BI: It has been suggested in some quarters that now, after the Lebanon war and ceasefire, might be a good time for a more comprehensive peace process between Lebanon, Syria and Israel to commence. Is this possible?

Kodmani: It is certainly possible. I think the focus is more on the Palestinian issue as it seems more urgent, and clearly the meetings of and speeches at the UN General Assembly indicate that the priority is with the Palestinian issue at the moment.

This being said, I think peace with Israel and the Lebanese and Syrians is something that needs to happen in different stages. One is through negotiations with Hizballah on very specific matters such as buffer zones, withdrawal of armed elements and an exchange of prisoners. These can clearly happen and in this case we don't need to see the active involvement of the Syrians. This is in Hizballah's immediate interest, in order to achieve some of what the group wanted when the war started in July.

But to broaden this to a peace process is not a likely option. Before one can imagine any active engagement from Damascus a prerequisite is a change of perception of Syria itself.

BI: When you say change of perception you mean from the outside world?

Kodmani: Yes. Syria has behaved in inconsistent ways several times over the last two years and has made a number of mistakes, especially in its choices and declarations. We have indications of a will to cooperate with the international community, from a stated willingness to join some regional arrangements to an expressed desire to normalize relations with a number of western powers, namely France and the US. But on the other hand we have statements that are provocative, that are more radically critical of US policies, western policies in general, France's role in the region and the UN's role in the region. These inconsistencies don't help change perceptions of Syria.

BI: How important would it be for Syria to at least be seen to be interested in a peace process?

Kodmani: There are many advantages to that. One of them is to make up for its withdrawal from Lebanon and the loss of its influence there, as well as the relative isolation of and finger pointing at Syria by the international community.

One of the major advantages would be to tone down the issue of the international investigation into the assassination of [former Lebanese PM Rafiq] Hariri, and thus increase the possibility for Syria to be considered a legitimate player in any arrangements in the region rather than be treated as a nuisance. In that sense there is a very obvious advantage for Syria to indicate that it is willing to cooperate with any arrangements, whether to pressure Hizballah or accept deployment of international observers on its border with Lebanon or, more likely, other arrangements to make up for it.

But, the priority today for Damascus is to be rid of the pressure from the international community regarding that investigation.

BI: Is this also a result of domestic pressure in Syria.

Kodmani: There is no significant domestic pressure at the moment on this particular matter. There is some opposition, some expression of discontent but no immediate pressure, at least not from society and it does not look like there is any serious threat from the establishment itself.

The pressure is from the outside, especially the pressure from some of the Lebanese factions that are opposed to Syria's influence and allied with the West. This is an axis of pressure that is extremely disturbing for the regime for two reasons: one, it regionally isolates and embarrasses the Syrian government; and secondly, there can be important implications internally and for the Syrian regime if there is a full accusation of Syrian officials at the highest level over the assassination.

So this is clearly an absolute priority.

BI: The Saudi initiative has lately been repackaged as a more comprehensive Arab-Israeli deal. Can such a repackaging have any traction?

Kodmani: It cannot be excluded that this is the decision of the international community--to reengage in something of the scope of what we had in Madrid in 1991--but I think the evolvement of the Arab plan is more to find a window through which the Palestinians can be brought back into the diplomatic and political game rather than having to accept the roadmap and the Quartet's conditions. In other words, it would be an intermediate option to join the diplomatic process.

So my sense is that while this revival could have the dimension of bringing in the Syrians, the Lebanese, the Palestinians and everybody else, the Palestinian-Israeli track has its own dynamics and can proceed separately, whereas reviving the Syrian-Israeli front involves a more sustained and long-term mobilization.

BI: We have talked about whether Syria wants to reengage. But is Israel willing to engage?

Kodmani: Over the last three years, Syria has been more willing than Israel to reengage. So if we come back now to revive that track, the Syrians are ready. But how ready is Israel and how much does Israel see a vital link between having a peaceful front in southern Lebanon and northern Israel and talking to the Syrians?

The temptation for Israel has always been to cut off Lebanon from Syria and negotiate directly with either. This will not be easy if only because Hizballah needs Syria for its survival as a military faction. There is scope for small arrangements but not a peace agreement with Lebanon. The determining factor here is whether Israel sees that the link with Syria is vital and cannot be dismissed. I don't think this is the case in Israel, and I don't see any serious signs that Israel is interested in engaging in a Syrian track at the moment. I think it is happy to see an internationalization of its border with Lebanon, would favor more limited and short-term arrangements with the Lebanese government, and might come under pressure to re-start negotiations with the Palestinians if a national unity government is formed. Peace with Syria comes last.

BI: So in this regard, the war in Lebanon did not change much.

Kodmani: No, it did not change much. It created a debate in Israel, and this is where Israel needs to sort out its strategic perceptions and priorities. It has not done so for the moment, but the domestic crisis in Israel reflects the need to do that. The reality is that the war over the summer has not brought any strategic change in terms of involving the Syrians more or less on the Lebanese front. They are as involved as before, no more and no less.- Published 28/9/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Bassma Kodmani is executive director of the Arab Reform Initiative.

Hizballah staged its massive "Divine Victory" rally in Beirut last week. Among the hundreds of thousands present were many from Syria and some from Iran who had come to celebrate the "historic defeat" of Israel and the United States. It was also an occasion for Syria's clients in Lebanon to flex their muscles and declare: "We're still here, and we continue to influence the course of events in Lebanon."

The bargain that seemed to be offered at the rally regarding Hizballah's arms boiled down to this: the Shi'ite militia will consider handing over its arms only to a national unity government that is truly representative, not corrupt, and capable of defending the country. With Iran proving a tough customer in its dealings with the Europeans and Americans over the nuclear issue, and given the defiant scene from the Hizballah rally in Beirut, the view of the neighborhood suddenly looked good in Damascus' eyes.

Syria is not returning to Lebanon--that era is over. Those lumped together as Syria's so-called supporters in Lebanon are a heterogeneous bunch that includes sizable portions of the sectarian and political spectrum, like the followers of General Michel Aoun, who are present not because of any sympathy for Syrian policies but only because they have been persistently rejected by the Sunni-dominated Hariri contingent. There is no way Washington, Paris, Riyadh and Cairo will accept a change of government in Lebanon that allows pro-Syrian factions to achieve a veto-wielding third of the cabinet seats.

Renewed civil strife is no longer a realistic option in Lebanon today, meaning those internal as well as external players who traditionally benefited from such mayhem are further constrained in their expectations. And the UN-sponsored investigation into the murder of Rafiq Hariri, with an international tribunal as its endgame, shows no signs of slackening. Seen from this perspective, the view from Damascus is not as rosy as might have appeared.

However, the Syrian regime does have open to it a crucial life-saving course: the sincere pursuit of Middle East peace on the basis of the Madrid principle of land for peace--reacquiring the Golan Heights in return for full peace and security and water guarantees for Israel. The argument has long been advanced that a repressive regime like that of the Baath in Damascus, which has thrived on the calculated application of brutality both at home and in neighboring states, cannot survive under conditions of regional peace. But Syria's leaders have on more than one occasion sung the praises of the Chinese model of development and modernization. It seems to offer the possibility of single-party rule that can slowly shepherd the country toward gradual economic and social advancement and even prosperity.

For the Chinese model to work in a place like Syria, however, the country would need to be at peace with all its neighbors. The challenge facing Syria's rulers therefore is first to reinvent themselves as serious peacemakers, and then to get busy applying their version of the Chinese experience with a view to improving the lot of the ordinary Syrian and raising the country to the status of respectable regional economic success, while retaining their hold on power. With time, even that monopoly on power can begin to ease with no adverse effects on regime stability, or on the country-at-large.

The timing for a Syrian-Israeli peace deal is a necessary function of the peaceful resolution of the current impasse with Iran over the nuclear issue. Since the costs of confrontation between the West and Iran are prohibitive for both parties, the only realistic course that is left is some form of comprehensive agreement that would include, in addition to settlement of the nuclear dispute, understandings regarding Iraq, Syria, Hizballah, Israel and Iran's future regional role.

The 34-day war in Lebanon this past summer between Israel and Hizballah created opportunities for historic movement on many of these areas of contention in the region. The Lebanon track will easily follow once progress on the Syrian-Israeli peace track has occurred. Parallel movement on the Palestinian track could also be envisioned, but the other two tracks should not be held hostage to breakthroughs on this knotty front; neither Egypt's nor Jordan's were.

As agreements with Iran ripen, Syria should be preparing itself for the next phase of regional peace by halting all meddling in Iraq and the Palestinian territories and complying with the instructions of Kofi Annan to demarcate the borders with Lebanon and exchange diplomatic representation with that country. Any other course of an obstructionist nature could present potentially grave perils for the rulers of Syria, ones that they are now still in a position to avoid. The stakes for the West, the leading Arab states, Israel and even Iran in terms of regional stability and global energy transportation requirements are too high this time to allow for opportunities to be scuttled.- Published 28/9/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Habib C. Malik is associate professor of history at the Lebanese American University (Byblos campus).

Unfortunately, some national leaders in the region, both Arab and Israeli, have missed occasions for peace more than occasions for war. The recent war in Lebanon is a case in point. It could have been avoided and thus have saved many hundreds of civilian lives and prevented the great destruction of homes and infrastructure. It has also contributed to radicalizing both Arabs and Jews and further hindered prospects for resuming the peace process between Israel on the one hand, and Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinians on the other.

On the face of it, a limited political agreement between Israel and Lebanon is now possible. It would comprise an exchange of prisoners or POWs, Israeli withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms (which officially belong to Syria) and provisions for safeguarding the Israeli-Lebanese border by both the IDF and the Lebanese Army. Both Israeli PM Ehud Olmert and Lebanese PM Fuad Siniora would like to implement such an agreement: Olmert, in order to demonstrate to Israelis that his war aims have been achieved; and Siniora, to strengthen his position and coalition, please Sunni Arab leaders in the region as well as the US and curtail the influence of Syria and Hizballah.

Alas, it is unlikely that Siniora could conclude any formal agreement with Israel without the approval of Lebanon's pro-Syrian president, and particularly of the leaders of Hizballah and Syria. Hassan Nasrallah and Bashar Assad would certainly object to any agreement with Israel that is not compatible with their interests, and are indeed capable of thwarting such an agreement, including by Hizballah firing rockets into Israel. Would or could the Lebanese army and UNIFIL stop such a provocative attack?

It would appear, then, that a more promising way to strike an Israeli-Lebanese agreement is by resuming the peace process between Israel and Syria, which began in 1991-92 and nearly culminated in a peace treaty between Damascus and Jerusalem, with Washington's active mediation. Such a treaty, entailing the return of the Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for peace with Israel, was expected also to bring about peace between Lebanon and Israel, neutralize Hizballah's military threat to Israel and possibly cool off relations between Damascus and Tehran, as well as facilitate the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.

Unfortunately, however, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Syrian President Hafiz Assad missed this unique opportunity for historic peace when it was within reach. In late 1999-early 2000, Barak agreed to a Syrian compromise suggestion to demarcate the Syrian-Israeli boundary so that it would be similar to the international boundary of 1923, stretching at least 10 meters away from the north-eastern shore of Lake Tiberias along a 12 km strip. But Barak, concerned about the Israeli public reaction, subsequently changed his mind and requested that the lakeside strip be 400 meters wide. Assad, when informed of Barak's new position at his meeting with US President Bill Clinton in Geneva on March 26, 2000, abruptly rejected the deal and reverted to his old demand to place the boundary in the lake itself. Following the collapse of this peace process, Barak decided to unilaterally withdraw the IDF and the Southern Lebanese Army from southern Lebanon, thus rendering an important strategic and political gain to Hizballah.

The crucial question now is whether or not Syria and Israel can resume the stalled peace process and reach a peace agreement that will also embrace Lebanon, contain Hizballah's military power and weaken if not eliminate Syrian-Iranian strategic relations. It is in the interest of both Jerusalem and Damascus to reach peace. Bashar Assad would retrieve the strategically and nationally important Golan/Jawlan and possibly enjoy US financial support to improve Syria's failing economy, while also safeguarding his rule in Syria against American attack from Iraqi territory.

But Assad apparently does not believe such an option is feasible and thus prefers to adhere to his alliance with Iran and Hizballah, increase his influence in Lebanon and perhaps try to regain the Golan by military force, with Iranian backing. This presumed position derives not only from Assad's admiration for Nasrallah and his interest in gaining popular legitimacy. Assad is probably convinced that Olmert and most Israelis are not prepared to give back the Golan even in return for peace with Syria. He certainly knows that Bush will prevent Olmert from negotiating with Damascus unless Assad capitulates to Washington's demands to stop helping Hizballah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad as well as the Iraqi insurgents.

As far as Olmert is concerned, although it is in Israel's interest to resume the peace process with Syria, he is not likely to embark on such a venture because of the negative attitude of Bush and most Israelis. Consequently, the only viable option for Olmert is to revive the peace process with the Palestinians, a process that Bush and many Israelis support and that may also contribute to weakening the Syrian-Iranian-Hizballah axis. But will Olmert seriously embark on this crucial venture--which involves negotiations over East Jerusalem?- Published 28/9/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Moshe Maoz is professor emeritus of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.