• Why bringing Iran into Iraq will only escalate the civil war  - Iason Athanasiadis
Iran's new leadership has done little to avert confrontation aside from making soothing rhetorical overtures toward its Arab neighbors.

• What about the Iraqi Kurds?  - Henri J. Barkey
Talk of engaging Syria and Iran or even an early pullout is not a solution.

• Lessons for a "Grand Bargain" with Iran and Syria  - Anouar Boukhars
Bush needs a grand strategy for the Middle East that deals with interrelated problems in the region.

• Concentrate on the Syrian-Israeli issue  - Murhaf Jouejati
There is not much Syria can do to stabilize Iraq. Iran has far more influence in Iraq than Syria ever will.

• First build confidence  - Sadegh Zibakalam
Before addressing dialogue, Tehran must feel it doesn't need the US predicament in Iraq as a safety net for its very existence.

Why bringing Iran into Iraq will only escalate the civil war
 Iason Athanasiadis

Nothing is more instructive about the trepidation coursing through Iraq's neighbors over that country's future than the recent saga of Nawaf Obaid, a security analyst and adviser to Saudi ambassador to Washington Turki al-Faisal. In an opinion piece he penned for the Washington Post, Obaid warned that the withdrawal of US forces from Saudi Arabia might prompt his country's leadership to give funds, arms and supplies to Iraq's Sunni militias as a means of countering Tehran's support for Iraqi Shi'ite militias.

The article raised a storm of Saudi official protest. The Saudi Press Agency, a government entity, pointed out that Obaid's article does "not represent in any way the kingdom's policy". Just to be sure, it added the caveat that Riyadh's policy is "to support the security, unity and stability of Iraq with all its sects and doctrines." A few days later, Obaid was dismissed from his advising post. He had obviously touched a raw nerve.

"Saudi Arabia has been, mostly unofficially, supporting Sunni Islamist movements around the world for a long time with the philosophy that their money buys them some minimal influence and even immunity from criticism from them," said Graham Fuller, the former vice-chair of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA. "I have no information about what the kingdom is doing in Iraq, but almost certainly they are in touch with and aiding to some extent the Salafis and maybe the Islamic Party of Iraq as well."

With barely any inquiry by the western media into US ally Saudi Arabia's role in Iraq, it is not peculiar that Riyadh's relationship with Sunni political groups in Iraq has gone unremarked. But as early as 2004, Sheikh Saleh al-Luhaidan, the chief justice of Saudi Arabia's Supreme Judicial Council, was caught on videotape at a government mosque encouraging young Saudis to go to Iraq and wage jihad against the Americans.

"The lawfulness of his action is in fighting an enemy who is fighting Muslims and came for war," said Luhaidan.

It is in light of such evidence that recent optimism over involving Iran in the political process should be judged. In a sign of quite how un-navigable the Iraqi quagmire has become, many western commentators have been happily arguing for Iran's entry into Iraq. The way they present it, Tehran's involvement will provide a magical panacea and banish the increasingly unruly Iraqi civil war from our television screens.

But how can this happen as long as Iran and Saudi Arabia--both flush with near-record oil receipts--are intent on going head to head? Iran is, at this point, a regionally resurgent Shi'ite theocracy while Saudi Arabia is the self-proclaimed champion of Sunni Islam and views Iran as a regional and religious trespasser?

A month ago in Tehran I interviewed a childhood friend of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad in his office in that sprawling city's polluted downtown. The last time I had seen him, just before the summer, he had appeared an enthusiastic proponent of his friend's presidency. This time, however, he was full of complaints.

"Ahmadinezhad is demolishing all these efforts that [former Iranian President Mohammad] Khatami made to allay the Arabs' fears of us. He believes Iran has to be a superpower and does not like the Arab sheikhdoms because he is anti-royalty. So he is returning the revolution to where we started and it has taken 27 years to assure [the Arab states] we are not a threat."

If America's involvement in the Middle East over the past three years should have taught US policymakers anything, it is that its demonization of Shi'ite Iran has unforeseen effects extending beyond the Beltway and Europe's diplomatic salons. Listing Iran as a member of an axis of evil and accusing it, despite the absence of published evidence to support this claim, of destabilizing Iraq and sponsoring a "Shi'ite axis" across the wider region, has terrified staunch Arab Sunni allies such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan. On an autumn trip to Syria, it was clear that even the policymakers of this closest of Iranian allies were less than jubilant over the prospect of Iranian influence lapping against their eastern borders. So it is unremarkable that cries of treason are elicited from the Arab world when the White House changes tack and invites Iran into Iraq to pacify it.

The US invasion of Iraq forever demolished the regional security architecture that prevailed in the 1980s and contributed to a stable, investment-free Persian Gulf. Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein is no longer the cork in the Sunni bottle, protecting Arab states from the spread of Iranian influence. Nor is Iran the boxed-in, under-fire country it was in the first years after the revolution, when Sunni Arab money kept Iraq's war machine oiled and on the offensive against the nascent Islamic Republic. It was Saddam Hussein's aggression against Iran in September 1980 that sparked off the bloody Iran-Iraq war that claimed an estimated one million victims in horrific trench warfare over eight years.

Iran's new leadership has done little to avert confrontation aside from making soothing rhetorical overtures toward its Arab neighbors. President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad has not repeated the diplomatic success effected by his moderate predecessor Mohammad Khatami. Where Khatami invited Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah to Tehran and hosted a successful meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1998, Ahmadinezhad's Persian chauvinist utterances have heightened the Arabs' perceptions of vulnerability. By stressing the anti-royalist, populist strains that run through Shi'ism, Ahmadinezhad has refocused a confrontation between the Islamic Republic and the Persian Gulf's kingdoms that had been in remission.

But there is little the oil-rich but politically fragile and sparsely-populated Persian Gulf monarchies can do against a muscular, security-centered Iran numbering 70 million and intent on assuming leadership of the region. In early December, Iran's national security supremo, Ali Larijani, counseled the Arabs to eject the US military from American bases in the region and join Tehran in a regional security alliance. It was an unprecedented statement and a sign of Iran's growing confidence in its might. Further proof that Tehran's message is being heard in the capitals of miniscule US allies such as Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE, was their non-participation in recent US-led maneuvers in the Gulf that were calibrated to send a warning to the Islamic Republic.

Iran's official entry into Iraq--even if only diplomatic--would create a perception of threat and possibly lead to an escalation in that country's travails. Just as Lebanon is today being resurrected as the proxy battleground for a host of regional powers, Iraq is increasingly turning into a Lebanon of the east.- Published 7/12/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Iason Athanasiadis is an Istanbul-based writer and photographer who lived in Iran from 2004 to 2007.

Following the Democratic victory in the mid-term elections and the Baker-Hamilton Commission recommendations, the Bush administration is under pressure to announce changes to its Iraq policy. Among those most alarmed by the prospect of change, especially if it involves a premature US withdrawal, are the Iraqi Kurds. Unlike any other group in Iraq, the Kurds bet everything on Washington's success in Iraq. They have been the US's most enthusiastic supporters and theirs is the only region where American soldiers do not confront any hostility--in fact the Kurds are to a person grateful to the US for overthrowing Saddam.

History and the US have not been kind to the Kurds. In the 1970s, the US and Iran backed a Kurdish rebellion against the Iraqi Ba'ahist regime. In 1975, the Shah of Iran, having exploited Iraqi Kurds' rebellion to extract a series of concessions from Iraq, promptly cut off their supply and exit routes. The Ford administration simply watched as a superior Iraqi army decimated its former allies.

In 1988, during Saddam's murderous Anfal campaign, unable to utter the most mundane of criticisms, the international community watched in silence as the Iraqi military used chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians. Finally, in 1991, following the first Gulf war, then President George Bush called on all Iraqis to rebel and overthrow their dictator. When the Shi'ites in the south and Kurds in north followed through, Washington once again was nowhere to be seen. Faced with a relentless Iraqi assault, a million and half Kurds abandoned their cities and villages to seek refuge along the Turkish and Iranian borders.

To protect their future in the post-Saddam era, the Kurds insisted on a federal constitution that maximized their autonomy without seceding from Iraq. Neither the Iraqi Sunnis nor even many Shi'ites welcomed this arrangement. The neighbors Syria, Turkey and Iran saw this as the first step toward an independent Kurdistan that could also inspire and galvanize their own Kurdish minorities.

Iraqi Kurds fear that, in its desperation, the US administration will heed calls from the Baker-Hamilton Commission to engage Syria and Iran. In effect, this would not only be rewarding these countries for their uncooperative behavior but would also legitimize their role in Iraq.

There is no doubt that both Iran and Syria are alarmed, perhaps not as openly as Turkey, at the growing indirect influence of the Iraqi Kurdish experiment in autonomy on their own Kurdish populations. Iran has experienced increased clashes with PJAK, an offshoot of the Turkish-based Kurdish insurgent group the PKK, and Syrian Kurds have time and again openly defied the regime. As long as the American project in Iraq had a chance of success, the neighbors' and others' concerns could be pushed aside. The current chaos, however, is pregnant to all kinds of anti-Kurdish coalitions, ranging from an Arab Sunni-Shi'ite one to any combination of the neighbors intent on reversing Kurdish gains.

Of all the neighbors, Turkey appears to be the most problematic because it has often publicly stated that Kurdish independence would propel it to intervene militarily. While Ankara puts forward the defense of the small Turkish-speaking Turkmen minority in northern Iraq as the cause for its potential involvement, it really fears that its own restless Kurdish minority might be emboldened to demand greater rights at home. This minority--perhaps 20 percent of the population--represents Turkey's Achilles' Heel. Adding to Ankara's woes is the PKK, which has found haven in northern Iraq under the very eyes of the coalition forces and their Kurdish allies.

Washington has three options if it does not want to once again leave the landlocked Iraqi Kurds to the whims of its opponents. The first is to engineer a rapprochement between Ankara and Iraqi Kurds. This would entail not only US pressure on the PKK to disband itself, but also extracting mutual promises from both sides. The Iraqi Kurds would institute measures--supervised by the international community--that ensure Turkmen minority rights. The Turks would not only provide security guarantees but also become a bridge between northern Iraq and the West. By deepening its ties to Iraqi Kurds, Turkey could buy peace at home and abroad. This approach has the added benefit of reducing the Turkish temptation to align itself with Iran and Syria and, thereby, constructing a solid front against these two countries' ambitions.

The other alternatives are much less attractive. Washington can leave troops behind in northern Iraq to deter against foreign interference. This is unlikely to please the neighbors, including NATO-ally Turkey. Finally, were the Kurds forced to declare independence because of an outright Iraqi civil war, Washington could push for United Nations recognition. As we saw with Croatia, this entails risks. Talk of engaging Syria and Iran or even an early pullout is not a solution. What the US needs to do is generate new and complex strategies if it wants to avoid crowning its Iraqi misadventure with a desertion of its only allies in Iraq.- Published 7/12/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Henri J. Barkey is a non-resident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and professor of international relations at Lehigh University.

It was Yitzhak Rabin, the tough-fisted, uncompromising professional soldier, who transformed Yasser Arafat, the alleged "arch-terrorist" into a partner for peace. As difficult as Rabin found it to engage Arafat, he understood as the Israeli writer David Grossman stated, "that life in a constant climate of violence, of occupation, of terror and fear and hopelessness, comes at a price that Israel cannot afford to pay."

When Ronald Reagan proclaimed the Soviet Union the "Evil Empire" in his own tough and undiplomatic fashion, his disdain for communism did not prevent him from negotiating agreements with it on arms control and other issues. And it was also mutual self-interest that brought Washington and Beijing together in a monumental meeting that the astute statesman and disgraced politician Richard Nixon called "the week that changed the world" back in 1972.

Nixon's diplomatic coup de maitre was an example of shrewd analysis of the great game that transformed superpower politics. By putting strategic interest ahead of ideological zeal and tactical talks, Nixon and his Machiavellian national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, pulled off a brilliant US diplomatic coup that turned out to be more important to the international balance of power than the loss of Vietnam to the communists.

Another brilliant stroke of policy was the so-called Helsinki Process that put human rights in a security framework. Launched in 1972 and culminating in the formation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, this multilateral framework between the Soviet-bloc countries and the democratic West transformed the agenda of East-West relations by providing a shrewdly comprehensive, political-military definition of security that enshrined sovereign equality, inviolability of frontiers, and respect for fundamental freedoms. Kissinger's brilliance stemmed from his realization that acceptance of the Soviet bloc's legitimate security concerns was crucial to winning Soviet agreement to Article 7 of the Helsinki Accords on respect for human rights that ultimately undermined the communist system.

Such constructive dialogues with adversaries are a great American tradition. But much of what is said or written about such dialogues in the post 9/11 world is unfortunately grounded in ideology and/or wishful thinking. The US won't talk to Iran and Syria until both nations alter their behavior. The Bush administration thinks that the only time it can talk to its enemies is when it can achieve through dialogue what it could not get through military threats and other coercive policies. But it is unrealistic to expect the Syrians to abandon Hamas, Hizballah, Iran and other groups that have been critical to the country's strategic posture unless they get credible incentives in return.

Syria's obstructionist policies and political calculations derive largely from the regime's perception of the US as an obstructionist force on Arab-Israel issues and regional stability. President Bashar Assad has hinted on many occasions that peace is his preferred strategic option but that peace will not come about unless the problem of Syria's undefined international borders is resolved. The most coveted quid pro quo Syria wants is not a reassertion of its control over Lebanon as many of its detractors trumpet incessantly but the return of the Golan Heights that Israel conquered in 1967.

The recent violent confrontations and political turmoil in the Middle East have underscored once again that a new Middle East will not emerge without the establishment of secure, just and recognized international borders between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The greatest contribution the Bush administration could make to the region is to create a context for a broad settlement of the Syrian-Israeli conflict in which support for radicalism and Assad's strategic interests no longer align. There is no doubt that a lasting Israeli-Syrian peace would go a long way toward de-radicalizing the regional order and depriving the Syrian Baathist regime of an issue it has long used to deflect calls for democratic change. If Assad is willing to respect Lebanese sovereignty and use his influence over Hamas, Hizballah and Sunni insurgent groups in a constructive manner, the United States and Europe should reciprocate by accommodating the country's legitimate rights and offering Assad a package of incentives he could not refuse.

The same applies to Iran. The Bush administration needs a strategic reassessment of its relations with Tehran that transcends simplistic and war-mongering rhetoric to include mutual security guarantees and arms control pacts. Engaging Iran in a manner that affirms its legitimate security concerns and right to pursue civilian nuclear power, while ensuring respect for nonproliferation and human rights norms, could provide the impetus for a settlement of the Iranian-American conflict. To pursue this agenda, the United States should adopt a broad political, cultural, and economic policy reminiscent of its engagement of the Soviet bloc in the Helsinki process which included a "security basket" that recognized the Soviet Union as a great power with legitimate global interests and a "human rights basket" that opened its domestic system to human rights norms.

It may seem repelling to engage an Iranian regime headed by a president whose absurd denials of the Holocaust and calls for the destruction of Israel clearly disqualify him from being a partner in any potential negotiations. But it is important to understand the subtle power struggle going on within Iran and the potential for a further divide of an already fragmented regime. By making a public offer to Iran that the regime cannot refuse, America's diplomatic maneuver would corner the regime into either refusing a deal most Iranians support or force it to compromise by opening its domestic system to democratic and human rights norms that would eventually undermine the clerical system in the same way that communism was undermined by the Helsinki accords.

Today US President George W. Bush needs a grand strategy for the Middle East that deals with interrelated problems in the region. "Unless a president sets his own priorities, his priorities will be set by others--by adversaries, or the crisis of the moment. American policy can become random and reactive--untethered to the interests of our country." These were the words of then candidate George W. Bush who ridiculed Clinton for his poor foreign policy decisions that led "our nation to move from crisis to crisis like a cork in a current." It is ironic that Bush failed to heed his own caution of drifting from crisis to crisis without clear priorities.- Published 7/12/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Anouar Boukhars is assistant professor of political science and international studies at McDaniel College in Maryland.

What are the implications for the Middle East if the Bush administration were to engage in a dialogue with Damascus? Would US-Syria talks contribute to the stabilization of Iraq?

At first glance, the proposition according to which Syria along with Iraq's other regional neighbors ought to be involved in the stabilization of Iraq sounds good. A dissection of the evidence, however, suggests that Syria is in a weak position to substantially improve the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Iraq.

On the one hand, Iraq's problems are for the most part homegrown. On the other hand, Syria does not have much influence over any of the warring Iraqi factions. The once exiled Shi'ite leaders that Syria hosted during the Saddam era are influenced more by Iran. The network of Sunni tribal chiefs Syria painstakingly put together in recent years is now next to marginal in terms of political influence. Iraq's Sunni insurgents take their marching orders not from Damascus but from al-Qaeda (and its local affiliates).

Remnants of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party continue to view their Syrian counterparts with much hostility. Furthermore, although Syria could potentially exert greater effort to seal its side of the Iraqi border, bribes from jihadist elements and fortune-seeking smugglers to underpaid Syrian border guards go a long way in trumping any such effort. In short, there is not much Syria can do to stabilize Iraq. Iran has far more influence in Iraq than Syria ever will.

This is not to say that Washington should continue ignoring Damascus. Syria wields much influence in the other trouble spots of the Middle East, Lebanon and Palestine. Syria exerts its influence in both areas in large part through its local clients Hizballah and Hamas, respectively. It is therein that Syria can affect events decisively.

That said, for Syria to change its jingoistic behavior as Washington demands, Damascus would need a good enough reason. This is especially so in view of the fact that America's anti-Syrian pressures, including the imposition of unilateral sanctions and the not-so-subtle hints at forced regime change in Damascus, have failed.

Instead of feeling vulnerable, the Assad regime now feels emboldened: Syria's Hamas protege won an electoral victory against the softer Fateh; its Hizballah protege won a military victory against Israel over the past summer; its Iranian patron, which at any rate proved to be a far better protector of the Assad regime's security than either Saudi Arabia or Egypt, continues to defy the US and its western allies; and the American electorate bloodied the nose of George W. Bush's Republican Party. Thus, in the absence of rock-solid benefits--like the return of the Golan Heights or, at a minimum, the resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace talks--Syria sees no real justification in either rethinking its regional strategy or in reshuffling its regional cards.

It is precisely on the Syrian-Israeli issue that a US-Syria dialogue can alter the political landscape of the Middle East. Should Washington pursue this route, a resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace talks leading to the Israeli return of the Syrian Golan Heights will have a hugely positive impact on the entire region. Peace between Syria and Israel weakens Hizballah, isolates Hamas, and neutralizes Iran. Peace between Syria and Israel allows Lebanon to breathe again. Finally, peace between Syria and Israel strips the Assad regime of its ability to justify the prolongation of emergency laws, in effect since 1963.- Published 7/12/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Murhaf Jouejati is professor of Middle East studies at the National Defense University's NESA Center for Strategic Studies. He also teaches at The George Washington University and is a scholar at the Middle East Institute.

As conditions in Iraq become worse and the country approaches a state of civil war and disintegration, all eyes are turning increasingly toward the regional powers for help in calming the crisis. Among those that come to mind immediately are two of Iraq's most significant neighbors, Syria and Iran .While the importance of Syria's influence in Iraq is not completely clear, many, including the Baker-Hamilton study group on Iraq, believe that Iran must seriously be taken into account by the allies if they are to reach a solution for the deepening crisis.

There are of course some observers who dispute the potential significance of Iran's role in Iraq. They argue that Iran's power and influence there have been somewhat exaggerated. I believe that Iran can and indeed does play a very significant role in Iraq. The key issue, however, is not the exact degree of Iran's influence, but rather the way the United States perceives Iran's role and influence. Equally important is the question whether the two countries are willing to talk with the view of possible cooperation over the future of Iraq.

There are two major obstacles regarding the prospect of direct talks between Iran and the US over Iraq. The first problem concerns Washington's ambivalence over Iran's role in Iraq. This is best demonstrated in conflicting signals coming from US officials regarding the perception of Iran's role in Iraq. The first view sees Iran not as part of the solution in Iraq but, to the contrary, as part of the problem. Not only does this school of thought not seek Iran's involvement in Iraq, but it actually urges Tehran not to interfere. In a joint press conference after his talks with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki at the end of November, US President George W. Bush stated that the best assistance Iran can offer to Iraqis would be to not interfere in their country.

This view, which is shared by a number of other US leaders, is in sharp contrast with the recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton study group on Iraq. Interestingly, there are also conflicting views in Tehran on the issue. Some Iranian leaders look upon cooperation on Iraq between Iran and the US with a great deal of suspicion. They argue that this would merely be a marriage of convenience for Washington, enabling the US to extricate itself from the Iraqi swamp with Iran's help. Not only would this not serve Iran's national interests, but it would be detrimental to Iran.

The moment the US is free of its ties in Iraq, it would turn on Iran with an iron fist, argue the opponents of rapprochement with the US in Iraq. A leading hard-line newspaper close to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad warned Iranian leaders, "not to fall into the trap laid by James Baker to throw a rope for the Great Satan to climb out of Iraq's well.... No sooner would the US be out of Iraq's dungeon than it would turn toward us."

This view is also shared by Iranians who are not hardliners. A reformist newspaper, for example, wrote that the US entanglement in Iraq and Afghanistan has indeed provided Iran with a degree of immunity or a safety margin.

As a clear example of America's deep-rooted hostility toward the Islamic revolution and its ultimate intention to overthrow the Iranian regime, the skeptics point to Washington's current determination to impose sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program, through the UN Security Council. In response to James Baker's recommendations, a leading anti-US Iranian leader asked, "how does Washington expect us to cooperate with it while it calls at the same time for imposing sanctions against us?"

In contrast to these skeptics, there are others who consider the US predicament in Iraq as a unique opportunity for Tehran and Washington to wrap up, in the words of yet another reformist newspaper, "the senseless animosity between the two countries that has only brought destabilization, insecurity and extremism in the region". Whatever the merits of direct Iranian-American talks on Iraq and the prospects for ultimate cooperation between the countries, a great deal of confidence-building must first take place between them.

Any normalization of relations between the two countries not only would greatly improve the situation in Iraq but, more fundamentally, would have a great impact on other major issues. It would undoubtedly soften Iran's stand regarding its nuclear program. It can be realistically argued that Iran's insistence on pursuing its nuclear program is linked to its perception of a threat from the US. It can also be argued that if Iran felt more secure from the US, it might play a far more constructive role in Iraq. To be sure, before addressing the prospect of any dialogue with Washington over Iraq, Tehran must feel that it doesn't need the US predicament in Iraq as a safety net for its very existence.

In short, before there can be any realistic chance of cooperation in Iraq between Iran and the US, a change in American leaders' attitude toward the Islamic regime is a fundamental prerequisite.- Published 7/12/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Sadegh Zibakalam is professor of political science at Tehran University.