• Confronting Iran: A US security guarantee for Israel?  - Chuck Freilich and Richard Rosecrance
No Israeli leader would wish to have his/her freedom of maneuver restricted, even by the US.

• US needs to assuage everyone's fears  - Ghassan Khatib
Israeli as well as US officials rarely waste an opportunity these days to point accusing fingers at what they call the Hizballah-Syria-Iran axis.

• A parallel strategy can free Washington  - Trita Parsi
Washington only can free itself from the chains of the Israeli-Iranian strategic rivalry by addressing both sides at the same time.

• No real change in policy  - Jalil Roshandel
Defend against what? Against a capsule of enriched uranium now kept in the holy shrine of an Imam in Iran?

• The US defends its allies  - Michael Rubin
While critics of the Bush administration suggest that US wars are fought for either Israel or oil, history suggests otherwise.

Confronting Iran: A US security guarantee for Israel?
 Chuck Freilich and Richard Rosecrance

The United States is now pursuing a long overdue attempt to engage Iran diplomatically, as part of a concerted international effort to end that country's nuclear weapons program. If this effort fails and coercive measures short of direct military action (e.g., a blockade) fail as well, the US and Israel will face a momentous decision: whether to strike militarily or adopt a defensive posture. This critical decision may be just months away.

For Israel, the prospect of even one Iranian nuke getting through its defenses is totally unacceptable. A possible defensive posture would thus have to be based primarily on deterrence, through the threat of massive retaliation. Although Israel's own deterrent capabilities are significant, they could be greatly strengthened through "extended US deterrence", i.e., a formal guarantee of Israel's security in the form of a defense treaty or memorandum of understanding. The US is already committed, de-facto, to Israel's security and President Bush has reaffirmed this in recent statements regarding Iran. The question is whether a formal guarantee would significantly add to this de-facto one and give Israel the confidence to rely on a deterrent posture.

Assuming US willingness to provide such a formal commitment--a significant "if"--Israel would come under an explicit American nuclear "umbrella", meaning the concrete Iranian knowledge that in threatening Israel it would be taking on the US as well and face "assured destruction". Furthermore, a US security guarantee might enable Israel to reduce its defense expenditures, much as NATO and other US allies have long done and, like them, allow it to focus more on domestic and economic issues. A treaty would also serve as a long term foundation for US-Israel relations and ensure Israel's standing in the US in the future, at a time when the pro-Israel community may be less influential and the administration and Congress less friendly than they are at present.

Such an arrangement would seem to be a "no-brainer" for Israel. Yet Jerusalem might in fact be quite reluctant to conclude one. This, for three primary reasons, each deeply entrenched in Israel's national security thinking. First, it would fear a loss of freedom of action, due to the contractual requirement to consult on the means of addressing the threat. Second, it would be concerned lest the US demand that Israel divulge and even forego its independent capabilities. And third, it might worry that the US would not live up to its nuclear commitments, much as NATO allies feared during the Cold War.

In reality, Israel has long consulted with the US on virtually all strategic matters, including Iran, and few decisions of consequence have been made in recent decades without first doing so. However, no Israeli leader would wish to have his/her freedom of maneuver restricted, even by the US, hence would be willing to act unilaterally, formal commitments notwithstanding, if the US did not come through in a crisis. If that occurred, it would probably be too late for the US to "punish" Israel anyway. Moreover, prior US defense treaties, e.g., the Polaris Agreement with Britain in 1962, have included exemptions in cases of "supreme national interest"; Israel could include a similar clause.

What good, then, is a security guarantee, if the presumption is that it may be circumvented precisely when needed? In truth, the primary importance of all alliance guarantees is to deter the potential threat. It can be of great deterrent value, but if actually invoked, this is testimony to failed deterrence.

Israel might also fear loss of freedom in other important if not existentially-threatening situations, such as combating Hizballah and Palestinian terror, or in a military confrontation with Syria. The US, too, would probably not wish to be entangled in these issues. The solution would be to limit the treaty to existential dangers to Israel.

The issue of Israel's independent deterrent capabilities might, of course, be raised by the US. Despite its past diplomatic formulae, however, the US may actually have an interest in Israel's retaining these capabilities, which would thereby obviate the need for the US to come to its aid. It is, therefore, doubtful that the United States would actually insist that Israel divulge/dismantle them. Moreover, if the treaty represented an alternative to an attack on Iran (assuming US opposition to any such strike, American or Israeli), the treaty would achieve a new and useful deterrent result.

The concept of extended American deterrence should be considered solely as an addition to Israel's independent deterrent, not as a substitute for it. The time to begin consideration of this option, however, is near. Failure of current diplomatic efforts vis-a-vis Iran may soon make it a pressing issue.- Published 6/7/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Chuck Freilich is former deputy national security advisor of Israel and a senior fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School. Richard Rosecrance is distinguished research professor of political science at UCLA and senior fellow of the Belfer Center at Harvard's Kennedy School.

The American approach to the escalating crisis with Iran that resulted from western countries' efforts to prevent Iran's nuclear program from progressing further has been subject to much criticism from the Arab world.

There are two main concerns that are usually mentioned by Arab analysts or politicians. The first is--again--Washington's double standards in its foreign relations. In this case, Israel is violating the same international standards on nuclear weapons that Iran is accused of transgressing, but without any pressure on Tel Aviv vis-a-vis its nuclear capabilities.

The second, and perhaps more provocative, was the statement by President George W. Bush giving assurances to defend Israel against any possible Iranian threat. Many Arab countries that enjoy friendly relations with Washington and might feel even more threatened by Iran haven't been receiving such assurances. The most notable examples are the Arab Gulf states.

That American attitude implies that the US government is looking at the Iran crisis primarily through the prism of the Arab-Israel conflict. In other words, the main motive behind Washington's efforts to prevent Iran's nuclear program is basically to prevent any shift in the regional balance of power that is not in favor of Israel.

It has not escaped the attention of many analysts that Israeli as well as US officials rarely waste an opportunity these days to point accusing fingers at what they call the Hizballah-Syria-Iran axis.

The most recent example is the conflagration in the Gaza Strip. In the first few days after the capture there of an Israeli soldier, Israeli politicians, starting with the prime minister, publicly held the Palestinian Authority responsible and directly fingered Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh. But it did not take long for Israeli rhetoric to be re-directed at the outside Hamas leadership with a clear and explicit reference to Hizballah-Syria-Iran.

The US-Israeli attempts to show the hand of the Hizballah-Syria-Iran axis in every regional crisis is creating fears that the two countries are trying to widen existing tensions in order to justify an Israeli and American move to preempt any potential change in the regional balance of power.

The US has two strategic options for dealing with Iran. One is to stick to the collective international efforts led by the UN with growing influence from Europe and balanced by the participation of Russia and China. This approach will have greater regional credibility and consequently will be more effective. Ultimately, it will be more difficult for Iran to challenge the whole world. In addition, the multilateral approach will equally reassure all the countries in the region that feel threatened by this problem and can thus minimize any potential role for extremist Islamist involvement.

The other approach is more or less the one the US took in Iraq when it deviated from UN-led international efforts and pursued an almost unilateral campaign that ended with the mess we see now in Iraq and the many mistakes that have been admitted as well as those that have not. That approach isolated American efforts in Iraq regionally and opened the doors for a significant extremist Islamist role.

As well as the importance of a genuine international effort, there is also a need for serious coordination with the major players in the region. The Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, have a major stake in a satisfactory resolution of the Tehran-Washington standoff and are concerned more than anyone about both the developments in Iran and the way this crisis is being handled internationally.

UN-led efforts, rather than unilateral American moves that appear heavily influenced by an Israeli agenda, can ensure a positive, regional context. This is turn will increase the chances of a successful resolution and minimize any dangerous side effects of the kind we saw appear in Iraq.- Published 6/7/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


Ghassan Khatib is coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet publications and director of the Government Media Center. This article represents his personal views.

The Bush administration has won much praise for finally realizing that it cannot succeed with its Middle East policy in general, and curtail Iranian nuclear ambitions in particular without negotiating directly with Iran. Less attention has been given to the unprecedented support Israel has offered this policy shift. Israel--who for years has opposed US-Iran talks--expressed support for Washington's decision and urged Jewish-American organizations to lower their profile on Iran.

Several factors have contributed to these developments. Washington has realized that its no-negotiation policy was gifting Iran an unlikely victory. Its options seemed to either be that Iran would get the bomb or the United States would be drawn into another war.

At the same time, Israel was faced with the prospect of seeing its uncompromising line on Iran lead to an unwinnable war that, unlike the Iraq conflict, was likely to also engulf Israel. On the bright side, however, America offered Israel explicit promises that it would come to the Jewish state's defense if attacked by Iran. "Israel is a close friend and ally of the United States, and in the event of any attack on Israel, the United States will come to Israel's aid," President Bush declared earlier in May.

These two developments--Washington's offer of talks with Iran and Israel's support of this move--are as unprecedented as they are necessary. At best, Washington's new direction and Israel's unforeseen agreement have the potential of paving the way for resolving the Israeli-Iranian geo-strategic puzzle. In a proposal to Washington in May 2003, the Iranians signaled a willingness to formally endorse a two-state solution in return for Iran's decontainment. At worst, these developments can further entangle Washington in a web of bilateral defense agreements that reduces the maneuverability for peacemaking and increases the likelihood of a complete collapse of the already fragile Middle East order.

President Bush's promise of coming to Israel's defense directly addressed an apprehension that has haunted Israel for more than a decade. Since the early 1990s, Israel has feared that improved US-Iranian relations could come at Israel's expense. Israeli decision-makers wondered whether Washington would be tempted to betray Israeli security interests when faced with the opportunity to reconcile with Tehran.

Israel's confidence in America's reliability had already taken a blow during the Persian Gulf War, when Washington reigned in Israel's inclination to retaliate against Iraqi Scud attacks.

Washington sent Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to Israel to--on a daily basis--assure the Israelis that the US was doing all it could to destroy the missile launchers in Iraq from which Saddam was hurling his Scuds. But according to Efraim Halevi, former head of the Mossad, both the Israeli army and the Israeli Ministry of Defense were unconvinced by Eagleburger's assurances. This caused much bad blood and disbelief as to whether the US could be relied upon when it came to Israel's existence. At the end of the day, America's protection was ineffective and the image that Israel was relying on the US for its security was hard to stomach for the Israeli public, Halevi writes in his book, Man in the Shadows.

The result of the geo-political turmoil after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Iraq was that both Israel and Iran sought to undermine US foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East that they deemed beneficial to the other. Israel aimed to prevent a US-Iran rapprochement and Iran acted against the Middle East peace process since, it feared, the Oslo agreement would lead to an Israel-centric Middle East order based on Iran's prolonged isolation. Even at the height of its strength, America could not neutralize Iranian and Israeli spoiling efforts.

It is in light of this that Washington's decision to simultaneously offer Iran conditional talks and Israel protection against possible Iranian aggressions must be seen. There seems to be a realization among realists in the Bush administration that Washington only can free itself from the chains of the Israeli-Iranian strategic rivalry by addressing both sides of this equation at the same time; ensuring Israel that talks with Tehran will not jeopardize its security while impressing on Iran that Washington sees room for both a special relationship with Israel and global and regional reintegration for Iran.

These two steps will only work, however, if they are consistently taken in tandem. If talks with Iran break down, if they fail to take place due to squabbling over preconditions, or if Washington intends the offer merely as a tactical maneuver aimed at winning time and strengthening international support for punishing Iran, then the security guarantees offered to Israel may, instead of advancing peace, draw Washington and Israel into a major showdown with Iran with unpredictable regional and global repercussions.

Disregarding the inescapable reality that the standoff with Iran lacks a unilateral solution can turn American security guarantees into a promise that only serves to ensure conflict. Israel should be cautious not to overestimate the value of such promises.- Published 6/7/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Trita Parsi is the author of Treacherous Alliance--The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the US and a silver medal recipient of the Council on Foreign Relations' Arthur Ross Book Award.

Earlier this year President George W. Bush vowed the United States would if needed protect Israel militarily against Iran. His statement, in what was described as the most explicit words a US president had ever used, was quoted by Reuters: "You bet, we'll defend Israel" as a "solid ally". The president's remarks came at a time when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad had given a menacing talk questioning the Holocaust and saying "Israel should be wiped off the map" [to be precise: vanish from the page of time].

Two points should be considered in parallel: First, it is questionable whether this and similar remarks by Iranian revolutionary leaders can be interpreted as a strategy to attack Israel, or whether they should be taken as little more than the rhetoric that has been repeated for over 27 years since the Iranian revolution of 1979.

Second, despite the clarity of Bush's remarks about defending Israel, it is also arguable whether the president was offering a real defense umbrella to shield Israel from any Iranian threat, or was merely using different language to reaffirm traditional US support for the state of Israel.

Many other questions surround the nature of the perceived threats and the promised defense. However, it appears that Iran has to respond to some of them now that it is responding to the western package of incentives regarding its controversial nuclear activities.

As in many areas of international relations and diplomacy, Iran's performance has been weak, and it has failed to get the international community's trust and respect or send the right message at the right time. Indeed, it has reacted hastily and conveyed messages from different and uncoordinated sources of power within the regime. In this regard, Ahmadinezhad is not and will not be the last to send such messages.

The creation of a "Foreign Policy Council" about a week ago to carry out the supreme leader's foreign policy--rather than Ahmadinezhad's slogans--is another sign that the real decision-making circles in Iran are located beyond the inexperienced president's office or the foreign ministry. While one should not totally discount what the latter say, it has mainly rhetorical value.

The issue of Israel is not mentioned in the package of incentives offered by the Europeans and the US. But it is implicit in them, and will influence the course of negotiations. It appears that Iran's relations with the West in general, and particularly the future of its nuclear program and its dealings with the US, are now to a great extent a hostage of its relationship with Israel.

Based on these assumptions, is there a genuine Iranian threat against Israel that may require US military defense? Two types of threats can be perceived: First, direct targeting of Israel using an Iranian missile capability that is believed to have adequate range to reach Israel. However, there is no indication that Iran is even thinking about a military offensive against Israel.

While Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kamal Kharrazi has confirmed Iran's capability of reaching Israel, it is improbable that Iran would ever want to use missiles against any country unless for defensive reasons. Iran's missile system is flawed, untenable and simply inadequate for such an offense. In addition, missiles have never been useful strategic targeting tools; the assumption that Iran would be able to equip its missiles with nuclear warheads is implausible and sounds more like Hollywood than the Middle East.

A second threat is of proxy wars through Iranian-supported groups like Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas. Following the Israeli withdrawal from the southern part of Lebanon and the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, and despite its ongoing ties with Iran, Hizballah is increasingly involved in domestic Lebanese politics, where its relationship with Iran jeopardizes its status as an independent national group. And Iran's relations with Hamas strengthened only after the Israelis increased their pressure on Hamas through economic sanctions.

This second scenario has more credibility in the short and probably the medium term. Iran may indeed increase its support for Hizballah and Hamas and strengthen its ties with the world Islamic movement, but eliminating the Iranian factor from the equation will not eliminate Hamas and Hizballah. They will still function through other means and manage to acquire international support; Iran is not their raison d'etre.

One should be aware of a relatively new factor in Iranian foreign policy that seeks to put the West and Israel on the defensive and buy more time. This is consistent with Iran's foreign policy tactics and with the general Iranian rule: let the weighty rock sink to the bottom of the well first, and then think about how to dig it out. We can see this factor in Ahmadinezhad's rhetoric, first denying the Holocaust and calling for the destruction of Israel, and then interpreting it as a scientific necessity to revisit the history of WWII. It is also evident in Iran's negotiating tactics that insist on its "natural" right to develop a nuclear capability for peaceful purposes and send signals that Iran would accept a face-saving solution if permitted nuclear laboratory experiments and the like. And it is visible in the ongoing negotiations over the so-called package of incentives offered to Iran to abandon its nuclear program. As everywhere else in the world, there are here red lines to be perceived and deciphered.

If these assumptions are correct, then why would an American military response be needed, and how do we interpret President Bush's commitment to defend Israel: defend against what? Against $50,000,000 promised to be paid to Hamas? Against dozens of centrifuge units that have produced a capsule of enriched uranium now kept in the holy shrine of an Imam in Iran? Is this a military step against policies that are being fought over internally in Iran? Or is it a military commitment against the rhetoric and war of words coming from Tehran?

Because the rationales of US foreign policy are different from those of Iranian politics, it is difficult to imagine that the US is trying to change policy fundamentals that have been in force since the creation of Israel and upgrade them to a NATO-type military umbrella that seems neither timely nor necessary at this point. In addition, whether such a change would even serve US or Israeli national interests remains to be seen.

Taking all aspects of the issue into account, it is more likely that President Bush's statement about defending Israel is simply reconfirmation of an already existing political will, but in stronger words, rather than a real change in policy. At the same time, his statement might also be interpreted as a harsh message to Iran not to go too far.- Published 6/7/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


Dr. Jalil Roshandel is associate professor and director of the Security Studies Program at the Political Science Department of East Carolina University. He is currently working on a book project (with Dr. Alethia Cook): US-Iran Relations: Policy Challenges and Opportunities.

Asked on February 1, 2006 whether the United States would protect Israel militarily against Iran, President George W. Bush left no doubt: "You bet, we'll defend Israel."

To some realists, his statement was evidence that Israel had become a strategic liability to the United States. A few prominent Jewish leaders, worried that Jews might be blamed for any military conflict with Iran, urged Bush to tone down his statements pledging support for Israel. "We are basically telling the president: We appreciate it, we welcome it. But, hey, because there is this debate on Iraq, where people are trying to put the blame on us, maybe you shouldn't say it that often or that loud," Abraham Foxman, national director of the Anti-Defamation League, explained.

In reality, though, Bush's pledge of support to Israel is neither new nor special. While critics of US foreign policy and the Bush administration suggest that US wars are fought for either Israel or oil, history suggests otherwise. In the last 15 years, the US military has intervened not only in Iraq and Afghanistan--both part of the war on terrorism--but also in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, in each case for humanitarian purposes.

That the US would act to defend its allies should not surprise. While US professors proffer informed comment that Iranian leaders do not mean what they say, policymakers have learned to take the opinion of academic experts with a grain of salt. One week before Iraq invaded Kuwait, The Times (London) reported, "The consensus among Middle East experts...was that Iraq would not invade Kuwait."

After Saddam Hussein demonstrated that sometimes dictators mean what they say, President George H.W. Bush did not go wobbly. Before a joint session of Congress on September 11, 1990, Bush declared, "Our objectives in the Persian Gulf are clear, our goals defined and familiar: Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait completely, immediately, and without condition. Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored." Professors John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt may receive plaudits in certain crowds for arguing that Israel is a strategic liability to the United States, but the fact remains that the US went to war in 1991 not to protect Israel, but to protect Saudi Arabia and liberate Kuwait. That it did so was correct.

US defense of allies from aggression is not limited to the Middle East. In both Korea and Vietnam, invasions by communist states of US allies sparked full-scale war. President Harry S Truman recorded the lowest popularity ever among US presidents in part because of high casualties and domestic criticism of his engagement in an "open-ended" conflict. He understood--as have subsequent presidents--that US credibility among its allies is more important than any snapshot poll. Today, the US maintains 35,000 troops in South Korea, and Truman ranks among the top five presidents in polls by American historians.

As costly as a war with China would be, US administrations have made clear that Washington would consider military action to defend Taiwan from Chinese aggression. In 1979, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act that declared it necessary to provide arms to Taiwan and "to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan." Early in his first term, against the backdrop of a crisis with Beijing, George W. Bush declared that if the Peoples' Republic of China attacked Taiwan, the US would do "whatever it took to help Taiwan defend itself".

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad may believe their anti-Israel rhetoric resonates with both their domestic audience and the Arab street. They may believe that Washington is too weak to respond. Addressing the United States on the seventeenth anniversary of the death of Islamic Republic founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Khamenei asked, "Why do you [the US] not admit that you are weak and your razor is blunt?"

But, despite Bush administration equivocation about its democratization policy, the strain of US involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and the failure of the White House to stand by its previously declared red lines, Tehran would be mistaken to believe that the US government neither had the will nor the capacity to stand by Israel or any other ally. If forced to act, Washington would and could. The US Air Force and Navy remain unencumbered. While no serious policymaker discusses occupation of Iran, the Islamic Republic's leadership would not likely survive should it push the White House into conflict over Israel or, for that matter, over Washington's allies in the Persian Gulf.

On certain issues, US policy is remarkably consistent and bipartisan. No matter how poisonous political battles are in Washington, Congress unites in the face of aggression against the United States or its allies. Bush's pledge to protect Israel is neither unique nor counter to US interests. For Tehran or any other state to believe otherwise or engage in policies that would challenge the White House on its fundamental duties to its allies would represent a serious miscalculation.- Published 6/7/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School.