• Countdown to Armageddon  - Ammar Abdulhamid
The prospect of a wider regional war is something the Iranian and Syrian regimes actually welcome.

• Russia reestablishes the Damascus connection  - Konstantin von Eggert
The Kremlin has decided to take Syria under its wing and use it to stage a "comeback" to Middle East politics.

• Try secret diplomacy  - Itamar Rabinovich
Syria has become less of a partner of Iran and more of a client, protected by the senior, more powerful party.

• Don't hand Syria a political victory  - David Schenker
Given Syria's continued unhelpful behavior on Lebanon, Gaza and Iraq, the international community should not presently be pursuing a dialogue with Damascus.

Countdown to Armageddon
 Ammar Abdulhamid

The rise of President Bashar Assad to power in Syria in 2000, which coincided with the collapse of the peace process and the rise of Ariel Sharon in Israel, signaled a gradual return to policies of confrontation with the international community and with Israel.

The reasons for this are numerous and are not all related to the internal makeup of the Syrian regime. Nevertheless, that issue does figure highly in this regard and should not be dismissed, lest this impede judgment regarding the current Syrian role in the region. Indeed, the minoritarian character of the Syrian regime and its consolidation around the private interests of one particular family, the Assad-Makhlouf clan, have served from the very beginning to undercut the potential for serious reform in the country.

The insistence on keeping things in the family and transferring power from father to son, all consideration of republican norms notwithstanding, has served to establish severe limits on the ability of the new president. But then, ever since his (s)election, Bashar has not missed an opportunity to show that he is a true believer in the system and in the mandate and mission assigned to him.

This is why he turned against all dissidents and reformers in early 2001, wholeheartedly embraced the Aqsa Intifada, allowed people like Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal to roam freely in Syria and transformed the relationship with Hizballah from that of master-client to a strategic alliance. Moreover, Bashar never turned his back on the possibility of getting himself embroiled in regional mayhem and controversy. As was the case with his father, the legitimacy that could not be received from internal successes and reforms now needed to be derived from external sources, namely from a continuing focus of energies and attention on the Arab-Israel conflict.

This explains why the president went overboard in his criticism of the US-led invasion of Iraq and lent so much support to the Iraqi "resistance", inviting other Arab states to follow his lead. This also explains his continuing willingness to support radical Palestinian groups and, of course, Hizballah. Indeed, the more pressures the new president and the ruling family have perceived, the more radical their stands and policies have become. The point of no return, if there ever was one, came with the assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri, a development that put the entire ruling family in the line of suspects.

After that, there was no end to how radical the Assad regime was willing to become. It was now facing an existential threat par excellence. The rise of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad and his subsequent visit to Syria on January 19 gave both regimes the opportunity to consolidate their alliance and to extend it to formally include Hizballah and the radical wing of Hamas. A decision seems to have been made to escalate matters further in Gaza and the Shebaa Farms in the hope of diverting international attention from these regimes and bringing about an acceptance of the status quo they represented, even as they consolidated their grip on power.

While current developments seem more than what these regimes and parties bargained for, they are also heaven-sent, hence their increased vociferousness, belligerence and confidence.

Indeed, as the recent declaration made by the Syrian foreign minister during his brief visit to Lebanon indicates, the prospect of a wider regional war is something these regimes actually welcome. For the strong showing that Hizballah has made, the destruction of the Lebanese infrastructure notwithstanding, is encouragement enough for these regimes, with their minds and hearts still stuck in the 1980s, to revive the old dream of defeating Israel militarily through involvement in a war of attrition and thus achieving military glory that will boost their credentials both at home and abroad. With the US caught in the Iraqi quagmire and its power seemingly neutralized as a result, this prospect might appear more and more tempting with each passing day.

In fact, the Assads seem to be actively preparing for this eventuality. They have already called up large reserve cohorts that are busy digging trenches all around the country, and they are currently preparing public opinion for this possibility and cultivating their support thereof. Thus, calls to reopen the Golan front are routinely reiterated during the Friday sermons, and communist and nationalist groups have recently joined the chorus.

So, even if the US and Israel seem uninterested in bringing about such a conflagration, their desires, wishes and interests are not the only factors that matter here. There is indeed another side involved, a full fledged alliance in fact, whose leaders seem to think that war, regardless of its potentially high cost in human and material terms, will serve their interests. The more troubles Israel has in Lebanon and the US in Iraq, the more convinced these leaders will be of the "wisdom" and necessity of war.- Published 17/8/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Ammar Abdulhamid is a Syrian dissident and democracy activist, currently exiled in the United States. He is the founder and director of the Tharwa Foundation, a non-governmental organization dedicated to facilitating democratic processes and improving inter-communal relations across the broader Middle East and North Africa region.

The year 2006 has become "the" year of the Middle East for the Russian leadership. First was the controversial visit by a Hamas delegation to Moscow, then President Vladimir Putin's trip to Algeria. In the early summer, reports surfaced that Russia was engaged in modernizing facilities in the Syrian ports of Tartus and Latakia (followed by a lukewarm denial by the Russian defense minister). Then came the crisis over Lebanon.

Over the last few weeks, Moscow has taken a very assertive position in the UN Security Council. Together with China (and even more vigorously than Beijing), it opposed the initial joint US-French draft resolution that suited Israel. The Russians have taken it upon themselves to be the international advocates for the Lebanese and Syrian governments. In the first days of the crisis, while hosting the G8 summit in Saint Petersburg, Putin freely admitted that he successfully lobbied his western partners to exclude any mention of Syria from the G8 statement on the Middle East situation. In his words, "the guilt" of Damascus "is not proven".

Official ties between Moscow and Damascus are increasing rapidly. It all started with a January 2005 visit to Moscow by President Bashar Assad. The Russians announced that they were writing off nearly three quarters of Syria's 12-13 billion dollar debt. It was then that Russia confirmed its willingness to continue supplying Syria with SA-18 light air defense rockets and allegedly suggested selling much more sophisticated "Iskander" missiles. After vigorous pressure from the US and Israel, Putin had to personally cancel the deal.

However, since then high-level contacts between the Russian and Syrian militaries have been on the rise. In September last year, the chief of the Syrian General Staff, General Ali Habib, visited Russia. His Russian counterpart General Yuri Baluyevsky reciprocated and was given a grand tour of Syrian military facilities this year. And although officially all talk is of small arms and ammunition shipments, exchanges between military academies and such like, there is a feeling that something bigger is afoot.

It is now beyond reasonable doubt that the Kremlin has decided to take Syria under its wing and use it to stage a "comeback" to Middle East politics. The Syrian-Iranian-Hizballah connection does not bother the Kremlin. Russia's Federal Security Service refused to put Hizballah on the list of terrorist organizations because it "does not operate on Russian soil". According to rumors circulating in Moscow, the Russian military mission in Syria might be aware that the Syrians have supplied Russian-made rockets to Hizballah.

The rationale for Russia's new course in the Middle East lies in the same motivation that drives Moscow's foreign policy as a whole: primarily, deep dislike of the United States combined with a desire to at least partly avenge Russia's defeat in the Cold War. Moreover, the Russian political class sees the American policy of promoting democracy as a direct threat to its own interests in the former Soviet Union and even in Russia proper. The idea that US influence has to be curbed as much as possible and wherever possible is very popular among influential people in Putin's administration. And in this game every ally counts. To quote Dr. Dmitry Trenin from the Carnegie Moscow Center, "Russia is busy constructing an international universe of its own."

Giant oil revenues make the Kremlin feel more confident domestically and provide for much more assertive behavior abroad. The West, and particularly the US and Britain, is increasingly seen as an enemy rather than a partner.

In these circumstances, Syria becomes Russia's natural ally in the Arab Middle East. Syria is the only Arab country that is genuinely isolated by and from the West. It has regional ambitions but few resources to back them up. Its young president, although increasingly skilled in politics, does not feel strong enough and looks for backers on the outside that are not international pariahs like Iran. Russia fits this bill well.

However, the future of this relationship is unclear at best. The Russians like to tickle the Americans by standing up to them in the Security Council and making mischief. The United States' problems in the region, stemming from the invasion of Iraq and Washington's support for Israel, make Moscow's task of wooing the Arabs easier. But Moscow lacks the military muscle it had in the Soviet days. It will not be able to project military power the way the Americans can. Putin even excluded sending peacekeepers to Lebanon--in full knowledge that they would be completely insignificant.

It is difficult to imagine Vladimir Putin or his successor deciding on full-scale support for Damascus if the latter finds itself on a collision course with the United States or Israel. In the end, the Russian political class has no stomach for a full-blown cold war stand off. Those in the Middle East who count on Moscow should study the lives of Russia's former friends, Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic.- Published 17/8/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Konstantin von Eggert, MBE, is the Moscow Bureau Editor of the BBC Russian Service.

Damascus must have been pleased with the editorial published on August 9 by the International Herald Tribune. Under the title "The price of not talking to Syria's Assad", the IHT criticized President George W. Bush and his administration for ostracizing Syria and its President Bashar Assad and refusing to talk to them. "Syria is also unlikely to even consider doing what Bush wants--rein in Hizballah and help halt the killing in Lebanon and Israel--unless its leaders know what potential rewards as well as punishments await them. And for this the United States needs to offer a serious high-level discussion with Syria and it needs to do it now."

This and similar voices heard in the US, Europe and Israel during the past two weeks must have reinforced Syria's sense that so far it is a beneficiary of the fighting in Lebanon.

Since coming to power in June 2000, Assad's record, particularly in foreign policy, is disappointing. This has been manifested through four principal issues. First is the deterioration of relations with the US. During his 30 years in power, Hafez Assad had mastered the art of straddling the fence. He was a Soviet ally and client who kept the lines to Washington open. In the 1990s, he engaged in a dialogue with the US and in a peace process with Israel, while hosting the rejectionist Palestinian organizations in Damascus and supporting Hizballah in Lebanon.

His son's attempt to conduct an equally complex policy collapsed in 2003. George W. Bush and his administration came to see Syria as a practical member of the "axis of evil", a country and a regime fanning the anti-American insurrection in Iraq, supporting Palestinian and Lebanese terrorist organizations, suppressing Lebanon and its budding democracy and stockpiling weapons of mass destruction.

Twice, in 2003 and 2005, it seemed that the Bush administration was seeking to topple Bashar Assad, and twice its anti-Syria campaign was suspended in mid-course. Most recently, in 2005, Washington was restrained by two principal considerations: reluctance to open a full second front in the Middle East while bogged down in Iraq, and fear of opening the door to the Muslim Brotherhood as the most likely successor to the Assad regime.

A second issue is loss of position in Lebanon. Clearly, the highest echelons of the Baath regime were implicated in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. This was a gross miscalculation that enabled an unusual coalition of domestic Lebanese forces, supported by the US and France, to seek and obtain the withdrawal of Syria's army from Lebanon. Syria has kept numerous assets in Lebanon, but the hegemonic position it had built in the late 1970s and consolidated in the 1980s and 1990s was significantly weakened.

Third is the end of the peace process. The failure of the Clinton-Assad summit in Geneva in March 2000 marked the end of the Syrian-Israeli peace process. During the 1990s, the Clinton administration and four Israeli prime ministers pursued a "Syria first" policy. These Israeli leaders were willing to withdraw from the Golan in order to achieve a satisfactory package of peace and security with Syria. The ultimate failure of these efforts was followed by political changes in Washington, Jerusalem and Damascus, with a devastating effect on the prospect of reviving the Syrian track of the peace process. Israeli PM Ariel Sharon decided to focus exclusively on the Palestinian issue and George W. Bush wouldn't hear of rewarding his bete noire, Bashar Assad, with the renewal of Israel-Syria negotiations.

A fourth issue is a weakening of position vis-a-vis Iran. Syria's strategic partnership with Iran dates back to 1979. During most of this period Hafez Assad was at the helm in Damascus and he conducted the relationship as a partnership of equals. His son's different stature, the decline in his country's position and Iran's build-up as a regional power have altered the equation. Syria is less of a partner and more of a client, protected by the senior, more powerful party.

Yet, in the past few months, Bashar Assad and his regime were emboldened by two developments. They realized that President Bush had practically called off the anti-Syria crusade of 2005 and came to the conclusion that they could take advantage of Iran's apparently successful quest for regional hegemony. Syria began to posture itself as an effective mediator between Iran and the Arab world. Syria's new boldness and self confidence were manifested in the overt patronage of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In the spring of 2003, after Colin Powell's visit to Damascus, these and other groups were asked by the regime to lower their profile. Three years later their collaboration was played up as a political asset.

Like all crises, the outbreak of the war in Lebanon confronted Syria with both risks and opportunities. Damascus has walked a fine line, designated to keep Syria out of the war, to extend to Hizballah logistical and political support and to fend off domestic, Lebanese and Arab criticism that Syria was keeping a quiet front in the Golan while conducting its conflict with Israel purely at Lebanon's expense.

More significantly, the Assad regime realized that the war's course and outcome could alter its strategic position. The war is likely to end with Hizballah's position diminished in South Lebanon but preserved as a major political and military force in the country as a whole and as Iran's bridgehead. Any long term effort to deal with this challenge will require allies and mainstays; hence the argument that Washington must swallow its pride, overcome its disgust and talk to Syria. Syrian spokesmen have been trying to promote this line by telling American and European journalists that the alliance with Iran was "a marriage of convenience", hinting openly that it could be abandoned in return for a fruitful dialogue with Washington.

It is quite clear what Syria seeks to achieve through the resumption of the dialogue: an end to diplomatic isolation and de-legitimization, renewed recognition of its "special position" in Lebanon, and the return of the Golan issue to the Middle East diplomatic agenda.

This is a tall order. Furthermore, it is possible, if not likely, that Syria might seek the political and diplomatic dividends of such a dialogue without actually disengaging from Iran. If the US and Israel wish to establish, as they should, whether Syria could become a genuine partner in stabilizing Lebanon, the best course open to them is secret diplomacy.- Published 17/8/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Itamar Rabinovich, Israel's former ambassador in Washington and chief negotiator with Syria, is the author of the forthcoming "The Lingering Conflict: Israel, the Arabs and the Middle East 1948-2011".

A year and a half into the international quarantine of Syria triggered by the assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri, Damascus has reemerged with a vengeance. In June, Hamas leader Khalid Meshaal declared responsibility from his Damascus safe haven for kidnapping an Israeli soldier. In July, Hizballah lobbed Syrian-made rockets into Haifa and employed Syrian anti-tank weapons against Israeli forces. Then in August, Damascus hosted a meeting of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Iran. Syrian President Bashar Assad capped it off on Tuesday, August 15 with an incendiary speech lauding Hizballah's victory while attacking Israel, the Bush administration, the UN ceasefire plan, and the government of Lebanon.

Today, as the month-long Israel-Hizballah war winds down, despite this egregious behavior Damascus has found itself in the proverbial catbird seat. Notwithstanding the cancellation of the German foreign minister's visit in the wake of Assad's tirade, recent weeks have proven a diplomatic boon for isolated Syria. During this time, a string of European diplomats made pilgrimage to Damascus to petition Syrian support for an Israeli-Hizballah ceasefire; meanwhile in the US, pundits and policymakers began to agitate for Washington to reengage in a dialogue with Damascus.

A leading patron of Hamas and Hizballah, Syria played a key role in fomenting the crises in Gaza and Lebanon; but now many are looking to Damascus as part of the solution. To some extent, the renewed debate about engaging Syria is driven by a dearth of good policy options on Hizballah and Lebanon. But given Syria's continued unhelpful behavior on a broad range of issues--Lebanon, Gaza, and Iraq, to name a few--the international community should not presently be pursuing a dialogue with Damascus.

During Colin Powell's tenure as secretary of state, the Bush administration did engage in a dialogue with Syria, but discussions proved unfruitful because Assad did not honor his commitments. In particular, Assad shirked his pledges to stop smuggling oil out of Iraq in violation of UN sanctions and to close the offices of Palestinian terrorist organizations. These so-called misunderstandings did not inspire administration confidence in the efficacy of dialogue with Damascus. Perhaps more importantly, though, Syria's policies and rhetoric today do not suggest any inclination toward a change in behavior that would warrant a dialogue.

And then there are the costs of engagement. Should the US reinitiate talks with Syria, the first casualty would likely be Lebanon. Already reeling from a disastrous war, the March 14 Movement--Lebanon's democrats who expelled Syria in April 2005--would be further demoralized and undermined. The Syrians have also made no secret of their desire to see the Siniora government removed; Assad said as much in his August 15 speech. Accordingly, and based on current dynamics in Lebanon, Damascus would no doubt see reengagement as an invitation to return to Lebanon.

Another potential cost of opening a dialogue with Damascus would be the collapse of the international isolation of Syria that started with the Hariri assassination. Scaling back the isolation would signal an end to the pressure on Syria to change its problematic behavior. A re-emergent Syria could also influence, if not undermine, the integrity of the United Nations investigation into this and other murders in Lebanon believed to have been perpetrated by Syria. Worse, it could further embolden Syria to pursue adventurist and dangerous policies, such as the planting of an improvised explosive device on the Golan by a Syrian government-authorized organization on July 31.

Given the potentially high costs associated with opening a dialogue that is almost certain to fail, if and when a decision is made to initiate talks the US and the international community should make sure to set tough criteria for Syrian participation. In this regard, future dialogue with Damascus should be predicated on a significant and irreversible demonstration of Syrian good faith. A good start would be for Damascus to expel--or better yet render--leaders of terrorist organizations currently residing in Syria.

No doubt, Damascus would find these preconditions onerous, as Syria remains home to several Palestinian terrorist organizations, including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, among others. But based on Washington's experience with President Assad, these conditions would be warranted. The conditions would also comport with the administration's counterterrorism policy.

A former US diplomat in Syria used to say that discussions with the Syrians regarding Hamas, PIJ, and Hizballah were largely "sterile" affairs. They were also futile affairs. Today, Syria remains a state sponsor of terrorism not because Washington refuses to engage with or otherwise offer sufficient incentives to Damascus. Syria supports terrorism because the repressive Assad regime perceives it to be in its interest.

During his August 15 speech, President Assad said it would be important to transform Hizballah's "military victory into political victory". Opening a dialogue with Syria now would provide Assad with the political victory he seeks.- Published 17/8/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


David Schenker is the Aufzien Fellow and director of the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.