attacks nuclear installations in Iran.
Of course, this will not resolve the problems Israel is having with the Palestinians. (Some Israeli leaders believe that if there is resistance in Palestine, it must certainly be inspired by a regional atmosphere outside Palestine's frontiers.) But war might improve the popularity of Ariel Sharon in Israel.-Published 6/11/03©bitterlemons-international.org
Mustapha Kamel al-Sayyid is a professor of political science at Colgate University. He is also the director of the Center for the Study of Developing Countries at Cairo University.
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