BI: Palestinian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Zahar has apparently been successful in securing funding from the Arab world. Is this evidence of strong support from the Arab world for the Palestinian government?

Hamad: I think, until now, the Arab position, on official and governmental levels, has been good. Arab governments have shown themselves willing and prepared to cooperate with and support and fund the Palestinian government without political preconditions.

Zahar has said he felt very welcome in the countries he has visited so far. I think he was very pleased with the results he achieved.

BI: The Arab League met recently and agreed to continue to fund the Palestinian Authority but didn't raise the level of funding. Was this a cause for disappointment?

Hamad: We've compensated with donations from individual countries, the last one being Libya, which agreed to pay $50 million. In addition, many countries have donated in other ways, with projects in the health, education and agricultural spheres. We've found a wide level of cooperation and support.

I think if we add up all the money from these countries we should be able to pay the salaries for this and next month and have our ministries back up and working.

BI: But is this sustainable in the long run?

Hamad: No, but we don't want to rely on donations, whether from the Arab world or the West, in the long run. We have a strategic plan to push the economy forward and we've been talking to Arab officials about exports, imports, about the crossings and investments as well as how to encourage small industries in several fields including agriculture.

We also have a program to combat corruption and clamp down on tax evasion. There are many ways in which we can improve the economy.

But in the short term, we need donations to keep things afloat. We inherited a very bad situation.

BI: Some Arab governments have urged the Palestinian government to adopt the Saudi [Arab] peace initiative. What has the government's response been?

Hamad: Some countries have advised us to adopt the Arab initiative but it has never been posited as a condition or a price to pay for funding. These countries say that, even if the initiative was rejected by Israel, to accept it would help open doors for us and bring us fully under the Arab umbrella and gain support from all Arab countries.

It is something we will take into consideration. We don't want to put all our cards on the table and we don't want to give Israel something for free. Let's not forget that Israel rejected the roadmap as well as the Arab initiative. This government will discuss all initiatives, whether from the Arab world, from the outside or inside, and we are ready to explore our options. But we do not want to take a decision under pressure or because we are being blackmailed.

BI: Last month there was a problem regarding alleged weapon smuggling in Jordan. Have relations with Jordan been repaired?

Hamad: There are efforts from here and from Jordan and now Sudan, which has said it will intervene to bring the leaders of Hamas and Jordan together to discuss and solve this problem.

The Palestinian government wants to strengthen our relations with Jordan. There is a historical relationship between Jordan and Palestine and we want to maintain this relationship. We have also underlined to the Jordanian government that Hamas is not interested in using Jordanian territory for any ulterior purposes and we are very concerned about maintaining the security and integrity of Jordan.

We need to talk to Jordan about last month's incident and maybe we will see mediation from the Sudanese government and some other parties.

BI: Hamas' is the first elected political Islamic government in the region. Do you feel Arab regimes are wary of Hamas' success because of the effect it might have on their internal politics?

Hamad: We have not heard from any Arab country of any such fears. All governments we have spoken to have shown support. I think they've found that we are moderate, we are pragmatic and we are open-minded. Maybe some countries have sensitivities on this point, but I think we've made it clear--and they are convinced--that we are not a danger to any Arab regime.

On the contrary, we can help improve security and promote peace in the region. We hope to build a new model for Islamic movements that all Islamic political movements in the region can look to. We hope these movements will be convinced that the best way to reach positions of power is through democratic elections and through peaceful means rather than by radical action.

This government can build bridges not only between Islamic political movements and Arab governments but between political Islam and the West. I think this is a golden opportunity for Arab countries and the West to see that Hamas and this government can play an important role in the stability and security of this region. -Published 4/5/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


Ghazi Hamad is a Hamas official from the Gaza Strip.

Hamas' success in the Palestinian legislative elections last January was not a happy surprise for decision-makers in Jordan. They did not expect the Islamic movement in Palestine to attain a majority sufficient for the formation of its own government in the Palestinian Authority. If the initial and official reaction was cautious and confused, observers believe that Amman has good reasons to be worried about the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine reaching a leadership position.

One of these reasons is the relationship between Jordan and Hamas, which since the closure of Hamas' offices in Amman and the expulsion of its leaders in 1999 has become problematic, with the efforts of Jordanian and Arab parties failing to narrow the gap between the two sides. They are in total contradiction over the peace process: Jordan is leading the camp supporting this process, while Hamas has led the opposition since the process was launched in Madrid, developed at Oslo and evolved into the roadmap and its vision of a two-state solution.

Jordanian diplomacy fears that Hamas' ascent to leadership in Palestine has weakened the chances of reviving a peace process that in any event has been in the intensive care unit for about six years. This could have drastic ramifications for Jordan's security, stability and interests.

Jordanian political quarters do not hide their concern over the spread of unilateral tendencies on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides of the conflict. Jordanian officials argue that Israeli unilateralism has generated the Palestinian unilateral tendency embodied in the Hamas movement, and that the big loser from this exchange of unilateral moves is the peace process and the two-state vision.

From the perspective of Jordanian interests as defined by decision-makers in Amman, any solution for the Palestinian issue that does not end in the establishment of a viable Palestinian state would in the end affect Jordan's interests and stability and open the door for developments that are detrimental to Jordan.

Jordan has demographic and political considerations that generate concern over the domestic effect of the Hamas victory: at least half of Jordan's citizens are of Palestinian origin, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and its political arm, the Islamic Action Front party, are considered a major force with special influence in the refugee camps and urban quarters with a Palestinian majority.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan became more self-confident after Hamas won the elections. Some of its leaders have abandoned their long-standing focus on mere parliamentary participation and aspire to obtain a majority or form a government. For example, the chief of the Islamic Action Front's parliamentary bloc stated that his party will be qualified to form the government after getting a majority of seats in the coming elections. This has provoked a strong reaction by the government and by writers and journalists who usually express the official line.

As a result of these developments, some Jordanian political quarters have in recent months become concerned over the government's slow progress in realizing parts of the political reform program that it promised to launch and encourage. Some parties and activists in the political reform and human rights fields fear that attempts to install a new elections law for next year will fail in light of lessons drawn from the Palestinian and Egyptian experiences.

Most recently, relations between Jordan and Hamas declined even further following the revelation by a government spokesman that a cell related to the movement was engaged in smuggling arms and explosives and storing them in Jordan, and had been reconnoitering key Jordanian installations and figures. This happened only a few hours before the planned arrival of Dr. Mahmoud Al-Zahhar, Palestinian Authority foreign minister, on his first visit to Amman since assuming his duties. The affair caused shock and disbelief among a large sector of the Jordanian public and raised a controversy that still rages.

Those who suspect the veracity of the official report rely on the fact that Hamas, since its establishment, has not committed any armed action outside Palestine and Israel. They argue that a movement that has been committed to a ceasefire with Israel for more than a year would hardly contemplate carrying out military acts against Jordanian figures and institutions, particularly at a time of intensifying isolation and blockade, and when the movement is concentrating on getting through the crisis in its relations with both the Arab and international communities.

After it was confirmed to many observers that the Jordanian security establishment did in fact arrest a cell working on behalf of Hamas, it was hypothesized that Hamas might have been infiltrated by the intelligence establishment in Damascus and Iran or that some of the movement's cells were working on behalf of Shi'ite or Salafi extremist Islamic groups.

As government quarters acknowledged the difficulty of convincing most of the public of the truth of the report, those still suspicious of its veracity speculated that its aim exceeded merely delaying the Zahhar visit to Amman until further notice. They postulated that the accusation that Hamas was targeting Jordanian national security constituted a message both for domestic and American consumption, with the United States, which is leading a broad pressure campaign to isolate Hamas, being thus informed that Jordan is distancing itself from the Islamic movement.

Against the backdrop of these open accusations toward Hamas, Jordan did not hesitate to declare that it would limit its political cooperation to that with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. The same attitude was adopted by Egyptian President Husni Mubarak at the Aqaba summit between the two leaders a few days ago. Both Jordan and Egypt clearly expressed their dissatisfaction with Hamas' extremism regarding the peace process as well as with Israeli unilateralism. Both undertook to deal with the Israeli prime minister and the Palestinian president according to the roadmap and President Bush's vision of two states for two peoples.- Published 4/5/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


Oraib Al-Rantawi is director of Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, Amman.

Hamas' victory in the recent Palestinian Legislative Council elections came as a big surprise for all interested parties. The surprise was not a happy one, except in Tehran and Damascus where the Hamas achievement was perceived as a consolidation of the anti-US camp in the Middle East.

For Egypt, the Hamas victory challenges its policy in Palestine. For years, Egypt has been playing the role of the main regional sponsor of the Palestinian National Authority and Fateh. With a Hamas-led government, Egypt's role in Palestine faces a major challenge. The strong working relationship between Egypt and the PNA is in jeopardy. The value of Egypt's political investment in Palestine, particularly during the preparation for the Israeli pullout from Gaza, needs to be reassessed.

The Hamas victory is a reason for concern but not panic in Cairo. Over the years, Egypt has developed functioning working relations with Hamas. Egypt has negotiated and sponsored the current tahdia ("calm") with Hamas, which should get credit for observing the terms of the tahdia against tempting, and sometimes adverse, circumstances. Nor does Hamas' victory alter the basic geostrategic realities. A Palestinian government, whether led by Fateh or Hamas, needs to win the cooperation of Egypt as its main channel to the outside world. An isolated Hamas government in particular is not likely to risk losing this. In a word, geography and politics place a Palestinian government, regardless of ideology, in dire need of Cairo's cooperation.

Egypt, a country that has long dealt with the ideological and political tides of the Middle East, believes that the hard realities of the Arab-Israel conflict can generate surprising transformations among ideology-driven actors. A country that led the radical Arab states for years believes in the power of reality more than anybody else. The conventional wisdom in Cairo is that, given the proper chance and sufficient time, Hamas will learn how to adjust to reality. To bring about the needed changes, a proper mix of incentives and pressures should be applied. It is necessary, however, to administer this mix cleverly, so that the required adjustments in Hamas' positions are engendered without risking unneeded escalation.

Moreover, the Egyptian leadership believes the Hamas hardliners in power could give peace in the Middle East a precious opportunity. After the disappearance of Arafat, credible leadership is needed if a negotiated final status agreement is to be reached. Fateh's decline does not permit it to provide the required leadership. Moreover, a leadership with a credible hard-line legacy is better equipped to sign a peace agreement that might otherwise be labeled a sell-out.

A more moderate Hamas position could bring tremendous positive changes to Middle Eastern politics. The Palestinian question has for years been the most important engine for the radicalization of the Arab and Muslim public. Previous peace agreements were not very helpful in containing the rising radicalism in the region. A peace deal cut by the radical Islamic Hamas could be instrumental in taking the wind out of the radicals' sails. The defusing of the Palestinian problem by a radical Islamic movement should grant the Middle East badly needed breathing room to give moderation a chance.

Coordinating Egyptian policy toward Hamas with other Arab states is important. Hamas should hear the same message in all Arab capitals. In particular, a coordinated policy among Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan could provide the leadership for a common Arab policy toward Hamas. Within this framework, the Arab League can help soften Hamas' positions; in particular, it can provide a face-saving venue for a more moderate Hamas to emerge.

Egyptian policy should be closely coordinated with the new government in Israel. While Israeli objections to dealing with a Hamas-led Palestinian government are understandable, Egypt is not at ease with the Israeli plan for a unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank. The new Israeli government is expected to allow sufficient time before launching its unilateral pullout: implicit reciprocity with Hamas' evolving positions would be instrumental in bringing about further changes in Hamas policy.

The Hamas victory should not put an end to the diplomatic process. To the contrary, a revitalized peace diplomacy could facilitate the needed changes in Hamas' positions. This is the message Egypt is now trying to market among the members of the Quartet. A Quartet initiative could be useful for all parties, without any individual party being liable to specific costs. Stronger commitments from the concerned parties would follow--when Hamas shows more solid signs of change.- Published 4/5/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Gamal A.G. Soltan is senior research fellow at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS) and the editor of the center's monthly Strategic Papers.