• No "one size fits all"  - Deborah Amos
Hizballah has come a long way from the days of smashing liquor bottles at the Commodore Hotel in West Beirut.

• Pushing Islamists to the center  - Hassan A. Barari
Free and democratic elections would not end Islam-driven groups, but would punish militant ones.

• The long haul in Morocco  - Anouar Boukhars
Morocco is still a quasi-absolute monarchy governed with a mixture of enlightened authoritarianism and relative parliamentary politics.

• Lessons from four elections  - Jonathan Steele
It is no longer possible to claim that the present generation of Arab rulers will never permit their citizens a free choice.

No "one size fits all"
 Deborah Amos

Islamists have demonstrated strength in every recent election they've been allowed to enter. If all Arab countries had free, democratic elections and the vote was tomorrow, it is a safe bet Islamists would sweep the polls across the Arab world. That is exactly the message autocratic Arab rulers want to foster. It is either "them or us". These very same rulers have strangled any other kind of political opposition except that emanating from the mosque.

In the present political climate, secular parties are no match for the Islamists. One recent example is in Iraq. Elections there were less than perfect and were carried out under foreign occupation and amid violence and intimidation, but by most standards the vote was relatively free.

I observed the January 2005 ballot in Iraq's southern city of Basra, where campaigning was lively. Many of the educated elites were convinced Iyad Allawi, who headed the most secular political list, would poll well in the south.

Allawi had plenty of advantages. He promised a pay raise for civil servants--a direct appeal to the police and army vote. He dominated the state media with around-the-clock television campaign ads. His campaign posters hung from every lamppost. But in the days leading up to the vote, Allawi was out-campaigned by local Imams.

On the Friday before the elections, Shi'ite preachers across the city instructed the faithful how to vote and identified the party that would most please God, the United Iraqi Alliance. For good measure, Imams informed Friday worshippers that a vote for the secular Allawi rather than the Shi'ite religious party would damn them to hell, an effective strategy that helped marginalize secularists in parliament.

The Iraqi elections also demonstrated another trend that would likely characterize free, democratic and immediate elections elsewhere in the Arab world, and that is the power of sectarian identity. Amid the chaos, Iraqis voted identity politics--a ballot cast for protection and self interest rather than national unity.

But even in Iraq, dissatisfaction with the performance of Islamist parties was soon apparent. In the south, voter turnout dropped dramatically in the 2006 election. Many Iraqi analysts attributed the poll numbers to a critique of local Islamist parties that were becoming more corrupt and heavy handed in imposing "Islamic" behavior, along with the inability of national parties to deliver on promises to the south.

While Islamists have made a strong showing in Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and Egypt, most voters are not casting a ballot for the institution of an Islamic government. Even the most conservative Islamist politician knows this is not what attracts the electorate. Most polls show a different motivation.

An old American political truism says that all politics are local. Islamists offer an alternative to the long-term corruption of Arab regimes. In Palestine, the corruption of the Palestinian Authority was legendary, as much a campaign issue as the rejectionist political platform of Hamas.

In Lebanon, Hizballah now says the larger jihad is fighting government corruption--harder, say Hizballah officials, than fighting Israel. It is a statement that appeals to the Shi'ite constituency. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has a reputation for delivering social services and for politicians more honest than those who serve the Mubarak government. In a region of resentments, this is a winning political platform.

But what if we take immediate elections out of the equation? What if elections and campaigns are seen as a longer process? "Islam is the Solution" is a slogan that continues to appeal as long as it remains an ideal not tested. Over time, voters may make different calculations as Islamists grapple with difficult issues in the rough and tumble of reality politics. How will they deal with non-Muslim populations in countries with multi-ethnic communities? What policies will govern the rights of women? How will they deal with minorities? Will they legislate away the pleasures of secular life? Most important, can they deliver on the economy, on jobs, on getting the sewers fixed and the electricity flowing?

The theory is that most will moderate rhetoric and positions in the give and take of political life. It is already clear that Hamas is looking to moderate the substance if not the style of its politics. The latest proposal forged in the special security wing of Israel's Hadarim prison between Hamas and the PLO calls for a national unity government, with stress on political and diplomatic action. This may not meet Israel's definition of moderation, but it is a sign that Hamas is being forced to reconsider its positions by the Palestinians who elected it.

In Lebanon, Hizballah, the Islamist party with the longest experience in government, has come a long way from the days of smashing liquor bottles at the Commodore Hotel in West Beirut. For the first time, Hizballah has entered the Lebanese cabinet, taking on the electricity ministry, the most corrupt in the country. Hizballah will be judged on its clean-up campaign, which is proving far more difficult than imagined.

In Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Brotherhood backed some technocrat candidates in the municipal elections. In Damascus, Riad Saif, one of the most charismatic figures in the secular opposition, courted Islamists to join him in a political campaign against the Assad regime, a strategy that has been slowed by the recent crackdown on all the political opposition in Syria. Saif believes Syria's secularist opposition would have to join forces with Islamists to "borrow" their reputation for clean politics. It is a coalition that is likely to moderate Islamists and give secularists credibility.

Thus there is no "one size fits all" in the Arab world, no stark choice between autocratic rulers and wild-eyed Islamists. Instead, this is an evolving political landscape, a complicated case that differs in every country where Islamists' solutions have yet to be fully put to the test.- Published 22/6/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Deborah Amos is an international correspondent for National Public Radio, specializing in coverage of the Middle East.

Central to addressing this interesting yet hypothetical question is a fair and objective reading of the current situation in the Arab world. In brief, one can safely make the case that, save for a few instances, democratic elections in Arab countries have not yielded a marked rotation of power. Put differently, elections held in some Arab states were, by and large, meant to project a positive and civilized image to the West. Thus, elections are cosmetic practices designed to serve the interest of the status quo and the ruling elites, rather than bring about genuine change. As a corollary, it is very difficult to discuss proper and real democratic elections in the Arab countries.

Nevertheless, recent global and regional developments have given impetus to democracy in our region. Indeed, there is a historic opportunity to introduce proper democratic reforms in the Arab world. Pressure from the West is a positive development and free, democratic elections have the potential to create a number of transformations, with great consequences for the wider region. While it is inconceivable that this article might address all the benefits of such developments, the following are examples of what could happen if Arab countries had free and democratic elections.

Firstly, contrary to conventional wisdom, democratic elections would create great incentives for Islamists to moderate. The resultant politics of inclusion would push more Islamists to the center rather than to the extreme. Militant Islamists would find it extremely difficult to recruit followers. Furthermore, Islamists would gradually abandon their outdated political ideology and resort to a more pragmatic approach, enabling them to participate in power. They would recognize that entrenching themselves in these inflexible positions benefits no one, and therefore would quickly learn the art of politics. Failing to do so would make them less appealing--even to those who have Islamic sentiments.

Free and democratic elections would not end Islam-driven groups, but would punish militant ones, as they would fail to recruit members. The maturation process of Islamists should be seen as a great gain to the region as a whole. This is in itself a very positive development that could facilitate the inclusion of Islamists in the political process. Perhaps the most salient experience of integrating Islamists into the system is the case of Jordan. Despite their high rhetoric and bombastic and fiery statements, Islamists in Jordan are positive elements that have helped stabilize the system for years.

Secondly, a genuine rotation of power would certainly lead to greater public participation in politics. In this case, governments would derive their legitimacy from the people rather than from kings or presidents. A government would realize that failing to deliver or holding on to the ongoing patterns of corruption and lack of transparency would lead to its replacement by another. A prime minister, for instance, would understand that the people could vote him or her in or out of power. Hence, the government would be both accountable and responsive to the people's demands. Furthermore, the allocation of resources would not be confined to a clique of unaccountable, corrupt and autocratic ruling elites. Instead, there would be wider public participation in this significant process, thus bestowing political legitimacy on the whole system. This would certainly lead to better and more efficient expenditure while concurrently reducing the level of corruption to a minimum.

A final consequence concerns the conflicts in the region. The democratic peace theory is of paramount relevance to this conflict-riddled area. The region has suffered from a recurrent pattern of inter-state wars and military clashes, and witnessed a number of internal conflicts and civil wars. At the domestic level, democracy could provide a framework within which internal differences can be resolved peacefully, while at the regional level, unlike the case of authoritarian regimes, democratic ones would find it harder to mobilize people for war. They would have to build a case for war, which means a public debate for months if not years, thereby allowing ample time for third party intervention to prevent conflicts.

Equally important, the prevalence of democracy would lead to the spread of the culture of tolerance and peaceful solution of differences, which could be externalized in states' conduct vis-a-vis one another. However, this does not mean that the spread of democracy would put an end to the Arab-Israel conflict. The root cause of the conflict remains occupation. Proper democracy would then be a post-conflict guarantee for stability.

In brief, a free democratic Arab world would be relatively free of corruption, lead to public participation in decision-making and create the conditions conducive for prosperity and stability.- Published 22/6/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Hassan A. Barari is professor of Middle Eastern politics at the University of Jordan and the author of "Israelism: Arab Scholarship on Israel, a Critical Assessment" (London: Ithaca, 2009).

Steps toward meaningful political reform in the Arab world have stalled, blocked by official changes of heart about the merit of representative democracy in stemming the tide of rising popular disaffection and Islamist jihadism. To be sure, support for democratic principles by the region's rulers has always been ambivalent at best. It is hard to believe that any absolute monarch or president-for-life would willingly agree to implement genuine change that would necessarily entail free and fair elections and constitutional reforms that dilute executive power and empower legislative and judicial branches of government. Even King Mohamed VI of Morocco, well known for his penchant for reforms and repeated rhetorical calls for embracing modernity and democracy, has shown no real taste for the diffusion of power, the structural base of any democratic polity. Despite evidence of democratization and the king's stated noble motivations, the Moroccan political system lacks any meaningful framework of checks and balances.

Morocco is still a quasi-absolute monarchy governed with a mixture of enlightened authoritarianism and relative parliamentary politics. Mohamed VI's endeavors to invent a new ruling bargain that breaks with his father's authoritarian reign yet perpetuates the dominance of the monarchy have succeeded in creating an image of Morocco as a modern and progressive constitutional monarchy. Domestically, however, the king has failed to deliver, leaving a large number of Moroccans impatient for the real political and economic reforms they hoped for when he assumed the throne in 1999. The current generation of young adults still complains of the same old practices of privilege, nepotism and cronyism that have plagued the Moroccan government for decades. Even the much-trumpeted official anti-corruption campaigns have met resistance in the inefficient and corrupt government bureaucracies. The powerlessness of elected institutions has created a suspicion of change and widespread political apathy captured by numerous surveys that show only a small minority of Moroccans trust politicians.

Today, Morocco is at a crossroads: The king can either prolong his father's authoritarian rule in a new guise at his own peril, or he can spearhead serious political reforms, anchored in human development and substantial democratic change. The country desperately needs the cultivation of a genuine nation of law that functions transparently, accountably and independently from the whims of the ruling establishment. This does not mean that the monarchy would necessarily lose its commanding influence. On the contrary, the king can still retain his prestigious role as a national symbol, enterprising power broker and honest arbiter in a democratic system bound by institutional checks and balances and constitutional responsibility of power.

Mohammed VI can be a powerful force for change if he could translate his rhetorical promises and vague endorsements of reform into concrete programs that could open the way for more power diffusion and compromise within the confines of well charted principles of political participation and a mutually agreed-on set of values endorsed by all nonviolent elements of the political spectrum. If constructed in good faith, a comprehensive and negotiated reform plan that openly embraces all segments of the population committed to democratic principles, including religious tolerance, women's equality and political pluralism, could go a long way toward ensuring a sustainable democratic outcome.

It is in the monarchy's best interests to support such a constructive negotiation framework among the regime loyalists, socialists, conservatives, Islamists and other non-violent opposition groups. It is equally important that the ruling establishment reaches out to the Islamists in all their diversity and resists the temptation to use existing institutional constraints to manipulate and de-legitimize the mainstream Islamist movements who have already agreed to abide by the rules of the political game. There is increasing concern that a number of shanty-town populations will swing over to radical Islamists who reject the democratic process altogether, if the moderate Islamists of the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) prove incapable of participating in the system without being thwarted and discredited by it.

To meet the needs of a predominantly young and restless population, the monarchy needs to reform itself within a framework of laws and plural democratic values. The political parties are in desperate need of reforms as well. They are internally fragmented and unable to forge far-reaching opposition alliances for political transformation. Their aging leadership is perceived as too pliant, complacent and no longer capable of connecting with voters' everyday concerns. There were some recent tentative moves by the small parties of the left to regroup into one bloc called the Rally of the Democratic Left but even this attempt failed to entice the main socialist party into joining the merger. It is imperative for the parties of the left and right to regroup to achieve a working majority.

As Morocco gears up for the 2007 parliamentary elections, its political system faces two major challenges. One is related to the growing apathy and disillusionment of average Moroccans with politicians, the other has to do with political and human rights that are still lagging behind, despite the significant improvement in the status of women and the cultural rights of Berbers. The year 2007 thus represents an opportunity for the creation of a national pact that could help strengthen reforms already in motion and regain the confidence of the electorate.- Published 22/6/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Anouar Boukhars is assistant professor of political science and international studies at McDaniel College in Maryland.

Democratic elections in the Arab world are no longer a mirage. Travelers in Palestine and Iraq reached the oasis about six months ago and found there was water. In Egypt and Lebanon voters did so somewhat earlier, and though the liquid they drank was partially polluted it has not killed them. So it is no longer possible to claim that the present generation of Arab rulers will never permit their citizens a free choice. Nor is it good enough to fall back on the old argument that a balance must be struck between democracy and stability--with the usual conclusion that stability is preferable because democracy may put the "wrong" people in power.

The elections in Palestine, the freest of the four recent polls, could have provided both stability and democracy. One party, Hamas, won a clear victory in a contest judged by all national and international observers as free and fair. Having won, it sensibly offered the losers--Fateh--posts in a government of national unity.

If this has not happened, the fault does not lie with Hamas. Fateh militants refused to accept the voters' verdict gracefully, they rejected the coalition offer, and outside powers have increasingly interfered by holding Hamas to international blackmail and demanding it reverse its positions or see Palestinians starve. The latest disruption of the election result is President Mahmoud Abbas' attempt to force a referendum on foreign policy--a move that is unnecessary, divisive, and likely to produce violence at a precarious moment when Palestinians need unity.

The moral in Palestine is not that democracy brings instability, but that it is the failure of powerful forces to accept democracy's results that causes instability.

The Iraq case is different. Although Iraqis had a reasonable choice of candidates, the December elections were highly flawed. Massive insecurity made it impossible for candidates or parties to campaign or hold more than a few token meetings, thereby undermining the chance of genuine debate. The second major flaw was the powerful presence of occupation troops and the sense that whatever government emerged from the election would not be truly sovereign. Polls have consistently shown that a majority of Iraqis want foreign forces to leave, yet no party in the Iraqi election was willing to reflect that clearly in its program.

Iraq's system is also bedeviled by the tendency for identity politics to replace issue politics. Parties project themselves as representing ethnic or sectarian interest groups. In a society where central rule is dangerously fragile and insecurity is mounting, voters are invited to link themselves to their "own" group. Parties, particularly secular ones, which try to project a broader nationalist image that overrides sectarian concerns have an uphill struggle.

Egypt is a case of aborted democracy. Its presidential and parliamentary elections both had some trappings of choice, but the effect of government-inspired repression skewed the results unfairly. State control of television, plus the patronage system through which members of the ruling party control most key jobs in public administration throughout the country, gave President Hosni Mubarak's National Democratic Party unfair access to the media and to campaign funding. The parliamentary elections were no better, though because Parliament is a weak body Mubarak was willing to allow the opposition a little more scope to campaign than he had in the presidential contest.

Finally to Lebanon, and an election that was flawed in one way that is similar to Iraq, if not worse. Whereas the sectarian bias in Iraq has come about informally, in Lebanon it is mandated under the Taif constitution that ended the civil war and lays down strict confessional quotas. Some Lebanese would like to move to a majoritarian system without quotas but a majority of the political elite is not willing to make the change. How electoral reform can be brought about in Lebanon therefore remains uncertain.

The upshot of this discussion is that generalizations about democracy in the Arab world do not have great value, and certainly none at all if they assume some sort of general Arab "unreadiness" for a free, open, and non-violent contest for power. The experience of elections in four Arab countries over the last year and a half offers rich lessons of how things can go right or wrong. It does not support the case that Arabs do not deserve to have a voice and a vote.- Published 22/6/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Jonathan Steele is international affairs columnist for The Guardian newspaper