• The nuclear syndrome  - Ali Asghar Kazemi
Iranian decision-makers may feel they have a free hand to follow the North Korean path and withdraw from the NPT.

• Will any lessons be learned?  - Gerald M. Steinberg
Like Kim Jung Il, the Iranian leadership has revolutionary objectives that seek to promote a different world order.

• The axis of not quite as evil  - Mark Perry
The North Koreans are safe. And the Iranians are moving as fast as they can to make sure they will be too.

The nuclear syndrome
 Ali Asghar Kazemi

The North Korean nuclear test on October 9, 2006 can be considered an ominous sign. It is an alarming syndrome of WMD proliferation that, if not properly contained and managed, could turn into an endemic danger for world stability and security. To what extent are international organizations and prevailing legal and political constraints able to respond quickly and unequivocally to this deceitful and fear-provoking act? What are the likely ramifications of this undertaking for the world, and in particular for the Middle East and the Persian Gulf?

The explosion of a low yield nuclear bomb by North Korea was not an unexpected event. Its occurrence at this critical juncture proved once again the bitter fact that international regimes and institutions in charge of peace and security are incapable of maintaining the fragile world order. Perhaps, if responsible world organizations had taken serious measures in time against similar proliferation ventures in India and Pakistan, we would not be in this thorny situation now. If immediate strong action is not taken in order to dissuade North Korea from further testing, the "domino effect" ramifications for those who contemplate following suit would be disastrous.

Security Council Resolution 1718 of October 14, 2006, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter by unanimous vote and providing for limited sanctions against North Korea, is an important step. Yet similar measures in the past have proven ineffective because not all member states complied rigorously and in good faith with its provisions.

Ever since North Korea was included along with Iran and Iraq in the "axis of evil", the memory of the disintegration of the "evil empire" Soviet Union has worried the leaders of Pyongyang. Hence they decided to obtain a nuclear deterrent capability in order to avoid a similar destiny. Ultimately they rejected economic incentives and left the Six-Party Talks, announcing their withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Of the three states included in the axis of evil, Iraq has already fallen and North Korea is now the object of meticulous sanctions with the aim of dissuading it from further testing and encouraging its leaders to resume negotiations. The case of Iran seems to be complicated; after several rounds of talks and negotiations with the 5+1 powers, the prospects of Iran's nuclear case being settled without much trouble and systemic harm to international and regional peace and order appear rather dim.

It took several years for the IAEA and western powers to realize that the case of Iran's nuclear activities could not be solved through dialogue and diplomatic negotiations. This conclusion was prompted by the uncompromising and intransigent position of Iran's new hard-line president, whose odd statements made him a controversial political figure in the world. Thus, after several rounds of futile talks, it was decided that the case should be referred to the UN Security Council. But so far, neither tentative UN sanctions, an American naval build-up and deployment in the Persian Gulf region nor the deliberate leaking of Pentagon contingency plans to strike Iran seem to have intimidated the Islamic government into reviewing its rigid position.

As a member of the NPT, Iran has always categorically denied any wrongdoing; it contends that it has the right under the NPT to enjoy access to full-cycle nuclear enrichment for peaceful purposes. But the international community seems unprepared to accept the risk of letting Iran go nuclear.

Iran's stubbornness vis-a-vis the UN and other powers seem to be based on the following rationales:

* The present atmosphere of mistrust and intolerance between Iran and the United States is deep-rooted and may not be settled merely by resolving the nuclear issue.
* There is no justification for making concessions on this matter since, in the opinion of Iranian leaders, this would merely increase the appetite of the US, whose ultimate objective is the total disintegration of the Islamic regime.
* Even were Iran to completely and permanently cease the enrichment process, the Americans would soon put forward further demands on other thorny issues such as terrorism, human rights, democratization, etc.
* Washington's entanglement in Iraq and Afghanistan prevents it from opening another front in the Persian Gulf against Iran. An eventual confrontation would only awaken Iranian patriotic fervor and consolidate national unity.

The sum total of these rationales is likely to push Iranian decision-makers to opt for a more rigid and intransigent stance, since they may feel they have nothing to lose. They may even contemplate withdrawing from the NPT, and could feel they have a free hand to follow the North Korean path. This in turn, could escalate the crisis, making its management harder and more unpredictable.

It is rather difficult at this point to predict whether all the permanent members of the Security Council, including Russia and China, will harden their position toward the Islamic regime in their current deliberations over imposing and enforcing sanctions under Article 41 of the UN Charter. Each of them has its own concerns and interests in this issue. Iran seems to be well aware of this cleavage and most probably will try to evade the negative consequences of eventual sanctions, unless it perceives a real threat to its core values and survival.

North Korea's nuclear program is unlikely to be effectively contained without the help of Russia and China. The latter is showing reluctance to enforce Security Council Resolution 1718 that establishes an economic embargo against North Korea. This could eventually encourage Japan and South Korea to embark on nuclear programs as a deterrent measure to counter the North Korean threat, even though they enjoy an American nuclear umbrella. The repercussions could affect other regions that are potentially susceptible to going nuclear, namely the Middle East where there is widespread concern about Iran's nuclear undertaking.

It now seems that the key to solving the impending nuclear crisis lies in the hands of Russia and China. Their implicit support for North Korea and Iran may lead them to continue to defy Security Council resolutions. In order to tackle the issue effectively the West, and especially the United States, should use all means of leverage to persuade the two powers that containing the North Korean nuclear program is in their long-term interest and will prevent other potential nuclear contenders from following suit.- Published 2/11/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of law and international relations in Tehran.

North Korea's reported test of a nuclear weapon culminates over ten years of diplomatic failure, for which all of the major world powers share some blame. In response, they have added some containment measures and sanctions to the standard menu, in the hope that the isolated Pyongyang regime eventually collapses from its own weight.

For Iran, these events and the weak international response are also cause for celebration, as the goal of crossing the nuclear threshold without paying a significant price appears closer than ever. Like Kim Jung Il, the Iranian leadership has revolutionary objectives that seek to promote a different world order. Both regimes support, fund, and train terrorist groups; Iran's close alliance with Hizballah in Lebanon contributed to the recent war. Both countries also violated their commitments as signatories to the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and share equipment and know-how.

North Korea is Iran's main source of missile technology and components, and Iran has adopted the North Korean practice of building massive underground facilities located in mountainous terrain and protected by huge layers of concrete. Tehran, like Pyongyang, has used dead-end negotiations to gain time in order to further develop facilities to enrich uranium and separate plutonium, the basic ingredients for producing nuclear weapons.

At the same time, a nuclear Iran is even more of a threat than North Korea, particularly in the wake of President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad's genocidal threats to "wipe Israel off the map". As a result, policies based on containment or deterrence are unlikely to succeed in the case of Iran. While North Korea lacks allies and is facing a loose alliance of surrounding states, Iran's close links to Syria and its support for Hizballah complicate the requirements for containment. In contrast to North Korea, whose limited resources make rapid expansion of a nuclear force difficult (despite the willingness to starve the population), Iran has large oil revenues that could finance a major weapons program.

In addition, fear of the consequences of an Iranian nuclear weapons capability and a general arms race would quickly lead to similar efforts by other regional powers, including Egypt (whose leaders have recently stated their intention of restarting a "peaceful" nuclear effort), Turkey and Saudi Arabia. This would mark the complete collapse of what remains of the NPT regime, and would be far more dangerous and destabilizing than the situation created in East Asia by the North Korean nuclear test. Iranian nuclear weapons would also force Israel to reevaluate its policy of nuclear ambiguity that has not changed for over 35 years. The result would be a multi-polar nuclear Middle East in which stable deterrence would be all but impossible to achieve.

Given these major consequences, the North Korean test has highlighted the urgency of efforts to halt the Iranian effort. In the US, the Bush administration recognized the limits of a weak diplomatic approach based on the illusion that dialogue and recognition are more important than power. But after 9/11, the Americans focused most of their power--military as well as diplomatic--on Afghanistan and Iraq, hoping to make them examples for the new approach to international relations. Tactical mistakes and too much faith in a rapid transition to democracy, particularly in Iraq, foiled this effort, and the US lost leverage against North Korea and Iran. While Europe has attempted to step forward to lead the campaign to halt the Iranian nuclear weapons program, a policy of "all carrots and no sticks" has not succeeded.

However, Iran is still some years away from crossing the nuclear threshold (the estimates vary from two years to at least six), and there is time for concerted international action. Sanctions, while late in the game, can have an impact, though the Iranian government has adopted policies designed to avoid them. Compared to North Korea, the Iranian public, including a significant middle class that is far from enamored with the austere and authoritarian Islamic regime, might protest policies that led to restrictions on travel, imports, and other forms of international isolation.

On this basis, stiff sanctions may force Iran to freeze its nuclear program. But if this fails, focused military action against the main nuclear facilities and support areas will be considered. A credible threat of an international coalition prepared to use force may also lead the Iranian leadership to reconsider the risks and costs of attaining nuclear weapons.

To implement this policy before Iran crosses the threshold, the United States will still have to lead: there is no alternative on the horizon. However, Washington will not be able to dictate policy, and the other powers--Europe, China, Russia, and Japan--must be prepared to share the risks and costs. Whether the North Korean test will accelerate this process, and whether there is enough time and political will to stop the Iranian nuclear program and its consequences, remains to be seen.- Published 2/11/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Gerald M. Steinberg is the founder and president of NGO Monitor and professor of political science at Bar Ilan University.

We might now take George Bush at his word: in the wake of the September 11 attacks, he named three nations as the "axis of evil": North Korea, Iran and Iraq. The statement had a solid tripartite ring to it, conjuring images of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan. The implication was chilling: that Axis, we might remember, damn near overran the world.

"North Korea," Bush then said, "is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens." Iran, he explained, "aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom." When it came to Iraq, Bush was oddly careful, saying it "had plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade." Had plotted.

We are now, some five years later, left with the realization that thinking about acquiring weapons of mass destruction will get you attacked (if you're Iraq), while actually having them will lead to negotiations--as is the case with North Korea. In truth, this is not an incoherent theory of deterrence: the Soviet Union had some 20,000 nuclear warheads aimed at us during the cold war and we spent our time fighting them in Nicaragua, Chile, the Congo, Vietnam--in other words, in places where our vital interests were not threatened in the slightest. In fact, we fought them on every continent in the world, except Europe, where our vital interests actually were threatened.

But we should not think Bush's words are a kind of historical conceit; we fought the Axis by first knocking off its lightweight contender, Italy. So too, we thought, we would do with Iraq. It was the "axis of evil's" Italy. More simply, as one of my colleagues has described it, the Bush administration went after Iraq because they thought it would be a pushover, "a Grenada with goats".

Such glibness is well-placed, for it shows that among the gibberish being uttered by Bush's most important policymakers, there is a sense that perhaps America is not the all-powerful hegemon its class of neo-conservatives would have us believe. At the beginning of the movie "Patton"--a classic, played nearly every night on some television somewhere in America--the great and strutting general faces his troops.

"Men," he says, "this stuff we hear about America wanting to stay out of the war--not wanting to fight--is a lot of bullshit. Americans love to fight--traditionally. All real Americans love the sting and clash of battle."

No we don't. At the height of World War II, when we and our allies were bumping up against the German army, the American army had the highest desertion rate of any fighting force in the European theater. Dwight Eisenhower was enraged; there were tens of thousands of men wandering around behind the lines, "separated from their units". (British commanders, by the way, often referred to the Americans as ... "our Italians".)

That is to say: we didn't invade Iraq because we thought they had weapons of mass destruction. We invaded Iraq because we knew they didn't. By this through-the-looking-glass logic, the only nations and movements worth attacking are those that are the least capable of hitting back. That sounds glib, but it is supported by the facts. During his recent address before the United Nations Security Council, Bush laid out a new axis of evil--Hamas and Hizballah (this is, it seems, the "axis of not quite as evil, but still evil"). Hamas and Hezbollah were each mentioned three times. Al-Qaeda, the movement that attacked the World Trade Center and killed thousands of Americans was mentioned once. Once. North Korea was never mentioned.

America has a great military man, but his name is not George Patton. His name is Fox Conner. He was a brigadier general and war theorist earlier in the last century, and was responsible for tutoring some of our greatest military leaders--like George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower. His view was that dictators would always fight better, because they ruled by fear. Democracies do not have that, ah, luxury. So, he said, democracies must follow three rules when it comes to fighting a war: never fight unless attacked, never fight alone, and never fight for long. The Bush administration has got it exactly backwards--we attacked a country that didn't attack us, we did it virtually by ourselves, and we have now fought longer in Iraq than we did against Germany and Japan.

So too, we have abrogated the most fundamental principles of diplomacy. We insist on negotiating with others (when both Iran and North Korea want bilateral talks), we insist on making demands we cannot hope to enforce, and we believe that the negotiations should be short, when everyone knows that constant negotiations mean constant peace.

Don't think that any of this has been lost on either the North Koreans or Iran. The North Korean leadership knows we're not going to hit them--why, Americans might actually die by the tens of thousands. It's much easier for us to hit Hamas, to ship weapons into the West Bank and Gaza in the hopes of fomenting a civil war. That suits us. So the North Koreans are safe. And the Iranians are moving as fast as they can to make sure they will be too.- Published 2/11/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Mark Perry is an author and foreign policy, military and intelligence analyst based in Washington, DC.