• Out of the quagmire  - Nizar Abdel-Kader
The greatest risk remains an attempt by Syria and Iran to use their proxies in Lebanon to oppose the deployment of a peacekeeping force.

• Why a Hizballah defeat is more important for the US than Israel  - Henri J. Barkey
The US as the sole superpower, cannot afford to see the proliferation of Hizballah-like organizations.

• Why America can't end the conflict  - Mark Perry
The language of the war on terrorism has opened a chasm between the United States and Europe.

• Peacekeeping in Lebanon by a NATO/EU force  - Jack Segal
The rapidly-deployable advance elements of the NATO Response Force could be in Lebanon within a week of a NATO/EU decision.

Out of the quagmire
 Nizar Abdel-Kader

While Qana villagers were digging through the ruins of the destroyed buildings with their own hands, looking for the victims of an Israeli air raid, the Israeli prime minister announced, "We will not stop. . . we will continue the activity, and if necessary it will be broadened without hesitation." Olmert has kept his word, but he did not specify by how much and how long the war on Lebanon might be extended. Four weeks from the beginning of the war, Lebanon's infrastructure, towns and villages are being steadily torn to pieces and hundreds of people are being killed while hundreds of thousands are made homeless.

The Israeli government asserted at the beginning of the war that the Israeli forces would destroy Hizballah or at least force it far enough north of the Litani River that its rockets could not threaten the Jewish state any more. Olmert should have remembered that it was Hizballah that forced the Israeli military to withdraw from South Lebanon in the year 2000. It is hard to see how his commitment can easily be realized.

Assessing the broad war launched by Israel on Lebanon leads us to believe that it was not merely retaliation against Hizballah's attack into Israel and its kidnapping of two soldiers, but was a preplanned war to destroy Hizballah. Should we link such a plan to Israel's strategy for countering the Iranian and Syrian threat it perceives?

The Lebanese government has repeatedly called for a ceasefire, and PM Fuad Siniora presented to the Rome Conference a seven-point plan to accommodate the needs of both sides to settle this crisis. At the same time, Hassan Nasrallah promised that if Israel halts its bombardments, Hizballah would cease its rocket attacks on Israeli towns. Peace calls have fallen on deaf ears and the Israelis, with the consent of the Americans, have continued their ground and air attacks to ensure achievements on the ground.

There is no doubt Israel can conquer all of South Lebanon if it chooses, but the question remains as to how the Israelis can hold onto what they capture. The Israelis have been forced to change their plans due to stiff resistance, and Israel and the United States are pushing for the adoption by the UN Security Council of an amended French draft calling for a cessation of hostilities. The plan envisions a strong international force (20,000-30,000 men) sponsored by the UN with a mandate and rules of engagement to keep Hizballah out and away from South Lebanon. The UN-sponsored multinational force must be backed by a strong Security Council mandate with assertive terms and provision for the use of all means at its disposal.

Lebanon has rejected these proposals, which fail to meet Lebanese interests regarding the return of Lebanese prisoners, the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanese territory and a solution to the Shebaa Farms issue. On security arrangements, the Lebanese authorities agree to the immediate deployment of the Lebanese Army in the South, but insist that any multinational force be put under UN control.

To circumscribe the Lebanese disaster, now is the opportune moment for the five permanent members of the Security Council and Israel to alter their views and positions in dealing with this highly complicated and multi-dimensional crisis. Left alone, the Lebanese government may be devoured by the intricacies of domestic differences and destabilized by the pressures exercised by Iran and Syria. The longer the current crisis continues, the higher the risk that events will descend into a vicious downward spiral, reminiscent of the multi-national force deployed in Lebanon in 1982 and the failure of the May 17 agreement. Olmert must not repeat the same mistakes committed after the 1982 invasion. The greatest risk remains an attempt by Syria and Iran to use their proxies in Lebanon to oppose the deployment of a peacekeeping force.

The Lebanese government should ensure the success of the UN plan by avoiding the Syrian-Iranian trap whereby Lebanese proxies challenge government decisions. Taking into consideration the negative attitude manifested thus far by Syria and Iran, the five permanent members of the Security Council should manifest a full-fledged interest in the success of this mission and provide adequate credibility and resources.

One way to help Lebanon to regain its sovereignty and disarm all militias was put forward recently by former prime minister Salim al-Hoss, when he proposed an Israeli withdrawal from Shebaa Farms, a return of Lebanese prisoners, the delivery of maps of mine fields and a return to the truce of 1949.

Despite all the atrocities against civilians and the destruction of Lebanese infrastructure, a door is now open: will the Americans and Israelis have the wisdom to walk through it safely? If they fail to do so, Israel may again fall into a Lebanese quagmire. With the continuation of fighting, no one will prevail and the risk will grow of a broader and more dangerous war.- Published 10/8/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Nizar Abdel-Kader is a political analyst/columnist at Ad-Diyar newspaper in Beirut. He has authored four books on Lebanon and regional political and strategic issues.

As diplomats look for a way to end the conflict in Lebanon, the US has proven reticent to support an immediate ceasefire that endorses the status quo ante. What most observers have failed to see in Washington's reluctance is how important it is for the US that Israel defeat Hizballah. In fact, a successful conclusion is far more critical for Washington than it is for Israel.

Of course Israel wants to defeat Hizballah. However, what would satisfy Israel may fall short of Washington's greater strategic goals. Israel would accept a severely weakened Hizballah that retreats north concurrently with the deployment of Lebanese and international forces to the border region. As far as Jerusalem is concerned, a Hizballah that remains armed within Lebanon but far away from Israel then becomes a Lebanese problem. The Lebanese will have to decide if they want Iran and Syria to continue supplying a militia within their own sovereign borders. Israel has amply demonstrated its fury and it is unlikely that a Lebanon-based organization will ever again risk a repeat of recent events.

Why would such an outcome fall short for the US? There are two reasons. The first is what can be called the Hizballah model. It represents the nightmarish metamorphosis of a well-supplied and trained militia. If it can work in Lebanon, the model can be emulated elsewhere around the globe.

Consider for one moment what Hizballah has achieved: it has a parallel state structure in Lebanon complete with its own social services and rudimentary revenue collection system. It conducts its own foreign policy and, as events have demonstrated, its decision-making system is unaccountable to the central government. Worse, it has managed to build up a sophisticated arsenal of missiles and other armaments that intimidates the Lebanese army. Arms by themselves do not make the organization. Clearly, Hizballah fighters have been trained at using weapons that no terrorist organization has hitherto acquired or mastered.

It fired two Chinese-designed Iranian-built Silkworm missiles at an Israeli naval vessel. One of the missiles hit its target while the other sunk a nearby commercial vessel. The Silkworm is a weapon that armies use and it boggles the mind that a militia such as Hizballah not only can acquire it but also use it with a modicum of success.

Hizballah is far more sophisticated and entrenched among a supportive population than al-Qaeda. It is impossible to defeat it without inflicting civilian casualties. Therein lies Hizballah's strength; it calculates that the outside world will relent in the face of civilian casualties.

The Hizballah model can easily be exported to other failed or semi-failed states, ranging from Somalia to Sri Lanka, Iraq and Colombia and perhaps even to Pakistan one day. All you need is an external patron willing to invest resources just as Iran has in this case and a supportive population base. One can easily imagine a scenario of a Venezuela-supported FARC in Colombia initiating action against Bogota's southern neighbor, Ecuador or Peru. The Hizballah model completely emasculates the notion that a state is defined by, among other things, its monopoly over the means of violence.

The second reason why Washington wants Hizballah completely defeated is because of Iran's patronage. Bogged down in Iraq, the US is facing an emboldened Iran ready to challenge it at any moment of its own choosing. For Iran, Hizballah is another strategic tool in an asymmetric conflict with the West. Hizballah extends Iran's reach well beyond the immediate region and the Middle East, but also to far-flung places such as the South American continent where it has an entrenched presence in the tri-border area of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay. In Iraq, the Mahdi Army has already modeled itself along Hizballah lines as has Hamas in the Palestinian territories. Any outcome that does not end up with Hizballah's disarmament is another step in the institutionalization of the model under Iranian tutelage.

The US as the sole superpower, which for better or worse also acts as the world's first responder, cannot afford to see the proliferation of Hizballah-like organizations deciding the fate of nations. For the same reasons, it is critical for the international community that UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which calls for Hizballah's disarmament and the reinforcement of Lebanese authority, be implemented fully.- Published 10/8/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Henri J. Barkey is a non-resident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and professor of international relations at Lehigh University.

Even the most unhappily married couple in the world knows this salient truth about their relationship: that there are things that should never be said, because they will never be forgiven. The same is certainly true for politics, and most certainly for American politics: it is one thing to question your opponent's position, but you dare not question his or her patriotism. It is sad, but predictable, that this rule is not applied in war. Perhaps this is expecting too much, though we know that the leaders of warring nations can, by their words, deepen hatreds and so escalate bloodshed.

But the slurs and stereotypes we find excusable when uttered by those fighting for their nation are difficult to excuse when used by those for whom a war provides an opportunity to air their political laundry, further their political career, or enhance their professional life. In such a case a slur and a stereotype is simply a slur and a stereotype--and nothing more. So it is that the implication by Israeli ambassador to the UN Dan Gillerman that Europe may wish to cleanse its Muslim population (or "take care of them," as he indelicately put it) is in some sense forgivable. That is not true, however, for America's chattering classes, who have made great strides in uncovering their own racial and religious preferences.

CNN's Anderson Cooper is a case in point, blithely comparing Hassan Nasrallah with Adolf Hitler, holding forth on "Islamofascism," and feeding verbal softballs to New Yorker reporter Jeffrey Goldberg, who once claimed that there was no doubt that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction and harboring members of al-Qaeda: "I think what's been lost in a lot of this coverage [of the war] is just how anti-Semitic Hizballah is in the rhetoric," Cooper said. Goldberg agreed of course (that's why he was on the show) saying that anti-Semitism is embedded "in the core" of Hizballah's ideology and that "They don't hide it. They don't try to mask it in any way."

The exchange was blunt and disturbing--not so much because of Cooper and Goldberg's allegation, but because neither quoted from any Hizballah document to support their claim. Three nights later Cooper fed the same softballs to Dan Gillerman, who dodged the anti-Semitism allegation, but defended Israel's bombing in Lebanon because "this war is not just about the safety of Israel or the freedom of Lebanon, it is about preserving civilization as we know it." Cooper was more careful with Gillerman than he had been with Goldberg, telling his viewers that Hizballah declined to respond to these charges because CNN was "broadcasting tonight from the state of Israel". Perhaps Hizballah's non-appearance signals the truth of Cooper's claims--or perhaps Hizballah commanders decided it might be too difficult to make their way to Haifa.

Cooper is not alone in his claims (Fred Barnes of Fox News called Muslims "enemies of western civilization") and he's entitled to his opinion, but that CNN might expand their news coverage to include such opinions shows just how deeply the language of "the war on terrorism" has taken hold of America and how significantly it has affected the views of America's political elite. It is now nearly impossible for diplomats to take seriously the Bush administration's claim that it seeks an early end to the conflict. The language of the war on terrorism has opened a chasm between the United States (which has a small Muslim population) and Europe (which has a significant, and growing, Muslim constituency). The Bush administration seems stunningly unaware that European nations might have difficulty explaining to their Muslim constituencies why their troops are being used to police Muslim lands. Which is why I believe we here in America will simply be incapable of stitching together the international agreement that is essential to bring this conflict to an end.

I have spent three years meeting with and speaking with Hizballah leaders. I have met them at all levels of their organization. I have walked the streets of South Beirut, speaking with Shi'ite families. Not once, not ever, have I heard one anti-Semitic remark. Not only that, but one Hizballah leader told me bluntly that Hizballah "has no argument with Jews, but with Israel." His response was emotional: "We're human beings. We're not racists and we're not barbarians." Of course, he may well have been lying and I may have been gulled by his sweet words. Or perhaps Jeffrey Goldberg is right when he noted that al-Manar producers never said anything overtly anti-Semitic in front of him because "they are slightly more schooled in let's say obfuscation or public relations."

There it is: the only reason that we can't find evidence of Hizballah's anti-Semitism is because they've become so adept at not talking about it. Those clever bastards.- Published 10/8/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Mark Perry is an author and foreign policy, military and intelligence analyst based in Washington, DC.

Amidst their discussions of the ongoing violence in Lebanon and Israel, diplomats have zeroed in on the need for a credible peacekeeping/peace enforcement force for southern Lebanon. Most often, the call is for a robustly mandated force manned primarily by European troops. Already, France and Italy have indicated a willingness to contribute to such a force, and it is likely that many more will join in this important task when it is more clearly defined. But experience has shown that organizing such a multinational effort can be difficult and slow.

It seems unlikely that any one nation would take on this task, so the European Union is frequently mentioned as the logical choice to create such a force. But there are legitimate questions about the EU's ability to deploy the essential military elements quickly enough in such a dangerous environment. The EU's experience in peacekeeping to date, while remarkably successful, has been confined largely to the relatively benign situations of Bosnia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro (FYROM)--not large-scale air, land and sea deployments into a still-smoldering war zone that the current crisis seems to demand.

Consequently, and with good reason, NATO has also been mentioned as the better option to launch the envisioned military mission. In recent years, NATO has dramatically transformed itself from a Cold War relic into a dynamic and capable tool of foreign policy. In Afghanistan, where this month NATO moved beyond the calmer regions of the north and west to the strife-torn southern provinces, NATO has already shown itself able to field an effective fighting force. Detractors who argue that NATO lacks the decision-making agility necessary for high intensity conflicts are being proven wrong in Hilmand, Kandahar and the like.

Admittedly, NATO's political deliberations can be tortuous; but once committed, NATO has allowed its commanders to do their job without micromanagement from Brussels. Furthermore, the fact that 26 member nations must reach consensus on every major decision--often a painful process--carries with it the advantage of creating a solid political commitment behind NATO's military missions. Nations do not take lightly the votes they cast to send their troops to a conflict and have shown that they are willing to stay the course if difficulties arise.

Some critics argue that NATO's close association with the United States robs the alliance of the credibility it would need to play the "honest broker" among Israel, Hizballah and the Lebanese government. The EU, it is suggested, brings to the table the additional credibility of its non-NATO members, its history of cooperation with Arab leaders, and its ability to link essential capabilities loosely associated with the term "nation-building" that will be critical to the reconstruction of the conflict zone--a necessary task that parallels the peacekeeping and peace-enforcement aspects of the proposed mission.

A combined EU and NATO mission could well bring together the strengths of both organizations. The current supreme allied commander, General Jim Jones, the first US Marine to command NATO, brought the Marines' concepts of rapid deployability, self-sufficiency and streamlined decision-making to the tradition-bound NATO structure. Although it has been at times an uphill battle, Jones, working closely with NATO's civilian leadership and, through his deputy, General Sir John Reith, with the EU, has succeeded in bringing the NATO/EU military partnership much farther along than anyone thought possible. The current crisis could provide the opportunity to bring the experience of NATO/EU military cooperation activities of the past decade into play in a critical mission.

One innovation that could allow this to happen was recently demonstrated in the island nation of Cape Verde. The NATO Response Force, a rapidly-deployable headquarters with a wide range of stand-by forces and enablers assigned to it, exercised a peace enforcement and humanitarian relief scenario that was, in many ways, a highly relevant preparation for the situation unfolding in the Middle East. An NRF force of over 7,000 troops, commanded by the German-led NRF Headquarters in The Netherlands, validated the NRF's current capabilities and its potential for more challenging missions. In addition, the significant role played in that exercise by the Eurocorps (a force drawn from Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain, that is independent of both the EU and NATO and has successfully performed missions commanded by both organizations) was a clear demonstration of the possibility for NATO and the EU to bring together their respective unique capabilities in a critical mission.

Since the Middle Eastern mission is likely to be a long-standing one, some argue that NATO's NRF, which is designed for quick, short-term deployments, is not ideally suited for such a task. But the rapidly-deployable advance elements of the NRF, which could be in Lebanon within a week of a NATO/EU decision, could well provide a vehicle for bringing into the conflict zone the larger multinational combined air, sea and land force that would have to follow--whether that is a NATO force, an EU force, or an ad-hoc creation.

In the next weeks, the NATO and EU nations will again separately consider how they might contribute to bringing the violence in Lebanon and Israel to a lasting solution. While it remains to be seen whether the NATO nations will choose to use the NRF to initiate the dangerous and complex mission that is emerging in the Middle East, the experience gained in forming the NRF and the confidence of NATO and EU nations in its capabilities make this a viable option. Equally, while it is not clear the EU would want to utilize the strengths of its existing security linkages with NATO in forming the proposed force, this too is a viable option.

The very existence of a NATO/EU option for the Middle East is a testimony to the vision and determination of both organizations' civilian and military leaders. From Bosnia, to Kosovo, to Iraq, to Afghanistan, NATO has deployed forces into distant and often dangerous theaters of conflict, and has done so with notable success. For its part, the EU has successfully taken over missions in Bosnia and FYROM that have progressed to the stage where the EU's ability to combine peacekeeping with nation-building became essential. Today, the member nations of NATO and the European Union have the tools at their disposal to take on what would be their most taxing mission to date, if they can overcome the institutional, cultural and historical obstacles that stand in the way. Both organizations, as well as the people of Lebanon and Israel, would benefit from such a decision.- Published 10/8/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Jack Segal is chief political advisor to the Commander, NATO Allied Joint Force Command, Brunssum, The Netherlands. The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent the views of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union or their member nations.