• Restoring the state  - Nizar Abdel-Kader
Hizballah's shift of focus to the political dimension clearly serves the Iranian-Syrian agenda in Lebanon.

• The pariah who came in from the cold  - Rime Allaf
It would seem idiotic for the Syrians to provoke a new outburst of anti-Syrian sentiments in Lebanon.

• Turbulence in Lebanon  - Nicholas Blanford
A by-product of the political maneuverings in Beirut is that Hizballah is keeping a low profile in the South.

• Uncertainty again clouds Lebanese politics  - Oussama Safa
The March 14 coalition has regained the initiative and the moral high ground.

Restoring the state
 Nizar Abdel-Kader

UN Security Council Resolution 1701 was perceived as an opportunity for progress in the immediate and mid-term future. It opened the way for the Siniora government to demonstrate its capacity to take the steps needed to regain sovereignty over South Lebanon, consolidate national security and achieve economic recovery and repair of all the damages caused by the war. The government quickly implemented the security provisions of 1701 south of the Litani River and along the Syrian border, opening the way for the UNIFIL deployment in the South. When Hizballah conceded the area for this deployment, many observers believed that Lebanon's domestic problems were on the way to be resolved.

Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah's declaration of a "divine victory" was the first indication of the collapse of the consensus among the Lebanese parties to accept 1701and the deployment of the army in the South. That speech offered clear signs that containing Hizballah would not be an easy task. Gradually it emerged that Hizballah was shifting the focus of its agenda from the military to the political dimension by trying to discredit the government and accusing Siniora of plotting with the US and France to disarm the "resistance". This shift clearly serves the Iranian-Syrian agenda in Lebanon.

The National Dialogue Conference held before the war achieved significant progress on issues relating to Shebaa farms, relations with Syria and the establishment of an international court regarding the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. But it failed to deal with Hizballah's arms and the election of a new president. After the war, Hizballah, allied with General Michel Aoun, moved from that agenda to a new one calling for the establishment of a "national unity government" in which both would have veto power over Cabinet decisions.

Hizballah's new agenda is driving the country toward a severe political crisis, especially with its threat to bring its supporters to the streets to bring down the Siniora government. This leads many observers to believe there is a hidden agenda in which Iran and Syria are the key forces.

While the government was seeking help and support from the Arab states and the international community, Hizballah and its allies were preparing the ground to overthrow the government. The sudden resignation of the Shi'ite ministers from the government was clearly caused by Siniora's call for the Cabinet to approve the special protocol for the establishment of an international court to look into Hariri's assassination. It is believed that Hizballah's move was prompted by Syria, which opposes the international court.

Nor is Iran, having supported Hizballah for many years with weapons and money, going to abstain from the game. The Iranian leadership hastened after the war to provide Hizballah with substantial financial aid to compensate for damages. Hizballah remains one of Iran's strategic assets in Lebanon--in the words of Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei, "the main battleground to defeat America and the Zionist state".

Nasrallah clearly explained in his recent speech on November 19 his intention to bring down the Siniora government unless the majority agrees to the "national unity" government formula. He stated, "we will call for early elections and we will take all necessary steps to force the government to resign and form a temporary or interim government to supervise the elections." There is no doubt that this plan is now underway; there is no indication of any possibility of renewing the dialogue. The government has so far resisted, arguing that Hizballah is trying to conduct a coup d'etat and asserting that it is ready to counter Hizballah's moves on the street.

The assassination of Minister of Industry Pierre Gemayel on November 21 added fuel to the fire. It is a political crime meant to derail the government and accentuate the divisions among the Christian factions while increasing tensions between the Shi'ite and the Sunni communities. Now uncertainties are greater than ever before; this tragic crime could engender political turmoil that in turn could lead to civil strife.

Is there a way out of the present crisis?

Both the government and the opposition must reassess the situation on a more realistic, political basis. There is now a great need for both to review their agendas, concentrating solely on reaching a common ground regarding power-sharing and rebuilding lost confidence.

Both parties need to reach a more solid consensus than the one reflected in UNSC Resolution 1701--covering interpretation of 1701's core demands and their implementation, including how to deal with Hizballah's weapons in the future. As for Hizballah, it must decide whether it actually wishes to integrate into the Lebanese state, free of Iranian and/or Syrian influence.

The key international players must follow through on their pledges, not only to beef up UNIFIL forces and provide military and financial assistance to the Lebanese government, but also to use carrots and sticks to convince Iran and Syria to stop those actions that are destabilizing Lebanon and derailing its evolving democracy. Also, it should be made clear to Israel not to play into the hands of Hizballah by continuing its violations and delaying resolution of the Shebaa farms issue.

Resolution 1701 stresses "the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East". Accordingly, the United States government should make all necessary efforts to re-launch Arab-Israel peace talks. Such a move would not only untie the knot of regional conflicts but also alleviate the growing tension and risk of state breakdown in Lebanon.- Published 23/11/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Nizar Abdel-Kader is a political analyst/columnist at Ad-Diyar newspaper in Beirut. He has authored four books on Lebanon and regional political and strategic issues.

The last couple of months have been good, or at least better than before, for the Syrian regime. After getting a cold shoulder from the US over its opposition to the invasion of Iraq and even more so after the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, the Syrian regime was finally being acknowledged as a force to be reckoned with, and a regional partner to be considered, even valued.

This is mostly because of the quagmire in Iraq, but also because of the Israeli aggression against Lebanon this past summer that, as far as the Syrian regime is concerned served to demonstrate to doubters that there exists a bigger and much more violent meddler in Lebanon. Israel's spectacular belligerence enabled Syria to say, "I told you so" to scores of Lebanese, many of whom agreed.

In addition, Hizballah's unexpected defeat of Israel, in all possible senses of the word, boosted the standing of the group even among Lebanese previously skeptical of the group's intentions but wary of rumors that other Lebanese parties had actually encouraged Israel's aggression. With Hizballah's sudden increased popularity, Syria influence in Lebanon was once again out in the open.

Since then, Hizballah has made no secret of its agenda: having enjoyed renewed power enhanced by its initial restraint after the Israeli aggression, it recently demanded more significant participation in the country's government, commensurate with its estimated size, and sought to oblige Fouad Siniora to install a more inclusive government. To this end, following rather blunt references to Siniora's government as that of Jeffrey Feltman (the American ambassador to Lebanon), Hizballah was to have called its followers to take to the streets on November 23, a day after Lebanon's National Day, to demand a national unity government.

This was certainly an event to which the Syrians were looking forward, and the irony of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud's complaint about the illegality of the present government (having himself been imposed by the Syrians in violation of the Lebanese constitution) seemed to pass unnoticed in the midst of so much tension.

All of this could only benefit Syria, especially as interesting developments were taking place on other fronts. British PM Tony Blair officiated over the first step in the rehabilitation of Syria by sending Nigel Scheinwald, his special envoy to the region, to test the waters in Damascus. While the Bush administration pretended not to be agreeable to this initiative, it is likely that Blair's overture had in fact been made at Washington's behest. Indeed, help on Iraq is desperately needed by the Anglo-American coalition and the time seems ripe for reconciliation with Syria and a reevaluation of the stakes.

The need to include Syria (and Iran) was also underlined by the Iraq Study Group, which is set to recommend engaging the two countries in order to help stabilize Iraq. Simultaneously, the European Union took the Association Agreement out of the closet, paving the way for more cooperation with Syria. Once again, Damascus airport was welcoming a string of foreign dignitaries.

Within this context, it would seem idiotic for the Syrians to provoke a new outburst of anti-Syrian sentiments in Lebanon--which seems to be the default initial reaction to the sadly frequent assassinations of political figures there. Indeed, whether as a deliberate aim or as an unintended consequence, depending on who actually committed this crime, the assassination of Lebanese Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel will initially hurt Syria's position in Lebanon.

For one, instead of Hizballah's demonstration aiming at bringing down the government, a mass funeral with a strong anti-Syrian tenor filled the streets of Beirut. Instead of the March 8 forces thanking Syria for its support, the March 14 forces are back to accusing it of deadly meddling. To all intents and purposes, Syria was coming in from the cold, until a sudden mafia-style assassination in broad daylight stole its thunder.

If only because of its timing, Gemayel's assassination will at the very least postpone Syria's plans for a friendlier--or at least more comprehensive--Lebanese government. Furthermore, it will empower the UN-led international tribunal investigating the assassination of Hariri to also include the assassination of Gemayel.

Nevertheless, while these developments have forced Syria to retreat to its usual defensive mode, even publicly refusing to cooperate with the international tribunal, there is every reason to believe that this is only a momentary lapse in its standing and that the only way is up with regards to regional influence.

The US is looking for a way out of Iraq and it needs all the help in can get; any talk about the "independence" and "sovereignty" of Lebanon, already forgotten during America's support of Israel's aggression, will again be put on the back burner while Syria is coaxed back to the axis of inevitable partners. The restoration of diplomatic ties between Syria and Iraq, mere hours before Gemayel's assassination, was a pivotal element both in Syria's rehabilitation and for America's hopes in Iraq, the latter having become even more of an issue after the Democrats took control of Congress in the US.

And even within Lebanon, as long as politicians' positions are stated purely in relation to Syria (as "pro-Syrian" or "anti-Syrian"), the Lebanese themselves are inflating Syria's influence instead of shaking it off, especially as the impact of Israel's war will continue to be felt and as Hizballah continues to consolidate its gains.

Because of these factors on both sides of Syria's borders, and because of the low likelihood of solving the mystery of Gemayel's killing, like that of Hariri, there seems little doubt that Syria's role in Lebanon is bound to regain some of its previous luster. Syria's plans may have been delayed, but they remain on track as it comes in from the cold. -Published 23/11/03 © bitterlemons-international.org

Rime Allaf is an associate fellow at Chatham House in London.

Talk to one of the newly-arrived United Nations peacekeepers in south Lebanon and one will quickly learn that their principle force protection concern has little to do with Lebanon's Hizballah guerrillas, Israeli aerial provocations or indeed potential ill-feeling from the local population. It's al-Qaeda possibly taking advantage of nearly 10,000 foreign, mainly western, troops deployed in Lebanon's deep south that is giving them pause for thought.

And with good reason. Al-Qaeda's brand of Sunni militancy has taken root in Lebanon in recent years, feeding upon the insurgency in Iraq where dozens, maybe hundreds, of young Lebanese and Palestinian Sunnis have fought American and British troops and returned home inspired by their experiences.

It is a more than usually turbulent Lebanon that has greeted the fresh reinforcements to the expanding UN Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL). No sooner had the devastating month-long war between Hizballah and Israel ended, and the country was mired in a deep political crisis between the western-backed government and the Lebanese opposition supported by Syria and Iran.

The assassination of Pierre Gemayel, Lebanon's industry minister, member of the anti-Syrian March 14 coalition and scion to one of Lebanon's leading Christian dynasties, has left many Lebanese wondering whether the country is on the brink of civil war. Ironically, however, the political tensions in Beirut and the circumstances arising from the Hizballah-Israel war have ensured a period of relative stability along the traditionally volatile Lebanon-Israel border.

Hizballah fought an impressive military campaign against the Israeli military, which clearly underestimated its foe. Israeli troops, whose battle-experience in recent years has been confined mainly to shooting teenage Palestinian stone throwers in the occupied Palestinian territories, found themselves up against probably the most adept guerrilla force in the world. The war was supposed to erode Hizballah's military capabilities, but it had little impact, and the Lebanese group emerged from the conflict declaring it a "divine victory".

Still, it is too soon to say who really won the war. Although Hizballah's stock soared immeasurably in the Arab and Islamic worlds (if not in Lebanon) due to its military performance, it has lost its previous autonomy along the Blue Line, the UN name for Lebanon's southern border. The intricate network of bunkers, firing positions, tunnels, arms depots and observation posts that Hizballah installed in the past six years have been abandoned. The deployment of a strengthened UNIFIL and, more crucially, 15,000 Lebanese troops south of the Litani River has made it politically inopportune and practically difficult for Hizballah to return to the status quo ante bellum.

That is a reason for Hizballah's bold political gambit to overturn the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. Initially, Hizballah and its pro-Syrian allies sought an expansion of the 24-seat cabinet, granting the opposition a veto-wielding two-third share. That would allow the pro-Syrians to block any legislation deemed unfavorable to them and their backers in Damascus and Tehran, including the formation of an international tribunal to try the killers of former Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri and any potential expansion of UNIFIL's mandate.

When the March 14-dominated government refused to yield, six pro-Syrian ministers quit, including all five Shi'ites, and Hizballah vowed to launch a series of mass demonstrations to press for early parliamentary elections.

A by-product of the political maneuverings in Beirut is that Hizballah is keeping a low profile in the South. Many of its fighters are still there, but that is because they live in the area. It is almost certainly true that Hizballah is presently replenishing its arsenal of rockets and anti-tank missiles and there are rumors that the resistance is setting up a new underground line of defense north of the Litani River.

Hizballah's top military commanders are also analyzing the results of the war and assessing future strategies and tactics. One possibility for anti-Israel military action by Hizballah is to try and shoot down an Israeli jet. Israel's persistence in continuing overflights in Lebanese airspace in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 has brought it into confrontation with UNIFIL and incurred the anger of leading troop-contributing nations, notably France. Israeli jets have twice mock dive-bombed the French battalion headquarters, apparently nearly causing the peacekeepers to fire anti-aircraft missiles in defense. Israeli warplanes have also buzzed German navy ships off the Lebanese coastline, part of UNIFIL's maritime component.

Hizballah was disappointed during the war to have had so little success in shooting down Israeli aircraft. The only success was against a troop transport helicopter that was struck by an anti-tank missile as it was taking off, killing all five crewmembers. Few tears would be shed in Lebanon (and in UNIFIL no doubt) if Hizballah was able to shoot down an Israeli jet and it would also burnish its self-declared credentials as the only force truly capable of defending Lebanese sovereignty against Israeli aggression.

Still, if the pro-Syrian opposition is able to overturn the government and replace it with one more in tune with Damascus, it will enhance Hizballah's freedom of action in the south, and then UNIFIL's peacekeepers may have to worry about Hizballah as well the threat posed by Sunni jihadists.- Published 23/11/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Nicholas Blanford is a Beirut-based correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor.

Barely had the Lebanese started to recover from the July war between Hizballah and Israel when instability came knocking again, in what seems like the beginning of a campaign to intimidate Lebanon and prevent its government from taking serious political decisions.

The assassination of Christian minister and Member of Parliament Pierre Gemayel came on the day that the UN Security Council was scheduled to approve the final by-laws of an international tribunal to hold accountable the assassins of the late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Gemayel was one of the young leaders of the anti-Syria March 14 coalition and a key minister in the Siniora government, and his death dealt a strong blow to the slim government majority that is badly needed to ratify the by-laws. It is very likely that more assassinations will come to undermine the final phases of the tribunal process.

As the deadline approached to approve the final draft of the tribunal by-laws, attempts to obstruct it multiplied. Prior to Gemayel's assassination, Lebanese politics were already stalemated by a major showdown between the governing majority of March 14 and the opposition led by Hizballah. At stake are critical and decisive issues that will significantly determine the weight of each political actor in the months to come. These include, in addition to the tribunal, expanding the government and giving the opposition a blocking minority vote, presidential elections and early legislative elections.

The passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 last August provided a useful framework to deal with security issues in South Lebanon. Three months later, the front there seems to have quieted down; a fait accompli of stability appears to be emerging, one that could be jeopardized only by Israel's continued violations of the provisions of the UN resolution. Hizballah's attention is now focused on internal politics in Lebanon, particularly on finding ways to force an increase in its share in government and protect its political gains.

As the government drew closer to voting on the draft by-laws of the tribunal, five Shi'ite ministers walked out in an effort to strip the government of its legitimacy ahead of a special session to approve the final draft of the by-laws. While it is widely believed that the Party of God and its allies in the Amal movement walked out for reasons related to the tribunal, in reality Hizballah is preparing itself for the departure of the incumbent president--a fierce ally of the party--and the election of a new head of the country closer in orientation to March 14. With the southern front with Israel frozen for now, Hizballah's spheres of influence in the Lebanese system will gradually be chipped away if they lose the presidency without securing a minority blocking vote in government. Hence, by making this strong statement opposing what it perceives as the majority's unilateral decision-making, the Party of God positioned itself better, looking toward the time when agreement is needed on the election of a new president.

Street demonstrations, drawn-out strikes and a carefully thought out campaign of civil disobedience were expected to be launched and to catch the government by surprise to force its resignation. Now the Gemayel assassination has reshuffled the cards. The opposition will find it difficult to carry on with threats of mass demonstrations and sit-ins and force the government's resignation. The March 14 coalition has regained the initiative and the moral high ground. It will resist for now the demands of the opposition and seek a negotiated exit out of the current stalemate while guaranteeing the passage of the tribunal and possibly a commitment for early presidential elections.

In the weeks to come, we might see a softening of Hizballah's position on the tribunal in an effort to defray mounting criticism after the assassination but also to secure some gains in return. With opposition to the tribunal seen as a Shi'ite defense of Syrian interests against a largely Sunni demand, Hizballah can only do so much to resist. It has been hesitant to take to the streets and paralyze the country after repeated threats to do so. While the assassination of Gemayel has allowed the March 14 movement to regain the initiative, it has also taken the pressure off Hizballah from having to mobilize its supporters to delay and potentially obstruct the tribunal--to which it had pledged its support in the past. This could usher in serious negotiations over a way out of the current crisis, lest sectarian tensions and the Sunni-Sh'iite political divide spiral out of control.

A negotiated exit from the crisis would rearrange the political balance of power in Lebanon and allow major political actors to reposition themselves, giving March 14 a much-needed win while accommodating the opposition. Prior to doing this, however, the deep-seated mistrust that characterizes relations between the government and the opposition will have to be dealt with through measured, incremental trade-offs, beginning with the international tribunal and extending to government expansion and the presidential elections. At a time of national mourning, the crisis is now ripe for resolution.- Published 23/11/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Oussama Safa is general director of the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies in Beirut.