Edition 13 Volume 1 - October 03, 2003
Perceptions of the United States
• Israel and the US: the complexities of asymmetric dependence -
byGerald M. Steinberg
This relationship has costs and some limitations.
• More angry than you can imagine -
an interview withMohammed Abu Roudeina
You can say no to the Security Council, but not to the United States.
• Turkish-American relations and the war on terror -
byErsin Kalaycioglu
The US was callous
toward Turkish sensitivities
regarding Iraq.
• A model for the region -
an interview withSalameh Nematt
If the western world does not approach a problem and solve it, it will come back to haunt them.
Israel and the US: the complexities of asymmetric dependence
by Gerald M. Steinberg Attitudes in Israel towards the United States, its primary ally, are generally very positive. However, at a deeper level, the relationship is more complex, reflecting both its centrality and its intricacy.
For the most part, Israelis view the US with a combination of admiration and appreciation. Just as polls reflect the dominant American view of Israel as a fellow democracy, facing similar security threats, including terror and weapons of mass destruction, Israelis see the US as the major source of understanding in the world. America is perceived as more consistent and uncompromising than Europe in supporting the principles of democracy and freedom, and in its commitment to the survival and security of Israel. While there are some differences, this highly unusual relationship encompasses Democrats and Republicans, as well as the White House and Congress.
The sense of shared destiny was reinforced by the mass terror attacks of 9/11 against the US and Palestinian bombings in Israel. America's military response in Afghanistan, the policy of targeting killings against terror leaders, and removal of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq by force were widely applauded in Israel, and not only by those who share the neo-conservative principles of the current Bush administration.
However, many Israelis also understand that this relationship has costs and some limitations. The goal of political Zionism and the restoration of Jewish sovereignty as embodied in the State of Israel was to end the dependence of 2000 years of exile and dispersion. Thus, reliance on outside powers, including the US, is seen by some as reflecting a reduced level of independence. If America were to falter and lose its superpower status, or turn inward in another cycle of isolationism, Israel would pay a major price. As a result, while sustaining close relations with Washington, Israeli leaders have been careful to maintain insurance policies, including an independent strategic deterrent capability. (On this central issue, Israeli leaders have consistently rejected US pressure.)
This close identification also makes it difficult for Israeli leaders to act independently and dissent from US policies and actions. During Cold War crises, Israel had little choice but to support the Americans, which increased hostility from the Soviet Union and severed links with its large Jewish population. During the Reagan administration, Israel was recruited to participate in the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars"), in part in order to influence the political debate in the US. Given the immense power and influence of the US, expression of official disagreement, when it exists, is very difficult.
In addition, the highly asymmetric nature of the relationship allows the US to exert a major influence on Israeli security policy, economics, and other issues. The Eisenhower administration demanded Israeli withdrawal from Sinai without a political agreement following the 1956 Suez war, and in 1970, Israeli protests regarding Egyptian violations of the ceasefire terms were suppressed. Later, Henry Kissinger's threat to "reassess" the relationship (including military aid) and President Carter's attempts to use economic and political leverage to gain concessions from Prime Minister Begin at Camp David also illustrate the friction and pressure. Conflicts took place between the first Bush administration and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (1991-2) over linking US loan guarantees to settlement policy, and the current negotiations with Washington involving the route of the separation fence provide a further example of the costs of dependence.
In response, Israelis from different parts of the political and ideological spectrum call periodically for reducing economic and defense dependence on Washington. On the right, the criticism focuses on American pressure on Israel to act with restraint in response to terrorism, and on US objections to Israeli settlement policy. The US is blamed for creating the conditions in which the disastrous Oslo process was conceived and maintained, and for influencing Israeli elections, including in 1992 when Yitzhak Rabin defeated Shamir. In addition, the current Bush administration is criticized for bowing to British leader Tony Blair and imposing the ill-conceived roadmap, and for the fraudulent ceasefire that allowed terror groups to restore their capabilities.
In contrast, the Israeli left shares much of Europe's criticism of the neo-conservative policies of the current administration. US pressure is sometimes blamed for encouraging the adoption of the free-market approach in which government support for social services is reduced, including drastic reductions in budgets for health and education. There was also some opposition to the American decision to initiate the 2003 Iraq war, fearing increased regional confrontation at Israel's expense.
However, for most Israelis, the US remains a vital source of political, military, economic and moral support, as highlighted in vetoes of anti-Israel resolutions in the United Nations and agreement on core issues. As a result, Israeli policy makers are likely to continue to avoid conflict with the US, and, where differences exist, to seek to resolve them through persuasion rather than confrontation.-Published 2/10/2003©bitterlemons-international.org
Gerald M. Steinberg is the founder and president of NGO Monitor and professor of political science at Bar Ilan University.
More angry than you can imagine
an interview with Mohammed Abu RoudeinaBI: Please tell us who you are and about your court case against members of the Israeli government.
Abu Roudeina: I am 26 years old. I was born in Shatilla Camp in Lebanon. I am a college student and I work during summer vacation. During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in [1982], when the Israelis surrounded our camp, they committed a massacre in the camp, led by Ariel Sharon, Israel's [current] prime minister and his troops; and Effi Eitam, the Israeli chief of staff; and the head of the Lebanese forces, Elia Hobeika.
At the time of the massacre, my father and mother and my sister and I left our own house because the shelling and shooting in the entire flat was bad and they were afraid that we would get shot. So we first went to our neighbor's house and stayed there for a while. Then they [armed men] surrounded the house and started to shoot at the house. Then they went upstairs and began to break the furniture. After that, they came down to where we were and separated the men from the women and told us that we [the women and children] had to leave immediately and go to the Sports Center [a nearby stadium] where we would be interrogated by an Israeli officer. Before we left, one of my uncles and his daughter were killed. We walked past many dead bodies.
BI: Is it your understanding that the United States has pressured Belgium to drop the case against those who carried out the killings?
Abu Roudeina: Absolutely. [US defense minister] Donald Rumsfeld told Belgium to cancel its law [against war crimes], or the United States would pull Belgium's NATO membership. I am pretty sure that Belgium will submit to American power because nobody says no to the United States. You can say no to the Security Council, but not to the United States.
In any case, we know that God is the only source of justice. Islam produces justice.
We are extremely disappointed right now, because America's power has changed the world. After September 11, the United States wanted to show that it is the only power and world leader. The United Nations and the Security Council are dead. The rest of the world is dead. The only thing left living is the United States. For one, I am not convinced that justice exists in these days.
BI: What exactly are you and the other plaintiffs asking for?
Abu Roudeina: We were taken to Belgium to give our testimony against Sharon and the others who committed this massacre, but we haven't gotten anywhere. When I went, I thought that at least we might be able to [draw attention] to the fact that Sharon is a war criminal, but we didn't even succeed in that.
We are seeking justice and to go back to our country. I am originally from Haifa; my family left [what is now Israel] in 1948. To expel us like that from our country was a crime. We have the right to return to our land according to United Nations Resolution 194.
In the West, there is near mindless support for Israel and against the Palestinian people--people who are just trying to live in peace. We agree that suicide bombing is not acceptable; there is dispute among Palestinians over this issue. But what Palestinians need is justice. All of the United Nations resolutions were implemented in Iraq, but not in Israel. Why? Is Israel above the law? No, it is because America is supporting Israel.
BI: If you could speak to the average American, what would you say?
Abu Roudeina: I would tell them that we want them to support justice. We are not against the American people, we are opposed to the American administration and we are against the lies that your administration is telling you. What happened in September 11 is, of course, terrorism, but what happened to us was much worse. We are now millions without a country. What the US is doing to us against the law. You are doing everything possible to bring Israel to the top and to shut the rest of us up.
What we need right now is for the Americans to right their policy, not to take the same hard-line, and not to re-elect President Bush, because this man is destroying the world. He is giving the Americans a bad name.
The American people need to understand that we are not terrorists by nature. When these people blow themselves up in the street, this is an act against God. But it is frustration that makes people carry out such an act.
BI: Are you angry at US policy?
Abu Roudeina: I am very angry--more angry than you can imagine.-Published 2/10/03©bitterlemons-international.org
Mohammed Abu Roudeina lost his father, his sister, and four other members of his family in the massacre carried out in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, Sabra and Shatilla. He lives in Lebanon and is a plaintiff in the war crimes case being pursued in the Belgian court system.
Turkish-American relations and the war on terror
by Ersin KalayciogluTurkey is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization member with a Muslim population of 70 million that has coped successfully with ethno-religious terror since the 1980s. Turkey is also a democracy with an industrializing free market economy.
These credentials have contributed to Turkey's emergence as a strategic ally of the United States in the “war on terror.” First and foremost, getting Turkish support for the fight against terror helps to paint an image of the US as fighting terror, not Muslims. Secondly, Turkey can be presented as a “model” to Muslim societies. Turkey also hopes to benefit from the enhanced emphasis on terrorism in US foreign policy: the company of the sole superpower of the world has been welcomed as a major boon in Turkey’s own struggle against terror.
Only one Turkish citizen died in the tragic events of September 11, 2001. However, as a country that has suffered dearly from terror, Turkey showed great sympathy to the US. There was no major protest against the idea of sending Turkish troops to Afghanistan, as the Turkish government wholeheartedly supported the US struggle there. Consequently, once the Karzai government was established, Turkey dispatched troops to keep the peace that had been established by the US-led forces, in an operation that turned out to be quite a success.
However, when the US started to organize a military campaign against Iraq, Turkish-US relations became severely strained. First of all, Turkish intelligence sources reported that Saddam Hussein's Ba’athist regime in Iraq was failing to muster much military power. Second, Turkey assumed that if the Ba’athists were removed from power, two dire developments would follow. Iraq lacks a “state-idea” that fosters national integration; thus Iraq is no more than a collection of tribes and religious communities united under a flag by British imperial policies and oil interests of the 1920s. Hence, once the Ba’athists were removed from power, Iraq might fragment to pieces. Consequently, the northern Kurdish tribes would try to establish their independence, and the majority Shi’ites would try to control the new Iraqi government and eventually forge an alliance with Shi’ite Iran.
Thus Turkey feared that new political entities would emerge to threaten the security of the Middle East and Turkey. In turn, the US was callous toward Turkish sensitivities regarding Iraq. It seemed as if the Bush administration planned to treat the Kurdish tribes as their “allies” in Iraq (just as they had treated the northern tribes of Afghanistan).
Turkey's worst fears now seem to be materializing. US authorities have proven incapable of preventing Iraq from turning into a shooting gallery for those who have been itching to attack them. The Kurds seem to have earned de facto autonomy. The Shi’ites have been thrown into a state of turbulence. As the Kurds were permitted to keep their weapons, the Shi’ite and Sunni Arabs, the Turkmen and other communities have also started to arm themselves. No central authority with effective power, no national legislature, and no national army seem to have emerged from the mess created so far.
Finally, the PKK/KADEK (the principal Turkish Kurdish terrorist group; KADEK is a recent designation for the PKK), which is still perceived as a threat by the Turkish government, seems to enjoy immunity from the measures imposed upon some terror groups, such as Ansar al Islam or the Iranian opposition. Under the circumstances, Turkey is getting the impression that the US has started to apply a double standard in its war against terror. Differentiating between America's terrorists (al Qaeda), and Turkey’s terrorists (PKK/KADEK) bodes ill for the US declaration of war on global terror. The US loses credibility in the eyes of the Turkish elites and masses alike. US policy dangerously approaches combating only “political Islam” as terrorism; if ill managed, this campaign could easily be perceived as a “crusade” against pious Muslims. The US war on Iraq is also perceived as more of a personal vendetta by President George W. Bush, and as the unfolding of neo-conservative plans for empire building. The Turkish public does not appear to agree to sending troops to Iraq, except perhaps to northern Iraq.
Finally, pious Sunni Muslims in Turkey appear to perceive the US as united with Israel in attacking Muslim Arabs, and further believe that eventually the US will attack other Muslims, including the Turks. In the eyes of others, the US appears to have become an unreliable global power, set upon redesigning the Middle East according to its own neo-conservative image, without heeding the egregious consequences that may emanate from such an image for its own allies in the region.
It is ironic that now Turks seem to perceive the US as being part of the problem rather than the solution in the Middle East. For up until now, the US was considered the sole provider of solutions for conflicts in the Balkans, Central Asia, and elsewhere.-Published 2/10/2003©bitterlemons-international.org
Ersin Kalaycioglu is full professor of political science at Sabanci University, Istanbul, specializing in comparative politics with special emphasis on Middle Eastern and Turkish politics.
A model for the region
an interview with Salameh NemattBI: How would you assess recent United States foreign policy successes and failures?
Nematt: I think that in the long run what the United States did in Iraq is of historic proportions, at least in the Middle East region. There is no question that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was a major achievement and a very important message to other dictatorships and regimes in the region. Americans don't see the value of that, because they take their freedoms for granted. But from a Middle Eastern perspective, this is very important.
The problem is that there is a lot of confusion as to what the United States is trying to do, and skepticism as to the motives of the US action. From my perspective, regardless of what the main motives are, I believe that the war in Iraq, and even the war in Afghanistan, had more to do with securing strategic US interests and energy interests than anything else. But the most important thing is the outcome: we got rid of one dictatorship. This is bound to be good for the people. Nobody can argue that keeping a dictatorship is better than getting rid of it.
We are already seeing, only a couple of months after the downfall of the Iraqi regime, 100 to 120 newspapers publishing there, which is unheard of. These newspapers don't need licensing from any authority. This has never happened before in the Arab world. Most governments just manipulate the media and make sure that no one can publish or broadcast anything without permission or official control.
And I think that, as time goes by, the situation will be resolved in Iraq. Those who are fighting to make the American project fail are bound to realize that because they don't have the support of the majority of the Iraqi people, they will fail. The sooner the Americans hand over control to the Iraqis the better. They [the Iraqis] know the trouble and know how to handle it.
BI: What about the banning of Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya televisions stations by the Governing Council? How can the US mediate between controlling the situation, on the one hand, and on the other, allowing freedoms to take root?
Nematt: We have to understand that freedom and democracy do not mean allowing people to incite for murder. What Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera have been doing is providing a forum for unidentified terrorist groups to appear masked on TV and basically tell people to go and commit murder--just for the purpose of destruction. I think this act makes them partners in the crime, and I wouldn't call that journalism.
I think if these people are doing something legitimate, they would have a legitimate political representation who would then hold press conferences. There are many people inside and outside Iraq that oppose the US presence and oppose US policy and are saying it publicly. What [the Governing Council] did by banning these two channels for a period of several weeks from taping their official functions was to say that democracy and freedom of expression have their own rules and regulations.
BI: Being there in Washington, how do you see Americans experiencing their encounter with Iraq and the Middle East region?
Nematt: It is really unfortunate that there are many Americans who do not understand the importance of pursing this project in Iraq and the Middle East. What happened on September 11, and what happened in attacks on Europe should be a message that we can no longer live comfortably in free and democratic countries, while such big problems happen to our neighbors. If the western world does not approach a problem and solve it, it will come back to haunt them. Your neighbors are bound to hit back because they want the same that you have. It is a very complex dynamic that created these problems in the Middle East.
BI: What do you think are the key projects that the Americans can hope to "grow" in the Middle East?
Nematt: I think that the United States is not clear on what it wants to do, how it wants to transform the Middle East and what would be too intrusive. I think that Iraq is going to be a model for the region, other than Iraq acting aggressively to undermine other regimes. I believe that the media in Iraq is going to play an important role in exposing dictatorships in the region. There was an example of that in the late eighties when Jordan started a democratization process that had an effect on other countries in the region. The Kuwaiti's, after dissolving parliament, revised themselves. In Syria, which was threatened by the Jordanian democracy, Jordan television was banned and they really tried to shield themselves. The hope is that Iraq will be the next catalyst for democratization and I hope that it will have a much bigger impact on the region.
BI: Would you expect Iraq to make peace with Israel?
Nematt: Yes, I believe that Iraq is definitely going to move in that direction. The new Iraq is going to be a peaceful one and is going to play a central role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In that sense, Iraq will be taking a leadership position, at the expense of the Egyptian and Jordanian role.
Within four to five years, we will be looking at an Iraq that is dynamic and improving economically. There will continue to be problems related to the aftermath of war, but we are going to have a very influential Iraq. In five years time, we will begin to see a country that is taking its place in the region and backed by the United States and backed by Western democracies, Iraq is going to emerge as the superpower of the Arab world.-Published 2/10/03©bitterlemons-international
Salameh Nematt is a political analyst and communications strategist. He is the former Washington bureau chief for al-Hayat international daily newspaper, and former international editor of The Daily Beast.
|
All Rights Reserved