• The third way out  - Awadh Albadi
A withdrawal from Iraq should be an opportunity to review the ideas and policies that got the United States into this historic mess.

• Maintain solidarity with Iraqis  - Safa A. Hussein
A practical withdrawal plan should be associated with the transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi authorities.

• Absent US forces, Iraq will lurch into greater chaos  - Lawrence Kaplan
Having gone into Iraq under the banner of idealism, the United States will abandon it in the name of cold-blooded realism.

• Stay the course?  - Khaled Salih
From Kurdistan's perspective, it is difficult to see how a messy US withdrawal could bring about a better alternative to the current situation.

• Iran and the US military presence in Iraq  - Sadegh Zibakalam
Tehran no longer sees any need for a US military presence and prefers that the withdrawal take place sooner rather than later.

The third way out
 Awadh Albadi

There can only be one answer to the question of whether the United States should withdraw from Iraq: a loud and clear yes and as soon as possible. This illegitimate war on Iraq and its consequent occupation should never have happened.

The good news in this regard is that the call for a pullout is now not only a popular demand in Iraq and the Arab and Islamic world but also in the United States itself, according to public opinion polls. The failure of this war has now become apparent to everyone except the American administration. Any delay in dealing with this failure can only lead to the bloodshed of more innocent Iraqis and Americans.

But the option of a quick and sudden pullout without first properly organizing conditions in Iraq may not be realistic. It will not be easy for the US to admit to its failure and immediately withdraw or flee after all it has endured in the past three years in terms of the human, financial, political and moral costs that such an admission would have at international and regional levels. This is particularly true in terms of the United States' credibility and international trust in its foreign policies, because an immediate pull-out would be seen as a military and political defeat of no less a magnitude than the Vietnam war. It would also be seen as a victory for America's enemies. This is a real fear that has persuaded the American administration to resist that option.

The alternative way out is to follow the strategy the United States is following now, i.e., reinforcing the institutions of power that US forces have created in Iraq, particularly the army and security forces. That would provide cover for the claim that one of the goals of the war has been achieved--i.e., establishing a new Iraqi political system able to protect itself and based on democratic principles.

This would then be marketed to American and international public opinion in a way that indicates that this "achievement" allows US forces to engage in a limited withdrawal from Iraq according to an agreement with the Iraqi "government". That government has gained "legitimacy" to "agree" to maintain a certain American presence--in the form of a limited number of troops and military bases that thus do not constitute an occupation--under the pretext of providing support for the system and protecting Iraq from external attacks.

This option is no better than the first. It will maintain the components of instability that came with the occupation. Furthermore, it will confirm the doubts and fears of critics of the war that the US came to Iraq to stay, something Washington has always denied. It is an option even Iraqis who supported the invasion of their country couldn't defend to Arab and Muslim public opinion. The fear that the US meant to stay combined with the above option will mean Arabs and Muslims will continue to view the United States and its policies in the region with great suspcion. Iraq and the entire region will thus remain vulnerable to permanent and open-ended instability. The Iraqi national resistance will not come to an end because the political situation left behind will be seen as a continuation of the occupation by another name.

If the United States truly wants what is best for Iraq when it leaves--and it will leave sooner or later--then it would do well to start by admitting that its interests cannot be achieved through the policies it is presently pursuing in Iraq. Washington should admit that it is incapable of achieving what it wanted to achieve at the outset and withdraw through a formula ensuring the least possible amount of strategic damage internationally, regionally and in Iraq.

This could be achieved by reaching an understanding with the Iraqi national resistance. These forces resisted the American occupation and embody a national project that is contradictory to all that accompanied the occupation in terms of sectarianism, terrorism, corruption and infighting. They are able to provide a legitimate national Iraqi leadership to deal with the post-occupation challenges with confidence and rectify the mistakes made throughout the years of occupation. They would also be able to implement any understandings that may be reached with the US prior to a withdrawal.

A pullout according to such a formula would, regardless of the specific mechanism, details or timetable, save a lot of American and Iraqi blood. It would save Iraq from a civil war and the region from the risks accompanying a divided and sectarian Iraq that could provide a stage upon which the aspirations of regional countries are played out. It would also create the necessary circumstances for Iraq to resume its role in the regional balance of power.

The regional pax-Americana will not be achieved by the occupation of Iraq. It is now an even more distant vision than it was before the war. Hence, the withdrawal from Iraq should be an opportunity to review the ideas and policies that got the United States into this historic mess, and an opportunity for the US to review policies that are at the root of much of the instability in this region, especially its policies regarding the Arab-Israel conflict and the case of Palestine.

Reviewing these policies, combined with a sensible end to the occupation of Iraq, can create a regional environment that would allow Washington to achieve its declared goals for the war on terror and secure its long-term strategic interests. This can happen without resorting to force, issuing threats or setting up military bases in the region, but rather by taking into consideration the interests and aspirations of its peoples.- Published 12/10/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Awadh Albadi is research director at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh.

Three and a half years ago, the Iraqi capital Baghdad fell to American ground forces. Today, with more than 140,000 US troops on the ground, the fate of this military presence is debated in the US and abroad. As American casualties mount, the American public is increasingly demanding to pull the troops out of Iraq. A decision to withdraw them will be determined largely by four factors: war cost, manpower, national security and politics.

War cost and manpower are pressing factors in any US decision to withdraw troops. Total military deaths exceed 2,700, and there are more than 12,000 wounded. Since its onset the war in Iraq has cost $379 billion, with a monthly cost of about $8 billion. Manpower is another concern. The US is already experiencing trouble among reservists and National Guard men and women regarding service in Iraq, so reduced numbers would help ease retention and recruitment.

Turning to national security, the US 2006 National Security Strategy specifically focuses on "Defeating Global Terrorism and Working to Prevent Attacks against the US and its Friends" by, in the short term, using military force to kill or capture terrorists and deny them safe haven or control over any nation, and in the long term by promoting democracy. How the war in Iraq measures up to these objectives is debatable. A recently leaked national intelligence estimate dated April 2006 and compiled by leading analysts across 16 US spy agencies concluded the following:

First, the US-led Iraq war has become a "cause celebre for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement". Second, if it is perceived that the jihadists in Iraq are succeeding, this will fuel more extremism, but if the jihadists are perceived to have failed, "fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight". Third, "US success in Iraq is the key to ensuring that this terrorist threat does not grow." Fourth, if democratic reform efforts in Muslim majority nations progress over the next five years, political participation probably will drive a wedge between intransigent extremists and groups willing to use the political process to achieve their local objectives.

The politics of this issue require that Iraq be controlled by Iraqis as soon as possible. Yet the war in Iraq and the presence of US forces there is a divisive issue for both American politicians and people. Republicans believe that Iraq is central to the war on terrorism and cannot be abandoned without giving jihadists a crucial victory. Prematurely leaving Iraq could result in Iraq descending into ethnic/religious squabbling, national and regional instability and the prospect of becoming a terrorist haven.

Democrats argue that the 2003 Iraq invasion has inflamed anti-US sentiments in the Muslim world and left the US less safe. Every day the exposed US military remains in war-torn Iraq imperils US security, drains its economy, ignores urgent domestic needs and prevents Iraqi democratic self-rule. They believe that announcing a definite withdrawal date would separate mainstream Iraqis from the insurgents and give the vast majority of people there a stake in replacing occupation with independence.

An effective US policy toward Iraq should reflect solidarity with Iraqis. Many of Iraq's leaders, even fundamentalists like Muqtada al-Sadr, call for phased rather than immediate withdrawal. However, they divide on whether there should be a timetable for withdrawal or it should be based on fulfilling certain conditions, which include a decreased threat level and a reasonable readiness level of the Iraqi security forces.

Most leaders of the Arab Shi'ite majority and all the Kurdish leaders believe that a withdrawal should be tied to the development of the Iraqi security forces. They fear the chaos that would follow a premature withdrawal of American forces. They know that Iraq's security forces are inadequate as yet to provide security; thus, an immediate withdrawal of US forces would leave a power vacuum that would invite terrorists, militias, and Islamist extremist groups to step in. However, other Iraqis such as the followers of Muqtada al-Sadr and most of the Sunni leaders demand a timetable for withdrawal. They think that the presence of the coalition forces is part of the problem in Iraq rather than part of the solution. In fact, they suspect that US forces intend to stay indefinitely.

A practical withdrawal plan should be associated with the transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi authorities. A plan has actually been agreed upon to gradually turn over security responsibility from the coalition forces to the Iraqi government. Security responsibility has already been transferred in two of the southern provinces, Muthana and Thi Qar, where coalition forces have pulled out of the cities and redeployed. As more Iraqi security forces are qualified they will take over security responsibility in additional provinces, thereby relieving more coalition forces, which will be pulled out. It is anticipated that the year 2007 will witness the transfer of security responsibility to the Iraqi authorities in at least the three provinces of the Kurdistan region and the remaining seven southern provinces. This will relieve significant numbers of troops and thus may be associated with a major US force reduction.

The size and mission of the US troop contingent after the full transfer of security to Iraqi authorities is debatable. US officials have not made their plans clear, though they have declared that troop presence will be tied to Iraqi government requests. Many Iraqis believe that once security responsibility is transitioned to the Iraqi government, US troops should leave, though a large military training mission would be required to stay. Others think that in practice some forces would stay for rather a long time in remote bases. They argue that for all practical purposes Iraq does not have an air force, artillery and many other weapons and equipment; hence it will need the US as a security provider for years to come.- Published 12/10/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Safa A. Hussein is a former deputy member of the dissolved Iraqi Governing Council. He served as a brigadier general in the Iraqi Air Force. Currently he serves in the Iraqi National Security Council.

Of all the lines of argument US President George W. Bush has used to rally the public behind the war in Iraq, few have elicited more howls of derision than his latest. "If you think it's bad now," he said at a recent press conference, "imagine what Iraq would look like if the United States leaves before this government can defend itself." To which a headline in The Washington Post offered this typical response: "Bush's New Argument: It Could Be Worse."

Whatever its political uses, Bush's new argument happens to be true. Yet the moral cost of abandoning a country America has turned inside out seems not to have made the slightest impression on US opinion-makers. To the extent that ethical considerations factor into the debate at all, it's usually in favor of a rapid withdrawal from Iraq. Mostly, though, the debate over leaving has been conducted in the sterile language of geopolitics, credibility, and "misallocated" resources.

This heartlessness of the withdrawal argument responds to multiple needs that are largely unrelated to Iraq. It comforts the sensibilities of opinion-makers who have a distaste for this administration's foreign policy and so don't seem to feel much stake in its human consequences. It testifies to the consistency of those who, having opposed sending US forces to Iraq in the first place, see nothing problematic about pulling them out today. And it offers assurance that, but for the bungled US occupation, Iraq can only be better off. No one has espoused this last view more vigorously than Democratic Representative John Murtha. His summary of the situation in Iraq amounts to this: America is the problem.

Facts on the ground suggest Murtha has things exactly backward. (Beware of American politicians who boast of special insights gleaned during trips to Iraq. They seldom venture outside the constellation of US bases, and, even then, their visits can last no longer than 48 hours.) The truth is that, as the war takes a sectarian turn, the Americans have become more buffer and lifeline than belligerent. With militiamen loose in their streets, even the Sunni residents of insurgent strongholds now look to the Americans as their protectors. During a recent US operation in Baghdad's Amiriyah neighborhood, terrified Iraqis emerged into alleys to beg for the Americans to stay. As one put it, "If you leave, all the people here will kill each other." Fully 88 percent of residents claim to feel safest in the presence of the Americans, and for good reason: Far from the reactionary enterprise imagined by so many Americans, the US military is the most progressive force in Iraq.

None of this jibes with the cliche that, "redeploying United States troops is necessary for success in Iraq," as Senator John Kerry has put it. But, for the likes of Kerry, what happens after the US leaves Iraq is beside the point; by then, the troops will be safely home. Withdrawal advocates who wear the position on their sleeves as if it were a badge of heightened moral awareness seem to forget that, as theologian Kenneth Himes wrote in Foreign Policy, "the moral imperative during the occupation is Iraqi well-being, not American interests." Having invoked just-war tradition to oppose the war's cause, they completely disregard its relevance to the war's conduct--namely, the obligation to repair what the US has smashed. The particulars of that tradition mean leaving Iraq with something better--or, at least, not worse--than what went before. That does not mean staying in Iraq forever. It does mean staying until Iraqis have the means to restrain the forces unleashed by America's own actions. The bloodshed overflowing Baghdad streets, after all, comes as a direct consequence of those actions.

Why is it, then, that so many of those who demanded action in the Balkans, and now demand it in Darfur, cannot accept that America's role in having created Iraq's humanitarian crisis imposes a special obligation to do right there? If anything, advocates of an immediate withdrawal seem to believe the reverse is true. They speak of the Iraqi people as though the entire population has been tainted--marred by its involvement in what Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid mocks as "George Bush's war". Thus has it become permissible for political operatives to tar one Iraqi prime minister as an American "puppet" and for politicians to boycott the congressional address of another and--responding in kind to the juvenile arguments of Republican operatives--write off the whole enterprise as a partisan joke.

Where all this leads is clear. Having gone into Iraq under the banner of idealism, the United States will abandon it in the name of cold-blooded realism. Never mind the thousands of Iraqis who assisted the Americans and could well be doomed. Never mind that, in the enemy's imagination, entire peoples--Iraq's Christian population, among others--belong to this category. Iraq's liberals, too--like Mithal al-Allusi, a decent man who heeded our summons to build a new Iraq and saw his two sons murdered for his sins--will be erased. The secular, the nonsectarian, the pro-western voices--these will be quieted as well. Nor should they look to the United States for refuge. Having enshrined in official policy the fiction that persecution went away with Saddam, the United States has all but sealed its borders to Iraqis in search of asylum.

If the whole rotten business seems familiar, that's because it is. At the height of the debate over withdrawing from Vietnam, the Washington Post editorialized: "The threatened bloodbath is less ominous than a continuation of the current bloodletting." About the impending departure of the Americans from Southeast Asia, New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis had this to say: "Some will find the whole bloodbath debate unreal. What future possibility could be more terrible than the reality of what is happening to Cambodia now?" Then, as now, responsibility for the war's outcome lay squarely with its architects. But the war's aftermath also bloodied the hands of critics who insisted on walking away without condition and regardless of consequence.

The genocide that followed in Cambodia and the spectacle of Vietnam's reeducation camps will not be repeated in Iraq. But ask any American officer there and he will tell you that, absent US forces, Iraq's ditches will fill rapidly as the death toll multiplies tenfold. The United States owes Iraq many things. Being an engine of murder isn't one of them.- Published 12/10/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Lawrence Kaplan is editor of World Affairs.

Last August, Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that however difficult the situation in Iraq is, "stay the course, stand up for those people who want democracy, stand for those people who are fighting sectarianism, stand up for a different vision of the Middle East based on democracy, liberty and the rule of law." US President George W. Bush and his supporters have continuously repeated the same message in many ways and on different occasions.

Less than ten days ago, the Republican chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator John W. Warner of Virginia, aired a different idea: "In two or three months if this thing [the Iraqi prime minister's plan to improve security] hasn't come to fruition and this level of violence is not under control, I think it's a responsibility of our government to determine: Is there a change of course we should take?" Some would say that dividing Iraq into three federal units is the only viable solution. Others argue that the Bush administration must accept and publicly acknowledge its failure in Iraq, leading to withdrawal as an inevitable outcome.

There is no doubt that an American withdrawal will happen; the question is when and how. From Kurdistan's perspective, it is difficult to see how any quick and messy US military and political withdrawal could bring about a better alternative to the current situation. A premature withdrawal plunges Iraq's major political processes into more chaos and deeper conflicts.

Under such circumstances the Sunni Arab insurgency would escalate, with hopes to recapture Iraq's political, military and security institutions. Iraq's Shi'ite political forces and population would do their utmost to avoid failing in their historic opportunity to come to power and rule themselves. Kurdistan's achievement in terms of self-rule, stability and prosperity could easily fade away.

Inevitably, more violent killings would follow as a consequence of haphazardly abandoning the emerging political arrangements based on Iraq's negotiated constitution under US and coalition protection. The idea of a federal, democratic and pluralistic Iraq can hardly survive without long-term American military, political and security commitments. On the contrary, a more likely outcome would be intervention by neighboring countries and terrorist groups to promote their own interests, exact revenge or punish those who sided with the Americans against Saddam Hussein's regime or dared to dream of a better and democratic future. In such circumstances, Kurdistan would pay a much higher price than we can anticipate: not only is the Kurdish leadership seen to be actively supporting redrawing Iraq's political system, but the entire population is viewed as supporting foreign forces, ideas and values.

An American withdrawal before Iraq's political, military, security and economic institutions can survive on their own would invite extremist groups to penetrate Iraq's borders and cause more destruction than we have seen. Kurdistan is particularly vulnerable in such a scenario because of its geographic location and in view of the difficulties implied in controlling the region's mountains. If extremist groups managed to survive in Afghanistan, create a rule of horror and extend their influence across continents before they were confronted militarily, Kurdistan can potentially function in the same way for anti-Kurdish, anti-US, anti-western and anti-democratic forces.

Panicked, unplanned and chaotic withdrawal is not the only answer to criticisms and demands for a different course of action in Iraq. It is not difficult to imagine the US rearranging its military and political presence but still remaining in Iraq. One option is to withdraw more from Baghdad and other cities in the hope that Sunnis and Shi'ites conclude that they cannot eliminate each other and therefore must find a modus vivendi.

Another option is to reduce the US military presence to a minimum level but keep the airbases the US has managed to build in Iraq in order to limit the capacity of extremist groups and to deter neighboring countries from embarking on a military adventure in Iraq. A further advantage of maintaining the airbases is the expected escalation with Iran on the issue of nuclear weapons and Iran's non-compliance with UN Security Council demands and resolutions. Even if the US military and airbases cannot function to create democratic institutions in Iraq and support liberty and rule of law in the Middle East, they can prevent the collapse of the current regional order and possibly prevent regional wars over the issue of weapons of mass destruction.- Published 12/10/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Khaled Salih is an independent analyst and consultant based in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. He is former senior advisor to the prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government.

An Iranian analyst once drew an analogy between the relations that would ultimately emerge between Iran and the US in Iraq and a married couple who live together only for the sake of their children. This strange prediction was made at the beginning of the US- led attack on Iraq, at a time when many people, particularly many Iranians who were eager to see the end of the Islamic regime, were contemplating whether or not there would be an attack by the Americans on Iran. The analyst wrote that in spite of all expectations of some sort of confrontation between Iran and the US in Iraq, the two adversaries would learn that they had to live together, even to cooperate with one another, however reluctantly, for the sake of Iraq.

An overall examination of the developments and changes that have taken place in Iran's perceptions and attitude regarding the US presence in Iraq during the past two and half years reveals that the Iranian analyst's prediction was not too inaccurate. Despite all their differences, Tehran and Washington have slowly realized that the two powers share many interests in Iraq.

The Iranian attitude toward the presence of the US in Iraq has gone through a number of phases. The first such phase emerged when the US launched its attack against the Baath regime in March 2003 and eventually occupied the country. Tehran strongly condemned the attack and described it as "unlawful and criminal". The Iranian leaders expressed their sorrow for the death and suffering of the "innocent Muslim people of Iraq by the infidel forces led by the US, the world's leading arrogant and anti-Islamic power".

As the US presence became entrenched in Iraq and the Americans assumed increasing responsibility for running the country, the Iranians referred to them as the "occupiers" or "the occupying forces" and demanded their "unconditional and immediate withdrawal". The Iranian state-run media as well as pro-government newspapers wrote at great length condemning the US and its allies fighting in Iraq and the war itself as "illegitimate, unfair and unjust". The more religious Iranian leaders, including Friday prayer imams, alleged that the US invasion of Iraq was the first stage of a grand anti-Islamic strategy designed by the western powers led by the Bush administration. They cited statements made by some western leaders, particularly the US president, as proof that the attack on Iraq was indeed the start of a new crusade against Islam. The notion of the so-called "Greater Middle East" was also portrayed as a sinister plot to further enhance the West's domination and influence in the Middle East.

The first contradiction for the Iranians emerged, however, after the first stage of the war. There was a strange silence among the Iranian media about the Iraqi regime and its leader Saddam Hussein. In contrast to the official and pro-government media, the more independent newspapers praised the overthrow of the ruthless Iraqi regime. The upshot of this contradiction was that, in contrast to the official line, there was implicit acquiescence in the US act of overthrowing the Baath regime.

The second contradiction was over the issue of democracy and the US-led action in Iraq. The official Iranian media did not mention the future of democracy in Iraq. It did not discuss the possibility of the advent of freedom and democracy in Iraq no matter how remote that possibility might have been. Instead it defended the right of the Iraqi people to self-determination following the withdrawal of the occupying powers. The more moderate and liberal Iranians, however, welcomed the possibility of a democratic Iraq as their neighbor and concluded that democracy in Iraq would inevitably help the democratic process in Iran. In short, some Iranians both inside and outside the Islamic regime welcomed the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime and therefore avoided outright condemnation of the US invasion of Iraq.

The third contradiction emerged as the resistance to US forces in Iraq began to intensify. Military operations (suicide bombings, assassinations, etc.) launched primarily by the forces loyal to Saddam were described by the official Iranian media as "resistance carried out by the heroic Muslim people of Iraq". It stated that the resistance would continue as long as the occupation lasted. There was no mention of the real identity of those responsible for the attacks on the allied forces. Again, the more moderate and liberal currents in Iran reported that these operations were carried out mainly by the elements loyal to the Saddam regime as well as the remnants of the Baath party, i.e., by the very forces who committed hideous crimes against Iranians, including the killing of tens of thousands, mainly civilians, by chemical weapons.

It did not take long, however, for the Iranian leaders to confront the dilemma of the reality of "the heroic resistance", as increasingly the suicide-bombers launched their attacks against Shi'ite targets. Many of the bombings and killings directed against the Americans were carried out by the same groups that were targeting Shi'ites, including Shi'ite holy shrines. In addition, a number of Arab leaders expressed their dismay that Iraqi Shi'ites were gaining power with the support of the Iranians. The Iranian leaders then blamed "Zionist agents as well as enemies of Islam for causing sectarian fighting among Iraqi Muslims".

Yet despite their rhetoric, the leaders were aware that the groups opposing the Americans were the same people who opposed the Shi'ite rise to power in Iraq. Whatever the Iranian leaders might say in public about the US presence in Iraq, the reality is that they know that for the first time since the country's independence from the British in the early 1950s the Shi'ites have managed to gain their fair share of power--thanks to the Americans.

In this regard, the Iraqi Shi'ites have been instrumental in forging an "undeclared truce" between Iran and the US in Iraq. Whatever differences Iran and the US may have, their common enemy has forced a marriage of convenience upon them in Iraq.

This conclusion, however, does not mean that Iran welcomes the US military presence in Iraq. On the contrary, the Islamic regime demands an immediate US withdrawal. The Iranian leaders perceive the US military presence in Iraq as a serious potential threat to their security. With the nuclear crisis still unresolved and the possibility of sanctions against Iran being seriously contemplated by the US government, it is quite natural for the Iranian government to perceive the US military presence at its doorstep as a serious threat. With the power Shi'ites have gained in Iraq, including military power, Iran believes that they can adequately defend themselves against Sunni insurgents even if the latter are supported by the Arab states in the region. Tehran therefore no longer sees any need for a US military presence in Iraq and prefers that the US Army withdrawal take place sooner rather than later.- Published 12/10/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Sadegh Zibakalam is professor of political science at Tehran University.