• The outcome is not clear  - Safa A.Hussein
Can the government reconcile with insurgents when it is not united?

• No end to the violence  - Saad N. Jawad
The much-touted oasis of democracy and prosperity is instead a snake pit of terrorism and complete economic, social and political breakdown.

• Without US troops Iraq has no future  - Lawrence Kaplan
The Bush administration has only bad options: It can either maintain force levels in Iraq and face political ruination at home, or it can bring the troops home and watch Iraq burn.

• Iran and the destabilization of Iraq  - Sadegh Zibakalam
Iran's strategy gains nothing by the disintegration of a future ally.

The outcome is not clear
 Safa A.Hussein

Observers, analysts, and politicians differ on the way Iraq is heading. A thorough picture may be obtained by the use of some diverse and broad indicators of social and economic health: statistics on the casualties (among civilian Iraqis and those in uniform), attacks and violent events, refugees, displaced families, the flow of religious pilgrims to Shi'ite shrines, pupils in Shi'ite seminaries, the value of the Iraqi dinar, and voters in the referendum on the constitution and in the elections.

These indicators show that there are advancements in some areas, but serious challenges in others. Does this mean that terrorists are winning the war? To answer this question we must examine what the insurgents have achieved with regard to their strategic goals.

Their first goal was to prevent the formation of the Iraqi security forces (ISF). To this end, they employed all types of terrorist attacks: suicide bombs, assassinations, and bombings against recruits, members, trainees, recruiting centers, restaurants, etc. Thousands from the ISF were killed, but long queues of young men continue to apply at recruiting centers. Within three years the newly-created ISF has exceeded 300,000 personnel. Over time, it is taking the lead in fighting the insurgents. Documents captured lately reveal that the terrorists have shifted to a less ambitious goal: trying to discredit the ISF and shake the people's trust in them.

The second goal was trying to stop the process of formation of a legal democratic government. The terrorists tried to do this in all phases of the political process: the Governing Council (GC), the municipal elections prior to the formation of the interim government, the general elections prior to the formation of the transitional government, the referendum on the constitution, and lastly the general election to form the constitutional government. To this end they assassinated GC members, threatened and killed both voters and candidates, and carried out suicide attacks on voting centers. They failed completely, as the number of voters and participants increased in each of the political phases.

The third goal for the insurgency was to keep the Arab Sunni community, which accounts for some 15-20 percent of the population, out of the political process. But that campaign collapsed when millions of Sunnis turned out to vote in the constitutional referendum and in the second general election.

The fourth insurgency goal is to shut down essential government services in order to make Iraq an unmanageable state. Hundreds of teachers, schoolchildren, university professors and students have been killed. But most schools across Iraq and all universities are open and functioning. By September 2005, more than 8.5 million Iraqi children and young people were attending school or university--an all-time record in the nation's history.

A similar story applies to Iraq's clinics and hospitals. Between October 2003 and January 2006, more than 80 medical doctors and over 400 nurses and medical auxiliaries were murdered by the insurgents. The jihadists also raided several hospitals, killing ordinary patients in their beds. But once again they failed in their objectives. By January 2006, all of Iraq's 600 state-owned hospitals and clinics were in full operation, along with dozens of new ones set up by the private sector. Yet basic services were deteriorating, partly due to insurgency attacks, but mainly due to corruption and mismanagement. This is another challenge the government has to deal with in order to maintain public support.
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The fifth of the insurgency's strategic goals was to bring the Iraqi oil industry to a halt and disrupt the export of crude. Though the insurgency and the corruption have caused heavy damage to this sector, succeeded in creating a real crisis in supply of oil derivatives to the public and denied Iraq billions of dollars in income, the insurgency has nevertheless failed to achieve its full goals. Iraq has returned to world markets as a major oil exporter. According to projections, by the end of 2006 it will be producing its full OPEC quota of 2.8 million barrels a day.

The sixth goal for the insurgents was to provoke a full-scale war between the Arab Sunni minority and the Arab Shi'ite majority. This strategy has produced many deaths, a lot of sectarian tension and a large number of sectarian killings. Though the mainstream Shi'ites as a whole have not yet been induced to organize a concerted campaign of nationwide retaliation, the level of sectarian tensions is nevertheless threatening.

Sectarian tensions were not created by the terrorists alone. Iraqi society has been divided along sectarian and ethnic lines since the creation of the Iraqi state in the beginning of the twentieth century. The lack of nationwide cross-ethnic organizations is a weakness of Iraqi society. Competition for power and the tensions unleashed by democratization created the right environment for the insurgents. Lastly, intervention by the countries of the region has caused additional polarization in Iraqi society. After the last elections, Iraqis, with the help of their US and UK allies, formed a national unity government to face this challenge.

Yet the outcome is not clear. The government is behaving like a gathering of representatives of different factions rather than a national unity government. Top officials issue contradictory statements on key issues concerning national security. The number of insurgent attacks has increased. Thus far it appears that the Sunni participants in the government have failed to co-opt some of the insurgents into the political process. If the insurgents succeed in taking advantage of the Sunni members of the government to cover their activities, the situation could become very critical.

Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has launched a reconciliation initiative. But can the government reconcile with insurgents when it is not united? It seems that Iraqi leaders need not only patience but also determination, luck, and a lot of help from the international community.- Published 27/7/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


Safa A. Hussein is a former deputy member of the dissolved Iraqi Governing Council. Prior to joining the Transitional Government he served as a brigadier general in the Iraqi Air Force and worked in the military industry as director of a research and development center. Currently he works in the Iraqi National Security Council.

After more than three years of occupation and almost direct American rule, most Iraqis have begun to feel that their lives under the ruthless Saddam Hussein were more secure. This feeling in a people that longed to rid itself of that dictatorial regime is both alarming and tragic. Security, or the lack of it, is the main concern. Other problems, like the absence of services, electricity, a secure water supply, petrol, etc., circumscribe daily life in Iraq.

The American promises that preceded the invasion and have been wheeled out ever since--promises to build a new, democratic and prosperous Iraq in which human rights are protected and respected--have proven baseless and deceptive. The much-touted oasis of democracy and prosperity is instead a snake pit of terrorism where the killing of innocent people is a daily occurrence, with unprecedented corruption and complete economic, social and political breakdown. This chaotic situation is the real result of the occupation and of the practices of the politicians brought to the fore as a result of it.

If one is to analyze the causes of the situation, American policies, and perhaps the lack of them, are the prime culprits. It seems obvious that those who planned the invasion of Iraq had only three objectives: a military occupation, the removal of Saddam Hussein, and the dissolution of the Iraqi army and the Baath Party. They had no idea how to rule Iraq, and when they were faced with this problem they tackled it in exactly the wrong way. They reverted to quota politics that divided the country along sectarian lines and resulted only in bringing unfit people to serve as representatives of a new ruling elite.

Furthermore, with the absence of the capable and efficient Iraqi army and security forces, the scene was open to whoever was able and ready to fill it. This first encouraged sectarian and narrow nationalist parties to establish or bring their already existing militias into play in Iraqi politics. That in turn encouraged anyone with the means to finance a militia to establish one. And this in the end encouraged the establishment of mafia-like groups. These groups began by ransacking Iraqi government buildings and, when they met no resistance there, turned to the American forces, the new Iraqi government and the Iraqi people itself.

Gradually all the other groups and militias, old or new, started behaving in the same way. Kidnappings, assassinations and a daily defiance of the government and the American forces are now the norm, and both the government and the American forces stand by helplessly.

To make matters worse, most if not all leaders of the many militias and mafia groups have lost control over their own followers despite statements to the contrary. This fact, together with the absence of a capable Iraqi force to stop them, American indifference and the interests of regional forces in keeping Iraq disintegrated, make the possibility of putting an end to this chaos more and more difficult.

Internally, three major factors collude to make Iraq's future look bleak. First is the failure to find a political solution to end sectarian-driven politics, include the resistance in the political process and end the policy of exclusion. Second, the weak and disunited government and national assembly, combined with the heavy interference of American administrators in Iraqi politics--of which they have proven to be ignorant--are the reasons why the present government, and indeed previous ones, have proven unable to overcome the challenge posed by sectarianism.

Finally, there is no single Iraqi politician in the present government, or who enjoys the support of Washington, who holds out any promise of uniting the people or establishing a strong and popularly acceptable government.

In the grip of such conditions, there will be no end to the violence.-Published 27/7/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


Saad N. Jawad is a professor of political science at Baghdad University.

Baghdad International Airport offers a fitting portal into the new Iraq. Unlike the military side of the airport, where US transport planes and helicopters operate in an industrious roar, the civilian side, which USAID renovated in 2003, now languishes in disrepair.

Iraqi Airways flights, on which it was possible to light up a cigarette until recently, still come and go. But, in the terminal itself, the rest room floors are smeared with excrement, wires hang from the ceiling, and pay phones have been ripped from the walls.

With US reconstruction aid running out, Iraq's infrastructure, never fully restored to begin with, decays by the hour. Iraq's political arena, from which the Americans had no choice but to withdraw, has dissolved into something unrecognizable, carved up for sectarian advantage and without a center to keep its parts from spinning away. In both cases, the United States may have given all it reasonably could be expected to give. But, when it comes to America's withdrawal from Iraq's security arena, a process that accelerates with each passing week, the only explanation can be that the White House, for all of its high-minded rhetoric about standing with Iraq, has decided not to.

The insurgency continues to rage. Iraq's security forces still cannot operate on their own. And, as what was once a largely one-sided Sunni campaign of terrorism rapidly approaches something like parity (with the Shi'ites taking up arms in their own defense), the likelihood of a civil war has surged. So, too, contrary to the delusions of war supporters and critics alike, has the importance of American troops.

Whether you measure Iraq's well-being through its infrastructure, politics, security, or even geography, one thing is clear: Where the Americans do not operate, very little else does. The level of corruption that pervades Iraq's ministerial orbit, for instance, would have made South Vietnam's kleptocrats blush.

According to a US Government Accountability Office report published earlier this year, an interagency group of State Department, military, and contracting officials concluded that "critical infrastructure facilities constructed or rehabilitated under US funding have failed, will fail, or will operate in suboptimized conditions following handover to the Iraqis." Absent US oversight, politicians from competing sects have transformed the ministries into personal fiefdoms, where expertise counts for nothing and connections for everything. And, just as the ministries have proved impervious to direction from above, local factories and refineries ignore the ministries.

Iraqi security forces have not reached the point where they can operate independently of the Americans. According to the US military, the Iraqi police force currently fields about 121,000 men, close to the number planned for, while the Iraqi armed forces number about 106,000 soldiers, nearly two-thirds of the force estimated for the end of this year. The Iraqi army no longer melts away in combat, nor does it suffer from mass desertions, as it did during its first battles in 2004. As the security forces grow more competent, they have rapidly expanded the amount of territory under their control, which now includes several neighborhoods in Baghdad and large swathes of western Iraq.

But the professionalism of Iraq's security forces can be overstated. One incident in which gunfire erupted around a US army convoy illustrates the problem. The Iraqi police, overwhelmingly Sunni in the particular area, and the Iraqi army, overwhelmingly Shi'ite and Kurd, were firing on one another.

Sectarian clashes present one problem. The fact that the Iraqi army still cannot operate without access to US firepower, logistics, communication, and intelligence presents another. American officers dismiss as wishful thinking the official US line that Iraqi troops by the end of the year can replace US troops on a one-to-one basis and then operate just as effectively as their American mentors.

As for the Iraqi police, if civil war comes to Iraq, it may be ignited as much by them as by the insurgents. For Iraq's police are, to an extent not fully grasped in Washington, not police at all. As one of his parting acts in June 2004, CPA chief L. Paul Bremer signed Order 91, outlawing militias in Iraq. In response, thousands of Shi'ite militiamen exchanged their street clothes for police uniforms. As they have gotten better at combating Iraq's Sunni guerrillas, the insurgency, at least in Baghdad and its southern outskirts, has weakened, with attacks declining since last fall. The only problem is that brutality is one of the tactics that achieved these results.

Yet in all of this, in Washington it's 1971 all over again--after support for the war in Vietnam collapsed and not long before America's efforts to salvage it did. Neatly summarizing prevailing wisdom, Democratic campaign adviser Robert Shrum recently told The Washington Post that, "the war in Iraq is over except for the dying." For all its testimonials to American resolve, the Bush administration can barely wait to devise the fig leaf that will permit the US to withdraw. Quietly, but inexorably, the administration is "moving in the direction of downsizing our forces," as American Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad has put it, having already cut troop levels to 127,000 with a plan to cut another 7,000 this summer.

In fairness, the Bush administration has only bad options: It can either maintain force levels in Iraq and face political ruination at home, or it can bring the troops home and watch Iraq burn. But in the Pentagon's desire to hold up the deployment of additional brigades one may glimpse the future of Iraq. There is none.-Published 27/7/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


Lawrence Kaplan is editor of World Affairs.

The events in Iraq are slowly but steadily moving in a sectarian direction, if not toward out-and-out disintegration. The disintegration of Iraq is a scenario that no one expected at the time of the US-led invasion two-and-a-half years ago.

Following the fall of Saddam Hussein, a series of conflicts emerged in Iraq, none of which appeared to be moving that country toward disintegration. The struggle between moderate Shi'ites led by Grand Ayatollah Sistani and the militants led by Moghtada Sadr was one such conflict. A somewhat similar situation erupted in the Kurdistan province in the north, where a group of radical Islamist Kurds tried to challenge the mainstream Kurdish groups. A third front was between a combination of Sunni nationalists, Islamic radicals, members of al-Qaeda, Baathist sympathizers and strong supporters of Saddam Hussein on the one hand and the allied forces, particularly the Americans, on the other. Yet a fourth pitted radical Shi'ite elements against US forces in Baghdad and British forces in the south.

Every one, including London and Washington, believed that these conflicts would gradually subside and that peace, stability and progress would ultimately prevail. It was further assumed that once an Iraqi government was elected democratically by the Iraqi people and was installed, and power was handed from the Americans to the Iraqi authorities, the normalization process would speed up enormously.

In short, every one hoped that the worst would soon be over and peace and stability would prevail. In Sistani's words, "there were lights at the end of the tunnel." He was of course not the only optimistic leader. Every time American and British leaders were confronted with criticism over their policies in Iraq, they defended the attack on Iraq based on the promise and expectation that things would get better sooner rather than later.

After nearly two-and-a-half years, many of the original conflicts that engulfed Iraq in the aftermath of the US-led invasion have subsided, albeit to varying degrees. The radical Shi'ite currents have by and large been absorbed into the main Shi'ite streams. The militant Islamist Kurdish groups have evaporated. The protracted conflicts among Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen in Kirkuk and Arbil have diminished enormously. The bitter fighting between Sunni Arabs and the US forces has also subsided. There are far fewer allied casualties today than before. And last but by no means least: a democratically-elected Iraqi government has been installed in Baghdad.

On the face of it, Iraq appears to have embarked on the treacherous road of nation-building. But such an image is a gross self-delusion. It is true that some of the original conflicts that erupted in Iraq following the fall of Saddam have died down. But a new conflict has gradually developed that is by far worse than all those other problems and conflicts put together. This problem can best be summed up as the emergence of a sectarian struggle between the two main Arab populations of Iraq: Shi'ites and Sunnis.

The Sunni nationalists, al-Qaeda members, ex-Baathist activists and Saddam loyalists are all increasingly targeting Shi'ites rather than Americans. In return, Shi'ite vigilantes are conducting an undeclared policy of "shoot to kill" against Sunni suspects as well as ordinary Sunni citizens. There are some reports of Shi'ite and Sunni families having moved from where they had been living for decades to more secure neighborhoods where one or the other are in the majority.

Both the United States and some Arab leaders have blamed Iran for stirring up this communal fighting. Iran further has been accused of trying to create a separate Shi'ite state in the south, thereby destroying any chances Iraq may have to survive as a unified state. Iran has also been accused by some Arab leaders of inciting Shi'ite nationalism and of trying to create a Shi'ite crescent stretching from Iran and Iraq through Syria and ultimately to southern Lebanon. For its part, Iran blames "dubious Zionist agents, anti-Islamic elements and the enemies of the Iranian and Iraqi people for causing sectarian and religious divisions among Shi'ites and Sunnis in Iraq".

There are two fundamental reasons why Iran is opposed to the creation of an independent Shi'ite state in Iraq and is therefore against the disintegration of its neighbor. First, in any democratic elections in Iraq the Shi'ites will automatically gain the majority and ultimately govern the country. Why should Iran want to have its influence limited to the south when through a Shi'ite-dominated government in Baghdad it can exert its influence over the entire country.

Second, if Iraq disintegrates along ethnic and religious lines, the Kurds would form an independent state in the north. This is unacceptable both to Turkey and Iran. The latter has enough problems with its sizable Kurdish population even without the creation of a Kurdish state on its border. So, contrary to what US officials and some Arab leaders might say, Iran's strategy favors the integration of Iraq, and gains nothing by the disintegration of a future ally.- Published 27/7/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


Sadegh Zibakalam is professor of political science at Tehran University.