• Compromise still possible  - Ephraim Kam
Diplomatic pressure alone will apparently not stop Iran's nuclear activity.

• Turkish dilemmas  - Kemal Kirisci
The government hopes the EU will discourage the US from mounting a unilateral military strike.

• The US will act alone if it has to  - Joshua Muravchik
The confrontation between Iran and the United States over Iran's nuclear program is likely to end in US air strikes.

• The greater threat is US strikes  - an interview withNawaf Obaid
If it does go to armed conflict it will be one of the most foolish attempts yet to settle a problem in the region.

• Nuclear crisis  - Sadegh Zibakalam
This is Iran's most serious international crisis since the Islamic Revolution in 1979.

Compromise still possible
 Ephraim Kam

The United States and Iran appear to be heading toward a military clash over the issue of Iran's drive to obtain nuclear weaponry. In recent months, the US has stepped up its pressure on Iran in this regard. The Bush administration sees in Iran the most serious threat confronting it, and is committed to stopping Tehran's military nuclear effort. It has made clear that military measures are one of the options it is weighing, and has leaked details of military planning involving Iran in the event it decides to move in this direction.

In the course of the past three years, an American-European front opposing Iran has been created. It has brought about the publication of a series of reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency that level sharp criticism at Iran's behavior in the nuclear sphere; these have moved the issue to the UN Security Council.

Faced with these growing pressures, Iran is intransigent. Talks with the EU3 have ceased, and Iran has removed most IAEA inspection arrangements for its nuclear installations and restored full uranium enrichment activity. Indeed, it recently announced that it had succeeded in enriching uranium. While it has enriched only a small, low-grade quantity that is not suitable for developing nuclear weaponry, this nevertheless constitutes a substantive breakthrough: Iran now possesses the technology for enriching uranium independent of outside actors, and from herein it is mainly a question of time until it enriches uranium of military quality and in quantities sufficient for making a bomb. Throughout, Iran has demonstrated arrogance and insensitivity toward the international community.

Is an American military attack on Iran's nuclear installations now inevitable? Not necessarily. The Bush administration still attaches highest priority to diplomacy, and for several reasons. For one, there is still a chance to succeed diplomatically. Then too, even if the administration does resort to force, it is important first to exhaust the diplomatic option in order to lay the groundwork for a military one. Nor is the administration particularly enthusiastic about the military option.

But diplomatic pressure alone will apparently not stop Iran's nuclear activity. This will require, at a minimum, the application of significant and extended economic sanctions. Yet at this point there is no consensus regarding sanctions, primarily because Russia and China refuse to support them. Without the application of genuine economic pressure on Iran it will continue to advance toward nuclear weaponry, and will achieve that goal within--according to the generally accepted assessment--three or four years.

What are the likely main considerations in administration thinking concerning a military option against Iran? First, Washington views the scenario of a nuclear Iran with great concern because it would threaten America's most important interests in the Middle East. As the administration sees it, nuclear weaponry in Iran's hands would endanger its allies in the region, beginning with Israel and the Gulf states; enhance radical trends in the region and the Muslim world; create a threat to the flow of oil from the Gulf; contribute to a strengthening of Iranian influence in Iraq; and threaten regional stability.

Second, it is important to define the objectives of a military move if one is decided on. The administration would probably not opt for an extensive ground operation in Iran--certainly not after the imbroglio in Iraq. In contrast, a pinpoint, limited operation aimed at disabling Iranian nuclear installations would be complex and problematic and would require precise intelligence--but would have a reasonable chance of success. The US has the operational capability of executing such a mission even if it requires repeated sorties. A limited air operation using cruise missiles and precision-guided weaponry would not require the presence of American forces on Iranian territory, hence would involve few complications. Such an operation might not persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program, but it could set that program back for a significant period of time.

Third, the US evidently has no practical option for bringing about regime change in Iran. Neither a military operation nor subversion or propaganda would work. Conceivably, in the long term the regime in Tehran will change, but this will be the outcome of domestic dynamics rather than outside influence or intervention.

Fourth, it would be important for the US to obtain international backing for military action in order to reduce criticism. For the time being, European governments support sanctions against Iran but not military action; it is even less likely they would participate in a military strike. Still, in view of the arrogance with which Iran rejects their diplomatic efforts, quiet European tolerance of an American attack cannot be ruled out. In any event, considering that most of the international community, including Arab and Muslim governments, is concerned about Iran obtaining nuclear weapons, the US would be able to deal with criticism leveled at it following military action.

Finally, Iran is liable to take retaliatory action if the US attacks its nuclear installations. This could comprise attacks on American forces in the region, attempts to thwart American efforts in Iraq, attacks on US allies, including Israel, and the use of terrorism against American targets. Yet Iran's response is likely to be restrained and cautious so as to avoid military escalation with the US. Iran might also respond by disrupting the flow of oil from the Gulf, but probably not for long, since the US would likely use force to ensure that oil exports proceed. In any event, the US must take into consideration that military action is liable to send shock waves through the oil market.

An American military strike against Iran's nuclear installations, then, would involve both military and diplomatic difficulties. But these are issues that a superpower like the US can handle if it is convinced that the only way to stop the Iranian nuclear program is by military force.

Finally, the very existence of a military option has diplomatic ramifications. It could persuade Russia to agree to sanctions in order to prevent escalation. And it could pressure Iran into agreeing to freeze its nuclear activity precisely because it fears a military confrontation with the US. Accordingly, the combination of increased diplomatic pressure and the readying of a military option, accompanied by economic and technological inducements for Iran, could yet produce a compromise.- Published 27/4/2006 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Ephraim Kam is deputy head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. His book From Terror to Nuclear Bombs: The Significance of the Iranian Threat (Hebrew, 2004) looks at the issue in its broadest perspective.

Iranian-Turkish relations have come a long way since the days when an ideological conflict raged between the two countries. In the 1990s, relations were poor partly because Turkey was unstable. Iran was very good at exploiting both political Islam and the Kurdish problem in Turkey at a time when both constituted a threat to the regime in Ankara. Turkey in turn felt very vulnerable to Iranian interference. There was ample evidence of Iranian involvement in support of the PKK as well as Turkish Hizballah. This would now and then lead to serious conflicts between Iran and Turkey, including occasional border skirmishes.

Today the situation is very different. Turkey feels much more confident toward Iran both economically and politically. Iran is an important supplier of oil and gas to Turkey, while Turkey attributes great importance to expanding its exports to Iran and increasing the involvement of Turkish companies in the Iranian economy. Turkey continues to maintain a visa free travel policy toward Iranian nationals, attracting more than half a million Iranian visitors a year.

In confonting the new Ahmedinezhad-led government in Tehran, the major challenge for Turkey is how to ensure continuation of the kind of pragmatic relationship that developed between the countries during the reign of the previous president, Mohammad Khatami. Iranian nuclear policy is one important aspect of the issues that will have to be addressed, but there are also economic considerations. Iran constitutes a growing market that Turkey does not wish to lose; Ankara needs the income from trade to be able to finance its energy bill.

Dependence on Iranian natural gas is another aspect. This winter, the Turkish government got a taste of what this means when Iranian supplies were interrupted for a brief period. This coincided with difficulties in supplies from Russia. As a result, supplies to Turkish industry had to be cut for a couple of days, and the government came close several times to cutting gas supplies to households in the big cities precisely when snowstorms were raging. Hence vulnerability to energy supplies, particularly from Iran, constitutes another major factor that bears on Iranian-Turkish relations. There is also some concern that the new government in Iran may attempt to use its natural gas and oil as a political weapon. This is of course exacerbated by the international crisis over fears that Iran aims to acquire nuclear weapons.

Clearly, Turkish decision-makers are very much concerned about the "security" dimension of Iranian aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons. Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul has repeatedly pointed this out, and in the media there is an extensive debate about what Iranian nuclear weapons would mean for Turkish and regional security. In this regard, Turkish policy-makers also face the challenge of managing relations with an American administration that may opt for unilateral military intervention against Iran.

The Turkish government prefers to resolve the crisis over Iran through dialogue. It has a clear stake in such a resolution: it fears both the economic and political consequences of sanctions as well as an eventual military intervention of a unilateral or even multilateral nature. After all, Turkish decision-makers and the Turkish public had first-hand experience of the economic and political ramifications of UN military intervention against Iraq in 1991, sanctions against Iraq during the 1990s and then the unilateral US intervention against Saddam Hussein. The government has made it clear that it would not support any unilateral policy initiatives, especially of a military nature.

The scenario most loathed is an American unilateral intervention that is accompanied by tremendous pressure on Turkey to cooperate. This would leave any government in Ankara in a pretty impossible situation.

First, the current government would have to be sensitive to its constituency's solidarity with yet another Muslim country coming under attack. Given the situation in Iraq, Turkish public opinion would view any unilateral intervention as "imperialism", pure and simple. Second, a military intervention would inevitably push oil prices to astronomical levels, with dire consequences for the Turkish economy, whose performance so far is one of the current government's strong points. Third, the entire region would risk being thrown into an even deeper political turmoil that could have serious consequences for Turkish democracy and reform. Fourth, no Turkish government would want to be involved in a unilateral military intervention that would run against the spirit of the Kasr-i Sirin treaty of 1639, signed between the Ottomans and the Saffavids in Iran. The frontier delineated by that treaty holds to this day, and the peace the treaty brought to the parties was interrupted only once, early in the eighteenth century.

These challenges suggest that Turkey is facing a major dilemma. On the one hand, a nuclear Iran is clearly a threat and a source of instability. On the other, the imposition of sanctions on Iran, let alone military intervention, would adversely affect Turkish economic and political interests. Turkey's relations with the current American administration would be soured, too, as the government and the public are almost certain not to support such an intervention.

For reasons of political realism Turkey is likely, at the declaratory level, to advocate accepting any decision that the international community reaches through the United Nations Security Council. At the same time, the government will probably look discreetly toward Russia and China to preempt any dramatic decision emerging from the Security Council. Furthermore, the government hopes the European Union will discourage the US from mounting a unilateral military strike and will contribute to efforts to persuade Iran to reach a negotiated settlement to the crisis. Ideally, of course, Turkey, as a country that borders Iran and is starting negotiations for membership, would want the EU to consult more closely with it over Iran.- Published 27/4/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Kemal Kirisci is professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Bogazici University, Istanbul. He holds a Jean Monnet Chair in European Integration and is also the director of the Center for European Studies at the university.

The confrontation between Iran and the United States over Iran's nuclear program is likely to end in US air strikes against Tehran's nuclear facilities.

There is little room for doubt that Iran, despite pro forma denials, is working to develop nuclear weapons and not just nuclear energy. Of course, many people in the Middle East are skeptical of American claims about this because of Iraq. But the answer to this is that while the US was grievously wrong about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, Washington did not lie. After all, it was the US that announced that no WMDs had been found in Iraq. If we were lying, we could have claimed otherwise or even planted things in Iraq once we occupied it.

In the case of Iran, there are several powerful reasons to believe that its nuclear program is intended for weapons:
* After its hand was forced by revelations by an opposition group, the Iranian government confessed that it had filed false reports to the International Atomic Energy Agency for 18 years.
* It still refuses to give the IAEA complete cooperation.
* Iran has stonewalled long, patient European efforts to negotiate an end to the crisis as well as Russia's compromise proposal to enrich nuclear fuel for Iran.
* Some of its acknowledged activities have no technological purpose except for weapons.
* President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad alluded to other Iraqi nuclear programs in a recent speech.
* Iran was involved with the nuclear weapons proliferation activities of the Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan.

The US views Iranian nuclear weapons as especially threatening. Iran is an unusually barbaric regime. It has organized death squads to murder its own dissidents at home. It has sent "hit" teams to murder dissidents abroad. It is the single most active government in the world in funding, supporting and organizing terrorist activity.

Moreover, it is uniquely virulent. Repeatedly, Ahmadinezhad has called for the destruction of Israel. He has also called for the destruction of the United States. Less attention was paid to this, probably because people thought it less likely to be acted upon. But the Iranian regime has sponsored the murder of Americans where it can. Also, "death to America" is the official slogan of that regime, painted on walls and chanted at Friday prayers.

For these reasons, President George W. Bush and members of his administration have said they will not tolerate a nuclear armed Iran. Is this inconsistent, since we do tolerate nuclear weapons in the hands of other states? Only slightly. We have tried to discourage nuclear proliferation everywhere and have been instrumental in persuading several states to abandon their weapons programs. Others we have not been able to stop. But there is no other regime on earth whose conduct so traduces the norms of civilized behavior.

The United States, as everyone knows, finds itself in a great mess in Iraq, where we have made many mistakes and are stretched thinly. For that reason Washington will be reluctant to undertake military action in Iran.

Should Washington go down that route, the US will surely pay a heavy price. By this I do not mean the various ways in which Iran will try to strike back at us in Iraq or Afghanistan or on American soil. I mean we will intensify anti-American feelings that are already far too high in the Middle East and elsewhere. We may also strengthen the Iranian regime. We know its undemocratic rule is quite unpopular in Iran, but people may rally around the regime if we bomb their country.

For all these reasons, Washington has taken a low-key approach, backing the Europeans and even the Russians, hoping that their diplomatic initiatives will work. So far, they have not worked, and their sponsors have undermined themselves. When Javier Solana, the EU leader, declares that the military option against Iran is absolutely "off the table", he is telling Tehran that it need not negotiate in good faith. And when Moscow refuses to support stern sanctions in the Security Council, it is making it more likely that Tehran will continue to brush aside Russia's proposal.

In the end, if Tehran continues its obdurate refusal to back down from its drive for nuclear weapons, I believe the US will act on its own. There is zero possibility of an Iraq-style invasion. But the US could conduct a bombing campaign that would destroy much of Iran's nuclear facilities. We would not have to destroy it all to set back by years Iran's acquisition of "the bomb". Perhaps that would buy enough time for the Iranian people to take their country back from their benighted rulers.- Published 27/4/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Joshua Muravchik is the author of "The Next Founders: Voices of Democracy in the Middle East".