• So what! And then?  - Christian Berger
The end of the PA will be the signal that Palestinian public institutions and the political aspiration of statehood are no longer feasible.

• A Palestinian choice  - Danielle Pletka
The Palestinians must decide the way forward for themselves.

• By choice or by the devil  - Abdel Monem Said Aly
The emergence of a possible Somalia-like situation in the Palestinian territories is of great concern to Egypt.

• Getting worse quickly  - an interview withDavid Shearer
As things erode, Israel will be looked at as having the primary responsibility to make sure Palestinians don't suffer.

So what! And then?
 Christian Berger

It has been a long-held belief by many observers of the Middle East conflict that if the Palestinian Authority did not exist already we would have to invent it. Now that the PA seems to be moving closer to a possible collapse, is this still the case? Financial deprivation caused by the lack of access to funds--the larger part of PA-owned taxes and other revenues is being withheld by Israel and direct international financial assistance is either stopped or not getting through because banks fear legal repercussions in the US--may well be the reason for the PA not being any longer in a position to carry out its functions.

The notion of a possible collapse is symptomatic of much bigger problems that endanger the peace process and the eventual implementation of the two-state solution. Is this not the legacy of an unresolved conflict, a "ceasefire" that never turned into peace? Are we witnessing the transformation of a protracted conflict into a frozen conflict?

Peace-building theory aside, the real question is: what do the parties and the international community want to see happening in the Middle East in the long run? Is it the implementation of the two-state solution? Is it something else? Will it be something else by sheer default? Only when we have an answer to this fundamental question will we know the value of the PA, and begin to understand the consequences of a collapsing PA.

Do we actually still need the PA? Is it not a last remnant of the discredited Oslo-process? The PA has been the most important provider of key services to Palestinians but has also been the governing body--the authority--in the Palestinian territory. Some may think that it has performed badly; nevertheless, this is the first time Palestinians have been responsible for a wide range of governmental affairs. They have been the interlocutor for the international community and efforts have been made to coordinate donor activities against the needs of the Palestinian people as expressed in the various development and reform plans drawn up by the PA. Again, some will say it was not enough or that it was badly implemented. The point is, however, that the PA as an institution has been performing an important job in governance and state-building.

In recent years, the PA as an institution has also achieved remarkable progress in financial transparency and accountability. With the collapse of the PA these achievements will be lost. Setting up different accounts, not any longer using the Single Treasury Account, channelling funds via routes that are less transparent--are all potentially a step backwards, with all its security implications.

Who will pursue the task of institution-building and preparing for statehood? The end of the PA will be the signal that Palestinian public institutions and the political aspiration of statehood are no longer, or at least not for the foreseeable future, feasible. It will be an admission of failure.

The real dilemma is that the collapse of the PA, including its civil service and security components, is seen by many as a way of removing the PA's political echelon from power. This would mean, however, that yet again more importance is being attributed to the incumbents of an institution than to the institution itself. At the same time, the majority of Palestinians believe that their government should act responsibly; after all, that is the reason they elected it. But this means that the Hamas-led government, like any other responsible government, will have to end violence, uphold law and order and abide by agreements the previous government concluded with Israel or with the international community.

If the PA collapses what will replace it? Will we see the return of the Civil Administration? Given Israel's current policy of disengagement, this is not a likely scenario. Will the international community move in? There are attempts underway to maintain key services, but this is only a temporary and limited approach to alleviate hardship for the Palestinian people. Will Arab neighbors take over? Again, not a likely scenario.

If the PA disappears, perhaps we can start all over again, and do it the right way by addressing the causes of the conflict and by helping build democratic and well-functioning institutions rather than supporting individuals. Yes, we can go back to the drawing board, try to reinvent the PA or something similar that will exercise government-like functions for Palestinians and serve as interlocutor with Israel and the international community. We may find, however, that the political environment has changed, that the proverbial window of opportunity is closed. And we will have to admit that 12 years of efforts to build Palestinian institutions were wasted and, far worse, that too many people died in a political experiment that has gone wrong.- Published 1/6/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


Christian Berger is European Commission representative in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Previously he served as EU representative on the team of Quartet Special Envoy James Wolfensohn, and was responsible for crisis response and peace-building in the European Commission. This article reflects his personal views and not necessarily those of the European Commission.

Much ink has been spilled over the question of the collapse of the Hamas-led Palestinian government. Should the United States concert all its energy toward causing a collapse? Must the international community, its collective heartstrings stretched by the prospect of a humanitarian crisis, avert a collapse with a cash infusion? What will it mean for the War on Terror? The dream of a two-state solution?

But what exactly is "collapse" and what will it mean? Hamas, the political group in control of the Palestinian Authority is already in fiscal crisis. Hamas, the terrorist organization, appears to be doing well. Hamas (government) doesn't have money to pay salaries. Hamas (terrorist group) has sufficient resources to re-equip and arm a 3,000-man militia in Gaza. Therefore, it is safe to assume that whatever collapse observers believe could be imminent is unlikely to affect the agenda of the terror group Hamas--to eradicate the State of Israel.

Second, collapse could mean the dissolution of civil society: riots, demonstrations, factional warfare in the streets. Fateh and Hamas have begun their own campaigns of targeted killings. But will that mean the government falls? Will there be new elections? A trusteeship? Confederation with Jordan?

Answers to these questions are not incidental to the formulation of policy. Because, of course, an election would merely reinstall Hamas, which won overwhelmingly the last time. A trusteeship should be inconceivable--an anachronism in this day and age; certainly, in the wake of the disastrous American attempt to govern Iraq, Washington should wash its hands of any such idea. A confederation, an idea enjoying a resurgence lately, would be resisted by Jordan's Hashemite ruler as a death knell.

Some have suggested that pushing Hamas toward "collapse" or merely isolating it to the point of political impotence will empower Fateh's Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president. Abbas, a weak-kneed leader with a lengthy track record of failure, looks pretty good next to Ismail Haniyeh, the hardline Hamas prime minister.

In addition, Abbas' lost convictions appear to have returned in recent months. He has thrown his weight behind the Palestinian National Accord, a vague quasi-endorsement of the two-state solution issued by Palestinian prisoners. Indeed, he has even threatened to call a referendum on the question if the government does not sign up. In addition, Abbas is planning to meet with new Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, and has declared a willingness to negotiate directly with Israel.

The fact that the Palestinian president has no power to deliver to Israel (or to the Palestinian people, if their election results are any indication) has not deterred ardent peace processors. But making peace with powerless partners is ridiculous, and Israel is unlikely to be enticed down such a dead-end road.

As far as the United States is concerned, the law is clear. Aid to the Palestinians has been sharply curtailed. Thus far, the Bush administration has held firmly to its demand that Hamas recognize Israel's right to exist and renounce violence. But in the months since Hamas' victory, Washington's allies have proven less steadfast. The European Union is itching to resume payments to the Palestinian Authority, including some government employees' salaries. The US Department of State, unenthused about the salaries, is nonetheless pondering a pool of "humanitarian" aid.

This is nothing short of capitulation. Aid funneled through an international fund will not be subject to US congressional restrictions. It will immediately lift pressure on the Hamas government. It will free money for state terror. Too cruel?

Though the Palestinians were until recently the world's number one beneficiary of per capita aid, an end to international assistance is indeed harsh. But let us recall that the Palestinian people freely and overwhelming elected Hamas. This was not (though some may quibble) an act of God. Hamas too has a choice; these consequences can be averted through the simple and customary expedient of recognizing the agreements forged by past governments, and acknowledging Israel's right to exist and renouncing violence. We cannot force this choice on Hamas, but its constituents can.

If this is still more than some can stomach, consider the rest of the world. For how long did the people of Darfur languish and die before nations rebooted their collective conscience? How much aid flowed to the Afghans when they were crushed by the Taliban?

The Palestinian people and their government have choices to make. They will live with the consequences of those choices. Israel, too, must decide whether to divorce itself from the West Bank and Gaza, recognizing that what may be over the fence is a terrorist state. But the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, whatever that means, will not end the terrorism, nor will cash handouts.

The Palestinians must decide the way forward for themselves. And no amount of cajoling, strategizing or talking can change this most basic fact. The United States should support moderate parties, and encourage pluralistic democracy. But at the end of the day, Washington can only hold open the door to peace and freedom; no one can be forced to walk through.- Published 1/6/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org



Danielle Pletka is vice president of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute.

At the height of the second intifada, in October 2002, I was one of those who called publicly upon the Palestinian National Authority to dissolve itself. At the time, it seemed to me that the PNA's legitimacy was being undermined by two opposing forces: Hamas and the other radical movements, Islamic and non-Islamic; and Israel.

The first made it impossible for the PNA to fulfill its obligations under Palestinian-Israeli agreements for preventing the use of force against Israel, whether through terrorism or resistance. The second, by building settlements and reoccupying Palestinian territories, made it impossible for the PNA to be the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It was one of those ironies of history in which two arch enemies work in unison to achieve the same strategic goal: ending the possibility of a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli question.

My appeal at the time was meant to affirm that the Oslo process had in practice come to an end. Israel, the international community and the different Palestinian forces, including Hamas, would once again face the same strategic choices they had encountered before the Oslo process was launched.

Yet the PNA, having failed in substance, nevertheless remained resilient in form. Whether under the leadership of Yasser Arafat or Mahmoud Abbas, the PNA lost its powers to manage both Palestinian lives and the Palestinian cause. The Israeli propensity for unilateral steps, including building the separation wall, and the success of Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary elections opened the door for a fundamentally new Palestinian situation: the PNA, built upon the legitimacy of the Oslo process, is now led by a force that is in total opposition to this process. In fact, as Hamas became the leader of the Palestinian people not only did the Oslo process come into question and not only was the two-state solution put to a test, but the entire peaceful approach to the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict may have reached its end.

Fortunately, this is not the only development. The Palestinian people have continued to support the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Fateh and the majority of the Palestinian political forces continue to believe in the two-state solution to the Palestinian historical calamity. As a result, a classic contradiction between national goals and sources of legitimacy has evolved in Palestinian society. The current climate of severe economic distress, siege of the Palestinian polity, isolation from the outside world, dissemination of arms among all factions and highly weakened forces of law and order are all ingredients of chaos and possible civil war. The signs are already there in the latest clashes between Hamas and Fateh forces, the deployment of organized Hamas security groups and their forced withdrawal at the hands of mainly Fateh security forces.

The emergence of a possible Somalia-like situation in the Palestinian territories is of great concern to Egypt. The declaration by the Egyptian Ministry of Interior about the training and financing of the recent terrorist operation in the Sinai resort town of Dhahab by Qaeda groups in Gaza bespeaks more to come in the event of a total collapse of the PNA. This collapse, in turn, would make the Palestinian territories a hotbed of regional terrorism, with links to Iraqi Qaeda groups and with Iranian revolutionary meddling. Chaos in Palestine would threaten Egyptian national security with terrorism, drug trafficking and regional instability.

Of no less importance, the entire regional peace build-up that Egypt helped to create over the past three decades would become severely vulnerable. Confrontation with Israel would be part of Palestinian chaos; this was the case during the civil war in Lebanon. Israeli use of force, based on past experience would be excessive, and would put Egyptian Arab responsibilities to a test that Egypt has always tried to avoid. The possible extension of the Palestinian chaos into Jordan would not only jeopardize the Jordanian-Israeli peace, but could extend the violence to the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese borders as well.

In reality, the collapse of the PNA would not only end any Palestinian political option for Israel but would also put an end to the role that the PLO has played in Arab political and diplomatic circles. As the main PLO personalities would be involved in a bloody confrontation in the Palestinian territories, it would be very difficult for the remaining leadership in Tunis, without Arafat this time, to lead the Palestinian people.

Nature would be taking its course in "Palestine", where reason lost its way and the principal actors failed to realize that order, as bad as it might be, is much better than chaos.- Published 1/6/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


Abdel Monem Said Aly is a writer and political analyst at Al Ahram newspaper in Cairo.