• Problematic balance sheet  - Roberto Aliboni
Libya's cooperation with the West and Europe apparently condones the total absence of political pluralism and freedom within that country.

• Libya's example one of patience and creativity  - Jon B. Alterman
US success with Libya depended on important factors not present in the Iranian case.

• Libya's emerging elites  - Amal Obeidi
The emerging elites have no clear agenda, although one can expect that the normalization process with the West might be one of the main priorities.

Problematic balance sheet
 Roberto Aliboni

With the removal of Libya from the American list of countries sponsoring terrorism, normalization between Washington and Tripoli is complete. It took more than two years, between 2003 and 2006, for American concessions to be traded against verified Libyan accomplishments. Meanwhile, normalization took place between Europe and Libya as well. Its pace was remarkably quicker than the American one, however, and the method substantially different.

How is Libyan reintegration to be assessed? Let's look at the European experience.

The European approach is based on inclusion and engagement. This is the strategy the European Union and its member states decidedly prefer, as it is in tune with their own experience of integration and peaceful relations after WWII. Indeed, this is the approach they have put into practice in their regional relations--EU enlargement--as well as inter-regional relations, in particular with Africa south of the Sahara and the Mediterranean area.

This EU approach contrasts with the one the US prefers. More often than not, this divides Europeans and Americans, particularly when it comes to the Middle East. The Europeans are more bent on carrying out negotiations or conducting dialogues, whereas the US has a tendency to the early use of coercion or muscular approaches, along with diplomacy. This difference emerged in the past in the cases of Iraq and Iran, and will likely reemerge with Ahmadinezhad's Iran.

It did with Libya as well. When Libya was under United Nations sanctions in 1992-2003 and the EU countries abstained from any engagement, they were nevertheless more or less openly convinced that sanctions should be coupled with some form of dialogue so as to provide breathing space to moderates inside Libya and avoid the risk of radicalization that international isolation generally brings about. So, while the United States waited for the end of the Camp Zeist trial and the April 2003 Libyan official recognition of responsibility before engaging (very cautiously) in normalizing relations with Tripoli, EU countries reestablished relations in 1999, as soon as Tripoli's rendition of the two suspects made it possible for the UN to lift international sanctions. Even the UK, the EU country closest to the US, resumed diplomatic relations with Libya in August 1999.

The EU engagement and inclusion approach to Libya received its most significant implementation when the conference of the foreign ministers of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), gathering in Stuttgart in 1999, invited Libya to join the EMP as an observer, with a view to becoming a full member as soon as the UN completed the process of lifting sanctions. This European move was strongly endorsed by the Arab Mediterranean partners, thus rendering it highly inclusive.

At first, Libya looked interested. As soon as sanctions were lifted, however, it hesitated. Then it tried to impose conditions by arguing that Israel and the Palestinian National Authority could only be EMP members after settling their conflict. The EMP European and non-European partners both rejected the Libyan approach, pointing out that candidates have to fully accept the EMP "acquis" to become members. Subsequently, on the occasion of the April 2000 Cairo Africa Summit, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi let the Europeans know that Libya's African solidarity was more important than any Mediterranean solidarity and that he expected all EMP North African members to take the same view.

Although Libya has remained an observer in the EMP, by now it should be rather clear that it will never join the Barcelona process. It is evident that the Libyan ruling class is absolutely unwilling to engage in a political process with the EU and the other Mediterranean members of the EMP, with the risk of having to accept conditions and obligations, as mild as the latter usually are in the EMP. Furthermore, while other Arab Mediterranean countries may have an interest in receiving financial support, Tripoli has none. In sum, from Libya's point of view, retaining observer status while not entering into full membership helps develop good relations with the EU while keeping Tripoli's hands free.

More recently, the EU initiated a European Neighborhood Policy, which is intended to introduce uniformity in policies toward neighbors in the Mediterranean as well as the European East and to upgrade integration and cooperation with them. Libya is keeping aloof from this policy as well. It may be illuminating to note that two of the EU's neighbors, Libya and the Russian Federation, have proved uninterested in the new policy, probably for the same reasons.

While this state of affairs may be satisfactory for Libya, it may prove less so for the EU. European security doctrine offers privileges to neighbors only on condition that they develop organic, cooperative links with the EU bilaterally and regionally so as to allow Europe to exercise its influence with a view to promoting reforms and long term stability. While the EU is certainly prepared to build cooperation with Russia on a more traditional basis, having Libya out of its strategy of regional governance is less acceptable. In fact, the absence of Libya weakens the EMP by bringing about two different regimes: one in which a number of Arab countries have to deal with EU pressure to modernize politically (or risk marginalization, as in the case of Syria), and another in which, at the end of the day, good relations with the EU can be attained without undergoing any political pressure.

Despite Libya's failure to enter the EMP regional framework, European bilateral relations have steadily improved since Tripoli began reintegrating into the international setting; as of today they are very good. In fact, Libya is proving very cooperative toward the EU and its members, even on issues as thorny as clandestine emigration to the EU and fighting terrorism. It has proved ready to accommodate restrictive or preemptive moves by EU governments, such as the EU project of setting up camps in Libya to detain migrants or the October 2005 deportation accord with the UK.

For its part, the EU is stimulating and rewarding this collaboration. In October 2004, it lifted the 1986 embargo on arms exports to Libya so as to allow its members to deliver the instruments Tripoli allegedly needs to help stop clandestine migration to Europe. Against this backdrop, in January 2006 Italy announced the sale of ten A109 Power helicopters for "non-military" border patrol purposes.

This cooperation, however, is also shedding light on a double standard concerning Europe as well as the United States: Libya's cooperation with the West and Europe apparently condones the total absence of political pluralism and freedom within that country--something that, as already noted, is not condoned at all for other Arab countries, beginning with members of the EMP. This cooperation is also used by European governments to implement policies, like those just mentioned, that most of European (and American) civil society definitely dislikes or considers with suspicion: the lifting of the arms embargo and the transfer of arms, the accords for deporting terrorists, the use of Libyan territory to set up detention camps for migrants. While the governments on both sides of the Atlantic have quickly accommodated Libya as a cooperative partner, western civil society is not happy with the double standards this entails with regard to democracy and human rights.

In conclusion, the balance-sheet is uneasy and perhaps premature. The assets of Libyan cooperation with Europe and the West are offset by the liabilities of its lack of reform (which may even be encouraged by western rewards for Libyan political cooperation). They are also offset by the double standards this situation is generating with regard to other Mediterranean and Middle Eastern regimes. Finally, for the EU in particular, its inability to include Libya in the EMP, along with the emerging double standard, may weaken its regional policy toward the Mediterranean and its broad strategy of security with respect to the neighborhood. Thus, while Libyan reintegration is clearly positive, there are challenges the EU and western governments may fail to appreciate.- Published 8/6/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Roberto Aliboni is director of the Mediterranean and Middle East Programme, International Affairs Institute-IAI, Rome and senior research adviser, European Institute of the Mediterranean-IEMed, Barcelona.

When US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced the resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Libya last month, she urged the Iranian leadership to make a "similar strategic decision".

The Libyan and Iranian cases have more differences than similarities, however, and while an Iranian turn would be a coup for US policy, even if it were to occur it would not yield results until the term of the next US president--or perhaps the one after that.

The Bush administration has put forth a rather simple tale of what the Libyan government did: awed by US power in Afghanistan and Iraq, and stunned by the capture of Saddam Hussein, the Libyans simply gave up. They turned over their nuclear program, became allies in the war on terror, and made amends for their past terrorist acts. In return, the United States agreed to resume diplomatic relations. Told this way, power yields results as former rogues return to the fold. The moral is one of more power, used purposively, yielding a better world.

In truth, the Libyan story is much more complicated, and much muddier. It is not a simple tale of American resolve, but also one of compromise and patience. Most notably, the success with Libya depended on some very important factors, none of which are present in the Iranian case.

The US-Libyan rapprochement took place over almost a decade, starting with a lower-stakes UK-Libyan negotiation in the mid-1990s that ended Libyan support for the Irish Republican Army. Through that negotiation, British and Libyan negotiators gained the confidence of their counterparts--confidence that formed the foundation of later negotiations involving the United States.

By the time the United States came to the table in the last months of the Clinton administration, the issues each side sought to address were relatively clear, they were verifiable, and they were discrete. The key issues from the US side were related to Libya's involvement in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, and Libya's deep involvement in nuclear proliferation networks, the full extent of which the US government was not sure about. These issues were ones that could be measured and tested; they were not messy ones of support for insurgent political movements or untoward influence on troublesome governments.

In addition to lending themselves to measuring compliance, the issues between the United States and Libya could be sequenced, since none of them was urgent at the time. Libya had been out of the terrorism business for almost a decade by this point and was not targeting American personnel anywhere in the world. Easier issues could be solved first, building confidence as the issues got increasingly difficult and Libya found itself forced to make decisions it would be hard to reverse.

Finally, the negotiations were helped by the fact that the politics in the United States and Libya were conducive to them. The compensation deal that Libya struck with the families of the Pan Am 103 victims gave each family millions of dollars in additional compensation if Libya's normalization progressed. In this way, many such families became advocates of resuming relations rather than bitter foes of it. For its part, Libya has few visible politics, with unquestioned power resting in the hands of Muammar Qadhafi, who adds to his mystique by holding no official post in government. The task for the US negotiators clearly extended no farther than determining Qadhafi's acquiescence, given the proof of previous years that he would stand by his word.

For each and every one of these reasons, Iran is a far more difficult case. A tangled web of issues divides the two sides, and they do not lend themselves to easy metrics, standard-setting or verification. An unusual number of the issues involve matters of life and death--for Americans, Israelis, Iraqi Sunnis, Gulf neighbors and others--and it is hard to imagine postponing one vital issue so that an easier one can be worked on; lives would be lost in the process. Finally, the politics in both environments are deeply poisoned. Americans have not forgotten the hostage crisis of 1979-1981, and Iranians have not forgotten the US role in overthrowing their democratically elected prime minister, Mohamed Mossadegh, in 1953. Politicians on each side see much reason to vilify the other, and advocates of closer relations are hard to find.

US-Iranian relations are not completely intractable, but there are many reasons that they are extraordinarily difficult to solve. The US-Libyan success in resolving those issues does not inspire confidence so much as it helps to highlight how much easier the Libyan case was (although it certainly did not seem so at the outset). If there is a lesson from the US-Libyan process, it is the importance of creativity and patience in resolving these issues. Doing so with Iran will take years at best, and perhaps much longer.- Published 8/6/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Jon B. Alterman is the director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.

The nature of the political system in Libya is based on the people's direct authority and the role of the Revolutionary Committees. Traditionally, the role of Muammar Qadhafi as the dominant figure within the elite structure effectively prevented the emergence of new political leaders or an elite from the younger generation, and leadership was kept firmly in his hands.

However, the rise of Qadhafi's sons and their increased role, especially in the late 1990s, raised two main questions: First was the question of succession, especially after the death of other Arab leaders since 1999 and the transfer of leadership in these countries to their children. Second is the role of external pressure through United Nations sanctions and internal pressure through the increasing strength of the Islamic movements, especially in the eastern region, that is creating potential sources for a new elite.

Since the 1990s, Qadhafi has tried to widen the circle of the elite through his sons and his tribe and by creating new institutions such as the Popular Social Leadership that reintroduced tribal leaders to the elite structure.

The question of succession has never been raised openly in Libya, as state ideology theoretically emphasizes the idea of direct democracy based on the authority of the people. However, the question was raised by some revolutionary committee members during the 1980s in different ways. The question then related to the continuity of the revolution after the departure of its leader. The result of the debate gave greater power to revolutionary committee members in order to protect the revolution and its principles. This, however, gave rise to dissatisfaction and anger among large segments of Libyan society toward the revolutionary committees and their greater role.

Libya, theoretically, has no head of state. Officially, Qadhafi holds no title other than "the leader of the revolution", and his power in dealing with the country is based on al-Sharaiya al-Thawriya, the revolutionary legitimacy that was approved by the General People's Congress in 1990s and takes all Qadhafi's speeches as the guide for the Basic People's Congresses.

In a speech by Qadhafi in March 2000 he made the suggestion that "Libya should have a head of state again, like other countries, in case something happens; a catastrophe or a war." He also suggested that the job might go to the coordinator of the General Popular Social Leadership, a post that theoretically rotates every six months.

Qadhafi's seven sons are involved in many activities, but none in any official capacity. For instance, the eldest, Mohammad, is the head of The General Company for Communications in Libya. Al-Sa'adi was the president of the Libyan Soccer Federation and Tripoli's al-Ahli football club.

Sayf al-Islam is the chairman of Qadhafi's International Charity Foundation, a non-governmental association. But through this association, Sayf al-Islam has taken a leading role in expanding his international activities. His mediation to release western hostages in the Philippines and his role in recent years in normalizing relations with western countries, especially the United Kingdom and the United States, were very visible.

Broadly speaking, there are two elements related to Qadhafi's sons that are worth mentioning. First, they are less ideological and more pragmatic than their father. Second, in addition to their academic backgrounds in engineering and business, and with the exception of Mohammad and Sayf, they all have military backgrounds. This might indicate an increasing role of the security and military dimensions in the dynamics of Libyan politics.

The rapid changes in positions within the elite structure since 1969, meanwhile, also paint an interesting picture of political authority in Libya that might help in identifying its characteristics at a practical level.

Briefly, the regime has become increasingly narrow in structure and more hierarchical, while the role of the military and security elements, connected mainly to the Qadadfa tribe, has steadily increased.

Until the late 1980s the regime based its legitimacy on ideology. However, since the mid-1990's the regime's legitimacy has increasingly depended on tribalism, especially in recent years through the Popular Social Leadership.

For the time being there will be no change of power within the regime as far as Qadhafi is concerned. But the increasing role of new actors such as the sons, especially Sayf al-Islam, might double the size of the core elite.

The emerging elites have no clear agenda, although one can expect that the normalization process with the West might be one of the main priorities. Also, they might discontinue some of the old policies to reform the economy as a step toward economic liberalization.

At the domestic level, the country has suffered in the last two decades from impractical and failing domestic policies. These have caused chaos in many sectors, including the economy, health, housing, and educational sectors.

And though the emerging elites have no clear agenda for solving the many challenges at the domestic level, it is worth noting that their socio-professional profile has changed compared to the old generation. Their field of study, place of study and other features such as mastering foreign languages and time spent in the West might all have an effect on their agenda, world-view and ideology.

The changes in language and of elements of Libyan ideology, especially Qadhafi's political discourse, might reflect a change in the priorities of Libyan policies at both the domestic and international levels as well as in the elite structure that will carry and justify new polices. However, changes in the basics of state ideology are not going to come easily.- Published 8/6/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Amal Obeidi is an assistant professor at the University of Garyounis-Benghazi in Libya.